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/ 

7 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Naval Appropriation Bill, 1922 


HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS 
UNITED STATES SENATE 



SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS 

THIRD SESSION 


H. R. 15975 

A BILL MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE NAVAL SERVICE 
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1922, 

AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 


Printed for the use of the Committee on Naval Affairs 


Oft ^ ° 



34772 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
1921 










COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS. 


CARROLL S. PAGE. 
BOISE PENROSE, Pennsylvania. 

HENRY CABOT LODGE, Massachusetts. 
MILES POINDEXTER, Washington. 
FREDERICK HALE, Maine. 

L. HEISLER BALL, Delaware. 

MEDILL McCORMICK, Illinois. 


Vermont, Chairman. 

CLAUDE A. SWANSON, Virginia. 
JOHN WALTER SMITH, Maryland. 
JAMES D. PHELAN, California. 
KEY PITTMAN, Nevada. 

THOMAS J. WALSH, Montana. 
PETER G. GERRY, Rhode Island. 
PARK TRAMMELL, Florida. 
WILLIAM H. KING, Utah. 


TRUMAN H. NEWBERRY, Michigan. 

HENRY W. KEYES, New Hampshire. 

Ei/win A Silsby, Clerk. 


2 




H.EA I 




NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL. 1922 . 


FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1921. 


United States Senate, ' 
Subcommittee of Committee on Naval Affairs, 

Washington , D. C. 

The subcommittee met pursuant to call at 10.30 o’clock a. m., in 
committee room, Capitol, Senator Miles Poindexter, presiding. 

Present: Senators Poindexter (acting chairman), Hale. Ball, 
Keyes, Swanson, Phelan, and Gerry. 

The Chairman. The committee will be in order. The subcom¬ 
mittee will take up the naval bill, and the first proceeding will be 
to have any suggestions there are from the department. If there is 
anyone here representing the department that desires to make sug¬ 
gestions or to be heard in regard to any proposed changes or addi¬ 
tions to the bill as it passed the House we would like to have their evi¬ 
dence and any information they have to give us. We will take the 
bill up from the beginning, and have the hearings, and afterwards 
we will then hold executive sessions and take action on it. 

Admiral Coontz, if you will bring up these matters and direct the 
hearing on the part of the department, we will be obliged to you. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT E. COONTZ, CHIEF OF NAVAL 

OPERATIONS. 

Admiral Coontz. I think I ought to call the attention of the com¬ 
mittee to one thing before we start, Senator. 

The Chairman. Just one moment. Senator Swanson suggests 
that it might be desirable on the part of the heads of the bureaus 
of the Navy to come here in sequence, and not to require them all to 
be present here at one time. 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. The early part of the bill involves 
only the Supply Department and the Chief of the Bureau of Navi¬ 
gation. After that, I believe, next comes Ordnance, Construction 
and Repair, Engineering, Public Works, and Marine Corps. I do 
not believe you will get beyond the Navigation Bureau this morning 
and “ Pay, miscellaneous.” 

The Chairman. With the exception of those representing the 
Bureau of Navigation and Supplies and Accounts, the others will 
be excused, if they desire, until this afternoon. 



4 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Coontz. I was going, first, gentlemen, to call your atten¬ 
tion to the fact that the House bill is apparently framed upon a naval 
authorization of 100,000 men, that all the appropriations are made 
with that in view, and that should be considered as we go along. 

The only other statement I have to make would be that last year’s 
appropriation bill as finally passed was for $435,000,000. Since then 
a deficiency of $61,000,000 has been added to that for this year, mak¬ 
ing $496,000,000. Of that a part was for the increase in the pay of 
officers and men, for which the law was passed but no appropriation 
was made. The appropriation bill as passed in this bill amounts to 
$395,000,000. Therefore there has been an even reduction of 
$100,000,000 over last year’s bill. 

Last year’s bill was based on the agreement that we would carry 
on a Navy of an average strength of 120,000 men, which we have 
done. 

Senator Swanson. Have you ever prepared an estimate both of 
men and ships that you would like to have in the fleet;.that is, with 
the names of the ships and the complements of the men of each one ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. The way we feel, Senator, is that to 
properly carry out the Navy for this coming year we want 120,000 
men. If we were absolutely forced down to the lowest limit and had 
to put out a large number, we would come to 110,000 men. 

Senator Swanson. What I mean is instead of round numbers, I 
have always insisted the number should be specific, and that we re¬ 
quire the submission of the ships that are wanted to have in full 
commission with the complements of men, not in round numbers, but 
the actual number required. Then we get an idea as to what we are 
doing. 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. But instead of to take 110,000 or 120,000 men, 
and then fit them to the ships, the better way is take the ships that 
you think ought to constitute your active Navy, and then furnish the 
men required to equip them in good shape. That is the policy I have 
always thought was wise. 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. We furnished the House Naval Com¬ 
mittee with the ships that we thought should be kept in commission, 
and we showed that we could man those for the coming year with 
120,000 men. 

Senator Swanson. How many did you put in reserve? Have you 
prepared the list? 

The Chairman. Is that the Naval Committee or the Appropria¬ 
tions Committee? 

Admiral Coontz. The Appropriations Committee. 

Senator Swanson. Will you file that in the record here? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. I have prepared three tables here. 

Senator Swanson. I would like to have that. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


5 


(The documents referred to are as follows:) 

Table A. —Detail list of operating forces on basis of 120,000 men in Navy, with 

SO.000 available for seagoing vessels. 

VESSELS IN FULL COMMISSION. 



Origi¬ 

nal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Battleships, iirst line (15): 



Arizona. 

1,006 

1,292 

Arkansas. 

930 

1,354 

California. 

1,340 

1,340 

Delaware. 

999 

1,263 

Idaho. 

1,327 

1,410 

Mississippi. 

1,055 

1,410 

1,393 

New Mexico. 

1,022 

New York. 

962 

1,345 

Nevada. 

969 

1,208 

North Dakota. 

847 

1,217 

Oklahoma. 

969 

1.208 

Pennsylvania. 

951 

1,298 

Tennessee. 

1.345 

1,352 

Texas. 

962 

1,345 

Wyoming. 

910 

1,354 

Total. 

15,594 

19, 789 

Battleships, first line (2) (re- 



duced complements for 
flagship duty other than 
with battleship force): 



Florida. 

845 

900 

Utah. 

845 

900 

Total. 

1,690 

1,800 

Cruisers (miscellaneous) (8): 



Birmingham. 

354 

359 

Charleston. 

653 

392 

Chester. 

354 

358 

Columbia. 

436 

437 

Frederick. 

777 

585 

Rochester. 

.502 

542 

St. Louis. 

653 

392 

Salem. 

354 

357 

Total. 

4,083 

3,422 

Destroyers, first line (122): 



Average complement of 


• 

each. 

114 

114 

Total. 

13,90S 

13,908 

Submarines (87): 

8ft’s,8 K’s,4 L’s, lfiO’s, 
27 R's, 21 S’s, 3 T’s 
(complements from 23 
to 41 depending on 


23-41 

type). 

18-41 

Total. 

2,462 

2,562 

Destroyer tenders (7): 



Black Hawk. 

353 

431 

Bridgeport. 

766 

767 

Buffalo. 

185 

411 

Dixie. 

290 

614 

Melville. 

268 

391 

Panther. 

128 

235 

Prairie. 

268 

449 

Total. 

2,258 

3,298 

Submarine tenders (5): 



Beaver. 

249 

274 

Bushnell. 

156 

201 

Camden. 

395 

304 

Rainbow. 

217 

298 

Savannah. 

376 

337 

Total. 

1,393 

1,414 


No. 


Origi¬ 

nal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

8 

Shore-based submarine ten¬ 
ders (5): 

Fulton (New I ondon).. 

199 

544 


Eagle 17 (Hampton 
Roads) . 

313 

323 


Eagle 31 (Coco Solo)_ 

357 

410 


Alert (San Pedro). 

385 

452 


( hicago (Pearl Harbor).. 

377 

452 


Total. 

1,631 

2,181 

9 

Repair ships (2): 

Prometheus. 

159 

48 


Vestal. 

159 

488 


Tola’.. 

318 

977 

10 

Hospital ships (2): 




Re ief. 

360 

300 


Mercy. 

317 

270 


Tota 1 . 

677 

570 

11 

Storeships (6): 




Bridge. 

150 

212 


■ Ce.tic... 

160 

157 


Culgoa. 

156 

165 


Glacier. 

135 

141 


Pompev. s. 

Rappahannock. 

106 

74 


149 

285 


Total. 

856 

1,034 

12 

Auxiliaries Garget, repair) 




(2): 

Lebanon. 

56 

112 


Nanshaw. 

45 

70 


Total. 

101 

182 

13 

Auxbiarv (radio repair) (1): 




Saturn. 

66 

120 

14 

Aircraft tenders (2): 

Aroostook. 

251 

317 


Shawmut. 

251 

369 


Total. 

502 

686 

15 

Ain raft carrier (1): 



16 

Langley (not yet com¬ 
missioned). 

Mine layers (2): 

Ba timorc. 

282 

322 


San Francisco. 

286 

376 


Total. 

568 

698 

17 

Mine sweepers and fleet tugs 




(35): 

8 fleet tugs, 27 to 56 men, 
depending on type.... 

328 

360 


15 mine sweepers for 
train service, 54 men 
each. 

1,005 

810 


12 mine sweepers for 
mine force, 54 men 
each. 

804 

648 


Total. 

j 2,137 

1,818 

18 

Colliers (9): 

| 



Ajax.. 

90 

06 


Caesar. 

71) 

80 

j 

Jason. 

| 128 

110 
























































































































































6 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Table A. —Detail list of opera tiny forces on basis of 120,000 men in Xa rj/, with 
SO,000 available for seagoing vessels — Continued. 

VESSELS IN FULL COMMISSION—Continued. 


18 Colliers (9)—Continued. 

Mars.... 

Nereus.. 

Neptune.... 

Orion... 

Proteus.. 

Vulcan.. 

Total... 


19 Oilers (11): 

Alameda. 
Arethusa. 
Brazos... 
Cuyama.. 
Kanawha 
Neches... 
Patoka... 
Pecos.... 
Ramapo. 
Sapelo... 
Trinity... 


Total 


20 


Transports and cargo ships 
( 6 ): 

Beaufort. 

Hancock. 

Henderson. 

Houston. 

Kittery. 

Newport News. 


Total. 

21 ! Ammunition ships (2): 

Nitro. 

Pyro. 


Tota’. 

22 Fleet aviation detachment: 

Consists of men of aviation 
ratings and training spe- 
cially assigned in connec¬ 
tion with aviation activi¬ 
ties in the fleet. Does not 
include the operatingcom- 
p ements o; a frera ft tenders. 

23 Flag comp ement: Com¬ 

prises men specially as¬ 
signed to staff duty on 
flagships, signalmen,' yeo¬ 
men, bandsmen, mess at¬ 
tendants, etc. 

24 Patrol craft (19): 

Albany. 


Origi¬ 

nal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

No. 


Origi¬ 

nal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 



24 

Patrol craft (19)—Contd. 



119 

103 


Ashe vice. 

148 

148 

135 

110 


Cleveland. 

279 

289 

148 

110 


Denver. 

279 

292 

139 

110 


Des Moines. 

279 

289 

135 

180 


Do’phin. 

128 

153 

119 

101 


El Cano. 

97 

94 




Helena, 

177 

162 

1,089 

1,000 


Monoeacy. 

46 

48 


New Orleans 

297 

297 




Niagara. 

195 

136 

75 

75 


Palos. 

46 

46 

78 

79 


Pampanga. 

30 

30 

88 

141 


Quiros. 

54 


101 

141 


Sacramento. 

151 

152 

139 

141 


Tacoma. 

279 

289 

138 

145 


Tulsa. 

148 

148 

75 

75 


Viila'.obos. 

54 

55 

141 

141 


Wilmington. 

177 

162 

75 

75 





75 

78 


Tota!. 

3,161 

2,992 

75 

75 




====== 



-•> 

Auxiliaries(surveyships)(2): 



1,060 

1,166 


Hannibal. 

143 

146 

. 



Pa.d iicah 

231 

223 




Total. 

374 

369 

81 

75 





215 

2S9 

26 

Fish Commission ships (2): 



201 

403 


Albatross. 

71 

81 

134 

134 


Fish Hawk. 

44 

44 

77 

97 





75 

120 


Total. 

115 

125 

786 

1,118 

27 

Special duty craft (by sta- 






ti rins) (13): 






Washington (3)— 



219 

219 


Aramis (Sylph). 

33 

47 

219 

219 


Mayflower. 

168 

172 




N nknmis 

57 

57 

438 

438 


Guantanamo (2)— 




M op tcftl pi 

39 

QO 



• 

Oceola. 

26 

ov 

27 




Santo Domingo (2)— 






Despatch. 

39 

47 




Potomac. 

36 

51 




Virgin Islands (2)— 






Tadousac. 

39 

47 




Vixen. 

100 

120 

1,180 

1,180 


Constantinople (1)— 






Scorpion. 

80 

81 




Guam (2)— 






Gulfport. 

68 

76 




Napa. 

39 

39 




Samoa (1): 



0) 

1,111 


Conestoga. 

27 

43 




Total. 

751 

821 

297 

297 






1 Variable. 

































































































































NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Table A.—-Detail list of operating forces on basis of 120,000 men in Navy, with 
80,000 available for seagoing vessels —Continued. 

VESSELS IN RESERVE OR REDUCED COMMISSION. 


No. 


28 


29 


30 


31 


Experimental ship ( 1 ): 

Ohio. 

Battleships, second line (6): 

Connecticut. 

Kansas.... 

Michigan. 

Minnesota. 

New Hampshire. 

South Carolina. 

Total. 

Submarines (22): 

13 in reserve, comprising 
3 D’s, 2 E’s, 7 I/s, 1 M.. 
9 in reserve for training 
submarine crews, com¬ 
prising 2 F’s, 7 N’s 

Total. 

Eagles (19): Held in reserve, 
and used for training re¬ 
servists, tending aviation 
stations, and developing 
antisubmarine tactics, 24 
men each. 


Origi¬ 

nal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

706 

600 

853 

600 

853 

600 

715 

600 

853 

600 

853 

600 

704 

600 

4, 831 

3,600 

282 

39 

204 

90 

486 

129 

1,064 

475 




No. 


32 


33 


Minesweepers (18): Held in 
reserve for upkeep and 
limited training duty, 
these being new ships and 
immediately necessary in 
case of national emergency 
25 men each. 


Destroyers, first line (176): 
Held in reserve for upkeep 
and limited training duty, 
these vessels being modern 
craft, vitally needed for 
immediate service in case 
of national emergency. 
Twenty-five with 49 men 
each 0,000 tonners); 151 
with 57 men each (1,200 
tonners). 


Grand total. 


Origi¬ 

nal 

comple¬ 

ment 


1,206 


19,614 


85,105 


Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 


450 


9,831 


79,864 


Table III. — Operating forces on basis of 120,000 men, with 80,000 available 

for seagoing vessels. 


[To accompany Table A.] 


FULL COMMISSION ON JULY 1, 1921. 


1. 15 battleships, first line (including California) _ 

2. 2 battleships, first line (reduced complements for flagship duty other 

than with battleship force)_____ 

3. 8 cruisers (miscellaneous)_ 

4. 122 destroyers, first line___ 

5. 87 submarines_:_______ 

6. 7 destroyer tenders__i_ 

7. 5 submarine tenders____ 

8. 5 shore-based submarine tenders_ 

9. 2 repair ships__ 

10. 2 hospital ships___ 

11. 6 storeships___ 

12. 2 auxiliaries (target repair)_ 

13. 1 auxiliary (radio repair)_ 

14. 2 aircraft tenders_ 

15. 1 aircraft carrier (not yet commissioned). 

16. 2 mine layers_ 

17. 35 mine sweepers and fleet tugs (12 for use with mine force)_ 

18. 9 colliers__ 

19. 11 oilers_ 

20. 6 transports and cargo ships_ 

21. 2 ammunition ships_ 

22. Fleet aviation detachment_ 

23. Flag complement_i_ 

24. 19 patrol craft--- 

25. 2 auxiliaries (survey ships)- 

26. 2 fish commission ships- 

27. 13 special duty craft (by stations)-— 


19, 789 

1, 800 
3, 422 
13, 908 

2, 562 

3, 298 
1, 414 
2,181 

977 

570 

1, 034 
182 
120 
686 

698 
1, 818 
1,000 
1,166 
1,118 
438 
1,180 
1 , 111 

2, 991 
369 
125 
821 














































































8 NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

RESERVE OR REDUCED COMMISSION ON JULY 1, 1921. 


28. 1 experimental ship (Ohio) _ 600 

29. 6 battleships, second line (for midshipmen’s practice cruise)_ 3,600 

30. 22 submarines (training and reserve complements)__ 129 

31. 19 eagles (25 men each)___ 475 

32. 18 mine sweepers (25 men each)_____ 450 

33. 176 destroyers, first line (50 per cent complements)_ 9,831 


Total____ 79,864 


COMMENT ON TABLE III. 

Above table represents a fairly well-rounded fleet. It does not provide as 
adequately as is desirable for ftew construction due for completion during the 
year and precludes the possibility of our developing destroyer tactics to the 
extent planned with the Navy at full legal strength, 143,000 men. It naturally 
affects the essential shore activities of the Navy, such as aviation and radio 
communication, for which restricted provision only can be made on account of 
the reduction of men from a total of 143,000 to 120,000. It will be necessary to 
place out of commission during the year two battleships, first line, four battle¬ 
ships, second line, and certain cruisers, in order to provide for the two battle¬ 
ships, first line, Maryland and Colorado, and the light cruisers, first line, and 
other vessels now under construction. It will become essential also, during 
the course of the fiscal year, to take over from the builders and man 29 subma¬ 
rines and to provide facilities for these vessels in the shape of tenders to the 
extent of a total personnel of 1,805, for submarines and tenders combined. 
This may force certain destroyers out of commission. 

The following vessels, among many others of a lesser military value, will be 
out of commission at the end of the fiscal year: Two battleships, first line; 17 
battleships, second line; 6 cruisers, second line; 3 light cruisers, second line; 
21 destroyers, second line. 

STATEMENT ON REASON FOR INCREASE OF PRESENT COMPLEMENTS OVER ORIGINAL 

COMPLEMENTS. 

The basic reason for the increase in complements of ships at present over 
original complements lies in the increase of fire control and radio appliances 
and in the lessons of the World War. Battleship radio stations have increased 
from one station to five stations, one of which is a direction finding station, 
which is used to determine the direction from which radio sound waves are 
coming. The development of aviation has required the installation and conse¬ 
quent manning of additional guns on all fighting ships. The lessons of the 
World War taught conclusively that all guns must be manned in battle, in¬ 
cluding the secondary battery guns on both broadsides. (It was customary 
before the war to provide men only for one broadside of the secondary and 
intermediate guns.) Certain of the auxiliary ships are shown with the original 
complements which they had under different operating conditions; for instance, 
the Prometheus and Vestal were originally colliers with a small collier comple¬ 
ment, while now they are fleet-repair ships with a large mechanical force aboard. 
Generally speaking, the increase in complements of auxiliary vessels is due to 
the change in character of the duty which these vessels are performing now as 
compared with their original duty and, where the increase is slight, is due to 
certain new installations, such as additional radio equipment, ice machines, 
antiaircraft guns, etc. 

Table B. —Detail list of operating forces on basis of 110,000 men in Navy, with 
71,000 to 7-),000 available for seagoing vessels. 

Vessels in full commission: Same as in Table A, with following exceptions: 

Yield of 


Placed out of commission : 2 battleships, first line— men. 

Delaware--1, 263 

North Dakota_;_1, 217 


20 destroyers, first line, shown in reserve in Table A, with 49 men each 
aboard-__ 


980 













NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 9 

Reduced from fn 11 commission to reserve status: 42 destroyers, first line, 
shown in full commission in Table A, with 114 men each aboard, and 
reduced to 57 men each_,_,_2, 394 

Net yield---1 5, 854 


Note. —Copy of Table A is attached corrected to show conditions with 74,000 
men on seagoing ships. In case seagoing availables drop to 71,000 or to any 
number seriously below 74,000, additional reserve destroyers will be placed out 
of commission. 

Table II .—Operating force* on basis of 110.000 men. irith 7 1.000 to 7 f /.000 

a railable for seagoing ressels. 

I To accompany Table B.] 

FULL COMMISSION ON JULY 1. H>2 1. 


1. 13 battleships, tirst line (including California) ___17,309 

2. 2 battleships, first line (reduced complements for flagship duty other 

than with battleship force)_ 1,800 

3. 8 cruisers (miscellaneous)___ 3,422 

4. 80 destroyers, first line_____ 9,120 

5. 87 submarines_ 2.562 

6. 7 destroyer tenders_1___ 3, 298 

7. 5 submarine tenders_i__•___;_ 1.414 

8. 5 shore-based submarine tenders_ 2,181 

9. 2 repair ships_ 977 

10. 2 hospital ships_'_ 570 

11. 6 storesliips_____ 1,034 

12. 2 auxiliaries (target repair)____ 182 

13. 1 auxiliary (radio repair)_-____ 120 

14. 2 aircraft tenders_ 686 

15. 1 aircraft carrier (not yet commissioned). 

16. 2 mine layers_ 698 

17. 35 mine sweepers and tleet tugs (12 for use with mine force)_ 1,818 

18. 9 colliers_ 1,000 

19. 11 oilers_*_ 1,166 

20. 6 transports and cargo ships_ 1,118 

21. 2 ammunition ships_ 438 

22. Fleet aviation detachment_ 1,180 

23. Flag complement_ 1,111 

24. 19 patrol craft_ 2,991 

25. 2 auxiliaries (survey ships)_ 369 

26. 2 fish commission ships_ 125 

27. 13 special duty craft (by stations)_ *21 

RESERVE OR REDUCED COM MISS-ION ON JULY 1. lt»21. 

28. 1 experimental ship (Ohio) _ 600 

29. 6 battleships, second line (for midshipmen’s practice cruise)_ 3, 600 

30. 22 submarines (training and reserve complements)_ 129 

31. 19 eagles (25 men each)_i_ 475 

32. 18 mine sweepers (25 men each)_ 450 

33. 198 destroyers, first line (50 per cent complements)_11.245 


Total_ y _74,010 


COMMENT ON TABLE II. 

Above table contemplates as out of commission the following valuable units: 
Two battleships, first line; 20 destroyers, first line. 

The same comment as before obtains as to vessels out of commission being 
subject to a certain measure of deterioration which it is not possible to control. 
The placing of new destroyers out of commission can not be justified on the score 
of economy. * 







































10 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


The reason for the variation in seagoing availables between 71,000 and 74,000 
flows from the same set of causes that act to reduce the seagoing availables on 
a total of 100,000 men to 60,000, instead of 66,000, which it would normally be. 
In other words, steps for obtaining normal replacements of men, due to discharge, 
etc., must be held back prior to the beginning of the approaching fiscal year, and 
there will thus be an initial drop to about 71,000 during the first four months of 
the year, from which there is calculated there will be a slow recovery until the 
seagoing personnel at the end of the year will number about 74,000. The tem¬ 
porary reduction to 71,000 will be accomplished by placing a sufficient number of 
reserve destroyers out of commission. It has been found, disadvantageous to 
retain destroyers in commission with less than 50 per cent complements, unless 
there is some assurance of obtaining additional personnel for them within a 
reasonable period. 

[Modified to show Table B conditions.] 

Table A. —Detail list of operating forces on basis of 110,000 men in Navy, with 

7If,000 available for seagoing vessels. 

VESSELS IN FULL COMMISSION. 


Item. 

Original 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

No. 

Battleships, first line (15): 
Arizona. 

1,006 

1,292 

6 

Arkansas.. 

930 

1,354 


California. 

1,340 

1,340 


Idaho. 

1,327 

1,410 


Mississippi. 

1,055 

1,410 


New Mexico. 

1,022 

1,393 


New York. 

962 

1,345 


Nevada. 

969 

1,208 

/ 

Oklahoma. 

969 

1,208 


Pennsylvania. 

951 

1,29S 


Tennessee. 

1, 345 

1,352 


Texas. 

962 

1, 345 


Wyoming. 

910 

1,354 

1 

Total. 

15, 594 

17, 309 


Battleships, first line (2) (re- 



8 

duced complements for 
flagship duty other than 
with battleship force): 




Florida. 

845 

900 


Utah. 

815 

900 


Total. 

1,690 

1,800 


Cruisers (miscellaneous (8): 




Birmingham. 

354 

359 


Charleston. 

653 

392 

9 

Chester. 

354 

358 


Columbia. 

436 

437 


Frederick. 

777 

‘ 585 


Rochester. 

502 

542 


St. Louis. 

653 

392 


Salem. 

354 

357 

10 

Total. 

4,083 

3, 422 


Destroyers, first line (80), 
average complement of 




each. 

114 

114 

11 

Total. 

13,908 

9,120 


Submarines (87): 

8 IDs, 8 K’s, 4 L ’s, 16 
O’s, 27 R’s, 21 S’s, 3 
T’s, complements 23 
to 41 depending on 




type. 

18-41 

23-41 


Total. 

2,462 

2,562 

12 

Destroyer tenders (7): 




Black Hawk. 

353 

431 


Bridgeport. 

766 

767 


Buffalo. 

185 

411 



Item. 

| 

Original Present 
comple-jcomple- 
ment. | ment. 

Destroyer tenders (7)—con. 



Dixie. 

290 

614 

Melville. 

268 

391 

Panther. 

128 

235 

Prairie. 

268 

449 

Total. 

2,258 

3,298 

Submarine tenders (5): 



Beaver. 

249 

274 

Bushnell. 

156 

201 

Camden. 

395 

304 

Rainbow. 

217 

298 

Savannah. 

376 

337 

Total. 

1,393 

1,414 

Shore-based submarine 



tenders (5): 



Fulton (New London).. 

199 

544 

Eagle 17 (Hampton 



Roads). 

313 

323 

Eagle 31 (Coco Solo)... 

357 

410 

Alert (San Pedro). 

385 

452 

Chicago (Pearl Harbor). 

377 

452 

Total-. .. 

1,631 

2,181 

Repair ships (2): 



Prometheus. 

159 

489 

Vestal. 

159 

488 

Total. 

318 

977 

Hospital ships (2): 



Relief. 

360 

300 

Mercy. 

317 

270 

Total. 

677 

570 

Storeships (6): 



Bridge. 

150 

212 

Celtic. 

160 

157 

Culgoa. 

156 

165 

Glacier. 

135 

141 

Pompei. 

106 

74 

Rappahannock. 

149 

285 

Total. 

856 

1,034 

Auxiliaries (target repair) 
(2): 



Lebanon. 

56 

112 

Nanshaw. 

45 

70 

Total. 

101 

182 




































































































































11 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Table A. —Detail lint of operating forces on basis of 110,000 men iu Nary, with 
7 'i,000 a callable for seagoing vessels. —Continued. 

VESSELS IN FULL COMMISSION—Continued. 


Item. 

Original 
comple¬ 
ment.. I 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

: Auxiliary (radio repair) (1): 
Saturn. 

66 

120 


Aircraft tenders (2): 

Aroostook. 

251 

317 

Shawmut. 

251 i 

369 




Total. 

502 | 

686 



Aircraft carrier (1): Langley 
(not yet commissioned).' 
Mine layers (2): 

Baltimore. 

282 

322 

San Francisco. 

286 

376 



Total.•. 

568 

698 



Mine sweepers and fleet tugs 

1 (35): 

S fleet, tugs, 27 to 56 men, 
depending on type.... 

15 mine sweepers for 
train service, 54 men 
each. 

328 

1,005 

360 

810 

12 mine sweepers for 
mine force, 54 men 
each. 

804 

64S 




Total. 

2,137 

1,818 



Colliers (9): 

Ajax. 

90 

96 

Caesar. 

70 

80 

Jason. 

128 

110 

Mars. 

119 

103 

Nereus. 

135 

110 

Neptune. 

148 

110 

Orion. 

139 

110 

Proteus. 

135 

180 

Vulcan. 

119 

101 




Total. 

1,089 

l, 000 



Oilers (11): 

Alameda. 

75 

75 

Arcthusa. 

78 

79 

Brazes. 

88 

141 

Cuyama. 

101 

141 

Kanawha. 

139 

141 

Neches. 

138 

145 

Patoka. 

75 

75 

Pecos. 

141 

141 

Ramaoo. 

75 

75 

fiauelo. 

75 

78 

Trinity. 

75 

75 




Total. 

1,060 

1,166 



Transports and cargo ships 
(61: 

Beaufort. 

81 

75 

Hancock. 

215 

289 

Henderson. 

201 

403 

Houston. 

134 

134 

Kittery. 

77 

97 

Newport News. 

75 

120 




Total. 

786 

1,118 



: Ammunition ships (2): 

Nit.ro . 

219 

219 

P vTO . 

219 

219 




Total . 

438 

438 








Item. 

Original 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Presen 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Fleet aviation detachment: 
Consist s of men of aviation 
ratings and training spe¬ 
cially assigned in connec¬ 
tion with aviation activi¬ 
ties in the fleet. Does 
not include the operating 
complements of aircraft 
tenders. 

1,180 

1,180 

Flag complement: Com¬ 
prises men specially as¬ 
signed to staff duty on 
flagships, signalmen,' yeo¬ 
men, bandsmen, mess 
attendants, etc. 

C 1 ) 

1,111 

Patrol craft (19): 

Albany. 

297 

297 

Asheville. 

148 

148 

Cleveland. 

279 

289 

Denver. 

279 

292 

Dos Moines. 

279 

289 

Dolphin. 

128 

153 

El Cano. 

97 

94 

Helena. 

177 

162 

Monocacv. 

46 

46 

New Orleans. 

297 

297 

Niagara. 

195 

136 

Palos. 

46 

46 

Pampanga. 

30 

30 

Quiros. 

54 

55 

Sacramento. 

151 

152 

Tacoma. 

279 

289 

Tulsa. 

148 

148 

Villalobos. 

54 

0«> 

Wilmington. 

177 

162 

Total. 

3,161 

2,992 

Auxiliaries (survey ships) 
(2): 

Hannibal. 

143 

146 

Paducah. 

231 

223 

Total. 

374 

369 

Fish commission ships (2): 
Albatross. 

71 

81 

Fish Hawk. 

44 

44 

Total. 

115 

125 

Special-duty craft (by sta- 



tions) (13): 

Washington (3)— 

Aramis (Sylph). 

33 

47 

Mayflower. 

168 

172 

Nokomis. 

57 

57 

Guantanamo (2)— 

Montcalm. 

39 

39 

Osceola. 

26 

27 

Santo Domingo (2)— 
Despatch. 

39 

47 

Potomac. 

36 

51 

Virginlslands (2)— 
Tadousac.. 

39 

47 

Vixen. 

100 

120 

Constantinople (1)— 
Scorpion. 

80 

84 

Guam (2)— 

Gulfport. 

68 

76 

Napa.. 

39 

39 

Samoa (1)—Conestoga.. 

27 

43 

Total. 

751 

821 


1 Variable. 




















































































































































12 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1022. 


Table A. —Detail list of operating forces on basis of 110,000 men in Nary, wit l, 
l.'/.OOO available for seagoing vessels —Continued. 

VESSELS IN RESERVE OR REDUCED COMMISSION. 


Item. 

Original 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Experimental ship (1): 
Ohio. 

706 

600 

Battleships, second line (0): 
Connecticut. 

853 

600 

Kansas. 

853 

600 

Michigan. 

715 

600 

Minnesota. 

853 

600 

New Hampshire. 

853 

600 

South Carolina. 

701 

600 

Total. 

4, 831 

3,600 

Submarines (22): 

13in reserve, comprising 

3 D’s, 2 E's, 7 L’s, 1 M. 
9 in resene for training 
submarine crews, com¬ 
prising 2 F’s, 7 N’s.... 

282 

39 

201 

90 

Total. 

•186 

129 

Eagles (19): Held in reserve 
and used for training re¬ 
servists, tending aviation 
stations, and developing 
antisubmarine tactics, 21 



men each. 

1,064 

475 


No. 

Item. 

Original 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

32 

Minesweepers (18): Held in 
reserve for upkeep and 
limited training duty, 
these being new ships 
and immediately neces¬ 
sary in case of national 
emergency, 25 men each... 

1,206 

450 

33 

Destroyers, first line (19S): 
Held in reserve for up¬ 
keep and limited training 
duty, these vessels being 
modern craft, vitally 
[ needed for immediate 
service in case of national 
emergency. Five with 49 
men each' (1,000 tminers): 
193 with 57 men each 
(1,200 tonners). 

Total.. 

19,614 

11,245 

. 

i 

Grand total. 

85,105 

74, 010 


Table C .—Detail list of operating forces on basis of 100,000 men in Navy, with 

60,000 available for seagoing vessels. 

Vessels in full commission: Same as in Table A, with following exceptions— 


Placed out of commission: 

2 Battleships, first line— Yield of men. 

Delaware _ 1,263 

North Dakota _ 1. 217 

3 Light cruisers, second line— 

Birmingham _ 359 

Chester ___ 358 

Salem _._ 357 

4 Destroyer tenders— 

Buffalo _ 411 

Dixie ___:_ 614 

Panther ___ 235 

Prairie _ 449 

218 destroyers, first line, includes 42 destroyers shown in Table A 

in full commission and 176 destroyers shown in reserve_14, 619 


Net yield_____19, 882 


Note. —Copy of Table A is attached corrected to show conditions with 60,000 
men on seagoing ships. In case seagoing availables increase above 60,000 in 
sufficient number to afford a surplus after manning the Maryland and other new 
construction, certain destroyers will be commissioned in reserve, as there is 
vital reason for keeping as many destroyers as possible in material condition 
for immediate service in case of national emergency. 

[To accompany Table C.] 

Subject : Reduction of enlisted personnel. 

1. The Bureau of Navigation has determined by close analysis of probable 
discharges, enlistments, reenlistments, etc., that it is possible to reduce the 
Navy to 100,000 men by July 1, 1921, and to have 75,000 of these men at sea, 
but since there are at present no men being accepted for enlistment, and as 

























































NAVAL APPROPRIATION RILL, 1922. 


13 


ree n list men ts have fallen off to a marked extent, the Bureau of Navigation 
has found that it will be impossible to maintain the 75,000 men at sea during 
the course of the fiscal year. This condition appears to be caused mainly by a 
large number of short-term enlistments (enlistments for a period of less than 
four years), which has resulted in so affecting the present enlisted personnel 
of the Navy as to require the discharge of about 20,000 men during the first 
four months of the approaching fiscal year, due to expiration of enlistments 
alone. The normal annual turnover in a Navy of 100,000 men on a four-year 
enlistment would be 25,000, on the basis of expirations of enlistment, but sta¬ 
tistics show that there will be actually discharged through expiration of enlist¬ 
ment during the coining fiscal year 43,123 men. In addition the Navy will lose 
through death, desertion, medical discharges, etc., several thousand men, which 
will result in a total estimated loss of between 50,000 and 60,000 men during the 
coming fiscal year. Past statistics show that this estimate is most conservative, 
and the total wastage may run much higher if the figures derived from the 
statistics of the first seven months of 1920 are to be trusted. 

2. The net result of the new calculations made by the Bureau of Navigation 
indicate that the number of men available for seagoing ships will fall very 
rapidly during the beginning of tbe next fiscal year to about 60.000 men, from 
which figure the seagoing availables will gradually build up to about 66,000 
toward the extreme end of the fiscal year. At no time during the coming fiscal 
year can 75,000 men be maintained at sea except at the very beginning of the 
year. These statistics, lately compiled by the Bureau of Navigation, have made 
necessary a revision of the table of ships which can be kept in commission, and 
there have been prepared three tables showing the operating forces on a basis, 
first, of 60,000 men on seagoing vessels: second, of 71,000 to 74,000 men on sea¬ 
going vessels; and third, of SO,000 men on seagoing vessels, 

O pern ting forces on basis of 100,000 men, irith 60,000 men on seagoing vessels. 

FULL COMMISSION ON JULY 1, 1921. 


1. 13 battleships, first line (including California) __17,309 

2. 2 battleships, first line (reduced complements for flagship duty 

other than with battleship force)_ 1,800 

2. 2 cruisers (miscellaneous)___ 2,348 

4. 80 destroyers, first line___ 9,120 

5. 87 submarines___ 2,562 

6. 3 destroyer tenders__ 1, 589 

7. 5 submarine tenders_ 1, 414 

8. 5 shore-based submarine tenders_ 2,181 

9 2 repair ships_ 977 

10. 2 hospital ships_ 570 

11. 6 storeships_ 1,034 

12. 2 auxiliaries (target repair)_ 182 

13. 1 auxiliary (radio repair)_ 120 

14. 2 aircraft tenders_:_ 686 

15. 1 aircraft carrier (not yet commissioned). 

16. 2 mine layers_ 698 

17. 35 mine sweepers and fleet tugs (12 for use with mine force)_ 1,818 

18. 9 colliers_ 1, 000 

19. 11 oilers_ 1,166 

20. 6 transports and cargo ships_ 1,118 

21. 2 ammunition ships_ 438 

22. Fleet aviation detachment_ 1,180 

23. Flag complement_ 1, 111 

24. 19 patrol craft__ 2 991 

25. 2 auxiliaries (survey ships)_ 369 

26. 2 fish commission ships_ 125 

27. 13 special-duty craft (by stations)_ 821 

RESERVE OR REDUCED COMMISSION ON JULY 1, 1921. 

28. 1 experimental ship (Ohio) - 600 

29. 6 battleships, second line (for midshipmen’s practice cruise)_ 3,600 

30. 22 submarines (training and reserve complements)_ 129 

31. 19 eagles (25 men each)_ 475 

32. 18 mine sweepers (25 men each)_ 450 


Total_ 59,982 


































14 


: 

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


COMMENT ON TABI.E 1. 

Above table contemplates as out of commission tlie following valuable units: 
2 battleships, lirst line; 3 light cruisers; 218 destroyers, first line; 3 destroyer 
tenders. 

While effort is made to maintain vessels out of commission in satisfactory 
condition, it must be recognized that such vessels are subject to rapid de¬ 
terioration, and the keeping out of commission of so large a number of prac¬ 
tically new destroyers, with the strain it will place on navy yard facilities, 
can be regarded as little less than disastrous to the material efficiency of the 
vessels. As men are obtained, as many of these destroyers as possible will be 
recommissioned in reserve with half-complements on board. All told, they re¬ 
quire for maintenance in reserve, with 50 per cent complements, a total of 
12,225 men. 

It is believed we may count on about 66,000 men being available for sea¬ 
going vessels toward the end of the approaching fiscal year, when men begin 
to be received from the training stations in excess of men discharged. As the 
year advances, the above table of ships changes as new construction is added 
to the Navy, mainly through the addition of one (possibly two) battleships, 
first line— Maryland, Colorado —and certain light cruisers and submarines. 
These additions will be met by placing out of commission certain battleships, 
second line, after the conclusion of this year’s midshipmen’s practice cruise 
and certain miscellaneous cruisers, as required by the completion of vessels 
through the year. 

Table A. —Detail list of operating forces on basis of 100,000 men in Navy, irith 

60,000 available for seagoing vessels. 

(Modified to show table C conditions.] 

VESSELS IN FULL COMMISSION. 



Orig¬ 

inal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Battleships, first line (15): 
Arizona. 

1,006 

1,292 

Arkansas. 

930 

1,354 

California. 

1,340 

1,340 

Idaho. 

1,327 

1,410 

Mississippi. 

1,055 

1, 410 

New Mexico. 

1,022 

1,393 

New York. 

962 

1,345 

Nevada. 

969 

1,208 

Oklahoma. 

969 

1,208 

Pennsylvania. 

951 

1,298 

Tennessee. 

1,345 

1,352 

Texas. 

962 

1,345 

Wyoming. 

910 

1,354 

Total. 

15,594 

17,309 

Battleships, first line (2) (re- 



duced complements for 



flagship duty other than 
with battleship force): 



Florida. 

845 

900 

Utah. 

845 

900 

Total. 

1,690 

1,800 

Cruisers, miscellaneous (8): 
Charleston. 

653 

392 

Columbia. 

436 

437 

Frederick. 

777 

585 

Rochester. 

502 

542 

St. Louis. 

653 

392 

Total. 

4,083 

2,348 

Destroyers, first line (80): 
Average complement of 



each. 

114 

114 

Total. 

13,908 

9,120 



Orig¬ 

inal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Submarines (87): 

8 H’s, 8 K’s, 4 L’s, 16 O’s, 
27 R’s, 21 S’s, 3 T’s 
(complements from 23 
to 4i, depending on 
type). 

18-41 

23-41 

Total. 

2,462 

2,562 

Destroyer tenders (7): 

Black Hawk. 

353 

431 

Bridgeport. 

766 

767 

Melville. 

268 

391 

Total. 

2,258 

1,589 

Submarine tenders (5): 



Beaver. 

249 

274 

Bushnell. 

156 

201 

Camden. 

395 

304 

Rainbow. 

217 

298 

Savannah. 

376 

33 / 

Total. 

1,393 

1,414 

} Shore-based submarine ten¬ 
ders (5): 

Fulton (New London).. 

199 

544 

Eagle 17 (Hampton 
Roads). 

313 

323 

Fagie 31 (Coco Solo). 

357 

410 

Alert (San Pedro). 

385 

452 

Chicago (Pearl Harbor).. 

377 

452 

Total. 

1,631 

2,181 





























































































15 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1022. 


Table A. —Detail list of operating forces on basis of 100,000 men in Karp. Kith 
60,000 available for seagoing vessels. —Continued. 


VESSELS IN FULL COMMISSION—Continued. 

' ' • * '• 


No. 

• - > T 

Orig¬ 

inal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

9 

Repair ships (2): 

Prometheus. 

159 

489 


Vestal. 

159 

488 


Total. 

318 

977 

10 

Hospital ships (2): 

Relief. 

360 

300 


Mercy. 

317 

270 


Total. 

677 

570 

11 

Storcships (6): 




Bridge. 

1.50 

212 


Celtic. 

160 

157 1 


Culgoa. 

156 

165 


Glacier. 

136 

141 


Pompev. 

106 

74 


Rappanannock. 

149 

285 


Total. 

856 

1,034 

12 

Auxiliaries (target repair)(2): 




Lebanon. 

56 

112 


Nanshaw. 

45 

70 


Total. 

101 

182 

13 

Auxiliary (radio'repair) (1), 




Saturn. 

66 

120 

14 

Aircraft tenders (2): 

Aroostook... 

251 

317 


Shawmut. 

251 

369 


Total. 

,502 

686 

15 

Aircraft carrier (1), Langlev 



16 

(not yet commissioned). 
Mine layers (2): 

Baltimore. 

282 

322 


San Francisco. 

286 

376 | 


Total. 

568 

698 

17 

Mine sweepers and fleet 




tugs (35): 

8 fleet tugs, 27 to 56 men, 
depending on type.... 

328 

360 


15 mine sweepers for 
train service, 54 men 
each. 

1,005 

810 


12 mine sweepeis fer 
mine force, 54 men 
each. 

804 

648 


Total. 

2,137 

1,818 

18 

Colliers (9): 

Ajax. 

96 

96 


Caesar. 

70 

80 


.J ason. 

128 

110 


Mars. . 

119 

103 


Nereus. 

135 

110 


Neptune. 

Orion. 

148 

139 

110 

110 


Proteus. 

135 

180 


Vulcan. 

119 

101 


Total. 

1,089 

1,000 

19 

Oilers (11): 

Alameda. 

75 

- | 

75 | 


Aret husa. 

78 

79 


Brazes. 

88 

141 | 


Oilers (11) Continued. 

Cuyama. 

Kanawha.. 

Neches.. 

Potoka.. 

Pecos. 

Ramapo. 

Sapelo.. 

Trinity. 


Total. 

Transports and cargo ships 
( 6 ): 

Beaufort. 

Hancock. 

Henderson. 

Houston. 

Kittery.. 

Newport News. 

Total. 

Ammunition ships (2): 

Nitro. 

Pyro. 

Total. 

Fleet Aviation Detachment: 
Consists of men of aviation 
ratings and training spe¬ 
cially assigned in connec¬ 
tion'with aviation activi¬ 
ties in the fleet. Does not 
include the operating com¬ 
plements of aircraft ten¬ 
ders. 

Flag complement: Comprises 
men specially assigned to 
staff duty on flagships, 
signalmen, yoemen, bands¬ 
men, mess attendants, etc.. 

Patrol craft (19): 

Albany... 

Asheville. 

Cleveland. 

Denver. 

Des Moines. 

Dolphin. 

El Cano. 

Helena. 

Monocacy. 

New Orleans. 

Niagara... 

Palos.... 

Pampanga. 

Quiros. 

Sacramento. 

Tacoma... 

Tulsa. 

Villalobos. 

Wilmington. 

Total. 

Auxiliaries, survey ships (2): 

Hannibal.. 

Paducah. 

Total. 


Orig¬ 

inal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

101 

141 

139 

141 

138 

145 

75 

75 

141 

111 

75 

75 

75 

78 

75 

75 

1,060 

1,166 

81 

75 

215 

289 

201 

403 

134 

134 

77 

97 

75 

120 


786 1,11,8 


219 ! 219 

219 219 

438 438 


1,180 1,180 




0 ) 1,111 


297 

297 

148 

148 

279 

289 

279 

292 

279 

289 

128 

153 

97 

94 

177 

162 

46 

46 

297 

297 

195 

136 

46 

46 

30 

30 

54 

55 

151 

152 

279 

289 

148 

148 

54 

55 

177 

162 

3,161 

2,992 

143 

146 

231 

223 

374 

369 








































































































































































16 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Table A. —Detail list of operating forces on basis of 100,000 men in Nary, with 
(10,000 avainable for seagoing vessels —^Continued. 

VESSELS IN FULL COMMISSION—Continued. 


No. 


Orig¬ 

inal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

2G 

Fish commission ships (2): 




Albatross. 

71 

81 


Fish Hawk. 

44 

44 


Total. 

115 

125 

27 

Special duty craft, by sta¬ 
tions (13): 

Washington (3)— 

Aramis (Sylph). 

33 

47 


Mayflower. 

168 

172 


Nokomis. 

57 

57 


Guantanamo (2)— 

Montcalm. 

39 

39 


Oceola. 

26 

27 


No. 

* 

Orig¬ 

inal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

27 

Special duty craft, etc.—Con. 
Santo Domingo (2)— 
Despatch. 

39 

47 


Potomac. 

36 

51 


Virgin Islands (2)— 

Tadousac. 

39 

47 


Vixen. 

100 

120 


Constantinople (1): 
Scorpion. 

* 80 

84 


Guam (2)— 

Gulfport. 

68 

76 


Napa. 

39 

39 


Samoa (1): Conestoga.... 

27 

43 


Total. 

751 

821 


VESSELS IN RESERVE OR REDUCED COMMISSION. 


28 

Experimental ship (1): Ohio 

706 

600 


Eagles (19): Held in reserve, 







31 

and used for training reser- 



29 

Battleship, second line (6): 




vists, tending aviation 



- 

Connecticut. 

853 

600 


stations, and developing 




Kansas. 

853 

600 


antisubmarine tactics, 24 




Michigan. 

715 

600 


men each. 

1,064 

475 


AT i n n 

853 

600 






New Hampshire. 

853 

600 


Mine sweepers (18): Held in 




South Carolina. 

704 

600 

32 

reserve for upkeep and 

* 







limited training duty, 




Total. 

4,831 

3,600 


these being new ships and 








immediately necessary in 



30 

Submarines (22): 




case of national emergency, 




13 in reserve, comprising 




25 men each. 

1,206 

450 


3 D’s 2 E’s 7 LN 1 M 

282 

39 




_ 


9 in reserve for training 


Grand total. 

85,105 

59,982 


submarine crews, com- 








prising 2 F’s, 7 N’s.... 

204 

90 






Total. 

486 

129 






Table D .—Detail list of operating forces on basis of lJ/3,000 men in Navy with 
86.000 available for seagoing vessels on .July 1, 1921. 

Vessels in full commission. —Same as in Table A, with following exceptions: 

Increase. 

Placed in full commission from reduced commission: 

2 battleships, first line— 

Florida _*_ 

Utah __ 

Placed in full commission: 

2 cruisers, second line— 

Pittsburgh __ 

Huron _ 

22 destroyers, first line, shown in reserve in Table A with 57 men 

each aboard_ 

12 mine sweepers, shown in reserve in Table A with 25 men each 
aboard__ 

3 colliers— 

Aba rend a _ 

Brutus _I_ 

Nero __ 


248 

250 


811 

791 

1, 471 

348 


83 

70 




























































































NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 17 

Placed in full comnUssion—continued: 

3 oilers— 

Maumee _$__ _ 125 

R. L. Barnes __ 52 

Sara Thompson __ 54 

3 transports and cargo ships— 

Bath _.._ 77 

General Alara _ l _ 4 _ 88 

Pensacola __u_:_ 83 

2 patrol craft— 

Chattanooga _._ i. _ 292 

Galveston _ 289 

2 auxiliaries (survey ships) — 

Dubuque _ 148 

Leonidas _i_ 284 

Placed in commission in reserve: 

2 hospital ships— 

Comfort _ 163 

Solace _;_:__ 143 


Net increase____5, 947 

Note. —Copy of Table A is attached corrected to show conditions with 86,000 
men on seagoing ships on July 1, 192L The 7,000 men who will become avail¬ 
able for sea duty during the fiscal year will be required as follows: 

10 light cruisers__1__ 3, 300 

29 submarines__ 1, 015 

1 destroyer tender_._ ___2_ _ 318 

2 submarine tenders_ 790 

1 repair ship_ 308 

1 airplane carrier_ j._ 275 

Fleet aviation (increase)_ 992 


Total_6.998 

Table IV (to accompany Table D).— Operating forces on basis of V/3,000 men, 
with 93,000 available for sea-going vessels, of whom 86,000 may be considered 
available on duly 1, 1921. 

FULL COMMISSION ON JULY 1, 1921. 

L 17 battleships, first line (including California ) _ 22,087 

2. 2 cruisers, second line (flagship duty)___ 1,602 

3. 8 cruisers (miscellaneous)_ 3,422 

4. 144 destroyers, first line_16,466 

5. 87 submarines--- 2,562 

6. 7 destroyer tenders_ 3, 298 

7. 5 submarine tenders_ 1, 414 

8. 5 shore-based submarine tenders_ 2,181 

9. 2 repair ships_ 977 

10. 2 hospital ships_ 570 

11. 6 storeships_ 1,034 

12. 2 auxiliaries (target repair)_ 182 

13. 1 auxiliary (radio repair)_ 120 

14. 2 aircraft tenders- 686 

15. 1 aircraft carrier (not yet commissioned)_ 

16. 2 mine layers_ 698 

17. 47 mine sweepers and Meet tugs (24 for use with mine force)_ 2,456 

18. 12 colliers_ 1,230 

19. 13 oilers_ 1,397 

20. 9 transports and cargo ships_ 1, 366 

21. 2 ammunition ships_ 438 

22. Fleet aviation detachment_ 1,180 

23. Flag complement__ 1, 111 

24. 21 patrol craft__ 3, 720 

25. 4 auxiliaries (survey ships)_ 801 

26. 2 fish commission ships_ 125 

27. 13 special duty craft (by stations)_ 821 

34772—21-2 




















































18 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922 


RESERVE OR REDUCED COMMISSION ON JULY 1, 1921. 


28. 1 experimental ship (Ohio) __ 600 

29. 6 battleships, second line (for midshipmen’s practice cruise)--— 3,600 

30. 22 submarines (training and reserve complements)-_ 129 

31. 19 eagles (25 men each)___ 475 

32. G mine sweepers (30 men each)_ 180 

33. 154 destroyers, first line (50 per cent, complements)_ 8,577 

34. 2 hospital ships (45 per cent complements)_ 306 


Total_ 

COMMENT ON TABLE IV. 


85, 811 


Above table represents the vessels which may be manned and which it is- 
desird to man in accordance with existing plans on July 1, 1921. The table 
is conditioned on the Navy not being at its full strength at the beginning of 
the fiscal year, or, if at full strength numerically, the large number of new 
recruits will be unavailable for sea duty until their training period is completed. 

The 7,000 men who will become available for sea duty during the fiscal year 
will be required as follows: 


10 light cruisers_ 

29 submarines_ 

1 destroyer tender_ 

2 submarine tenders_ 

1 repair ship_ 

1 airplane carrier_ 

Fleet aviation (increase) 


3, 300 
1,015 
318 
790 
308 
275 
992 


Total_^___ G, 998 

The following vessels, among many others of a lesser military value, will be 
out of commission at the end of the fiscal year: Seventeen battleships, second 
line; G cruisers, second line; 3 light cruisers, second line; 21 destroyers, second 

line. 


Table A. —Detail list of opera tin ft forces on basis of 143,000 men in Navy , with 
86,000 available for seagoing vessels on July 7, 1021. 


[Modified to show table D conditions.] 
VESSELS IN FULL COMMISSION. 



Orig¬ 

inal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Battleships, first line (15): 
Arizona. 

1,006 

1,292 

Arkansas. 

'930 

\, 354 

California. 

1,340 

1,340 

Delaware. 

999 

1,263 

Florida. 

l' 148 

Idaho. 

1,327 

1,410 

Mississippi. 

1,055 

l' 410 

New Mexico. 

l’ 022 

1, 393 

New York. 

'962 

1,345 

Nevada. 

969 

1, 208 

North Dakota.... 

347 

1,217 

Oklahoma. 

969 

l' 208 

Pennsylvania. 

951 

1, 298 

Tennessee. 

1,345 

1,352 

Texas . 

'962 

11 345 

Utah. 

l' 150 

Wyoming. 

910 

1, 354 


Total. 

15,594 

22,087 



No. 


Orig¬ 

inal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment 

2 

Cruisers, second line (2) (for 
flagship duty): 

Pittsburgh. 

777 

811 


Huron. 

777 

791 


Total. 

1,554 

1,602 

3 

Cruisers (miscellaneous) (8): 
Birmingham. 

354 

359 


Charleston. 

6,53 

392 


Chester. 

354 

3.58 


Columbia. 

436 

437 


Frederick. 

777 

585 


Rochester. 

502 

542 


St. Louis. 

653 

392 


Salem. 

3.54 

357 


Total. 

4,083 

3,422 








































































NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


19 


Tahle A. —Detail list of operation forces on basis of 143,000 men in Nary, v ith 
86,000 available for seagoing vessels on July 1, 1021 —Continued. 

VESSELS IN FULL COMMISSION—Continued. 


, 

Orig¬ 
inal c 
comple¬ 
ment. 

Present 

omple- 

ment. 

No. 


! Orig¬ 
inal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

compleT 

ment. 

Destroyers, first line (144); 



14 

Aircraft tenders (2): 



Average complement of 




A roostook. 

251 

317 

each. 

114 

114 


Shawm ut 

251 

369 






Total. 


16, 466 


Total 

502 

686 







Submarines (87); 8 H’s, 8 



15 

Aircraft carrier (1): Langley 


j 

K’s, 4 L’s, 10 O’s, 27 It’s, 




(not vet commissioned). 



21 S’s, 3 T’s. Complements 



16 

Mine layers (2): 



from 23 to 41, depending on 




Baltimore. 

282 

322 

type. 

10-41 

23-41 


San FranHsen 

“'86 

376 








Total. 

2,462 

2,562 


Total 

.568 

698 







Destroyer tenders (7): 



17 

Mine sweepers and fleet tugs 



Black Hawk. 

355 

431 


(147): 



Bridgeport. 

766 

767 


8 fleet tugs, 27 to 56 men, 



Buffalo. 

185 

411 


depending on type_ 

328 

360 

Dixie. 

290 

614 


15 mine sweepers for trai 



Melville. 

268 

391 


service, 54 men each... 

1,005 

810 

Panther. 

128 

235 


21 mine sweepers for 



Prairie. 

268 

449 


mine force, 54 men 







ea eh 

804 

1 296 

Total 

2 °58 

3,298 








Total 

2,137 

2 456 






’ 

Beaver. 

249 

274 

18 

i Colliers (12): 



Bushnell. 

156 

201 


Abarenda. 


77 

Camden. 

395 

304 


Ajax. 

96 

96 

• Rainbow. 

217 

298 


Brutus. 


3 

Savannah. 

376 

337 


Caesar. 

70 

80 





.1 ason 

128 

1 1 > 

Total. 

1,393 

1,414 


Mars... . 

119 

103 




Nero 


70 

Shore-based submarine ten- 




Nereus. 

135 

110 

ders (5): 




Neptune. 

148 

110 

Fulton (New London).. 

199 

544 

Orion. 

139 

110 

Eagle 17 (Hampton 



Proteus. 

135 

180 

Roads). 

313 

323 

Vulcan. 

119 

101 

Eagle 31 (Coco Solo). . .. 

357 

410 

. 



Alert (San Pedro).. 

385 

452 

Total. 

1,089 

1.230 

Chicago (Pearl Harbor). 

377 

452 






19 

Oilers (14): 



Total. 

1,631 

2,181 | 

Alameda. 

75 

75 




\ rath visa 

78 

79 

Repair shins (2): 


1 


Brazos. 

88 

141 

Prometheus. 

159 

489 j 


Ouyama. 

101 

141 

Vestal. 

159 

488 


Kanawha. 

139 

141 





Maumee. 


125 

Total. 

318 

977 


Neches. 

138 

145 





Patnka 

75 

75 

Hospital ships (2): 




Pecos. 

141 

141 

Relief. 

360 

300 


Ramapo. 

75 

75 

Mercy. 

317 

270 


•Sapelo. 

75 

78 





R. L. Barnes. 1 


52 

Total. 

677 

570 


Sara Thompson. 


54 





Trinity 

75 | 

85 

i Storeships (6): 





_ | 


Bridge. 

150 

212 


Total.j 

1,060 

1,397 


160 

157 ! 





Culgoa. 

156 

165 

20 

Transports and cargo ships 



Cf lacier. 

135 

141 


(9): 



PoniDev. 

106 

74 


Bath. 


77 

Rappahannock 

149 

285 


Beaufort. 

81 

75 





General Alqvq 


88 

Total 

856 

1,034 


Hancock. 

215 

289 





H end^rson 

201 

403 

Auxiliaries (target repair) 




Houston. 

134 

134 

(2): 




Kittery. 

77 

97 

Lebanon. 

56 

112 


Newport News. 

75 

120 

Nanshaw 

45 

70 


Pensacola. 


83 








Total . 

101 

182 


Total. 

786 

1.36 








Auxiliary (radio repair) (1): } 







Saturn.1 

i= 

68 

120 





















































































































































































20 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Table A. —Detail list of operating forces on basis of 143,000 men in Navy, with 
86,000 available for seagoing vessels on July 1 , 1921 —Continued. 

VESSELS IN FULL COMMISSION—Continued. 



I 

Orig¬ 

inal 

j comple¬ 
ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

No. 


Orig¬ 

inal 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Present 

comple¬ 

ment. 

Ammunition ships (2); 




Patrol craft—Continued. 



Nitro. 

219 

219 


Wilmingtrin 

177 

162 

Pyro.. 

219 

219 








3,161 

3,720 

Total. 

438 

438 






25 

Auxiliaries -(survey ships) 



Fleet aviation detachment: 




(4): 



Consists of men of aviation 




Dubuoue. 


148 

ratings and training spe- 




Hannibal. 

143 

146 

cially assigned in connec- 




Leonidas. 


284 

tion with aviation activi- 

- 



Paducah. 

231 

223 

ties in the fleet. Does not 







include the operating com- 




Total. 

374 

801 

piemen ts of aircraft ten- 







ders. 

1,180 

1,180 

26 

Fish Commission ships (2): 



Flag complement: Com- 




Allatross. 

71 

81 

prises men specially as- 




Fish Llawk. 

44 

44 

signed to staff duty on 







flagships, signalmen, yeo- 




Total. 

115 

125 

men, bandsmen mess at- 







tendants, etc..... 

G) 

1,111 

27 

Special-dutv craft (by sta- 







tions) (13): 



Patrol craft (21); 




Washington (3)— 



Albany. 

297 

297 


Aramis (Sylph).. 

33 

47 

Asheville. 

148 

148 


Mayflower.. . 

168 

172 

Chattanooga. 


292 


N okomis.. 

57 

57 

Cleveland I. 

279 

289 


G uantanamo (2)— 

Denver. 

279 

292 


Montcalm. 

39 

39 

Des Moines. 

279 

289 


Oceola. 

26 

27 

Dolphin. 

128 

153 


Santo Domingo (2)— 



El Cano. 

97 

94 


Despatch.. . 

39 

47 

Galveston. 


289 


Potomac. . 

36 

51 

Helena. 

177 

162 


Virgin Islands ( 2 )— 



Monocacy. 

46 

46 


Tadousac. 

39 

47 

New Orleans. 

297 

297 


Vixen. 

100 

120 

Niagara. 

195 

136 


Constantinople (1)— 



Palos. 

46 

46 


Scorpion. 

80 

84 

Pampanga. 

30 

30 


Guam (2)— 



Quiros. 

54 

55 


Gulfport. 

68 

76 

Sacramento. 

151 | 

152 


Napa. 

39 

39 

Tacoma.1 

279 

289 


Samoa (1)— 



Tulsa. 

148 

148 


Conestoga. 

27 

43 

Villalobos. 

54 

55 





1 




Total. 

751 

821 


VESSELS IN RESERVE OR REDUCED COMMISSION. 


Experimentai ship (1): Ohio. 

703 

600 

32 

Mine sweepers (6): Held in 
reserve for upkeep and 
limited training duty, 
these being now ships and 
immeidately necessary in 
case of national emergency, 
30 men each. 



Battleships, second line (6): 
Connecticut. 

853 

600 




Kansas. 

853 

600 




Michigan. 

715 

600 




Minnesota. 

853 

600 


1,206 

180 

New Hampshire. 

853 

600 

33 

Destroyers, first fine (154): 
Held in reserve for upkeep 
and limited training duty, 
these vessels being modern 
craft, vitally needed for 
immediate service in case 
of national emergency. 
Twenty-five, with 49 men 
each (1,000-tonners); 129 
with 57 men each (1.200- 
tonners). 

South Carolina. 

704 

600 









Total. 

4, 831 

3,600 








Submarine (22): 

13 in reserve, compris¬ 
ing 3 D’s, 2 E’s, 7 L’s 

1 M. 

282 

39 




9 in reserve for training 
submarine crews, 


19,614 

8,577 

comprising 2 F’s, 7 
N’s. 





204 

90 

34 

Hospital ships (2) .(45 per 
cent complements): 
Comfort. . 






Total. 

486 

129 



163 



ftnlnpp 


143 

Eagles (19): Held in re¬ 
sene, and used for train- 

i 










306 

ing reservists, tendinga 1 ; i- 
ation stations, and deA y el- 









Grand total. 


85,811 

oping antisubmarine tac¬ 
tics, 24 men each. 

1, C64 

475 










1 Variable. 



































































































































































NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 21 


Table B.- 


- Detail list of operating forces on basis of 110,000 men in Nary, with 
17.000 to 7).000 available for seayoiny vessels. 

Yield <>f 


t csscls in full commission: Same as in Table A. with following execu¬ 
tions : 

Placed out of commission—2 battleships, first line— 

Delaware _ 

North Dakota _ 

20 destroyers, first line, shown in reserve in Table A, with 49 men 

each aboard_ 

Reduced from full commission to reserve status—42 destroyers, first 
line, shown in full commission in Table A, with 114 men each 
aboard, and reduced to 57 men each__ 


men. 


1, 263 
1,217 

980 


2, 394 


Net yield- * -- 5,854 

Note. —Copy of Table A is attached, corrected, to show conditions with 74,000 
men on seagoing: ships. In case seagoing availables drop to 71,000, or to any 
number seriously below 74,000, additional reserve destroyers will be placed out 
of commission. 


Table (\—Detail list of operation forces on basis of 100.000 men in Narp. with 

00.000 available for seayoiny vessels. 


Vessels in full commission : Same as in Table A, with following exceptions— 

Yield of 


. men 

Placed out of com mission .— 2 battleships, tirst line— 

Delaware_*___,__ 1,263 

North Dakota__ 1,217 

3 light cruisers, second line— 

Birmingham___^_ 359 

Chester_ 358 

Salem___ 357 

4 destroyer tenders— 

Buffalo_ 411 

Dixie_ 614 

Panther___’__ 235 

Prairie_ 449 

m -m-’os di '•'troyers shown in Table A in 
full commission and 176 destroyers shown in reserve_:_14,619 


Net yield ______ 19,882 

Note. —Copy of Table A is attached corrected to show conditions with 60,000 
men on seagoing ships. In case seagoing availables increase above 60.000 in 
sufficient numbers to afford a surplus after manning the Maryland and other 
new construction. < err?'in destroyers will be commissioned in reserve, as there is 
vital reason for keeping: as many destroyers as possible in material condition 
for immediate service in case of national emergency. 

Admiral Coontz. With a force of 120.000 men we would keep in 
full commission on the 1st of July, 15 battleships, tirst line, including 
the California; 2 battleships, first line, with reduced complements, 
for flagship duty, other than with the battleship forces; 8 cruisers 
122 destroyers, 87 submarines, 7 destroyer tenders, 5 submarine tend¬ 
ers, 5 shore-based submarine tenders, 2 repair ships, 2 hospital ships, 
6 store ships, 2 auxiliaries for target repair. 1 auxiliary for radio re¬ 
pair, 2 aircraft tenders, 2 mine layers, 35 mine sweepers and fleet 
tugs (12 for use with mine force), 9 colliers. 11 oilers, 6 transports 
and cargo ships. 2 ammunition ships, 19 patrol vessels. 2 survey ships, 
2 fish commission ships. 13 special-duty craft (7 stations). 

We would have in reserve or reduced commission 1 experimental 
battleship, the Ohio : 0 battleships, second line, for midshipmen; 22 




















22 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


submarines for training and with reserve complements, 19 Eagle 
boats, 18 mine sweepers, 176 destroyers of the first line with 50 per 
cent complements. 

That would place at sea 80,000 men, or in exact numbers, 79,864 
men. 1 have also prepared tables as to what we could do if we had 
to come to 110,000. 

Senator Swanson. Do you name the 15 battleships? Have you the 
names of those 15 battleships? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir; we have them all outlined. 

Senator Swanson. Will you also put in there the complement of 
men that you estimated for at the time they were constructed by the 
constructor ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. I notice that some of these ships they^construct 
them to carry 800, and they fix up a complement of 900 ? 

Admiral Coontz. That is true, and that has been largely due to 
development of fire control. 

Senator Swanson. And in addition to that, during the war you 
might have casualties. But during a peace basis you would not need 
that ? 

Admiral Coontz. No. Of course, another thing we have had to 
contend with for a long time is the fact that we have many boys in 
the Navy instead of grown men. 

Senator* Swanson. What is the earliest battleship you include in 
the 15? 

Admiral Coontz. The earliest battleship is the Delaware. Two of 
them .stay in and two go out. 

Senator Swanson. You have 122 destroyers. Why do you need 
that many? 

Admiral Coontz. We need 122 destroyers for use with the two 
branches of the fleet and for use abroad. We have now in the Black 
Sea and in the Adriatic Sea and in Europe 18 destroyers. We 
would like to bring them home, and we have asked the State De¬ 
partment, but the situation over there is such that they are unwilling 
to allow a single ship to come home. We want 36 in the Pacific, 36 
in the Atlantic, 18 in Chinese waters and the Far East, 12 in Europe, 
and the others as light mine layers suitably distributed. 

Senator Swanson. When you fix upon these 15 battleships, and 
the 2 battleships, first line, reduced complement, what is the basis of 
the organization of those battleships into squadrons or fleets? 

Admiral Coontz. In the Pacific we should have seven of them 
and in the Atlantic eight. 

Senator Swanson. I know when we were getting up the naval pro 
gram of 1916 we fixed upon the number of destroyers and the num¬ 
ber of submarines that ought to accompany a fleet in proportion, 
to the number of battleships. Do you keep up that proportion, 
or what proportion of destroyers do you expect to accompany the 
fleet? 

Admiral Coontz. We expect with each of those to have 36. 

Senator Swanson. Is not that far in excess of what was considered 
a well-rounded fleet in the program of 1916? 

Admiral Coontz. The destroyers have been increased. In the first 
place we had very few. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


23 


Senator Swanson. How many destroyers did the general board 
recommend as being necessary to accompany a squadron of four 
battleships when they made their recommendation in 1916? 

The Chairman. You seem to be assuming the number of destroyers 
is based entirely on the number of battleships. 

Senator Swanson. No. 

The Chairman. There are many other duties they perform besides 
that. 

Senator Swanson. In preparing that program the General Board 
said a well-rounded fleet ought to have so many submarines and so 
many destroyers, and I want to know to what extent that basis is 
being carried out now. 

Admiral Coontz. I don’t believe it lias been materially changed, 
Senator. 

Senator Swanson. Do you remember what was considered the 
basis at that time? 

Admiral Coontz. 1 do not, offhand. 

Lieut. Commander Hill. We had six during the war. 

Senator Swanson. Six for each battleship, and in peace I think it 
was four for each battleship. I remember that when we fixed up the 
program in 1916 we tried to carry out the idea of the General Board 
of the Navy Department as to what was a complete and well-rounded 
fleet. 

Admiral Coontz. This would differ very little from that. 90 
against 72. The other destroyers are now abroad. T think we have 
about 12 in the Black Sea and the Near East now. 

Senator Swanson. If European countries were such that they 
could be withdrawn how many destroyers would you need to have a 
well-rounded fleet in active service? 

Admiral Coontz. We would need 36 and 36 and 18. That would be 
the lowest number we feel we could get along with. It would be 90, 
not counting those for use with the mine forces. 

Senator Swanson. How many men do you have on an average for 
these destroyers? 

Admiral Coontz. It is 114, Admiral Washington? 

Admiral Washington. One hundred and fourteen. 

Senator Swanson. Take the submarines. What is the proportion 
of submarines that you usually require to, say, a squadron of four 
battleships? Do you remember the basis on which that was fixed up? 

Admiral Washington. No, sir: I do not think it was ever figured 
that way. 

Admiral Coontz. We will have, Senator, when we get them all 
done, 133 submarines. We have about 100 of them that will be ready, 
I think, the 1st of July, and we propose to keep 87 of them in com¬ 
mission. 

Senator Swanson. Let me ask you about the 87. The submarines 
have no use much except to practice for submarine work in time of 
war. That is the main use to which you put them now? 

Admiral Coontz. That is a practical use, for practical work and 
training. We have to put them through every possible scheme, and 
also they take out and place in shape new vessels, run their drills, 
and everything of that character. 


24 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Senator Swanson. About how many men would you have in the 
submarine force on a basis of 120.000 men; what would the subma¬ 
rine force amount to? 

Admiral Coontz. It is right there on that list. 

Senator Swanson. Two thousand five hundred and sixty-two men, 
I see that. 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. In your estimate you only require for your 
battleships 19,789 men? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. And for your destroyers you take nearly as 
many as you do for your battleships, namely, 13,908? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. And for your submarines, 2,562. You think it 
would be well to keep the submarine force well practiced ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. Because it takes a long time to learn to be an 
expert in the manipulation and operation of submarines, does it not? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. Both in mechanical work and in skill in con¬ 
nection with their use? 

Admiral Coontz. In every line. 

Senator Swanson. Do you think you need 13,000 men in the de¬ 
stroyer service? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir; those vessels, Senator, are new. They 
have to be kept in condition; they have got to drill in the fleet, go 
through all the maneuvers. 

Senator Swanson. Of what benefit is service on a destroyer with 
very small guns to a man in service compared to being on a battle¬ 
ship with its large guns? 

Admiral Coontz. There is not such a difference. 

Senator Swanson. To what extent does service on a destroyer 
equip a man for service on a battleship, except getting what they 
call the “ sea instinct ” ? 

Admiral Coontz. In regard to the officers it makes men of them. 
They get the sea habit. The officer learns how to train men, he learns 
how to fire torpedoes, to run the engines. In the case of the men they 
are trained for destroyer work, and even a man that runs a small gun 
gradually moves up until he gets to the larger one. 

The real thing about those destroyers, though, Senator, outside of 
the fact that they have got to teach them scouting, screening, and 
every other thing that has now come up, is that we have no light 
cruisers. That is one reason we want to keep more destroyers in. 

Senator Swanson. When will your light cruisers be available? 
How far off is that? 

Admiral Coontz. They will begin to come along this fall, if I am 
correct. 

Lieut. Commander Hill. August 1 was the date, but I believe that 
has been postponed. 

Senator Hale. How many w T ill come along by July 22? 

Admiral Coontz. We did expect 10 of them. I hope we will get 8, 

Senator Hale. Not enough to make a full rounded fleet? 

Admiral Coontz. No, sir. 

Senator Hale. Destroyers are needed to take their place? 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


25 


Admiral Coontz. And to carry out the policies of the fleet. 

Senator Hale. How many destroyers have you ? 

Admiral Coontz. We have altogether 298 of the first line and 21 
of the second line, and of those I think some 31 are not yet com¬ 
pleted. 

Senator Hale. What are you going to do with the destroyers that 
are completed? 

Admiral Coontz. We will put 198 of them in reserve with 50 per 
cent complement. 

Senator Hale. Not in ordinary or out of commission? 

Admiral Coontz. No, sir. 

Senator Hale. How about the battleships—the older battleships ? 

Admiral Coontz. The old battleships will go out of commission, 
and I doubt if any beyond the Delaware class will ever be used again 
except in case of sudden war. All of the Nebraska class and the 
Virginia are now out. We are holding 6 to take the 2,000 midship¬ 
men on their summer cruise, and th&n they go out forever, except for 
use as auxiliaries to the fleet with reduced complement. One of those 
we are using for experimental purposes. 

The Chairman. What six are those you refer to? 

Admiral Coontz. The six include the Minnesota, New Hampshire, 
Kansas, Connecticut, /South Carolina, and Michigan. It will be their 
last cruise. 

Senator Swanson. I see here that for destroyers, submarines, de¬ 
stroyer tenders, submarine tenders, and shore-based submarine tend¬ 
ers, you have 23,000 men, more than you have for the entire battleship 
fleet. I may be mistaken, but it seems to me that in time of peace, 
when men do not take so long to be trained for destroyer work like 
it does for submarine work, that the number of ships in active com¬ 
mission as destroyers could be right materially reduced. I can see 
an advantage in putting a young man with three or four destroyers, 
under him from the experience he has as a commanding officer, and 
training, etc., but, in addition to the expense incident to keeping all 
of these destroyers in operation at this time, it will keep a great many 
of these young officers from being trained on battleships, will it not? 

Admiral Coontz. Of course, they get a training, and if you cut 
out these destroyers- 

Senator Swanson. I do not mean to cut them all out. I am just 
talking frankly. It seems to me that you could reduce them without 
reducing the efficiency of your fleet on a peace basis, and for neces- 
sary training. It seems to me in looking at this that you have an 
excess of that character of craft. 

Admiral Coontz. No, sir; I don’t think so. Senator. You see the 
battleships now have gotten so they are the thumb on a man’s hand,, 
and. that with the battleships for their offensive and defense work, 
you have got to have the destroyer, the submarine, the air force, and 
everything that goes with it. * A battleship itself no longer goes 
alone. 

Senator Swanson. No one is talking about it going by itself. It 
seems to me if you carry out the theory of getting efficiency for time 
of war, but not right during war conditions, it seems to me you 
could reduce somewhat in this respect and not destroy the efficiency 
of your fleet at all. 

Admiral Coontz. No, sir. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


26 


Senator Swanson. If you did not have those destroyers you would 
not construct them for this purpose now, would you ? 

Admiral Coontz. We would construct enough to round out the 
fleet. 

Senator Swanson. We did that in 1916, but on account of the 
late war, and with England asking us to please construct destroyers 
in order to fight the submarines, we increased the number. 

Admiral Coontz. Look at the bottom line, and see how many we 
have put out—198. 

Senator Swanson. I know. 

The Chairman. Is your 120,000 men based on keeping, among 
other conditions, 198 destroyers in reserve? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. Would it not be possible, Admiral, to take some of 
these destroyers that are now in reserve and put them either out of 
commission or in ordinary, and reduce the crews thereby? 

Admiral Coontz. It would be possible except that the cost in the 
upkeep and the endeavor to keep them in shape would be so far 
the other way that it is not deemed advisable. Most of these are 
brand new ships. 

Senator Hale. And they would deteriorate? 

Admiral Coontz. They would deteriorate rapidly. But with a 
50 per cent complement on them they are kept in prime condition, 
and would be immediately ready for service in case of war. 

Senator Hale. Senator Swanson spoke about the training of offi¬ 
cers. Is not an officer who is put in command of a destroyer getting 
better training for his future in doing that work than he would if 
he were in a subordinate position on a battleship ? 

Admiral Coontz. That is a phase in the life of every officer. He 
ought to be a submariner, an aviator, a destroyer man, and then a 
battleship man. 

Senator Hale. And are not the officers on the destroyer with him 
getting better training in those responsible positions that they 
would have on the destroyer than they would in the subordinate 
positions they would naturally occupy on a battleship? 

Admiral Coontz. Unquestionabty. 

Senator Hale. It is really a good training for those officers? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. Let us see your program for 110,000 men. 

The Chairman. Before we proceed with that I would like to ask 
the admiral what kind of organization you have on your first-line 
ships on the basis of 120,000 men. How far below the full war com¬ 
plement of a battleship would your force be? 

Admiral Coontz. It would be about 80 or 85 per cent, would it not? 

Admiral Washington. If we had 120,000 men with the number of 
battleships we have got we would have a full complement because 
so few battleships would be placed in reserve. 

The Chairman. A full peace complement? 

Admiral Washington. Yes. 

The Chairman. I mean war complement? 

Admiral Washington. We have only one complement. 

The Chairman. Would you have a complete organization of offi¬ 
cers and men on your battleships with this basis of 120,000 men? 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


27 


Admiral Washington. No, sir; not exactly that. When I said we 
have only one complement, I mean that is a war complement. We 
have a war complement only. But the ships have always less men 
than that, anywhere from 100 to 150 men less than we would carry in 
war times. We do not call that a complement. It is simply the 
allowance that we are giving them to run on. 

The Chairman. Iam asking you about the war complement. How 
much below the war complement of a battleship would you be? 

Admiral Coontz. For these 15 battleships we would have sufficient 
men for them if put on a regular war complement. 

Senator Swanson. I have to go to attend to some other business, 
but I wish you would put in there the number of men you have on 
each ship. 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir; I will. 

Senator Swanson. And what the estimate was when it was con¬ 
structed ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What we would like to get clearly stated, so that 
it would be understood and could be stated to the Senate, is a plain 
statement of the extent to which the ships of the Navy that we will 
retain or acquire, to constitute the Navy, will be reduced below the 
personnel organization at these various numbers that have been sug¬ 
gested, 120,000 and 110,000. T understand from Admiral Washing¬ 
ton that with 120,000 men that we would have a full complement of 
officers and men on your battleships. 

Admiral Cooxtz. Those that are in commission? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Does that also apply to the destroyers and the 
cruisers such as we have? 

Admiral Coontz. Those few that we keep. 

Senator Hale. To what extent would you have to change it if it 
were cut down to 110,000? 

Admiral Coontz. At 110,000 we would come down to 31 battleships. 

Senator Hale. You would not cut down the complement on the 
ships, but cut down the ships? 

Admiral Coontz. Cut the ships; yes, sir. The number of men 
would be reduced. The showing would be in reduced commission. 
We would reduce the number of ships in commission from 368 to 319. 
The number of vessels in reserve would be increased from 242 to 264. 
That would be the difference. The destroyers would be reduced. 

Senator Hale. To what extent would the destroyers be reduced? 

Admiral Coontz. The destroyers would be reduced from 122 to 
80 in full commission. 

The Chairman. That is on the basis of 110,000 men? 

Admiral Coontz. To 110,000, that would be the proper reduction, 
to just throw out that many more destroyers. 

The Chairman. What would be the effect of coming down to 

100 , 000 ? 

Admiral Coontz. To come down to 100,000 we would still hold on 
to 13 battleships for the battleship force. 2 battleships of the first line 
for flagship duty other than with the battleship force. The cruisers 
would come down to 5, destroyers 80, submarines 87. Certain aux¬ 
iliaries would be reduced, and the ships in reserve or reduced com- 


28 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


mission would be down to 1 experimental ship, 6 battleships, 22 sub¬ 
marines, 19 Eagle boats, lb mine sweepers, and all the others would be 
out of commission absolutely. 

The Chairman. Have you made allowance for reducing the num¬ 
ber of ships that are new ships that will be coming in, now under 
construction ? 

Admiral Coontz. We expect by putting the older ships out of com¬ 
mission to keep flie new ships going, and our plans are made along 
that basis. Those that are getting older with a nonmilitary value 
would go out. 

The Chairman. When the present program is completed according 
to a statement I have here, you will have 27 capital ships. Do you 
include those in your estimate there? 

Admiral Coontz. No, sir; because this only carries for the next 
fiscal year. When we come to those, if we have them all in com¬ 
mission, we would need up to our limit of 143,000 men, which we* 
have not now. 

Senator Hale. Do you expect any new battleships to come into 
commission during the next fiscal year? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir; the California and the Maryland; pos¬ 
sibly the Colorado , at the end of the fiscal year. 

Senator Hale. When they come into commission you will retire 
some of the older ones? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. You spoke of reducing the number of cruisers, if 
we have only 100,000 men. Why is that done? Past experience has 
shown that that is the place where we are weakest, has it not? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir; but we have to cut out cloth with what 
Ave have. 

Senator Hale. You would rather keep your destroyers for the 
fleet and give up the cruisers ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir: because the cruisers Ave have now are 
pretty poor cruisers. 

The Chairman. What is your recommendation as to the number 
of men Ave should have? 

Admiral Coontz. Of course Ave feel, Senator, that Ave need the 
120,000 men to efficiently carry on the Navy for the coming year, 
as avc see it, to give us a well-rounded fleet that we can maneuver 
Avith and drill; that in order to do that Ave need all Ave have at 
present. 

The Chairman. Can you give us some idea about the relative 
preparation for Avar that is invoWed in the various figures as to the 
full personnel of the Navy? Several questions haA T e been asked about 
how many Avould be necessary or sufficient for a peace basis. Of 
course there are various sorts of peace bases. We have one peace 
basis when we take it for granted that Ave are not going to have 
any war. But the whole purpose of establishing and maintaining 
a navy is preparation for possible war. 

Senator Ball. What is the difference between a peace basis and a 
Avar basis? 

1 he Chairman. What I am trying to get at is some idea as to the 
time and the difficulty of building up a personnel in case of a sudden 
naval emergency. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


29 


Admiral Coontz. At present, of course, we have just enlarged our 
personnel. I think we have got up to 135,000, because we were al¬ 
lowed an average of 120,000. We started in not many months ago 
with only 99,000 men; 38,000 of those had been in the Navy before. 
The rest were recruits. We built up to that number and were train¬ 
ing them in various camps, as we are to-day, before we began this 
reduction. 

The idea for the coming year was that these 120,000 men would 
man a fleet sufficient to carry out our policies, to carry out the 
maneuvers, the drill, and the training. We still have several hun¬ 
dred thousand reservists who are dropping out at a very fast rate. 
If a war came suddenly, these vessels that have 50 per cent comple¬ 
ment would be immediately manned by reservists, and in a very short 
time be ready for service. 

The Chairman. The vessels that have the 50 per cent complement, 
are they in reserve? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I wish you would explain, in brief, the difference 
between reserve, in ordinary, and out of commission? 

Admiral Coontz. To start with, u out of commission” means they 
are. laid up at a navy yard or at a base with no stores on board and 
no men. 

Senator Hale. You have a janitor or a caretaker? 

Admiral Coontz. What they call a ship keeper. I suppose there 
would be three of those for maybe two or three or more ships; that 
would be all. There would be nothing on board that could be stolen 
or taken away. 

“ In ordinary ” means with part of her stores aboard and a very 
reduced crew. It might be 8 or 10 or 12 per cent, the idea being that 
with those people aboard, to keep it clean and to look after the 
stores, she could be put in commission much quicker than if she was 
entirely out and everything off. 

Senator Hale. She would be packed in grease ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. In reserve, a vessel should be capable, 
very quickly on her crew coming aboard, to get to sea. She would 
have practically all her stores on board, her engines would be work¬ 
ing. and she would be all ready to go out by filling up her comple¬ 
ment with crews from other vessels. 

The Chairman. Do you say she has 50 per cent of her personnel 
on board? 

Admiral Coontz. At present, in the case of a vessel like a de¬ 
stroyer, we cut down as low as 25 men out of 114. Then we lifted 
that to 35. But to be in absolute readiness for quick, complete work, 
and almost immediate use, we would bring it up to 50 per cent of 
full complement, if we put all those 198 destroyers in reserve. 

The Chairman. How much of a fleet have we in the Orient now? 

Admiral Coontz. In the Orient we have one old cruiser, the Huron , 
whose name was changed from the South Dakota, We have ordered 
and have on the way there 18 destroyers. We have two gunboats 
that go up the Chinese river, the Yangtze, to look out for our inter¬ 
ests. We have two or three very olcl ones in the neighborhood of 
Hongkong. 

The Chairman. Gunboats? 


30 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir; and we have a few gunboats about 
Manila. Those gunboats, with the exception of two, we captured 
from the Spanish in 1898 , and they are just about to fall apart. Vi e 
have a couple at Guam, little tugs or station ships. The Asiatic Fleet 
with its personnel is as follows: 

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET. 


The following are the vessels assigned to the Asiatic Fleet, 
the number of men on hoard each ship: 

Huron (ex-South Dakota) flagship__.- 

Cruisers: 

New Orleans__ 

Albany_____ 

Patrol vessels: 

Helena____:_ 

Pampanga_ 

Wilmington_ 

El Cano_ 

Villalobos ___ 

Quiros _____ 

Palos_1__;_:___ 

Monocacy_ 

Mine detachment: 

Hart____—_ 

Rizal_ 

Heron_ 

Finch__ 

Avocet__ 

Destroyers: 

Panther (tender)__ 

Tarbell_ 

Yarnall_____ 

Upshur_ 

Greer (F.)_ 

Elliot____:_ 

Lea_:_ 

Chandler__ 

Southard_____ 

Hovey___ 

Long_ 

Broome___ 

Alden_ 

Auxiliaries: 

Ajax--- 

Piscataqua_ 

Abarenda_ 

Pompey_ 

Genessee __ 

General Alava_ 

R. L. Barnes_ 

Bittern_ 

Napa_ 

Sara Thompson_ 


together with 


856 


297 

297 

162 

80 

162 

98 

55 

55 

46 

46 

114 

114 

54 

54 

54 


235 

114 

114 

114 

114 

114 

114 

114 

114 

126 

114 

114 

114 


96 

47 

77 

74 

52 

88 

52 

54 

39 

54 


Total- 4, 737 

In addition there are personnel on district craft and naval shore activi¬ 
ties to the number of about 724, including 30 men looking out for sub¬ 
marines out of commission at Cavite and awaiting sale or final dispo¬ 
sition ___ 724 


Grand total_ 5 , 431 


Senator Hale. You say we have 10 destroyers in the Adriatic. 
What do they do? 














































1ST AVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


31 


Admiral Coontz. I said 12 in the Black Sea and the Near East. 

Senator Hale. How many in the Adriatic? 

Admiral Coontz. Four in the Adriatic, and the old Olympia. 

Senator Hale. What are they doing: in the Black Sea ? 

Admiral Coontz. Tn the Black Sea and the Near East they are 
looking out for American interests, and taking: care of various Ameri¬ 
can refugees along the coast there. Some duties come up for them all 
the time. 

In the Adriatic we have been unable to feel that we could safely 
withdraw, because ours, we feel, has been the influence there that 
has stabilized conditions. Then, we have one or two up along the 
Baltic where troubles are not yet at an end. We have one old flag¬ 
ship over there, the Pittsburgh , formerly the Pennsylvania. We use 
those old cruisers for flagships. The European force, with its per¬ 
sonnel, is as follows: 

[Tage 28 of hearings. ] 

EUROPEAN FORCE. 


The ships assigned to the European station with their complements are as 
follows, the complements being kept as nearly as possible tilled at all times: 

Complement. 

Flagship, Pittsburgh___ 697 

Cruisers: 


Olympia_ l 

St. Louis_ 

Chattanooga_ 

Destroyers: 

Barker_ 

Borie__ 

Brooks_ 

Childs_ 

Edwards. John D_ 

Fox__ 

Gilmer_ 

Humphreys_ 

James, Reuben_ 

Kane_-_ 

McFarland_ 

Overton_ 

Sands_-— - 

Smith Thompson_„_ 

Nturtevant_,_ 

Tracy_ 

Whipple_ 

Williamson_ 


402 

392 

292 


114 

114 

122 

114 

114 

122 

122 

114 

114 

122 

114 

114 

114 

114 

114 

114 

114 

114 


Subchasers: 

No. 96_ 14 

No. 338_ 14 

Station ship at Constantinople, Scorpion_ 84 


Total_3,979 

There are required for the service of this force the following fuel ships, 
which also carry the necessary supplies which can not be secured on the 
European station: 


Complement. 

Collier, Vulcan---101 

Tankers : 

Alameda------*■- 75 

Ramapo___ 75 

Trinity_—---,-- 75 


Total 


326 


































32 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Senator Hale. During the war, when the war started in 1917, we 
had a good many ships in reserve, did we not ? 

Admiral Coontz. I think we did at that time; had a number that 
were in reserve or not in commission. 

Senator Hale. In changing those reserve ships that were in re¬ 
serve over into the active service was it done immediately, or did it 
take a very long time to do it ? 

Admiral Coontz. It took some time, because a number of them 
needed repairs and changes, and. of course, at that time we had no 
reserve whatever. 

Senator Hale. The same would be true now if these vessels were 
put in reserve ? 

Admiral Coontz. The same would be true now, depending on how 
many men we left aboard the ship, and what shape they are in. I 
feel we w r ould be better off now than in 1917, because we would have 
somebody out in the country to call on. 

Senator Hale. But in no event would you consider that vessels 
which were in reserve could be used at once w T ith the fleet? 

Admiral Coontz. There are, of course, a number of vessels in re¬ 
serve that would have to be more or less put in shape, but we could 
get them in with the fleet if we had them with this 50 per cent com¬ 
plement very quickly. 

Senator Hale. Within a few days or few weeks? 

Admiral Coontz. Some of them in a few days and some of them 
in a few weeks. In the other war we had been robbing battleships 
of crews to go on cargo vessels and armed craft. Another war would 
posibly be different. 

The Chairman. We will pass on from the question of personnel, 
and if you have any other points you want to bring out we will be 
glad to have them. 

Admiral Coontz. We will be glad to put in the hearing these ships 
by name, and what w T e intend to do. 

Senator Hale. I would like to ask one question before we leave 
the subject of personnel. If we are going to cut down our personnel 
and establish 100,000 as the full personnel for the future is there any 
need of going ahead and increasing our naval program ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir; there would be the need. 

Senator Hale. But it is not looking after the future naval pro¬ 
gram in any way to cut it down to 100,000 men ? 

Admiral Coontz. It is not looking after the future. Senator, if it 
can possibly be avoided, because with the new ships coming on and the 
necessity for trained men and with the knowledge of the number that 
have to be discharged the coming fiscal year, it is something we should 
not do unless driven to it, because it takes time and everything else to 
train these men to handle those great big vessels. 

Senator Hale. I recall at some time before the war the personnel 
of the Navy was not increased as the General Board wanted to have it 
by some 19.000 men, I believe ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. And a number of years afterwards the fact they 
had not been increased at that time has a disastrous effect on the 
Navy? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


33 


Senator Hale. The same would be true at a future time if we should 
cut down the personnel at the present time below where it should be, 
would it not ? 

Admiral Coontz. It would seriously hurt us, Senator, in case of any 
sudden emergency and would have a great bearing on the future for 
this reason: That the sailorman looks on and would see what was doing 
to happen. He would think they are going to cut us down, and a great 
many of them are married and few of them get shore duty, and I be¬ 
lieve its effect on the morale is going to be bad to cut down unless we 
are absolutely driven to it. What you say is true; we did not provide 
enough, and we paid for it. 

Senator Hale. We paid for it very severely. 

The Chairman. What appropriation would be required, or what in¬ 
crease in appropriation, for the increase of 20,000 men over the amount 
provided for by the House ? 

Admiral Peoples. We have all the details of it and itemized. 

The Chairman. \Ye would like to have that itemized so for as the 
different elements are concerned. 

Admiral Peoples. Would you like to have it now or have it brought 
out under the various subheads ? 

The Chairman. Probably you will have some statement to make 
later, and we can take that up then. 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you gone over this part, Admiral? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Are there any particular things that you want to 
call the committee’s attention to in it or out of it ? 

Admiral Coontz. I can talk on the question along a few lines. 
There were a number of points of order made in the House on little 
clauses in the bill that naturally should go back. 

The Chairman. On the second page of the bill, did you notice 
that the House has stricken from the bill, as reported by the com¬ 
mittee, lines 14 to 17, the words, “ and for mileage, at 5 cents per 
mile, to midshipmen entering the Naval Academy while proceed¬ 
ing from their homes to the Naval Academy for examination and 
appointment as midshipmen?” 

Admiral Coontz. My understanding is that that was stricken out 
on a point of order, and I would ask Admiral Peoples to explain that 
clause. We would like to have that restored. 

Admiral Peoples. For many years, Mr. Chairman, the traveling 
expenses of the midshipmen, upon their entrance to the Naval Acad¬ 
emy, have been paid by the Government. Two years ago, in order 
to simplify the matter each midshipman was allowed by law the 
sum of 5 cents a mile as mileage to cover his actual traveling ex¬ 
penses. 

The Chairman. You say their actual expenses? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. They averaged about 5 cents a mile. 
It is appropriation law, and as such, under the legislative rules, is 
subject to a point of order when the bill, at a new session, is reported 
from the House Appropriations Committee. 

The Chairman. What we are interested in is not so much the pre¬ 
liminary status of it as the views of the department in regard to 
the merits of the appropriation ? 

34772—21-3 


34 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Peoples. It should be reinstated, sir, undoubtedly. 

The Chairman. How long has it been since the Government lias 
been paying expenses of these appointees to the academy. Have 
they always done it, in your recollection ? # 

Admiral Peoples. For 25 years, to my positive knowledge. 

Admiral Coontz. They were doing it 40 years ago. 

The Chairman. I would like to ask you about this change made 
in the bill as it was reported by the House committee, on page 3, lines 
15 to 20: 

Provided, That no part of this appropriation shall be available for the expense 
of any naval district unless the commandant thereof shall be also the command¬ 
ant of a navy yard, naval training station, or naval operating base. 

Admiral Coontz. I will have to tell you very frankly about that. 
The Secretary of the Navy and myself do not agree on it. He is 
willing that the clause should remain in. I think it was put in with 
the idea that it would be an element of economy. We have districts 
all over the United States and have had since 1903, just as the Army 
has and just as the Treasury and various others have. When the 
war come on they each one had a commandant of the district irre¬ 
spective of the commandant of the navy yard, which were most 
valuable assets. They looked out for war supplies and handled the 
smaller craft, and everything of that sort. We accumulated 300,000 
or 400,000 reservists during the war, and we still have probably some 
200,000. The Navy Department, of its own option, has reduced those 
districts down until only three of them now have commandants out¬ 
side of the navy yards—Boston, New York, and San Francisco. In 
the first district, for instance, there is the Portsmouth Navy Yard, 
Boston Navy Yard, torpedo station, war college, and any number 
of minor adjuncts. If I want anything done out there I ask the com¬ 
mandant of the district to do it. He handles all the tugs, has all 
the people at his disposal, and everything of that character. 

In New York, for instance, there is what we call a pool of ail 
shipping. Before we had the pool there were tugs at the navy yard, 
and tugs everywhere else. Now, by having them all at one place, 
one man in New York has the control. 

Also the commandant of the district is the man that we use in 
this great demobilization which started sometime back and is still 
going on. He is not connected with any separate identity there 
and he can go through it with an ax and cut them out. 

I feel that that legislation there is really holding down the hands 
of the department and the Chief of Operations. In Boston the 
commandant’s office is in the navy yard. It is at no expense. In 
New York it is now in the supply base in Brooklyn, and the officials 
of the city of New York are giving us free a certain new central 
location. In San Francisco we pay rent, but we hope later on to 
have the commandant of the district and the commandant at Goat 
Island combined in one. That would leave just two. The expense 
connected with this is that the district commandant has a certain 
amount of clerks. On the other hand he is the man that saves us 
the money as we cut them down. 

The Chairman. What is your judgment as to the respective econo¬ 
mies of the two systems? 


35 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Admiral Coontz. My judgment is it is more economical to have 
the commandants in those three districts until we can reduce them 
down to two or one than it is to give the job to another man who is 
already a commandant and has a pretty big job on his hands. I had 
the honor of being the commandant of a district and of a navy yard 
during the war, and I managed to survive it. I was finally relieved 
by two admirals to keep the thing going. Of course, now, it is back 
to where one man does the job. In all the 1G districts we have re¬ 
duced all of them except these three. We have in contemplation 
reducing one more, and maybe two. 

The Chaiman. You think there ought to be discretion left in the 
department ? 

Admiral Coontz. I do. I feel that I am an economist. 

The Chairman. As to when that rule should be applied and when 
it should not? 

Admiral Coontz. I feel that I can bring them down myself. 

STATEMENT ON NAVAL DISTRICTS. 

1. It comes as a matter of some surprise that a question is again raised in 
regard to naval districts. It was believed that the hearings of last year had 
effectually dispelled all doubts that might have been entertained as to the essen¬ 
tial necessity-of the naval district organization, and that it was made clear that 
any direct expense which might be traceable to the upkeep of the district organi¬ 
zation was in reality merely a transfer of charges which, if not listed against 
naval districts, would be absorbed elsewhere, and not only absorbed in their 
sum total, but very considerably increased, in an indirect way. by the lost motion 
that would result in the endeavor to operate a multitude of small activities from 
the Navy Department, keep them coordinated, prevent them from duplicating 
activities, and safeguard them from the losses and wastes inseparable from many 
independent and self-contained units. The district organization conserves the 
essential independence of these units, but, while carrying on without interference 
their own proper functions, they are closely interlocked and under a common 
control as to those things in which they must all share or be served alike. 

2. It should be conspicuously kept in mind that naval districts are no new 
thing. Their genesis was essentially military, and may be traced to certain dis¬ 
cussions taken up in the Naval War College before the Spanish-American War 
which had to do with the subject of coast defense and naval activities on land as 
auxiliary to the strictly offensive machinery and effort of the Navy alloat The 
Navy was small and its administration simple when these discussions began, 
but they afforded the groundwork for the activities of the Navy for the defense 
of the Atlantic coast and harbors during the Spanish-American War. The 
measures taken at that time were pitifully meager, and it is considered fortu¬ 
nate that the Spaniards did not put their efficiency to a practical test. How¬ 
ever, the need for such measures was so apparent that the General Board, after 
its establishment in 1900, took up the consideration of a plan for naval coast 
defense which eventually led in 1903 to the establishment of naval districts. 

3. It is pertinent at this point to invite attention to the need that other Gov¬ 
ernment departments have felt for districting the country for the purposes of 
economical and efficient administration. Primarily, may be mentioned the War 
Department, which has found it essential to have “ departments ” or “ corps 
areas.” The Treasury Department has its Coast Guard districts and its Public 
Health Service districts. There are the lighthouse districts. Then there are the- 
numerous purely civil districts, such as those under the Departments of Justice- 
and Commerce and the Treasury. The most cursory study and investigation of 
this subject reveals the basic administrative need that has forced upon the 
governmental departments this essential decentralizing agency—the district 
organization. The district organization is to naval shore activities what the 
fleet or squadron organization is to the Navy afloat. Its comparatively recent 
development as an essential need to the economical administration of the Navy 
lies in the fact'that the character of naval warfare has suffered a change along 
material lines. Before the Spanish-American War the tradition of sail power 


36 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

was strong upon the Navy. Most of our ships actually carried sails as a part of 
their regular equipment, xl sailing vessel is only remotely tied to the shore; 
she need visit it only at infrequent intervals. The Navy itself was small and a 
navy yard contained within its immediate confines practically all that was needed 
to fit out and maintain any of our small squadrons. 

4. With the growth and expansion of the Navy and the abandonment of sail 
power, the essential shore activities have multiplied. The areas occupied by our 
older navy yards have again and again been found insufficient to quarter the 
activities that must be attendant upon, as a sort of “ overhead.” the upkeep and 
maintenance of a Navy adequate to the country’s defense. This increase and 
multiplication of shore activities is not one that has been willfully fostered by 
the Navy Department. It has been forced on the Navy as surely and as irre¬ 
sistibly as the increase in the number and power of our ships have been forced 
upon the country at large. Our yards in congested city districts have been found 
incapable of the expansion necessary to carry on the essential repair and upkeep 
work on our ships, for which they are primarily designed, and to harbor all the 
attendant facilities besides. It follows, therefore, that gradually coal piles, fuel 
tanks, supply storehouses, receiving stations or barracks for personnel, hospitals, 
and so on have been forced to find locations outside of the confines of yards 
proper. Naval communications, involving far-reaching radio activities, with 
high-power stations and navigational aids of various sorts; submarine flotillas, 
which can be trained at tremendously less expense when based on a shore base 
than when compelled to dei>end solely on floating tenders; aviation activities, 
with their absolute need of shore facilities for maintenance—all those and many 
smaller activities, spread abroad through considerable areas in a geographic 
sense, indicate the need of some coordinating agencies located strategically along 
our entire coast line, including the Great Lakes, which shall represent the Navy 
Department and its authority, within well-defined limits, for the purpose of 
insuring the operation of all of these activities in an effective and economical 
manner at all times, as well as providing the means of consolidating their 
defense in time of war and securing their largest measure of cooperation with the 
fleet and with the Army as the public safety may demand. 

5. After the lessen of the World War, when the naval district organization 
was conclusively shown to be the only effective way of decentralizing the 
otherwise insuperable burden placed upon the Navy Department, it remains a 
matter of extreme regret that after 17 years tenure as an essential feature of 
naval organization and at a time when the shore activities of the Navy are 
necessarily far more numerous than at any time before in its peacetime history 
the naval district idea should be called into question. The reaction to the ques¬ 
tion takes the form, “ One might as well talk of doing away with the fleet organi¬ 
zation and endeavor to operate our vessels from the department as a series of 
separate squadrons and divisions as to do away with naval districts.” It 
is firmly believed that the question would not be raised if a comprehensive grasp 
were had of what the district organization does in the administering of the 
general activities of rlie Navy. Just as we once had numerous little squadrons 
or even single ships scattered in many localities throughout the world and 
each one separately administered from the Navy Department, so we can carry 
on to-day. But just so surely as there is no cause to discuss the question of 
so carrying on with the same assurance we can state that no justifiable reasons 
exist for abandoning the naval district organization. As a matter of fact we 
can not abandon it. The organization, were it done away with in name, would 
force itself upon the Navy immediately in some other form. The administration 
of the 219,000 naval reservists on inactive duty and scattered throughout the 
country would alone necessitate some subdividing of the department’s authority, 
which would inevitably take on a geographic form, because such a force of men 
can not be inspected, trained, accounted for, and generally administered from 
one central point. There must be subdivision, and the naval district organiza¬ 
tion affords a ready means of carrying on this administration. The same 
condition holds for radio communications. Just as the Western Union or the 
Postal Telegraph must district the country in the interests of economy, so must 
the Navy arrange for the administration of its communications ashore by 
districts. The naval districts again afford the convenient administrative 
agency. A great railroad system, with its repair plants, its storage yards, its 
passenger stations, its freight storehouses, its dispatching systems, is of 
necessity administered in divisions, and each division has its division head¬ 
quarters, with administrative offices and expense of upkeep. But the saving in 
ultimate expense pays for this administrative cost. The division superintendent 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


37 


doesn’t interfere with the proper functions of the repair plant head or the 
various yardmasters or the doctor in charge of the dispensary or the freight- 
house superintendent, or any other head. But he may. with propriety, and he 
draws a large salary for doing so, see that an idle switch engine is detailed 
to help out congestion at the repair plant or a locomotive is rushed to bring 
emergency supplies to the dispensary, or a yardmaster is put in line for holding 
on temporarily to freight when the freight storehouse can not receive 
it. and a hundred other details of coordination might doubtless he mentioned 
as falling within his cognizance. It would be pretty hard to run such things 
from headquarters where the president and the directors sit. 

G. Navy Department General Order No. 372 (revised), which is appended, 
states the following as the mission of the district commandant: 

To direct the local naval defense of the district in accordance with the 
approved war plan, and provide for proper coordination with land defense. 

To relieve the Navy Department of the administrative details of the district. 

To promote the interests of the United States generally, within the limits 
of his authority. 

To administer the Naval Reserve Force within the district in time of peace ; 
to mobilize the Naval Reserve Force, transferring to the jurisdiction of the 
Bureau of Navigation all reservists destined for duty outside the naval dis¬ 
trict; to assist in the demobilization of the Naval Reserve Force in general 
service; all in accordance with such instructions as may he issued from time 
to time by the Bureau of Navigation. 

Because perhaps the most words in this mission are used in connection witn 
the Naval Reserve Force, it appears to he erroneously held by some that the 
district commandant’s most important duty is the administration of* this force. 
Although, as stated above, it is essential that there he decentralization of the 
department’s authority over the reserve force and that the district organiza¬ 
tion readily lends itself to such decentralization, the administration of this 
force is only one of the administrative details of which the dstrict commandant 
relieves the Navy Department. If these details were carried on in the depart¬ 
ment, there would be concentrated in Washington the personnel now required 
for carrying them on outside of Washington. They must he carried on. and 
incalculable lost motion would result were an attempt made to carry them on 
entirely from the department itself. 

7. Much criticism has been offered because it has been stated that the 
records show that district commandants before the World War employed 22 
clerks and that now several hundred are employed. The records are mislead¬ 
ing because of the changed character of the work carried on under the head¬ 
ing of district headquarters activities. The naval district organization lent 
itself so readily to the forced decentralization of the war-time period, wherein 
some of the larger district headquarters, such as the thi’d district in New 


York, carried on activities easily commensurate with the activities of the en¬ 
tire Navy Department before the war, that certain administrative details have 
never been absorbed back into the department, but have remained decentralized 
in the hands of the district commandants. While this is markedly the case 
with the administration of the 219,000 reservists who did not exist before the 
war, it remains equally true in a lesser degree of many other activities. 
Meanwhile the Navy itself, exclusive of the Reserve Force, is, roughly, three 
times as large in personnel and many times as large in material units than it 
was in July, 191G, which is a date commonly taken as a basic comparison. 

8 . A comparison of personnel charged against districts and their total pay 
before the war and at present leads to results from which no proper conclusions 
can he drawn. The entire character of the performance required of naval dis¬ 
tricts in their function of relieving the department of administrative details 
has changed, and the ramifications of this change are so varied as to defy out¬ 
line, except in a tediously drawn table of statistics. For instance, the last 
return from the district commandants indicated a total enlisted personnel em¬ 
ployed in district activities amounting to 1,593 men, but an analysis of this 
fb’-ure showed these men employed mainly on district craft, which include all 
floating craft within the geographical limits of the district, except those form¬ 
ing units of the organized fleets or on special duty. If there were no district 
these men would be doing exactly what they are at present doing, except a very 
few employed to man the barges, and so on, assigned to the district command¬ 
ants in Boston New York, and San Francisco, which number is negligible. 
Another instance of district organization coordination at work is exemplified 


38 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


in the recent visit of the Naval Affairs Committee to the first naval district, 
where all that was done for the committee was arranged for by the district 
commandant. It would have doubtless been necessary, in the absence of such 
a coordinating agency, to detail an officer from each one of the activities in¬ 
spected, and possibly one from the department, and all would have had to meet 
together or communicate in some way and laboriously and with detriment to 
the performance of their regular duties arrange an interlocking program, with 
always the chance of overlap or lost motion. Whereas the district commandant, 
with the organized machine built up and at his command under the district 
organization, was enabled to carry out the needed details without friction or 
needless interruption of customary routine. This incident, small in itself, is 
typical of an endless variety of incidents constantly occurring where the co¬ 
ordination of independently functioning and disassociated activities within a 
given geographical area is essential. 

9. It has been stated above that no useful conclusion can be drawn from an 
attempt to compare the cost of clerical hire chargeable against the naval dis¬ 
tricts before the war and now. It is felt that this statement must be em¬ 
phasized and most strongly adhered to. Were it possible to compare the 
total personnel employed in district clerical activities at the time of the 
armistice in November, 1918, and now, it might prove valuable in showing the 
extensive use to which the district organization was placed in the decentraliza¬ 
tion necessary in speeding up for the supreme effort we were prepared to make 
to insure ultimate victory. It would be valuable also in showing the extent to 
which we have gone in demobilizing the forces then brought together. This 
comparison is impossible, however, because the clerical personnel employed was 
almost entirely enlisted or enrolled personnel, and there are no means at hand 
for differentiating those employed in what were purely navy-yard activities or 
activities afloat and those employed ashore outside of navy yards. 

10. An attempt was made last year to separate the clerical personnel which 
could be legitimately charged to district activities, but it was found that the 
figures obtained were so misleading as to be useless to the Navy Department, 
although they were of necessity submitted. As nearly as could be found there 
were 1,416 persons employed in district activities, including those employed in 
communications. An estimate was given for the current fiscal year by the dis¬ 
trict commandants which cut this number to 1.011. The department cut this 
number further to 833, of whom 482 were to be employed in communication 
activities alone, leaving a total of 351 employees for activities in the district 
which might be classified as an outgrowth of the decentralizing processes 
brought about by the lessons of the World War. The latest available report 
from the district shows these employees now number 253. If these employees 
are not. engaged in work outside of Washington they will of necessity have to 
be removed to Washington to carry on their duties, with perhaps the exception 
of 15 to 20 per cent, who would be required whether the name “ naval district ” 
was abolished or not. It must be borne in mind that there are only three dis¬ 
tricts which have separate district commandants; the first district, with liead- 
qua?t< rs at Boston; the third district, with headquarters at New York; and 
the twelfth district, with headquarters at San Francisco. All other district 
commandants have additional duties which would engage the services of officers 
of their rank whether the name “ naval districts ” was done away with or not. 
Separate commandants exist in the first, third, and twelfth districts on account 
of the extent and variety of the naval activities in those particular districts. 

11. Should the naval district organization be done away with, there would 
inevitably arise some form of administrative' functioning which would cor¬ 
respond very closely to the existing district organization. In other words, a 
district organization has been forced upon the Navy by the administrative needs 
of the Navy Department. 

1 he ( hatrman. On page 4 of the bill, line 13, the House struck 
out the words “ and for such purposes as he may deem proper ” under 
the head of “ Contingent expenses. Navy, for emergencies and extraor¬ 
dinary expenses, exclusive of personal services in the Navy Depart¬ 
ment or any of its subordinate bureaus or offices at Washington, 
I). C., arising at home or abroad, but impossible to be anticipated or 
classified, to be expended on the approval and authority of the Secre¬ 
tary of the Navy, and for such purposes as he may deem nrooer 
$50,000.” A * 1 1 ’ 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


39 


Admiral Peoples. The words in line 13 should be reinserted, be¬ 
cause they are a part of the appropriation itself. The Secretary has 
written a letter to the Senate committee recommending that those 
words be reinserted. They have been there for a good many years— 
since this appropriation was originally established. It is one of 
those items that went out in the House on a point of order. This ap¬ 
propriation covers all emergencies which are impossible to antici¬ 
pate or classify. The amount is small. It is expendable only upon 
the personal direction of the Secretary of the Navy himself, covering 
unusual expenses which are not covered by any other appropriation 
arising at home or abroad. 

Senator Hale. Why is it not as well covered without the words 
“ and for such purposes as he may deem proper ” ? 

Admiral Peoples. It is restrictive. 

Senator Hale. It already allows him to act for all emergencies and 
extraordinary expenses. 

The Chairman. If that is the case, what harm will it do to put 
it in? 

Senator Hale. I can not see the point. 

The Chairman. I suppose maybe because it has been in before. 

Admiral Peoples. It is for such purposes as the Secretary of the 
Navy may deem proper. 

Senator Hale. For extraordinary expenses and emergencies. 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. It makes an expenditure proper which 
is in his discretion. It does not give the accounting officer of the 
Treasury anv discretion as to whether or not any expenditure under 
this $50,000 item is proper or not. 

Senator Hale. Of course, the approval and authority of the Sec¬ 
retary of the Navy would take care of that. They have never held 
up the accounts, have they ? 

Admiral Peoples. The Treasury officials in many, many cases sub¬ 
stitute their own judgment as to what they think or deem is a proper 
charge against an appropriation. 

Senator Hale. This is to clear it up with the Treasury Depart¬ 
ment? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. While you are on “pay, miscella¬ 
neous.” I have several points to bring out in connection with the ap¬ 
propriation itself, if you have finished with that one. 

The Chairman. My idea was to get through with Admiral Coontz, 
and then to call you. 

Admiral Peoples. He is interested, Mr. Chairman, in two of the 
points that I am going to bring out in connection with the appropria¬ 
tion for “ pay, miscellaneous.” 

The Chairman. All right; go ahead. 

Admiral Peoples. This appropriation as passed by the House 
amounts to $3,500,000. The estimate as originally submitted by the 
Secretary of the Navy for 1922 amounted to $6,00*0,000. It was later 
revised in the hearings before the House Appropriations Committee 
to $5,000,000. The expenditures for the fiscal year 1921, that is the 
present year, are at the rate of $4,891,000. The sum of $3,500,000 is 
allowed by the House. They allow with respect to mileage, which I 
will take up later with Admiral Washington, $600,000. 

Mr. Reed. $600,000 for mileage. 


40 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Peoples. $600,000 for mileage, for officers traveling on 
duty, and transfer between stations of dependents. The estimate for 
1922 was that this item will amount to $1,250,000. The present rate 
of expenditure is $1,030,000 for mileage, plus $208,000 for transporta¬ 
tion of the effects of dependents, making a total of $1,238,000. 
$600,000 is insufficient for this purpose. 

The House put a restriction in line 12, page 3, that telephone 
rentals, and telegrams, and cablegrams should not exceed $250,000. 
The Secretary has recommended that that item be increased to 
$400,000. 

Senator Hale. On what page is this? 

Admiral Peoples. Page 3, line 12. That item should be increased 
to $400,000. The expenditures for 1921 are at the rate of $600,000, 
and that pays for the cost of cablegrams, telegrams, telephone rentals, 
which are a part of the communication service. The sum of $250,000 
is wholly inadequate, as may be judged by the fact that the rate of 
expenditure this year is $600,000, which represents a reduction over 
last year of $400,000. 

Senator Hale. Look at the item opposite page 3, “ For the current 
fiscal year they are estimated to amount to over $900,000.” 

Mr. Reed. That was in the original estimate of $6,000,000 which 
was submitted last October. That figure was subsequently revised 
in the $5,000,000 limit to $600,000. 

Senator Hale. It was too large. 

Admiral Peoples. It was too large. 

Senator Hale. Then, this on the page opposite page 3 of the bill is 
of no value ? 

Admiral Peoples. No, sir; not with reference to that particular 
item. The chief of Naval Operations is vitally interested in that 
particular item because the total cost of cablegrams, telegrams, tele¬ 
phones, and telephone rentals is charged to that sum. The Secretary 
has recommended that it be increased from $250,000 to $400,000. 

The Chairman. How do you account for the enormous increase in 
the expense of those communications now and what they were in 
1915? The House committee reports that in 1915 the expense was 
$101,028? 

Admiral Coontz. I would state as to that that thq telephone and 
telegraph rates since 1915 universally have increased over 30 per 
cent. During that period Navy activities regarding communications 
have been increased by the establishment of stations in Haiti, Santa 
Domingo, and the Virgin Islands, and a general increase in the size 
of the Navy in the last five years. 

Admiral Peoples. There is another item in that in which Admiral 
Coontz is interested, and that is on page 3, line 25, the last line on 
the page. The sum of $750,000 is insufficient to provide a sufficient 
administrative force for the commandant’s offices. This appropria¬ 
tion covers the clerical forces for the commandants of all navy yards 
and stations, the inspection boards, boards of labor, examining 
boards, and offices of the commandants of the naval districts. It has 
been recommended that that item be increased from $750,000 to 
$950,000. The amount allowed for 1921 is $1,000,000. The amount 
asked for 1922 is $950,000. 

Admiral Coontz. I would like to add to that statement that shortly 
after the war that amount was $11,000,000. It had grown to that 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


41 


on account of the war activities. It was then cut down, last year, 
to $1,000,000, and we have from time to time made reductions at 
the rate of 20 per cent, 12 per cent, and then up, but making it in all 
60 per cent, and we should be allowed that $950,000 at the present 
time, because otherwise these activities will be crippled. 

I do not know but what this would be a good time, while we are 
on communications, to suggest that our actual cash revenue is—how 
much, Admiral Peoples—$1,800,000? 

Admiral Peoples. About that; yes, sir. 

Admiral Coontz. From the commercial traffic that we handle. 

Senator Hale. Through the radiostations? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes. That money goes into the Treasury and, 
of course, must be considered somewhat as an offset to these expendi¬ 
tures. 

Senator Hale. What does this appropriation mean? It says “ For 
clerical, inspection, and messenger service in navy yards.” Does it 
mean all clerical work? 

Admiral Peoples. No, sir. That is clerical work in the offices of 
the commandants of navy yards, the boards of labor employment, 
the examining boards at navy yards, and the clerical forces in the 
offices of the commandants of naval districts. 

Senator Hale. Do the expenses of the boards of inspection and 
examining boards come out of this appropriation ? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. It is all part of this same appropriation? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ball. It is all covered by this $750,000? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. 

Lieut. Commander Hill. We are not allowed to charge any clerical 
force to any of those various items under “ Pay, miscellaneous,” ex¬ 
cept the $1,000,000 which specifies for clerical hire. That has been 
the decision, and what we are allowed by law to do. 

Admiral Coontz. I think that is all under “ Pay, miscellaneous.” 

Admiral Peoples. That will make the total $4,540,000, page 4, 
line 6. 

The Chairman. Have you anything special to say about the avia¬ 
tion conditions in the bill, Admiral? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. The House bill provides for $6,913,000. 
We had also a legislative bill which provided for about eight or nine 
million more. That failed. Therefore what remained in this bill 
is $6,913,000. The Secretary has a letter which will be here this 
morning that will tell exactly what the list is and how we would 
like to have it handled. It goes into the various phases of this, and 
if you will, pass that, Senator, for the present. 

The Chairman. All right; we will pass over aviation then. 

There was a hearing before the committees, I think, of both 
Houses on the question of the State marine schools, on page 6. 
The presidents of the schools of Washington, Pennsylvania, Massa¬ 
chusetts, and New York appeared here and gave a statement of the 
increase of expense that the States had been put to in maintaining 
their half or supposed half of the cost of the schools, and asked for 
an increase of this appropriation from $25,000 in each case to 
$50,000. We would like to get your views about that. 


42 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Coontz. For many years three States, sometimes the same 
and sometimes another, particularly New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Massachusetts, have carried on these nautical school ships for train¬ 
ing schools; that is, the Federal Government would furnish $25,000 
and the States the rest. They have done remarkably good work in 
the training of officers for the merchant marine, and during the war 
I suppose almost without exception the graduates came into the 
Navy and did very good service. They have run along with $25,000 
while the price of everything was going up, all these years, and per¬ 
sonally I would strongly favor their getting the amount they desire, 
provided the States put up the same amount of money, because I 
do not know of any other way in which the money could be better 
spent. I was executive of the Massachusetts school two years myself, 
and we would take these boys on long cruises, and in the list of 
people who were in the Navy during the war you will find their 
names. 

The Chairman. Have you been able to observe what benefit was 
effected by the training they received in these schools, in actual serv¬ 
ice? Has it shown good results? 

Admiral Coontz. It has shown most excellent results. They get 
the Navy training, and what is especially good regarding their train¬ 
ing is that they are made proficient in navigation. The great fault 
I have always found among the merchant marine is that they are 
not as skillful navigators as I would always like to see them. But 
this is a training in all lines, from engineering and electricity up, and 
long courses which makes them especially good navigators. They 
have either active or retired naval officers to head these schools, and 
then they take the rest of the officers from civil life. They are act¬ 
ually in almost straight-away naval training. I believe it is a most 
worthy cause. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL THOMAS WASHINGTON, CHIEF 
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION. 

The Chairman. Under the head of “ Bureau of Navigation,” I 
notice a change made by the House in the House Committee bill, lines 
21 and 22, on page 6, where they strike out the words under “ trans¬ 
portation and recruiting,” “and applicants for enlistments;” also, 
in line 22, “ or cash in lieu thereof.” Is that of any importance, 
Admiral Washington? 

A.dmiral Washington. Yes, sir; that is of very great importance. 
As it is now worded it would practically limit us to recruiting from 
our main center stations, which would necessarily be in the large 
cities. The applicants for enlistment referred to, generally speaking, 
are boys and young men who come in from the country, and the 
smaller towns, either voluntarily or we send out traveling recruiting 
parties into the small towns and they then come in for enlistment, or 
take the preliminary steps toward enlistment. We pay their ex¬ 
penses. The boys or the men ought not to be expected to pay their ex¬ 
penses from their homes or towns or farms, and the cutting out of this 
provision will prevent us being able to refund these applicants for 
the expense they have incurred in reaching the recruiting station. 
We have had this authority in the bill for years. 

Admiral Coontz. It went out on a point of order. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


43 


Admiral Washington. It is very necessary to have it back. 

The Chairman. Both of those clauses, you think, are important? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. “And applicants for enlistment,” and also the 
words “or cash in lieu thereof”? 

Admiral Washington. \es, sir. The cash in lieu thereof means a 
■small amount of money which is given a man when he is transferred 
from one place to another to pay his street car fare, his baggage 
transfer, and his ferry expenses. Of course, the supply officer does 
not have tickets for these purposes, and we give him a small amount 
of money to cover them. That is the purpose of it. 

The Chairman. We would be glad to hear any suggestion that you 
have on your mind, Admiral, in regard to this legislation affecting 
the Bureau of Navigation as contained in the bill. 

Admiral Washington. Taking up this total of $3,500,000 as author¬ 
ized by the House, the estimate submitted bv the bureau and ap¬ 
proved by the Secretary for that item was originally $9,000,000. We 
submitted $9,000,000 and the department approved $6,000,000. The 
House awarded us $3,500,000. The Secretary has written a letter 
which will reach the committee to-day or to-morrow in which he has 
recommended that the amount be increased from $3,500,000 to 
$4,500,000. That amount, if not increased, will render absolutely nec¬ 
essary the running of a deficit if only because of two fixed charges 
which we have by law—that is, the paying of a man 5 cents a mile 
when discharged from the place of discharge to his place of enlist¬ 
ment—and then if a man reenlists we also have to pay his expenses 
back from the recruiting station, or wherever he reports in for enlist¬ 
ment. 

Those two items, based on the known discharges of the men, 43,123, 
who will go out by expiration of enlistment, plus 6.6 per cent which 
we allow for those who go out by medical discharge, undesirability, 
inaptitude, and reasons of that kind, total $1,869,474, on a basis of 
100,000 men. 

The transportation of enlisted men and apprentice seamen, and 
applicants for enlistment at home and abroad, with subsistence and 
transfers en route, to replenish and keep the Navy up to 100,000 will 
amount to $4,483,858.30. Those are practically fixed charges. We 
have got to meet them, because the law required them. It is not a 
question of discretion. The men are entitled to them under the law. 

Senator Hale. If the Navy is cut down to 100,000 there will be 
more discharges this coming year than if you left it 120,000? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; and I base these figures on that. 

Senator Hale. Therefore, if you do not cut down below 120,000, or 
if we cut down to 110,000 instead of to 100,000, you won’t need so 
much money for this purpose, will you ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; because these 43,123 men, who 
go out by expiration of enlistment would reduce the Navy Jrom 
100,000, if we started at that number on the 1st of July, to 57,000. 
They go out absolutely. Their enlistments expire. 

Senator Hale. Then it makes no difference whether we cut it 
down or not? 

Admiral Washington. No; those are fixed charges. For the 
^transportation of men allowed by law. 5 cents a mile, we figure that 
would amount to $7,495,399.70. That is, cutting all the items under 


44 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


transportation and recruiting down to bedrock. We have cut out r 
for instance, advertising and matters of that kind, and allowed only 
$ 2 , 000 . 

Senator Hale. You estimate it will be over $7,000,000 and the 
estimate here is $6,000,000? 

Admiral Washington. We thought we could get along by cutting 
these various items to $6,000,000, with the understanding that we 
would have to run a deficit. We have already for the present year 
a deficit of $2,697,000 which the Secretary has asked for in the de¬ 
ficiency bill. That is in the present year. He has recently asked 
Congress to grant that amount additional to what Congress had 
allowed for the current year. 

xCdmiral Coontz. This is one of the items on which we can run a 
deficit. 

Admiral Washington. Yes. This appropriation, if made to re¬ 
main at $3,500,000, will be too small, and we have repeatedly informed 
the House Appropriations Committee that we must run a deficit 
unless it was increased. 

Senator Hale. What is the deficit this year? 

Admiral Washington. The Secretary has asked for $2,397,106. 
That request is before Congress now. 

Senator Hale. And you need how much of this appropriation for 
this year so as not to have a deficit? 

Admiral Washington. We need $7,495,399.70. That will cover 
the contemplated expenses, and is a little more than double what is, 
appropriated for in this bill. 

Senator Hale. Was this explained to the House committee?. 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. The House committee had, in 
taking this matter up, assumed we would really have to do but very 
little recruiting, and that 60 per cent of the men entitled to would 
reenlist; that is, 60 per cent of the 43,123 discharged by expiration of 
enlistment. That was an estimate we made, but have found it to be 
incorrect. 

Senator Hale. In which case they are not paid? 

Admiral Washington. No, sir; we would not have to recruit them 
if they reenlisted. In that case we would not have to go out in the 
cities and towns and the country to get new recruits, because 60 per 
cent of the 43,000 whose enlistments expire would give us 25,000 
who would come back of their own volition, and then we would not 
have to recruit but a small number to keep the Navy up to 100,000. 
This supposition, however, appears to be wrong, and we will have to* 
do a great deal of recruiting of new men. 

. Senator Hale. How about that expectation? 

Admiral Washington. We have found that it does not work at all,, 
in fact, is entirely wrong. 

Senator Hale. Why not ? 

Admiral Washington. Last month, in January, our reenlistments 
were only 150, and was a great surprise and disappointment. 

Senator Hale. Out of how many? 

Admiral Washington. We expected about 1,500 to 1,600 or more. 
We have no figures really to go on in reenlistments. There is nothing 
we can base on with any degree of satisfaction because conditions 
have been so disturbed and unsettled during the war and also during; 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 45 

the past year, due to demobilization and the economic state of the 
-country. 

Senator Hale. Do you find the tendency is that as wages go down 
and it is harder to get work, that the men come back to reenlist? 

Admiral Washington. That is what we hoped would be the case 
and is usually so, but during January and this past half of February 
we‘find it has not worked out at all according to our expectations. 
Instead of getting 1,500 or 1,600 reenlistments we got only 150, so 
I think recruiting will be necessary to a considerable extent, to keep 
up the enlisted force. 

Senator Ball. How do you account for that ? 

Admiral Washington. I do not account for it; I don’t know why 
it is. It was a great surprise. 

Senator Ball. With business conditions as at present? 

Admiral Washington. It looks like with business unsettled as it 
is men would come back to the service but they have not done so. 
What this is due to I can not fathom. Our expectations were that 
we would get quite a large number of reenlistments in January. 

Senator Hale. Is there not some provision that they can be dis¬ 
charged and then reenlist any time within a month? 

Admiral Washington. Within four months. 

Senator Hale. By doing that they can get their pay for traveling 
expenses from their home? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. That is what they do probably. 

Admiral Washington. We figured on a percentage of perhaps 60 
per cent reenlisting on the experience of seven months only, from 
June to December 31 last. It was thoroughly explained to the sub¬ 
committee of the House Appropriations Committee that that esti¬ 
mate was based on conditions in the country when everything was 
thoroughly upset, and we did not know whether it was going to 
hold good or not, and that instead of getting 60 per cent of reenlist¬ 
ments we might not get 10 per cent, and this latter supposition seems 
nearer the actual facts. But the moment we stopped recruiting it 
seemed that the reenlistments rapidly fell off, and I therefore attribute 
the lack of reenlistments more to the stoppage of recruiting efforts 
than I do to any other cause—not to the financial condition of the 
country at all, but simply the suspension of recruiting offices which 
would stir the fellows up and bring them back into the service. We 
stopped recruiting absolutely on the 31st of December. As it now 
appears, on or before the 1st of July next we have got to reopen all 
our recruiting stations and recruit to fill the places of those 20,000 
men whose terms of enlistment will expire during July, August, and 
September next. 

Senator Phelan. How does the failure to recruit affect the men 
who are already in the service? What is your theory ? 

Admiral Washington. The House has intimated they are going to 
reduce us to 100,000 men, so we have already begun to discharge as 
rapidly as we can all the undesirables. The effect on others prob¬ 
ably will cause some of them to ask for their discharge. 

The Chairman. We will have to suspend for a few minutes, as 
there is a vote going on in the Senate. 

(After an informal recess the committee reassembled.) 


46 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


The Chairman. Admiral Washington, you may continue your 
statement. 

Admiral Washington. The appropriation for the transportation 
of these two classes of men—that is, those discharged by expiration of 
enlistment, medical discharge, reenlistments, and applicants, etc.— 
amount to a total of about $6,000,000. We have cut the appropria¬ 
tion for recruiting and for getting in men to replace those whose 
terms expire but who do not voluntarily reenlist as low as we thought 
it should be, and the House committee apparently took the stand 
that reenlistments would be very great; that recruiting would not be 
necessary, or, if necessary, it would be at such a very small amount, 
that they practically cut the recruiting appropriation out. 

Admiral Coontz. I think you ought to tell Senator Poindexter that 
there are 43,000 men who go out by discharge alone. 

Admiral Washington. There are 43,123 who go out of the Navy 
by discharge alone during the fiscal year 1921-22. 

The Chairman. How many have you in the Navy now? 

Admiral Washington. At the 15th of this month we had about 
130,600, and those we are gradually reducing, or rapidly reducing in 
fact, so as to average for the year not exceeding 120,000 for which 
number Congress appropriated pay in the last bill; that is, the 
current year. 

The Chairman. What is the total authorized strength of the Navy 
now? 

Admiral Washington. At the present time it is 137,485, plus the 
Hospital Corps, men in prisons, men assigned to the Naval Reserves,, 
and a few other items, making a grand total of about 145,000. That 
is the total enlisted force, but Congress last year appropriated pay 
for only 120,000. 

The Chairman. What did you estimate would be required for re¬ 
cruiting ? 

Admiral Washington. Our estimate was $7,495,399.70. 

The Chairman. For recruiting alone? 

Admiral Washington. No, sir; that is for recruiting and trans¬ 
portation. Transportation is the big item. 

The Chairman. What did you estimate would be required for re¬ 
cruiting ? 

Admiral Washington. For recruiting we asked $378,000, and I 
think the House committee’s item allowed was about $78,000. That 
is my recollection of it. For rent of rendezvous and expenses of 
maintaining the same, advertising for and obtaining men and ap¬ 
prentice seamen, which meant the maintenance of about 350 recruit¬ 
ing stations, we ask $262,574. 

The Chairman. What did the House allow? 

Admiral Washington. The estimate was about $640,000 and they 
cut it to about $150,000. They practically abolished all possibility 
of successful recruiting. 

The Chairman. Does the estimate that you mentioned include the 
cost of advertising? 

Admiral Washington. We allowed only $2,000 for advertising 
that is practically did away with it. 

The Chairman. How much did you spend last year in advertis¬ 
ing? 


AVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 47 

Admiral Washington. $300,000 for advertising. This year we 
cut it to $2,000. 

The Chairman. Give us an idea of how reliable your data as to 
the money you need for recruiting is? Is it just guesswork, or have 
you got pretty substantial data? 

Admiral Washington. We have very substantial data for it. 
Last year it was $1,200,000, and we set aside $200,000 for advertis¬ 
ing. Now, this year we have asked for $2,000 only for advertising 
for recruits. But we must maintain the recruiting stations, and for 
some of them we have to pay rent. Wherever we can get a room in 
the Post Office Building or a Federal building of any kind through¬ 
out the country, we try to get it. 

The Chairman. How many stations have you? 

Admiral Washington. About 350 we did have. At present we 
have only about 43. and these we hope to retain. We have cut them 
down to almost nothing. 

The Chairman. When was it you had 350? 

Admiral Washington. The 1st of January. 

The Chairman. But you have cut them down to 43 ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; about 43—that is, we have left 
only our principal stations. 

The Chairman. How many men can you maintain under the ap¬ 
propriation carried in the bill as it passed the House? 

Admiral Washington. We can not maintain really any but the 
most necessary ones. We will try and maintain the main stations in 
the principal cities. But our recruits come from the country and 
smaller towns as well as from the larger cities, and we should have 
substations in the smaller towns also. The larger cities we can reach 
better locally, from receiving ships and places like that, in New York, 
Boston, Baltimore, and San Francisco—there we can reach them 
locally. But we can not get to the small towns and country unless 
we have recruiting appropriations which will enable our people to 
go out and interview the people in the neighborhood of where they 
live. 

The Chairman. How much does it cost to maintain the recruiting 
stations you have at present, the 43 ? 

Admiral Washington. We will maintain them on what the House 
allowed, but it will not meet the needs of the recruiting we must 
undertake to keep the Navy filled. 

The Chairman. It will maintain 43 stations on what the House 
allowed ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes. 

The Chairman. But you are giving them up now ? 

Admiral Washington. We intend to give up about 300. We had 
about 350. 

Senator Hale. You propose to hold on to the 43, and you have 
given up the rest? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I understood you had given them all up ? 

Admiral Washington. We have called in and given up the men 
stationed in about 300. 

The Chairman. What lam trying to find out is whether you can 
continue to maintain your present recruiting establishment under the 
amount allowed by the House ? 


48 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Washington. No, sir; not the recruiting establishment 
we had on the 1st day of January, and that is what we will really 
need after the 1st of July. 

Senator Hale. That included the 300 extra stations? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; it did. And we have got back 
and reestablished them, because we have to recruit and can not depend 
on 60 per cent of reenlistments. It shows that we have got to get 
our recruiting force started to get men to come back and reenlist as 
well as to bring in new men. The recruiting force was evidently a 
stronger factor in bringing back reenlistments than was the action 
of the men themselves voluntarily coming back. 

Senator Hale. You do not mean to say that you have only re¬ 
cruited 150? 

Admiral Washington. We reenlisted that many in January. We 
have stopped recruiting absolutely. I think, however, we did take in 
two recruits during the month. 

The Chairman. You want this item more than doubled. You say 
that you w r ant, instead of $3,500,000, $7,000,000? 

Admiral Washington. T es, sir; we would like to have that or as 
near as we can get it. 

The Chairman. What portion of that do you appropriate to trans¬ 
portation ? 

Admiral Washington. About 90 per cent of it goes for the fixed 
charges of transportation. 

The Chairman. You can estimate that pretty closely? 

Admiral Washington. We know absolutely what it is going to cost 
for the 43,123 men whose enlistments expire, and if we take our usual 
assumption of such a percentage of discharges for inaptitude, unde¬ 
sirability, medical discharge, and matters of that kind Ave get it fairly 
accurately. Our figures, so far as transportation is concerned, are very 
close to accurate. 

The Chairman. You say the Secretary in his letter recommends 
$4,500,000? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; an increase of $1,000,000, and I 
said to him this morning we must necessarily even then make a deficit 
for the year, as it was not enough. 

Senator Hale. This must involve a deficit ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; there is no way out of it. 

The Chairman. Even if you have no recruiting? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; because we have to pay these time- 
expired and other men their transportation home. 

The Chairman. And there would be a deficit on a basis of an ap¬ 
propriation of $4,500,000 even if you abandoned recruiting? 

Admiral Washington. If we totally abandoned recruiting we 
would have the Navy reduced, Senator, to less than 50,000 men by 
reason of honorable discharges, and unless we recruit we can not re¬ 
place these men. 

Senator Hale. You said 90 per cent had not anything to do with 
recruiting? 7 

Admiral Washington. The charges for transportation are about 
that. We have to give men under the law T 5 cents a mile to their 
homes, and it amounts to about that wherever they are transported. 

Senator Hale. So if you do not recruit at all your expenditures for 
traveling will amount to $6,000,000? 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 49 

Admiral Washington. That is a little in error; we would not have 
quite that much perhaps. 

Senator Hale. But you have just said 90 per cent is for that? 

Admiral Washington. I mean of those fellows discharged and 
going home, there would be about 60,000 of them, and those men 
being paid at the rate of about $50. There is $3,000,000 right there; 
then to recruit new men, send them to a training station, and then 
later to a ship makes up the rest. 

Senator Hale. Then, what is your estimate for recruiting in its 
total? 

Admiral Washington. It is $378,000 for the expense of recruiting 
and $264,574 for rent of rendezvous and expenses of maintaining the 
same, $2,000 for advertising, and $2,000 for actual necessary expenses 
of officers in connection with recruiting parties. 

Senator Hale. So the whole recruiting appropriation, if you got it, 
will be under $600,000? 

Admiral Washington. Under that arrangement, just about. 

The Chairman. What is the minimum amount required for trans¬ 
portation without considering recruiting at all? 

Admiral Washington. Roughly, $6,300,000. Of course, a great 
many of these men are now on the Pacific coast, and if they are dis¬ 
charged there that means nearly $300 transportation to him to go 
home. He gets that under the law whether he goes home or not. If 
he goes home and reenlists there and wants to come back to a ship on 
the west coast, our general practice has been to send him back. 

The Chairman. This item on page 7, lines 15 to 23, is entirely 
$50,000 for reporting the services of persons in the Navy during the 
war ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; that was in the bill last year. Last 
year Congress allowed us $200,000, as I recollect it, to be used in copy¬ 
ing the records that the adjutant generals of the several States wished 
to cover the records of service of all officers and enlisted men from 
their respective States who served in the war. We have got about 
three-quarters through with this work and it is necessary to have an 
additional appropriation to carry it on in order to complete it. If 
we do not complete it, it will not be worth anything to any of the 
States. 

The Chairman. And we simply lose the value of what has been 
done ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. Last year the bill as passed took 
$100,000 of our bureau appropriation for' use on this work, in addi¬ 
tion to the $200,000 appropriated especially. 

The Chairman. You have spent altogether a total of $200,000 on 
it so far? 

Admiral Washington. No, sir; we will have spent by June 30, 
$300,000, and we ask this year that the amount be increased from 
$50,000 to $200,000, because if we use the regular bureau clerks for 
this work in addition to the others employed under this special ap¬ 
propriation, as we did this year, we find ourselves shortened greatly 
in our clerical force by the action of the Appropriations Committee 
which has just passed the legislative bill, and in it has reduced us by 
130 clerks, or by the sum of $152,000. I therefore ask that that 
wording be put back in this bill and the sum be made $200,000, so 


34772—21-4 



50 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


that we can use the clerks in the same manner as we did this year, 
and complete the work. 

Senator Hale. For this purpose? 

Admiral Washington. Yes. Last year Congress authorized the 
interchangeability of these two appropriations—that is, to the ex¬ 
tent of $100,000 of the regular bureau appropriation—to help out 
in this copying work, and I now T ask that the same authorization be 
carried in the present bill and the amount be increased to $200,000. 

The Chairman. How much money will be required to complete 
this work? 

Admiral Washington. Not less than the amount stated in the bill. 

Senator Hale. Including the hiring of clerks? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; and I would like to have that 
restriction of date removed. 

The Chairman. Not including the hiring of clerks? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. I would like to have that re¬ 
striction on or before October 31, 1921, removed, because, while it 
is practicable to do it, yet there will be a great many inquiries later 
on coming from every State for more information, and the work 
therefore will be more or less continuous for some time to come. 

Senator Ball. You want this provision from lines 15 to 23? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir: the whole thing reinserted, with 
the amount at $200,000 in place of $50,000, and after “ 1921,” in line 
18,1 would like to add “ or as soon after as possible.” That will not 
limit us to that date, because we must have correspondence on this 
subject later on with the adjutant generals of the several States. 

Senator Hale. Fifty thousand dollars would not do any good, 
would it? 

Admiral Washington. It might do this work if we stopped the 
bureau part of our work and turned the clerks entirely on this par¬ 
ticular job, but the work of keeping and copying these records is so 
interwoven with the regular bureau work that it is impossible to 
thoroughly separate it. There are some clerks Avorking on records 
at one time and others at another time, and the records can not be 
used by the different clerks at the same time. 

Last year Congress authorized $100,000 from the regular bureau 
appropriation to be used in connection with this appropriation 
which Avas made for this particular job, and I ask that that authority 
be again given and that the amount of $200,000 be put in the bill, 
and in practically the same language as last year, so that we can 
efficiently use it during the coming year in the same manner as we 
did this year, and complete the work. 

The Chairman. What is the language? 

Admiral Washington. I haA^e it here: 

The Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, is hereby directed to furnish 
to the proper officers in the several States, Territories, insular possessions, and 
the District of Columbia, United States, on or before .Tune 30, 1921, statements 
of the services of all persons from those several places who served in the 
Navy during the war with Germany, and for that purpose a sum not to exceed 
$200,000 is hereby appropriated for obtaining the necessary material and the 
employment of the necessary clerical force, and the further sum of $100.000—* 

And this is what I particularly refer to— 

shall be allotted of the appropriation of $404,140 for temporary employes, 
Bureau of Navigation, contained in the legislative, executive, and "judicial'ap¬ 
propriation act for the fiscal year 1921. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922 . 51 

The C hairman. It was understood that when that appropriation 
was made that that would complete the work. 

Admiral Washington. No, sir. 

The Chairman. It says by June 30. 

Admiral Washington. That is what they put in, but it was a clear 
understanding of the committee that this estimate at this time was 
$750,000, as I recall it. and that the first appropriation of $200,000 
would not complete it. 

The Chairman. It was? 

Admiral Washington: Yes, sir; the original estimate was $750,000, 
and the smaller sum was put in, we might say, as an afterthought. 

Senator Hale. I suppose it went out on a point of order. Mr. 
Chairman, don't you think it would be a good idea for the admiral 
to draw up what he thinks would be a clause that would cover this, 
and leave it with the clerk? 

Admiral Washington. I have it here, sir. This was not the 
action of the department in asking for this money for copying these 
records, but it comes from adjutant generals of the States through¬ 
out the Union. The Army and Marine Corps are working on the 
same matter. 

(The amendment suggested is here printed in full, as follows:) 

The Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, is hereby directed to furnish 
to the proper officers in the several States, Territories, insular possession, and 
the District of Columbia, on or before October 31, 1921, or as soon thereafter 
as possible, statements of the services of all persons from those several places 
who served in the Navy during the war with Germany, and for that purpose 
a sum not to exceed $200,000 is hereby appropriated for obtaining the neces¬ 
sary material and the employment of the necessary clerical force. 

The Chairman. What else of importance under this head have you 
to speak about ? 

Admiral Washington. Gunnery exercises. 

The Chairman. Before you get to that, under the head of “con¬ 
tingent,' 1 on page 8, the House struck out two lines there, lines 8 and 
9. Is that of any importance? 

Admiral Washington. No, sir: we do not care about that. We 
have not used that heretofore, and we probably would have no occa¬ 
sion to use it again. It was put m during the continuation of the 
war. 

Mr. Moses. The Secretary has asked for it. 

Admiral Washington. In line 18, page 8, “Gunnery and engi¬ 
neering exercises,” on a point of order that section was stricken out. 
We ask to have it reinserted. It is legislation that has been there 
for a number of years, and it is the means by which we have of 
maintaining our target practice and gunnery work. 

The Chairman. I think myself that is one of the most important 
things in the bill. 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir 

The Chairman. “Prizes, trophies, and badges for excellence in 
gunnery.” 

Admiral Washington. Yes. sir. 

The Chairman. What about these lines that were added to the 
committee bill in the House, page 9, lines 2 to 5. inclusive? 

Admiral Washington. That was in the first bill, I think. 

Mr. Moses. That is included in the previous clause. 

The Chairman. Is that not carried anywhere else in the bill? 


52 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Mr. Moses. They struck it out on a point of order and carried 
those words to care for what they wanted to care for in that clause. 
It is already in the previous clause. 

Admiral Washington. It would be very much clearer to have it 
put back as it was last year and heretofore. 

The Chairman. That is the same as the part that is stricken out. 

Mr. Moses. After they struck it out an amendment was offered 
which was adopted. 

The Chairman. What is the next item ? 

Admiral Washington. They struck out the outfits on first enlist¬ 
ments for the men. That I think is to be taken up by the chief of the 
Bureau of of Supplies and Accounts. Will you take that up ? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes. 

Senator Hale. That is supplies and accounts? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. In the ordinary routine it would come 
with this section. 

Admiral Washington. It is the means by which we outfit the 
recruits on their original enlistment. They are allowed a $100 outfit 
of clothing upon first enlisting, and this provides for it. 

The Chairman. We will come back to that again. 

Admiral Washington. The amount allowed in the 23d line, on 
page 9—$750,000—will not meet our needs. We have about 31 unde¬ 
livered destroyers and a number of other vessels for which no pro¬ 
vision is made for gyrocompasses or navigation outfit. We esti¬ 
mated originally for this section, $1,236,719: the Secretary approved 
$1,000,000, and the House cut it to $750,000. 

Senator Ball. What are you asking now? 

Admiral Washington. $950,000. We have 31 destroyers coming 
on, and yet to be outfitted besides other vessels. 

The Chairman. You asked for $1,000,000? 

Admiral Washington. $950,000. 

The Chairman. How does it happen there was an estimate for a 
million and a half? 

Admiral Washington. No, sir; $1,200,000 and odd was our origi¬ 
nal estimate—$1.236,000—and the department approved it for 
$1,000,000, and the Plouse cut it to $750,000. 

Senator Hale. Can’t you get along on that? 

Admiral Washington. We can get along, but the ships may not 
be properly outfitted. These 31 destroyers, and the scout cruisers— 
I am not sure about them—but several of the other vessels will not 
have their complete navigation outfits, and their gyrocompasses, 
particularly, we should have. 

Senator Ball. But you can equip with $950,000? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. Can you not cut down on things like libraries and 
other items here, and use it for only the necessary things ? 

Admiral Washington. We can. to a limited extent, sir, but we hate 
to cut down on necessary things like that, and I doubt if we could 
save enough on it to outfit these destroyers. A battleship requires 
about $30,000 for gyrocompasses and a destroyer about $3,000, and 
we have 30 destroyers. 

Senator Swanson. How long does it take to equip with these gyro¬ 
compasses? 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


53 


Admiral Washington. About a year and a half at the present 
time, because they have had difficulties of construction, and strikes, 
etc., at the works, I am informed. 

Senator Swanson. Under stress how long would it take ? 

Admiral Washington. It ought not to take more than three 
months. 

The Chairman. Does this include repair and readjustment? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Keeping in condition ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. It also includes pilotage, towage, 
canal duties, wharfage, etc. 

The Chairman. What is the next item? 

Senator Ball. Naval training stations, is that satisfactory? 

Admiral Washington. The naval training station, California, was 
given $125,000, with the distinct statement with the Subcommittee on 
Appropriations that no repairs of any kind whatsoever were to be 
put on the buildings; the buildings were to be allowed to go downhill 
all the time and until they were vacated by transfer to San Diego. 

Senator Ball. How soon do they expect to transfer the station? 

Admiral Washington. I had a letter yesterday from Admiral 
Welles, the commandant at San Diego, and he told me he doubted very 
much if they would get in in 1922. 

Senator Ball. If it was going to be transferred shortly it would 
probably be worth while not to spend a great amount on improve¬ 
ments. 

Admiral Washington. No, sir. We can get along with $125,000 if 
we do nothing to the buildings, but the sanitary conditions will 
necessarily go down from day to day. They are temporary struc¬ 
tures—wooden structures. 

Senator Ball. The place itself is a very sanitary place. 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; but during the rainy season if the 
men do not have a roof over their heads, it will not be very sanitary 
for them. 

Senator Ball. There was a special understanding that if the roofs 
leaked they would be allowed to leak. 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. That is, the House Committee 
asked whether we could run the station, and not put any repairs on 
it. and we said we could do it on the amount allowed. 

The Chairman. What amount did you ask for? 

Admiral Washington. The Secretary is sending a letter now ask¬ 
ing for $50,000 more, making $175,000. 

Senator Hale. If we allowed you $25,000 more could you not take 
care of anv kind of leaks? 

Admiral Washington. I think so; yes, sir; we could get along 
with if because we will only be there during the time we are kept 
away from San Diego. 

Senator Hale. How long will that be? 

Admiral Washington. Admiral Welles told me this past week lie 
doubted if we would get in during the present year; if we get in by 
the fall of 1922 we will probably be doing well. 

Senator Gerry. I see the committee has reduced the appropria¬ 
tion for the naval training station at Newport to $185,000; that the 
estimate was $500,000, and that last year $275,000 was appropriated. 
Can you get on with that, with $185,000? 


54 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Washington. Not unless we treat it pretty much in the 
same way we expect to treat the San Francisco station. 

Senator Ball. Are you going to continue training there in the new 
grounds or on the old training station, at the island ? 

Admiral Washington. At Newport? 

Senator Ball. Yes. 

Admiral Washington. I had a letter last week from Capt. Dis- 
mukes asking authority to move back to Coasters Harbor Island. 

Senator Ball. If they move back to the old island they will have 
to have repairs. The buildings are in miserable condition. 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ball. If they can maintain it on the expenditure of $6,- 
000,000 that they made there during the war for their new training 
station, there will be no repairs needed? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ball. They expended $6,000,000 for a new training sta¬ 
tion. 

Senator Hale. But they are now contemplating giving that up. 

Senator Ball. It is so inaccessible, I don’t see how they can use it— 
they can’t reach it. 

Admiral Washington. The transportation problem is very diffi¬ 
cult. 

The Chairman. How much has been spent of the $6,000,000? 

Admiral Washington. I don’t remember the sum, but probably 
that much. It accommodates about 12,000. 

Senator Ball. But you have to have repairs? 

Senator Gerry. What reason did Capt. Dismukes give for moving 
back? 

Admiral Washington. One reason was that the old station can be 
run more economically. He gets his light and power now from the 
torpedo station, and that has reduced the expense very materially. 
The permanent buildings over on Coasters Harbor Island are much 
better, on the whole, if they are in good condition, than the ones 
over on Codington Point. The convenience of the old station, due to 
the inaccessibility of Codington Point, is very much greater. 

Senator Gerry. Of course, the buildings at Codington Point were 
new buildings when they moved into them ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes. 

Senator Gerry. Now, I understand you to say he wants to go back? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; because he says he can more eco¬ 
nomically handle the whole station. 

Senator Gerry. Won’t he have to repair those buildings? 

Admiral Washington. The wooden buildings on Codington Point 
have tar-paper roofs, and it is only a question of a year or so-;- 

Senator Gerry. He wants to move back again to the old permanent 
buildings ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ball. If they move back, what is your idea, what does 
he expect to do with these new buildings? Let them just deterio¬ 
rate with age? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; allow them to go as a war loss. 

Senator Ball. They had better scrap the whole business. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


55 


Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. That is what we are doing at 
the other station, at the Great Lakes, at Mare Island, and I suppose 
we will do it at East Camp—just let them go as a war loss. 

Senator Gerry. Will he be able to accommodate those men in the 
permanent buildings ? 

Admiral Washington. He has written me he would; yes, sir. 

Senator Gerry. There is not so much repair needed at the perma¬ 
nent buildings? 

Admiral Washington. We put in quite a good deal of repairing be¬ 
tween the 1st of July and the end of the year. It is his own idea to 
move back, and the reason he gave was such I thought it well enough 
to authorize it, but he does not care to go until warm weather sets in. 
He gets all light, heat, and power from the torpedo station, and that 
is a big factor now. Before it was a very expensive affair, and he ran 
the plant over on the old station, if you recall, with fuel oil. Now he 
gets all of it from the torpedo station. 

Senator Ball. They have a heating plant and lighting plant over 
on the island now ? 

Admiral Washington. Over on Codington Point. 

Senator Ball. The new training station? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; he has several of them. I think 
something like at least three separate ones. They have to keep two 
of these in operation. If he gets back to the old station, he will get 
his power and light from the torpedo station, and save considerably 
thereby. He can put in one more camp in addition to the frame 
buildings on Coasters Harbor Island, running a coal-burning boiler 
which he already has (In the island, he says, and which he will estab¬ 
lish himself, and he thinks on the whole the result will be more 
economical on Coasters Harbor Island after he moves back than it 
would be to maintain the establishment on Codington Point. 

The Chairman. There ought to be a decision as to which is to be 
used. He ought not to waiver between these two places and divide 
this appropriation. This speaks of new buildings and wharves, for 
maintenance of buildings and wharves, dredging channel, extending 
sea wall. Is that at the old place or the new place ? 

Admiral Washington. That is an appropriation that has been in 
for years, and sometimes we have occasion to take advantage of it 
on either station. 

The Chairman. You use it sometimes on the old place and some¬ 
times on the new ? 

Admiral Washington. There won’t be anything to do at the new 
place. It will be practically all put in on the old. 

The Chairman. Coasters Harbor Island? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; as soon as we get back. 

The Chairman. You could do either under the appropriation? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And both of these are included under the head of 
training station, are they not ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; but we would have very little 
occasion to spend anything on Codington Point after we once move 


back. 

Senator Gerry. Would this appropriation, then, be sufficient if he 
moves back to look after those repairs ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 


56 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Senator Gerry. It will ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; entirely. 

Senator Gerry. This appropriation, then, will cover the whole 
thing ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gerry. And look after about how many men, 2,000 ? 

Admiral Washington. More than that—with the overhead and 
the schools they are running more than 3,000. 

Senator Gerry. I was thinking of the apprentices. 

Admiral Washington. The apprentices are about 1,800 to 2,000. 

Senator Gerry. That is what I thought. 

Senator Hale. Then $185,000 is not enough? 

Admiral Washington. Oh, no; $300,000 is necessary. 

Senator Hale. Could you get along with $250,000 ? 

Admiral Washington. To a less extent than we could with 
$300,000, sir. 

The Chairman. What have you to say about the item concerning 
the naval training station at Great Lakes ? 

Admiral Washington. The Secretary has written a letter to-day 
asking that the appropriation be increased to $500,000, and we will 
get along with that. 

The Chairman. You could get along with $400,000? 

Admiral Washington. We can. Senator, but that $400,000 contem¬ 
plated practically the abandonment of the station as a training place 
for apprentices. 

Senator Ball. Do they propose disposing of the additional land? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. We have withdrawn all our 
activities to the east side of the railroad. We have nothing now west 
of it that we wish to retain, and we have salvaged all the buildings. 

Senator Ball. The buildings ought to be painted and cared for; 
there is no doubt about that. 

Admiral Washington. They are going down very rapidly, but we 
have had no funds from which to do that. 

The Chairman. Are they of permanent construction? 

Admiral Washington. Some of them are. The original station 
was of brick and stone. The subsequent camps built during the war 
were temporary, and those w T e have been occupying. We have a 
medical school there of 450 and 600; we have a machinist’s-mate 
school numbering about 2,000. The aviation school ran as high as 
2,000, and we have now about 1,200. We also have other schools. 

The Chairman. What is the total appropriation for the Naval 
Academy at Annapolis? 1 only want to use it as a comparison. I 
suppose it is about $500,000 for the Naval Academv. and you have 
$400,000? 

Admiral Washington. $2,273,595.83. 

The Chairman. Is that for maintenance ? 

Admiral Washington. That is the total expenses; maintenance 
and repairs amount to $1,118,500. 

The Chairman. I don’t see why you can not get along with $400,000 
at the Great Lakes Naval Training Station. 

Admiral Washington. The idea is to shut up all of the buildings 
that are not actually used, so far as possible, and to condense the 
activities to where the buildings can be heated and lighted as eco¬ 
nomically as possible. That is a very expensive plant, and a great 


57 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


deal of it is due to the arrangement of the heating system. Coal is 
the largest item by far. Most of these expenses are paid by “ Yards 
and docks,” and 1 am not familiar enough with the details of it to 
tell you how it goes, but coal is the greatest item. They have some¬ 
thing like 11 heating plants for the entire station. 

The Chairman. We come now to the next section, page 12, line 12. 
I see, Senator Swanson, that refers to the mine depot at Yorktown. 

Admiral McVay. We had to buy quite a bit of land there, sufficient 
for the needs of the mine depot, and in addition to that to provide 
a safety zone one-half mile around the station. The question is now 
being taken up by a board of appraisal. That board discussed the 
question with me a couple of days ago, and I told them that if a 
sufficient number of landholders there were willing to take back the 
land that we could do it, but if there are a large number of land¬ 
holders who do not wish to take back the land, we had better keep it. 
My experience is that every time we give up land to-day, 20 or 30 
years later we buy it back at a higher price. 

I think the safety zone is advisable. It is purely a question of 
economy. I think the bill should pass as it is, because it gives the 
department an opportunity to act for the best interests of the Gov¬ 
ernment as well as the people there. 

Senator Swanson. You mean as it passed the House? 

Admiral McVay. Yes, sir. If we have to take over little spots of 
this land it will be of no use to us, and we would want the right to 
sell it. 

Senator Swanson. That is your main depot for mines and ex¬ 
plosives ? 

Admiral McVay. That are used in mines; yes, sir. We are putting 
quite a lot of explosives there, to get them away from Norfolk. 

Admiral Coontz. The Secretary has asked me to handle the East 
Camp question. He recommends in the pending naval appropria¬ 
tion bill, on page 13, line 3, following the word “ Illinois,” the in¬ 
sertion of, “ and East Camp, Hampton Roads, Virginia.” Also on 
page 13, line 6, strike out the words, “ together with,” and insert in 
lieu thereof “ also any.” 

Senator Hale. How does that change it ? 

Admiral Coontz. I would have to read it. This letter has just 
come to me. Also the following amendment: 


February 18, 1921. 

My Dear Mr. Chairman : Referring to the pending naval appropriation bill, I 
beg to request that— 

On page 13, line 3, after the comma following the word “ Illinois,” insert “ and 
East Camp, Hampton Roads, Virginia.” 

On page 13, line 6, strike out the words “ together with,” and insert in lieu 
thereof “ also any.” 

On page 13, line 6, after the word “ improvements,” insert the words “ that 


have been.” 

These amendments are necessary to enable the department to dispose of the im¬ 
provements on the property at East Camp, Hampton Roads, Va., where the land 
is not now owned by the Government. 

Sincerely, yours, 

Josephus Daniels. 


Hon. Carroll S. Page, 

Cl airman Commute on Naval Affairs, 

United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 

This allows a considerable portion of the land there to be turned 
back to the owners at once that has not been used at all. I understand 


58 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

the percentage paid for is 3 per cent on the valuation of $139,000, and 
it will allow the Secretary to sell or otherwise dispose or salvage the 
improvements that are on certain parts of the land. It puts it in 
the same class in a way with Chicago, and also with the mine depot 
at Yorktown, and will allow the matter to be handled, we believe, to 
the best interests of the Government. 

The House Naval Committee were unable to agree to purchase the 
land and then have it sold, but to pay the rentals and settle with the 
various owners, a lot of which it is believed can be done collectively, 
and then salvage whatever is desired. 

Senator Swanson. A part of the land there now, I understand, is at 
present not necessary? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. And while they condemned the land and put 
improvements on it they ought to be able to exercise the option of 
selling the land or removing the improvements? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. There are a number of matters that 
could be well salvaged, like laundries, and things of that character. 
To purchase the land it was believed it would cost about $320,000, 
and they did not think it proper to do that, that they would get more 
out of it by paying rental and selling to the owners. 

The Chairman. For the naval training station, etc., at Hampton 
Roads, page 14, beginning line 18 of the bill, I see they got what they 
asked for. How did that happen ? 

Admiral Washington. The main reason for that was that Hamp¬ 
ton Roads is our main training station, and they granted the whole 
amount asked for. 

Senator Ball. The House bill carries all that the department 
asked for? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Naval Reserve Force, page 15, $50,000? 

Admiral Washington. The Secretary has a letter about that which 
is coming up to-day, in which he asks that the appropriation for the 
summer school be inserted. Last year Congress gave us $200,000 for 
maintaining summer schools for boys, the course taking about six 
weeks. As a result of that boys came from all over the country, and 
it was most satisfactory. We had one at Hampton Roads and one at 
the Great Lakes. In those we had about 2,000 boys to whom we gave 
six weeks’ instruction. This year the House omitted that, and the 
Secretary has written a letter asking that it be reinserted. The gen¬ 
eral tone of the letters we received from the parents of these boys was 
most commendatory. 

The Chairman. For maintenance of receiving barracks, $50,000? 

Admiral Washington. One more thing there, sir. The Secretary 
asks that an addition be made to that provision of last year, authoriz¬ 
ing these two summer schools, to the following effect: 

The Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to establish 
at two of the permanent training stations experimental summer schools for boys 
between the ages of sixteen and twenty years. For this purpose he is author¬ 
ized to use such buildings or other accommodations at such training stations, 
to loan any naval equipment necessary for such purposes, and to give instruc¬ 
tions which will fit them for service in the Navy of the United States. He is 
empowered to establish and enforce such rules within the camp as may be 
necessary, and to detail such members of the naval personnel as may be 
required in order to encourage and execute the spirit of this act. The Secretary 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


59 


of tlie Navy is further authorized to loan the necessary naval uniforms during 
the period of training and to furnish subsistence, medical attendance, and other 
necessary incidental expenses for those attending these schools: Provided , That 
those under instruction, with the consent of their parents or their guardians, 
shall enroll in the Naval Reserve Force for not less than three months, and no 
person not so enrolled shall he admitted to said training schools. For carrying 
out the provisions of this paragraph the sum of $200,000 is appropriated: 
Provided further , That the appropriation shall he available to reimburse other 
appropriations for the Naval Establishment for any expenses incurred in con¬ 
nection with members of the Naval Reserve Force who enrolled in accordance 
with this section for attendance at the experimental summer schools. 

The reason for that was the accounting officers held that these boys 
as soon as enrolled were on the same basis as if enrolled in the reserve 
force, and were in the pay of the Navy, and their expense of trans¬ 
portation, etc., was charged against the regular naval appropriation, 
so that the $200,000 was not fully used for this purpose, and the 
greater part of it was turned back into the Treasury, and now we 
wish to use the money, the $200,000, for the purpose of carrying on 
the school in all its respects and have asked that the wording of the 
section be changed accordingly. 

Senator Hale. You believe m keeping the reserve up in every way 
possible ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. There is some further legislation in the bill cutting 
this down ? 

Admiral Washington. I do not think that is in this bill. I think 
it is in the Naval Affairs Committee bill, which was introduced but 
has not passed the House. 

Senator Hale. And probably will not come up this session? 

Admiral Washington. Probably not. This bill does not cut the 
reserve pay down, but it does cut the total amount. Our estimate 
was $10,000,000, and they cut it to $7,000,000 for reserves. I do not 
know whether we can possibly get along with it or not. 

Admiral Peoples. No ; we can not. 

Admiral Washington. That was just a lump sum. 

The Chairman. It is now 1 o’clock, and the committee will take 
a recess until 2 o’clock. 

(Thereupon, at 1 o’clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o’clock 
p. m.) 

AFTER RECESS. 

The subcommittee reconvened at 2 o’clock p. m. 

The Chairman. The committee will be in order. 

Admiral, the next item is receiving barracks—maintenance of re¬ 
ceiving barracks, $50,000. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL THOMAS WASHINGTON—Resumed. 

Admiral Washington. In the item just above that, Naval Reserve 
Force, I wish to request that on page 15, line 4, that we strike out the 
word “ and ” and insert after the word “ janitors ”- 

Senator Hale. Page 15, line 4? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; strike out the word “and” and 
insert “ and for actual and necessary expenses, in lieu of mileage and 


60 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

travel expenses in connection with the organization and administra¬ 
tion of the Naval Reserve Force.” 

That allows us to pay necessary expenses instead of mileage when 
desired. At the present time we have no means of paying the neces¬ 
sary expenses of reserve officers, for instance, when we send them 
around to help out with drills and instructions of the reserve force. 

The Chairman. There is nothing in the general provisions of the 
general appropriation that can be applied to that? 

Admiral Washington. No, sir. 

Senator Hale. Why was the word u and ” cut out in line 6 ? 

The Chairman. It should be a comma there. 

Senator Swanson. That comma stays there. 

The Chairman. Has this ever been allowed before ? 

Admiral Washington. No, sir; it is something new. We did not 
ask for any increase of appropriation, but only the insertion of that 
proviso. 

Senator Swanson. Does that mean that you could put reserve 
officers on active duty? 

Admiral Washington. No, sir. 

Senator Hale. You recommend the increase asked for by the 
Secretary of the Navy? He asked for $50,000. 

Admiral Washington. That was originally in the provision 
passed last June which allowed us also to use the money checked 
against reservists for nonperformance of drills. This past year this 
checkage amounted to nearly $100,000, and, assuming the same 
amount next year, it will give $150,000, including this sum appro¬ 
priated by the House. 

The Chairman. You are asking for $150,000? 

Admiral Washington. No, sir: that will be the amount if we 
get the same checkages of officers and men who do not carry on the 
drills during the coming year. The law allows that. 

Senator Hale. I understood the Secretary asked for an addi¬ 
tional appropriation. 

Admiral Washington. I did not know that. 

Senator Hale. He has written a letter, has he not? 

Admiral Washington. I do not think so. 

The Chairman. Yes; he has, in regard to summer schools. 

Admiral Washington. That is a different thing. 

The Chairman. His item for summer schools is to go in here,, 
is it not ? 

Admiral Washington. It is to go in ahead of that, as a separate 
item. It has no bearing on the reserves. The reserves, that this 
item covers, are the regular naval reserves. The schools are for 
those boys who only enlist for the 3-month period. It will come 
in between lines 2 and 3 as a separate item—summer schools. 

Senator Ball. How much is asked for that? 

Admiral Washington. $200,000. 

The Chairman. I thought we were talking, before we had a re¬ 
cess, about the amount under the head of Naval Reserve Force, and 
that we had finished that. What have you to say about that $50,000 
item? Is that sufficient? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. With the clause you suggest? 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


61 


Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The only difference in the clause added would be 
that it would make an additional demand on the funds. We will pass 
that. What have you to say about the item “ Receiving barracks ” ? 

Admiral Washington. The Secretary has written a letter asking 
that that be increased to $100,000. That is the amount we had last 
year and that we really need. 

The Chairman. What does he estimate $200,000 for? 

Admiral Washington. That was the original estimate on the basis 
of 143,000 men. If we are going to have 100,000 men only- 

The Chairman. What would you need for 110,000 men? 

Admiral Washington. There would be no material increase; 
$100,000 would be sufficient to get along with. 

The Chairman. How about “ Naval War College, Rhode Island”? 

Admiral Washington. That is the same appropriation they gave 
us last year. 

Senator Hale. In all these items. Admiral, I think you should give 
us the difference if we had 110,000 and 120,000 men. 

Admiral Washington. I will do that. As to the Naval Home, we 
ask for no increase. 

The Chairman. I would like to mention now T , in the statement I 
asked you awhile ago to prepare for us- 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I would like you to state the amount in case you 
have 110,000 and the amount if you have 120,000 and the amount if 
you have 100,000? 

Admiral Washington. Those three items? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Hale. And in the statement you can tell how it affects the 
legislation in the bill. 

Admiral Washington. I have nothing more except the item under 

Naval Academy.” 

Senator Hale. What page is that? 

Admiral Washington. Page 33. On page 35, under “ Commissary 
department,” line 6, the House committee cut out an item for the 
•employment and wages of waiters and men of that character. 

Senator Hale. What page is that? 

Admiral Washington. Page 35, under the head of “ Commissary 
department.” Without changing the wording of the bill, they simply 
reduce the amount by $152,000, and we ask that that be reinserted. 
The occasion for that reduction was the fact that for the past two 
years, during the very difficult time of obtaining servants, we have 
allowed them to have enlisted men of the Navy to perform the duties 
of attending the midshipmen’s mess, and if the Navy is reduced we 
can not afford to let them have the 420 mess attendants from the 
Regular Navy. That is what the superintendent has asked, and we 
request that the $152,000 deducted by the House be reinserted in 
the bill. 

The Chairman. Has that been returned to the Treasury? It is 
not a continuing affair. 

Admiral Washington. It is turned in each year to the Treasury. 

The Chairman. And what is the total—$152,000? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is the estimate? 


62 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Keyes. That is what you ask for ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; to have the amount reinserted,, 
which amount was not included on the supposition we would con¬ 
tinue to let the midshipmen have the enlisted men as mess attendants,, 
which we can not do if the Navy is reduced. 

On page 37 it will appear in line 20—it will increase that amount 
by the same sum, making, in all, $2,425,395.83. 

Senator Hale. Two million and what? 

Admiral Washington. $2,425,795.83. 

Senator Hx\jle. $2,425,795? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. The two figures you gave are different. 

Senator Keyes. That is just the difference caused by adding that 
additional amount. 

Senator Hale. Oh, it is the total? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is that all, Admiral ? 

Admiral Washington. That is all, sir. 

The Chairman. That Naval Home at Philadelphia is all right? 

Admiral Washington.' Yes, sir: that is paid out of the pension 
fund and does not come out of the Treasury. 

The Chairman. Now, we have worked to the head of “Aviation.”' 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT E. COONTZ, CHEIF OF’ 
NAVAL OPERATIONS. 

Admiral Coontz. Under the head of “Aviation,” I would like to- 
make a short statement and then I will let Capt. Craven carry on. 

The House bill was expected to be in two parts, one giving us> 
six million, nine hundred and some odd thousand in that bill, and 
another bill providing, in a special bill, for about $9,000,000. Of 
course the special legislation bill failed.to pass, arid all that there 
is in the bill is this amount. The two principal things that I wish 
to call attention to- 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this: Was the item $6,915,000 fixed' 
by the House committee on the assumption that these other items 
were going to be added ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir; making a total of fifteen or sixteen mil¬ 
lion dollars. We have two important provisions that will be pre¬ 
sented later—one in the legislative bill and the other on increase in 
the Navy. In the legislative bill we are asking to have a Bureau of 
Aviation in the Navy Department, in order that all these activities 
may be coordinated under one head and one officer placed in full 
and complete control. 

Senator Hale. What do you mean? Will be presented later in 
the legislative bill? The legislative bill has already gone through. 

Admiral Coontz. I mean in the legislative part of this bill that 
Senator Poindexter is going to consider at the end. 

Senator Hale. Oh, I see. 

Admiral Coontz. The other item covers two seaplane carriers, 
which will cost, I think, between or about $24,600,000 each, and for 
which we ask an appropriation for one-third of that amount to, be* 



NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. . 63 

added to the increase of the Navy for the current year. That would 
be $8,260,000 each. 

The Chairman. What is the limit of cost of these? 

Admiral Coontz. $24,600,000 each. Of course that subject was 
considered by your committee when we talked it over the other day 
and the subject of whether or not you should leave out certain vessels 
already provided for and not contracted for. That, of course, can 
be taken up. Those were destroyers and three submarines. The 
transport was not touched. That is a matter, of course, to be taken 
up later on. 

The whole matter of the control of the air forces—I think that 
was brought up the other day and I do not think it is necessary to 
talk any more about that before the committee. Of course we be¬ 
lieve in a separate naval air force. We believe men trained in our 
service should be seagoing people and that aviation is just one part 
of what the Navy men do. We must have the battleships and battle 
cruisers and destroyers and submarines and airships; in other words, 
the man who commands airships in his earlier days may, later on, 
command a fleet and may command it in the air—we can not tell. 
We believe the most important thing before us is to get those sea¬ 
plane carriers started so we may be on a par with various of the 
other nations. 

The amount we are asking in this bill and which we have scaled 
down—we think to the lowest compatible limit—is about $22,000,000. 
I would like to ask Capt. Craven to go ahead and read the Secretary’s 
letter and make any statement he desires to. 

The Chairman. Before he goes ahead, I would like to see if I 
understand this provision correctly. It contains nothing whatever 
for the procurement of new aircraft, does it? 

Admiral Coontz. No, sir. Tt was supposed that that would he 
new legislation and if provided for in that special bill, there wxnild 
be no authority for calling it up. 

The Chairman. Probably Capt. Craven will cover this, but what 
position would that leave the dirigible in nov T under construction? 

Capt. Craven. Unless the sums provided in the House are in¬ 
creased, the dirigible under construction in this country would have 
to be abandoned. 

The Chairman. What is the status of that construction? 

Capt. Craven. A considerable sum of money has been spent on it 
for the designing of the ship, and tests, experimental work with 
materials, and the preparation for the erecting of the ship. The 
erection of the ship will proceed just as soon as the hangar will per¬ 
mit it. I think about a million dollars has been invested in the ship. 

Senator Swanson. How much has been provided for it ? 

Capt. Craven. $1,500,000. 

Senator Swanson. That was not to complete it, but to start it? 

Capt. Craven. Yes. sir. 

Senator Swanson. What is the total cost to be ? 

Capt. Craven. We are asking for a million dollars in this year’s 
appropriation, although some of last year’s appropriation will lapse 
on the 1st of July. 

Senator Swanson. What will the total amount to? 

Capt. Craven. Something over $2,000,000. 


64 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Senator Swanson. You have already spent nearly one-half of the 
amount, then? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. How much of that sum will be unexpended at 
the close of this fiscal year? 

Capt. Craven. I have not got the figures. 

The Chairman. I had been informed it would be something like 
a million and a half unexpended appropriation that would lapse 
unless it is renewed—aircraft construction. 

Capt. Craven. I think about one-half of that amount has been 
spent already in this ship. 

The Chairman. I wish you would look up that balance that will 
remain over unexpended from previous appropriations for aircraft 
construction. 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; and I will attach a statement to my hear¬ 
ings. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you also what is the status of appro¬ 
priations with reference to this ship we are getting from Great 
Britain ? 

Statement of condition of funds allotted and expended in connection with the 
construction of the rigid airship “ZR-1.” 


1920—Appropriated_$1, 500, 000 

Expended _ 800, 000 


Balance unexpended_ 700, 000 

1921—Appropriated_ 1, 500, 000 

Expended to Feb. 18, 1921_ 100,000 

Obligated and to be expended by June 30, 1921_ 400,000 


Balance unexpended_ 1, 000, 000 


1922—Estimate required to complete airship_ 1, 000, 000 


Allocation of current aviation appropriation of $20,000,000, Feb. 10, 1921. 


To- 

Already 

allotted. 

Allocations proposed. 


Balance 
expected 
te remain 
at end of 
fiscal year. 

Bureau of Construction 
and Repair. 

$2,887,256. 00 

Subhead 1. To purchase 2 nonrigid $1,083,577.20 
airships, 3 kite balloons, 21 airplanes 
(various types) and to continue au¬ 
thorized construction of Vought and 

NC-type planes at naval aircraft fac¬ 
tors (to be completed prior to July 1, 

1921). 

Subhead 2. To buy equipment, para- 29,000.00 

chutes, instruments, etc. 

Subhead 3. To continue work on rigid 113,000.00 
airship ZR-1 to July 1,1921. 

Subhead 6. To continue maintenance 609,320.00 
at stations and naval aircraft to July 

1, 1921. 

Subhead 7. To continue experimental 841,000.00 
projects already authorized at naval 
aircraft factory and navy yards to 

July 1, 1921, including experimental 
catapults, metal planes, giant boat, 
and to purchase 12 experimental 
planes (various types). 

Total.1. 2,675,897.20 

i $850,000.00 


1 Unexpended for rigid to be constructed at Lakehurst—reappropriation of this amount 
or $1,000,000 is asked for 1922. 
























NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


65 


Allocation of current ariation, appro aviation of $ >0,000,000, Feb. ID, 1.921 —Con. 


To 


Bureau of Engineering.. 


Already 

allotted. 


Allocations proposed. 


$5, 305, 420. .">4 


4,384, 276. 80 


Bureau of Yards and 
Docks. 

Bureau of Navigation... 

Bureau of Supplies and 
Accounts. 

Secretary’s office. 275,000.00 


180,000.00 
166, 144.31 


Total_:. 13, 198,096.65 


Subhead 1. To purchase power plants 
for 2 nonrigid airships, 21 airplanes 
(various types), and Vought and 
NC type planes at naval aircraft 
factory (to be completed by July 

1,1921). $462, 550. 46 

Subhead 2. To buy equipment, radio, 

etc. 

Subhead 3. To continue work for 
rigid airship ZR-1 to July 1, 1921.. 

Subhead 7. To purchase power plants 
for 12 experimental airplanes (vari¬ 
ous types) and to continue projects 
already authorized to July 1, 1921.. 


137,000.00 
75,000.00 


240,000.00 


Total. 


914,550. 46 


Aviation mechanics School (training), $10,000. 
Maintenance, January to July, 1921, $200,000. 


$3,800,447.66. 


Balance 
expected 
te remain 
at end of 
fiscal year. 


1 $1.50,000.00 

22,000,000.00 

-10,000.00 

11,455.69 


3,001,455.69 


1 Unexpended for rigid to be constructed at Lakehurst—reappropriation of this amount or $1,000,000 
is asked for 1922. 

2 Reserved for hangar on west coast—will be expended under contract immediately when site is au¬ 
thorized. 


('apt. ('raven. The sum of $2,500,000 was appropriated for the 
purchase of that ship, .$2,000,000 of which was to- go for the ship 
proper and $500,000 to cover the expense of the contingent of officers 
and men which we have in Great Britain learning to operate these 
ships, the housing of the ship and the incidental expenses of the 
ship before she is sent to this country. 

The Chairman. How is she to come to this country—under her 
own power? 

('apt. Craven. Yes, sir; we expect to bring her here under her 
own power by the end of July. 

The Chairman. Do you think that will he carried out? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; the ship will be finished next month and 
will be taken out and tested, and with the completion of the hangar 
on the 1st of July, it will be possible to bring her over. 

The Chairman. Under the appropriations in the bill ? 

('apt. Craven. Yes, sir; we require some more money for Lake- 
hurst, for the hangar, but we have enough money to carry out that 
part of the plan. 

The Chairman. Will those funds be available in July? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; those things are all under contract. 

The Chairman. So that the appropriation is regarded as already 
expended ? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; as far as this ship is concerned. 

The Chairman. Well, we will hear any statement you desire to 
make on the subject of aviation. 


34772—21 


■5 































66 


IS"AVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


STATEMENT OF CAPT. T. T. CRAVEN, DIRECTOR OF NAVAL 

AVIATION. 

Capt. Craven. Admiral Coontz lias set forth the general situation 
The only sums carried for aviation are those approved by the Appro¬ 
priations Committee in the House, set forth here. The amounts pro¬ 
posed by the Naval Committee do not appear, and with the figures 
as they stand it will be impossible to carry on aviation at all in its 
present fashion. 

No money is proposed for new construction whatever, either of 
flying equipment or for new construction on the ground which would 
permit flying. The amounts which we have asked for and which 
we consider urgent for the purposes of operation have been mate¬ 
rially reduced. 

The amounts which we asked for experimentation have been prac¬ 
tically cut in half. 

Senator Swanson. What did you ask for? 

Capt. Craven. We asked dor experimentation, $3,405,000. The 
figures contained in this act are $1,615,000. 

Senator Swanson. And did you make an itemized statement of 
the purposes for which you would use the amounts ? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; I have it here. 

Senator Swanson. Put it in your testimony. 

Capt. Craven. The figures here are given in great detail for the 
operation and maintenance of our various stations, and rather than 
to curtail our activities during the coming year we hope to increase 
them, because during the summer we expect the Langley to be com¬ 
missioned. The Langley is a vessel converted into a carrier. For¬ 
merly she was the Jv/piter. She will be be placed in the fleet during 
the coming summer. We have also another vessel, a seaplane tender, 
the Wright , also to be put in commission during July. 

The Chairman. Is that a converted vessel? 

Capt. Craven. She was a Shipping Board vessel turned over to> 
the Navy for our purposes. 

Senator Hale. But neither of which will be ideal carriers? 

Capt. Craven. No, sir. 

The Chairman. How many planes will the Jupiter carry ? 

Capt. Craven. Between 30 and 40. 

The Chairman. Will she be able to go with the fleet ? 

Capt. Craven. As far as her low speed will permit. Her maxi¬ 
mum speed is 15 knots. She is an old vessel and getting along in 
years, and probably that speed has been reduced. 


67 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1022. 


Estimates of appropriations . aviation , Xaty, 11*22. 


Item. 

Number 

asked. 

Bureau 
of Con¬ 
struction 
and 
Repair. 

Bureau 
of Engi¬ 
neering. 

Total. 

Subhead No. 1.—Necessary aircraft: 

Ship’s spotting planes. 


$10o, 000 
297 500 

$181,700 
364 000 

$286,700 
661,500 
1,923,000 

Ship’s fighting planes. 

17 

Torpedo planes. 

22 

990,000 

933! 000 

Photographic planes. 

Marines— 

Reconnaissance, photographing, and bombing planes... 
Pursuit planes. 

25 

14 

437, .500 
245 000 

426,000 
244 800 

863,500 
489,800 
882,000 

Practice planes. 

22 

330,000 

352,' 000 


Total heavier-than-air craft. 

107 

2,405,000 

2, 501,500 

4,906,500 


Free balloons. 

5 

25 000 


25 (XX) 

Kite balloons. 

15 

225 000 


22 . 5'000 
60 000 

Small towing airships. 

i 

52,556 
160,000 

7 444 

Nonrigid airship, approximately C size. 


160'000 

Spares, envelopes, surfaces, winches, cables, etc., for rigids, non- 
rigids, and kite balloons. 


150,000 

.50,000 

200 000 




Total lighter-than-air craft. 

21 

612,556 

57,444 

670,000 


To continue authorized construction of giant boat. 


200,000 

100,000 

800,000 

90,000 

290,000 

To continue miscellaneous new work (in Government plants) 
uncompleted July 1, 1921. 


50,000 

150,000 

1,000,000 

To continue authorized construction of 1 rigid airship. 


200,000 



Total combined lighter-than-air and heavier-than-air craft. 


1,100,000 

340,000 

1,440,000 



Grand total subhead No. 1. 




7,016 500 

Subhead No. 2.—Necessary equipment for lighter-than-air and 
heavier-than-air craft: 

Miscellaneous equipment for new aircraft. 


60.000 


60,000 

Radio accessories and equipment and to replace obsolete 
equipment. 



378,720 

378, 720 

Engine spare parts, Liberty, Hispano-Sviza, Union, etc., 
now in service. 



.500. 000 

.500.000 

Power plant equipment for above. 



50,000 

50,000 




Total necessary equipment. 


60,000 

928, 720 

988, 720 




Item. 

Bureau of 
Yards and 
Docks. 

Bureau of 
Engi¬ 
neering. 

Total. 

Subhead No. 3.—New construction at stations: 




Cape May. 

$2.5,000 


$25,000 



Coco Solo. 

392,000 

$104,000 

402,000 

Hampton Roads. 

70,000 

8,000 

78,000 

Lakehurst.*.I. 

360,000 

100,000 

460,000 

Pearl Harbor. 

200,000 

10,000 

210,000 

Pensacola. 

120,000 

10,000 

130,000 

San Dieeo. 

123,000 

41,000 

164,000 

Great Lakes. 

. 

20,000 

20,000 

Total. 

1,290,000 

199,000 

1,489,000 

Marines— 




Guam . 

50,000 


.50,000 

Qpant.ic.fi . 

50,000 


50, (XX) 

Sa n Diogn (Dutch Flats) 

75,000 


75,000 

Total . 

175,000 


175,000 

New projects (proposed stations), Pacific coast (rigid station), 
(including procurement of land). 



1,200,000 

250,000 

1,450,000 

Total. 

2,265,000 

449,000 

3,114,000 




























































































68 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Estimates of appropriations, aviation, Navy, 1922 —Continued. 


Item. 

Bureau 
of Navi¬ 
gation. 

1 

! Total. 

Subhead No. 4.—Navigation new equipment: 

Navigation equipment . 

$16,250 

16,000 

7,000 

10,000 


Photographic equipment. .. . 


Aerolnptaal oninnmont _ _ 


Equipment and installation of instrument-re 

pair shops. 




Total. 

49,250 

$49,250 


Estimates of appropriations, aviation. Navy, 1922, for $22,259,590 . 

Stations and activities. 

Bureau of 
Construc¬ 
tion and 
Repairs. 

Bureau of 
Engi¬ 
neering. 

Bureau of 
Yards and 
Docks. 

: Bureau 
| of Sup¬ 
plies and 
Accounts. 

i 

Bureau 

of 

Naviga¬ 

tion. 

Total. 

Subhead No. 5.—Maintenance and 
operation of aircraft factory he¬ 
lium plant, air stations, etc.: 
Atlantic Fleet— 

Langley. 

1 

! 


l 

$3,000 
3,000 
1,000 

$3,000 
3,000 
1,000 

Shawniut. 


. 



NC Tender. 





Battleships. 





Landing fields. 

*118000 *400806 

$50,000 

$9,000 

600 

3,000 
3,000 
1,000 

617,455 

3,000 

3,000 

1,000 

Pacific Fleet— 

W right. 


7 . 

Aroostook. 





NC Tender. 





Battleships. 





Landing fields. 

118,000 
38,000 
180,000 
30,000 
6,000 
15,000 
70,000 
600 
90,000 
20,000 

90,000 

439,855 
105,162 
564,770 
45,000 
23,413 
134,000 
427,600 
1,600 
332,581 
40,000 

127,000 

50,000 
99,000 
250,000 
30,000 
16,000 
45,000 
250,000 
2,000 
150,000 
76,000 

40,000 

6,000 
15,000 
25,000 
36,T)00 
1,200 
2,000 
30,000 
800 
2,000 
10,000 

246,000 
20 , 000 
600 

600 
5,000 
6,000 
9,000 
4,000 
4,000’ 
5,000 

614,455 
262,162 
1,025,770 
150,000 
50,613 
200,000 
782. 600 
5' 000 
578,581 
150,000 

519,000 
20,000 
60,600 
20;000 
757,000 
400,600 
18,000 

65,000 

252,412 
10,000 
78,940 
157,132 
96,800 

75,000 

5,000 

200,000 
100,000 

Hampton Roads.... 

Pensacola. 

Rockaway. 

Anacostia. 

Coco Solo. 

San Diego. 

Chatham. 

Cape May. 

4,000 
4,000 

16,000 

Pearl Harbor. 

Aircraft Factory and Philadel¬ 
phia Navy Yard. 

Fleet Supply Base. 

Great Lakes. 


30,000 


30,000 

20,000 

4,000 

Naval Observatory. 



Lakehurst. 

134,000 

266,000 
397,000 
15,000 

50,000 

106,412 
3,800 
36,940 
100,332 
36,600 

350,000 

3, 000 
3,600 

Helium Plant. 

Dahlgren, Va. 

3,000 

15,000 

32,000 
3,500 
12,000 
21,000 
6,000 



Washington Navy Yard (wind 
tunnel and engine testing 
laboratory). 




Marines— 

Quantico. 

104,000 
1,000 
30,000 
21,000 
50,000 

75,000 

6,000 

1,200 

4,000 

500 

Parris Island. 

San Diego (Dutch Flats).... 
Haiti. 

4,800 

1,200 

10,000 
3,000 

Guam. 

New projects, Pacific coast 
(rigid station). 

Miscellaneous— 

Clothing. 



5,000 


Overhaul of planes drawn 
from stores. 

159,000 
22,000 

41,000 
22,000 



Miscellaneous (claims, etc.).. 

Total. 

38,000 

11,000 

7,000 

1,183,100 

3,785,920 

1,727,000 

439,400 

150,700 

7,286,120 



Grand total subhead No. 5, $7,286,120. 
































































































NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


69 


Estimates of appropriations, aeiation, Navy, 1922, for $22,269,090 —Continued. 


Items. 

Number 
asked. 

. 

Bureau of 
Construc¬ 
tion and 
Repair. 

Bureau of 
Engineer¬ 
ing. 

Bureau of 
Navigation. 

Total. 

Subhead No. 6. Experimental work, devel¬ 
opment of all types of aircraft: 
Experiments in regard to launching de¬ 
vices, catapults, arresting gear, etc., 
and antiaircraft defenses. 


$200,000 
75,000 
90,000 
150,000 

175,000 



$200,000 

145,000 

170,000 

250,000 

175,000 

Experimental type A planes. 

Experimental type B planes. 

Experimental type C planes. 

Experimental miscellaneous construc¬ 
tion . 

3 

3 

3 

$70,000 

80,000 

100,000 


Total heavier-than-aircraft. 

Combined lighter-than-air craft and heavier- 
than-aircraft: 

Experimental research on materials, ac¬ 
cessories, etc. 




9 

690,000 

250,000 


940,000 


565,000 

75,000 

800,000 


1,365,000 

75,000 

5,000 

3,000 

10,000 

5,000 

1,002,000 

To complete miscellaneous experiments 
uncompleted July 1, 1921. 



Optical equipment’.... 



$5,000 
3,000 
10,000 
5,000 

2,000 

Aneroid instruments. 




Photographic appliances. 




Aerological appliances. 




Miscellaneous, including antiaircraft de¬ 
vices and appliances. 

Total combined lighter-than-air and 

heavier-than-aircraft. 

Total subhead No. 6. 


500,000 

500,000 


1,140,000 

1,830,000 

1,300,000 
1,550,000 i 

25,000 
25,000 

2,465,000 
3,405, (XX) 


Grand total subhead No. 6, $3,-105,000 

Subhead No. 7: Drafting, clerical, and technical help at stations (classified force), $400,000. 

Grand total for all subheads, $22,259,590. 

The Chairman. What is the maximum speed of the new battle¬ 
ships? 

Capt. Craven. Twenty-three knots. 

Senator Swanson. What is the average speed for the entire fleet? 

Capt. Craven. The fleet seldom cruises, economically, at over 15 
or 18 knots, but under stress of circumstances, it might be called upon 
to go very much faster and in that case, of course, the Jupiter will 
fall behind. 

Senator Hale. What is the speed of the English carriers? 

Capt. Craven. Something over 30 knots for the fastest. They 
have various speeds. There are seven carriers now in existence, all 
but two of which were improvised from older vessels and the latest 
vessel, the Hermes , has about 23 or 2d knots. 

Senator Hale. And speed is one of the principal factors of a 
carrier? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; it is a lasting thing when built in a ship 
and it is a valuable characteristic that can not be placed in a ship 
once built. 

Senator Hale. • What is the speed of the British ships? 

Capt. Craven. The fastest is the Furious. She makes 31 knots. 

Senator Hale. How fast is the slowest? 

Capt. Craven. The slowest is about 11 knots, the old Ark Royal. 
She was the first vessel, and of the type of the Wright , the one we 
are converting now. She was not properly a carrier but a tender. 
She carried seaplanes, but they were not flown from her decks. 

Senator Hale. How many are they converting? 
















































70 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Capt. Craven. They are not converting any more. They have 
just finished building one for that purpose. 

The Chairman. Have they any others under construction? 

Capt. Craven. No, sir; not that I know of. 

The Chairman. How many others are there? 

Capt. Craven. The latest carrier is the Hermes , which is a vessel 
of nearly 550 feet in length and of 25 knots speed. Th z Eagle, 
another vessel of the British fleet, is 650 feet long approximately 
and of 24 knots speed. 

Senator Hale. Are these converted vessels? 

Capt. Craven. The Hermes was not. The Eagle was. She was 
to be a battleship. The Argus was laid down as a battleship, but 
early in the game converted into a carrier. Her length is about 570 
feet and her speed is 21 knots. 

The Furious was intended as a fast cruiser, armed with 18-inch 
guns. They were taken out before she was completed and she was 
converted into a carrier. She has a length of about 780 feet over 
all and has a speed of 31J. knots. 

Besides those vessels, which are the important carriers of the 
British fleet, there are the Vindictive , a vessel of 650 feet in length, 
making about 30 knots. The Pegasus is a merchant-type ship, about 
330 feet long, with a speed of 20-J knots, and the Ark Royal , an old 
ship, 360 feet long, with a speed of 11 knots. During the war they 
had another vessel, the Compagnia , a merchant vessel, which was 
sunk. 

The Chairman. What is the total capacity in planes of the entire 
fleet ? 

Capt. Craven. Assuming each one to carry 40 planes, I should say 
the maximum would be about 230 planes. 

The Chairman. How many planes have they—-Great Britain? 

Capt. Craven. Planes? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Capt. Craven. I am unable to answer that, Mr. Chairman. I do 
not know. The planes come and go so rapidly, it is impossible to 
estimate the number now on hand. 

The Chairman. How about dirigibles, then? 

Capt. Craven. Dirigibles—the English have recently decided to 
sell two rigids or turn them to commercial use. They hope to use 
them commercially. From a newspaper report published the other 
day, they have decided—I think largely from economic reasons—at 
the present time not to continue their rigids. 

Senator Swanson. Not at all—abandon them all? 

Capt. Craven. That is reported in the newspapers. I can not 
speak of this with authority. They have been using one rigid with 
their fleet recently in maneuvers. 

The Chairman. What is the Japanese equipment and program in 
regard to aviation? 

Capt. Craven. Our figures from Japan are rather vague. We 
know or hear that recently she has become very active. It is re¬ 
ported that she is procuring a great deal of material from Germany; 
that she is obtaining instructors from both France and England: 
that she is taking active steps to organize squadrons for naval pur¬ 
poses, establishing aviation schools, and aviation centers on her coast, 
nnd has laid down one carrier and is proposing to lay down another. 


71 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

We also hear that planes are carried on her battleships and have been 
used recently in maneuvers. 

Senator Swanson. On all battleships? 

Capt. Craven. I do not know that. It has been reported she plans 
to carry them on all battleships. 

Senator Hale. Do you know anything about the details of the 
carrier laid down? 

Capt. Craven. Nothing beyond the reported tonnage, which is 
about 14,000. 

Senator Swanson. Will you make up, in the office of Naval In¬ 
telligence and in your office, a comparative statement as to the present 
capacity of Japan and Great Britain in aviation in all directions, 
and ours? 

Capt. Craven. We have that already pretty well in hand. We 
have the figures already, but they are pretty hard to substantiate. 

Senator Swanson. Will you put them into the record? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You should include in that not only what you 
have at present but what their program is. 

Senator Swanson. First, what they have and what is the program 
of the three nations—as at present appropriated, what they will 
amount to. 

Capt. Craven. We have the figures in regard to the personnel 
right here, but figures in regard to planes and equipment, of course, 
are difficult to obtain. 

The Chairman. I want to ask about planes, bearing on the im¬ 
mediate items of appropriation we are now considering. 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What have you to say about the relative merits 
of the Japanese and British heavier-than-air naval planes as com¬ 
pared with ours—I mean as to speed and efficiency? 

Capt. Craven. It is rather a difficult question to answer, Mr. Chair¬ 
man. The Japanese are young in aviation and they follow the lead 
of the country they think is supreme. At the present time, I think, 
they are under the British idea so far as naval aviation is concerned. 
We hear that they have English naval people there experienced in 
air matters—I understand there are 30 such now there. 

In regard to planes, I think Japan has not, so far, built planes in 
her own country in any great numbers. We understand, however, 
they are contemplating establishing the industry in Japan. 

The plane for naval purposes all over the world is behind in its 
development by comparison with the plane which is in use over land 
to-day. I think I am correct in saying that the proper plane or 
ideal plane to be carried on ships has not yet been developed any¬ 
where. England is striving for it, and everyone is striving for it, 
but it is going to take money and two or three years to get it, but it 
has not yet been developed. We require money to permit the devel¬ 
opment of materials, opportunity to investigate the usefulness of the 
art, and organization which will enable us to attack the problem 
directly. 

The Chairman: You will have different types? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; we will have different types, but there arc 
certain characteristics which will have to appear in those types. 


72 NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

The Chairman. You have bombing planes, torpedo planes, and 
fighting planes? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; those are the ordinary types that the man 
on land thinks of, but in addition to carrying bombs, torpedoes, etc., 
the sailor has to have a plane which will float, and a plane which 
will take down and permit of being stored away in the superstruc¬ 
ture of the ship or inside. He must have a plane that will fly from 
the deck of a ship in a short space or be projected by a catapult. 
He has to have a plane that will have a low landing speed to enable 
it to light on the deck of a ship, etc. 

The landsman does not have to have these characteristics. Up 
to the present time the naval designs have been dominated somewhat 
by land ideas, and our development of planes has been restricted 
somewhat by our hope of utilizing the land machines. We have to 
get away from that plan and develop our own planes. As you know, 
the land planes during the war progressed and were developed 
intensively, and the nayal plane for use on ships did not come along 
in the same way at all. We can not develop those planes until we 
get a carrier or something to work from. We hope to use the 
Jupiter successfully for that. 

The Chairman. You need not state details or facts you think 
should not be stated; but,. generally,, what are you doing toward 
the development of such a plane? 

Capt. Craven. We have recently encouraged competition in de¬ 
signs, incorporating these principles that I have sketched to you, 
and we hope to get ideas from the manufacturers. I understand 
that, some 27 designs have been submitted to the department recently 
along those lines. 

The Chairman. Is it the policy of the department to encourage 
private manufacture of planes? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; it is. We, of course, supplement the efforts 
of private manufacturers experimentally in the factory which we 
have at Philadelphia, which is very useful and will always be very 
, useful for that purpose. 

In addition to encouraging this competition we try to keep our¬ 
selves advised of developments abroad and have procured planes 
of various characteristics which have come out in Italy and in Eng¬ 
land hoping to get ideas from them—and also from Germany. 

Senator Hale. Do all planes have to be provided with facilities for 
landing on the water? 

Capt. Craven. Every plane that flies over the water should be pre¬ 
pared to come down on the water. 

Senator Hale. That is, it has to have its boats ? 

Capt. Craven. The precise form of flotation has not vet been 
determined. Some have floats and some have bags which provide 
flotation. 

Senator Hale. Air bags? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; some have pontoons, as you know, and 
others have boat structures. But the precise form of our ultimate 
development we do not know as yet. We hope to get it within the 
next few months from the experience which our kviators have had 
during the last year in the two fleets. We hope soon to get some con¬ 
cise and definite and helpful suggestions. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 73 

Senator Hale. But an ordinary land machine could not land on 
a carrier? , 

Capt. Craven. It might if its speed was low enough, but the point 
is that in operating from time to time you have engine failures. 
Engine failures over land harm no one if there is a landing field 
available. Over the water, unless you have flotation, there is no 
landing place whatever, and without it in the ordinary activities of 
aviation at sea a commander of a fleet or the commander of a vessel 
.would hesitate to use aviation in the broad way he should in order 
to develop tactics of aviation and to develop the possibilities of 
aviation. He must be assured of moderate safety of the pilots, and he 
can not have that safety unless there is flotation. That is the reason 
for the type of machine of which T speak. Unless that type of ma¬ 
chine comes, we will not have aviation over the water. 

The Chairman. Admiral Coontz, Senator New has spoken to me 
several times about making some provisions toward providing aban¬ 
doned ships or obsolete ships for tests for airplanes that the Army 
wants to use. Can you give us information as to whether that can 
be done; whether there are any ships available for that purpose ? 

Admiral Coontz. I will be glad to do so. I will state that the 
subcommittee of the joint board are considering various experiments 
that we had settled on a month ago and carried out at sea with 
bombing, and, in addition to other things, the possibility of the tor¬ 
pedo plane—that is, with the old German ship Auesfriesland , and 
with the Iowa , and perhaps others. Those are experiments that the 
Navy intended to carry on anyway. 

Senator Hale. Captain, these two new carriers which we have 
been discussing, and which would cost about $24,000,000 apiece—what 
speed are they to have? Can you tell us something about their gen¬ 
eral characteristics ? 

Capt. Craven. I should prefer to have Admiral Taylor answer that. 

Admiral Taylor. They will have a speed of 32f knots. 

Senator Hale. How long will they be? 

Admiral Taylor. Between seven and eight hundred feet. 

Senator Hale. They will be the equal of any carriers laid down 
anywhere in the world? 

Admiral Taylor. They will be superior. 

Capt. Craven. I might mention, before I continue, Mr. Chairman, 
that this morning I brought three letters down from the Secretary 
of the Navy bearing upon this appropriation. It is probably unneces¬ 
sary to read the letters. 

Senator Swanson. What appropriation do j^ou ask for? 

Capt. Craven. A total of $22,259,590. 

The Chairman. How much did you get last year? 

Capt. Craven. $20,000,000. 

Senator Swanson. How much did you spend ? 

Capt. Craven. We will probably spend $20,000,000, unless the 
hangar and work which we expected to complete at the start is ar¬ 
rested—there was the construction of a hangar on the Pacific 
coast- 

Senator Swanson. After all of these expenditures have been made 
and the contracts entered into have been completed—what will be the 
situation in the aviation branch of the Navy when all of this $20,000,- 
000 has been expended ? 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Capt. Craven. At the end of this year? 

Senator Swanson. Yes. Have you that information? 

Capt. Craven. No, sir; I can probably work it out. 

Senator Swanson. Will you put that in your evidence—a detailed 
statement of what you will have accomplished with this $20,000,000? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. And you want $20,000,000? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. Have you a clear detailed statement of the 
purposes and reasons for that and what will be the situation in the 
aviation branch of the Navy—the aviation part of the Navy—when 
this is done? 

Capt. Craven. Not exactly in the form you desire, Senator, but 
I have a complete analysis of how we will use those funds and the 
reasons for every dollar. 

Senator Swanson. You have the reasons and a detailed statement 
of the purposes for which it is to be devoted? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. What does the House give you? 

Capt. Craven. $6,900,000. ♦ 

Senator Swanson. Have you a detailed statement of what you 
will do with this $6,000,000? Will you furnish us that? If we 
give you $6,000,000, what would you do with that? Can you give 
a statement of what you would do, if limited to that? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; of course it is detailed somewhat in the 
bill. 

Senator Swanson. It is not necessary to give it now. You can 
read it in the evidence. 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. And will you supplement that with what would 
be the deficiency in the aviation branch of the Navy if that is not 
increased ? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Coontz. Of course you know they had two bills—-this 
one of $6,000,000 that went through and another with six or eight 
million dollars that was not allowed to come up, so that the total 
appropriation would be about $16,000,000 in the House. 

Senator Swanson. Will you make a statement of what that 
$16,000,000 would have done? 

Senator Hale. This $6,913,000—does that take care of specific 
things provided for in this bill ? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. The specific things are outlined here. 

Senator Hale. That is satisfactory for those specific things ? 

Capt. Craven. No, sir; the sums are too small. 

Senator Hale. What should it be ? 

Capt. Craven. $12,580,000, instead of $6,000,000. 

Senator Hale. For these items there in the bill? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; for the maintenance of aviation, as it now 
exists, we ask for twelve millions and a half and ten millions more 
for new materials. 

Senator Hale. That is to take care of new projects and stations? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Senator Smith. Did they propose that the $6,900,000 they provided 
should meet the requirements of those propositions you make there, 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


75 


costing $12,000,000? Did they undertake to say you ought to get 
through with that amount of money? 

Capt. Craven. ^ es, sir; these same arguments that I am presenting 
to you to-day were presented to the Appropriation Committee, and 
the figures were cut to this six million and some odd thousand dollars. 

Senator Hale. I think it would be well for you to go ahead on 
Senator Swanson’s plan and show us how this appropriation of the 
House would cut down your plans ? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Senator Smith. As I understand it, this $6,900,000 they propose 
to give you they claimed should be sufficient to do what vou think 
$12,000,000 is necessary for ? 

Capt. Craven. The Appropriations Committee came to that con¬ 
clusion. 

Senator Smith. How did they form their judgment, because I pre¬ 
sume the statement you made to them was just the reverse—that you 
required double that amount? Where do they get this idea that 
$6,900,000 would do; can you tell us ? 

Capt. Craven. No, sir; I can not. In addition to the $6,000,000, of 
course, the House Naval Affairs Committee recommended about 
$9,000,000 for new projects, but there is no legislation carrying those 
funds. 

Senator Swanson. Then this appropriation is about $10,000,000 
less than in the judgment of the House Naval Committee they 
thought was necessary to carry out proper aviation? 

Now, as to the effectiveness of aircraft for bombing or destructive 
purposes, what is vour opinion as to that ? 

Capt. Craven. Vou can destroy anything with bombs, sir. 

Senator Swanson. Can you get down low enough to do it effec¬ 
tively ? 

Capt. Craven. That is an open question. 

Senator Swanson. When I got the list of submarines destroyed, 
we were very much disappointed with the number of submarines that 
were destroyed by aircraft. 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. I think a competent authority stated some 
years ago in a book, that the simplest thing in war was difficult. You 
can take anything on the surface of the water or land and destroy it 
if you drop bombs on it in sufficient numbers and of sufficient size. 
You can destroy any ship with guns; you can destroy practically 
anything that floats with torpedoes; you can destroy any modern 
ship with a ram or with mines. 

Senator Swanson. We all know that, but the difficulty of air¬ 
craft has been you can not get low enough to a ship to destroy a ship 
without being destroyed yourself by, anti-aircraft guns. 

Capt. Craven. I am a firm believer in aviation, but one should not 
project himself too far into the future. You remember the Goben 
was mined twice and beached outside the entrance to the Straits of 
the Dardanelles where she lay for seven days. She was, as you re¬ 
member. a battle cruiser, a formidable ship, and she was attacked 
247 times by aircraft bombs, 15 tons of bombs were projected at her; 
16 hits were made, 3 of which are reported to have been with 500- 
pound bombs, and yet the ship was taken off and salvaged. 

Of course, she made some defense, such as she could, such as every¬ 
body would in those circumstances. It is said that she put sand on her 


76 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


upper deck a couple of feet thick and other precautions were taken, 
but that simply shows the difficulty of doing things in war. 

Senator Hale. Did she have any airplane protection? 

Capt. Craven. No, sir; she had no airplane protection, but she 
had guns. 

Senator Swanson. It has been suggested that you have discovered 
a way that aircraft could produce a cloud—produce something in 
which you could hide and get nearer to use these bombs. Has there 
been any discovery of that kind? 

("apt. Craven. When I spoke of the Gotten , T did not mean to say 
we would not do better now than then. I think we would. We ha ve 
made material advances and could probably operate much more 
effectively against a ship like the Goben than formerly. It is very 
difficult to say what you could not do. 

Senator Swanson. Well, can you create clouds and get in them and 
hide your airship? 

Capt. Craven. In the newspapers; yes, sir. We have not created 
that cloud yet, but 1 think we will as we have smoke bombs which 
promise to be effective and useful. 

Senator Swanson. How near do you have to be to a ship to obtain 
a moderate degree of accuracy in dropping your bombs? 

Capt. Craven. To obtain 100 per cent accuracy you should be on 
the deck. 

Senator Swanson. I mean, in order to secure a hit once out of 
20 times? 

Senator Smith. You mean standing still or sailing? 

Senator Swanson. Under ordinary conditions. Under ordinary 
conditions a ship does not stand still for you to fire bombs at her. 

Capt. Craven. Under battle or peace conditions? 

Senator Swanson. Under battle conditions. 

Capt. Craven. I am sorry, sir, but no data have been collected. 
During the war, the effort to bomb armed ships was not very great 
and the data collected, as the result of bombing armed ships are 
not complete. 

Senator Swanson. Ih this appropriation, how much is designed 
for scouting planes and how much for destructive—bombing outfits,, 
etc. ? 

Capt. Craven. We have not separated them that way. 

Senator Swanson. How do you expect to divide your appropria¬ 
tion ? 

Capt. Craven. I should say about half of the machines we would 
turn out would be fighting machines and reconnoissance machines 
and the remainder would be machines carrying torpedoes, which 
many officers think would be most efficient, as naval weapons. These 
later machines would be capable of carrying torpedoes or bombs. 

Senator Swanson. Your idea would be to have an aerial torpedo, 
and that you could start a torpedo with more accuracy than a bomb? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; it would be released in the air. 

Senator Swanson. The torpedo would be used in the air the same 
way as in the water? 

("apt. Craven. No, sir; it would be dropped into the water. 

Senator Swanson. Then you would have two elements involved in 
obtaining accuracy, one dropping into the water and the other direct¬ 
ing it after it has hit the water f 


77 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. Have you made any tests to determine that? 

(apt. C raven. A es, sir; T would not be here asking for an appro¬ 
priation at this time if we had not done that. We have had tests of 
accuracy with the usual types of torpedoes. We are using 1 at the 
present time a service torpedo. We hope to improve the service tor¬ 
pedo and we hope to get planes to carry the largest service torpedo 
for that purpose. 

Senator Hale. How near does a plane have to come to the water in 
order to use a torpedo ? 

Capt. Craven. Fifteen or twenty feet. 

Senator HaliT. That is pretty close. 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. Have you any invention that will permit your 
directing a torpedo in the air? 

Capt. Craven. No, sir: that is yet to be developed. 

Senator Swanson. But are there not experiments being made for 
a torpedo to he flown in the air like a water-floating torpedo? 

Capt. Craven. All large nations for several years have been work¬ 
ing with the radio-controlled flying machines, the idea being that 
you could put bombs and explosives into these machines and fly 
them where you wish. 

Senator Swanson. During the war the airplane was a best scout¬ 
ing force that the Navy had: it could locate the submarine and cover 
a large field and use the wireless to notify destroyers of the sub¬ 
marine’s location and the destroyers could go and destroy it. In 
that phase it was one of the most important weapons of fighting 
submarines ? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; it was very important. 

Senator Swanson. Do you know how many submarines were de¬ 
stroyed during the war by aircraft? 

Capt. Craven. It is very difficult to say. 

Senator Swanson. T have been unable to find a single one, in m} r 
reading. 

Capt. Craven. I can show you in our records where 43 were at¬ 
tacked by our machines, and the English records on this subject 
might be quite illuminating. 

Senator Swanson. If they destroyed all they reported they at¬ 
tacked, they destroyed about ten times the number Germany had. 
They would not have had any at the end of the first six months if 
they had destroyed all they attacked. 

Capt. Craven. That is so. 

Senator Swanson. How many ships and submarines destroyed by 
aircraft were really reported with an accuracy that is convincing? 

Capt. Craven. I can not tell you offhand, t know the number of 
attacks—just by comparison I will give you the number of attacks 
reported bv our London office about a year and a half ago by destroy¬ 
ers and the number of attacks by aircraft. The number of attacks 
by destroyers reported by Admiral Knapp was 25, if I am not mis¬ 
taken. 

The number of attacks on submarines by aircraft were 15. That 
gives you a comparison of the two—the American destroyers and the 
American aircraft—on the coast of England and in that neighbor¬ 
hood during the war. But these figures were incomplete because they 


78 NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

did not include data from other parts of the world where we were 
engaged* 

Senator Swanson. These were reports of attacks made, but not as 
to whether they were effective? 

Capt. Craven. It was impossible to decide whether the attack Avas 
effective in all cases. Of course, the man directing the attack always 
thought it was effectwe. The submarine disappeared, and that Avas 
the end of it. 

Senator Smith. It Avent out of his sight, and therefore he thought 
he destroyed it? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I understand you are asking for approximately 
$10,000,000 for the procurement of aircraft ? 

Capt. Craat:n. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. And for landing stations and neAV construction ? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; neAV construction and equipment. 

Senator Hale. That would include eA r erything? 

Capt. Craaen. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. How many aircraft stations have you now for 
your heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air machines? 

Capt. Craarn. I will enumerate them. 

The Chairman. Where are they located? 

Capt. Craa en. The greatest activity is in the fleets—in the Atlantic 
and Pacific—Avhere Ave haA T e borrowed a mine SAveeper from each 
organization and supplemented her by assigning destroyers and simi¬ 
lar craft as tenders with which to enable us to build up an organiza¬ 
tion. 

On shore Ave have a station at Chatham, on Cape Cod, which is out 
of commission. The first acth r e station along the east coast which 
we have is that outside of NeAV York, at Rockaway. We then have a 
station, now inoperatwe, at Cape May, which is out of commission. 
We are enlarging the old dirigible hangar there and next fall Ave hope 
to haA T e that ready to accommodate the rigid that is coming oA^er. 

The Chairman. Is this station at Rockaway for heavier-than-air 
craft? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; although it has a hangar that will accom¬ 
modate small nonrigid dirigibles. The hangar at Cape May is of 
the same type, but Ave have arranged it to accommodate the big 
dirigible that is coming OA^er. 

Our next station is at Hampton Roads. That is perhaps the most 
important of all. 

Those are the only stations on the east coast of the United States 
now in the possession of the Navy. 

We have our school at Pensacola Avhere Ave lnue, Ave think, the 
finest airplane school in the Avorld. 

We have a station at Coco Solo, in the Canal Zone, Avhich is one of 
those Avar-time mushroom camps in which the personnel is still living 
and Avhere, if the station is to be continued, a great deal of money 
has to be spent to make it suitable. 

Senator Hale. That is an important station, strategically, in the 
Canal Zone? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. on the Avest coast Ave have only one station, 
at San Diego. It is very important and is the base for all our activi¬ 
ties on the Pacific coast at the present time. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


79 


We are building a station at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands. 

I should have mentioned the rigid station at Lakehurst, N. J., 
where we are building a hangar for the accommodation of the diri¬ 
gible ship. 

• I should also have mentioned the station at Anacostia, at Wash¬ 
ington. Those are the only activities we have. 

Idle Chairman. There is a proviso in the House bill that “ no part 
of this appropriation shall be expended for maintenance of more 
than six heavier-than-air stations on the coasts of the Continental 
United States.” How many have you now? 

Capt. Craven. We have five. 

The Chairman. That includes Coco Solo? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Does that include the small experimental station 
here ? 

Capt. Craven. No, sir. 

The Chairman. That would have to be included, would it not, 
under that language—“ no more than six heavier-than-air stations ” ? 

Capt. Craven. That is a delicate point. I do not know Iioav far 
back the coast extends. 

Senator Smith. There are others. 

Capt. Craven. I want to retract my former statement. 1 should 
have included Quantico for the marines. 

Senator Hale. I understood the House in their legislative bill pro¬ 
vided nearly $9,000,000 for new construction, taking care of these 
substations ? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. That is almost what you asked for? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. If that was in this bill, could you get along with 
that ? 

Capt. Craven. The onl}- increase is $1,000,000, which is asked for 
for the rigid airship. 

Senator Hale. That was cut out? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. So if you had that, you would have substantially 
what you want for new construction? 

Capt. CraYen. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. And what you object to in this bill is the cutting 
down from $12,000,000 to nearly $7,000,000? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. So if we should put in the House legislative bill 
appropriation and should give you an additional amount in this bill 
to what is already in that, that would take care of aviation? 

Capt. Craven. Approximately; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That would not take care of it unless you changed 
that item of $440,000? 

Capt. Craven. You would have to add $1,000,000 there. 

The Chairman. I wish you would look up and see what would be 
available of unexpended appropriations already made for that pur¬ 
pose. 

Capt. Craven. For that purpose, nothing will be available, because, 
Mr. Chairman, the money appropriated which could be used for that 


80 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


ship will revert to the Treasury. We are going to turn in a balance 
which might be utilized for that purpose on the 1st of July. 

The Chairman. We want to know what will be the amount avail¬ 
able from turning into the Treasury. 

Senator Swanson. If we should make a new appropriation or re- 
appropriate that, it would like we were appropriating so much money, 
at this time. 

The Chairman. What have you to say about the amount stricken 
out in those lines in that bill [exhibiting]—I mean as to the im¬ 
portance of leaving them in, if there is any importance ? 

Capt. Craven. I think they should remain there. It saves a great 
deal of trouble to the Navy Department to quiet and settle imme¬ 
diately small claims for damages. The Secretary, I am informed, has 
asked that that be included. 

Senator Swanson. When that was put in there we had hundreds of 
little claims around $25 and $50. A flying machine would kill a man’s 
cow, and it was such an aggregate of trouble that we put it in there. 
It was subject to a point of order, because it was included in an 
appropriation bill. 

Capt. Craven. I would like to direct the attention of the committee 
to the letters addressed to the committee by Secretary Daniels. 

The Chairman. We would like to have you put them in the record, 
calling attention to any particular features. 

Capt. Craven, lie has written one dealing on the general subject of 
aviation, one inviting attention to the importance of including a pro¬ 
vision for a bureau of aeronautics in the Navy Department, and the 
third deals with the necessity of taking ac tion in regard to the site for 
a rigid on the west coast, recommending the site selected by the board 
of Congress which recently inspected naval activities on the west 
coast and suggested Cape Kearney as the proper place at which to 
establish a rigid station. He urges upon the committee the importance 
of including these measures as amendments to this bill. The funds 
for the purchase of the land are already available. We have it already. 
A proposition has been made that a certain amount of land shall be 
given to the Government in that vicinity, the Government to procure 
additional land for the completion of the station. 

The Chairman. The town of San Diego was to give 25 acres for the 
construction of the buildings and the other land can be bought at $100 
an acre. 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. I am informed there are many improve¬ 
ments on it, such as sewage, water, etc., and that if the Government 
does not take the land it will cost a vast sum to restore the property to 
its former condition. 

Senator Ball. There are w r ater, light, roads, sewage,, and every¬ 
thing complete. 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; and gas also. 

The Chairman. Is that all. Captain? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. We are going to leave with the committee 
this draft which I have drawn up of a proposed bill and invite atten¬ 
tion to the wishes of the department and to the suggestions of the 
department in regard to this appropriation. 

The Chairman. Put that in the record, together with the letters 
from the Secretary. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL. 1922. 81 

Senator Hale. When are you going to submit those tables Senator 
Swanson asked for? 

Capt. Craven. It will take me a day or two. I will do the best I 
can. 

(The papers referred to are printed in full, as follows:) 

The Secretary of the Navy, 
Washington , February 18, 1921. 

My Dear Mr. Chairman: At the hearing of the House Naval Affairs Com¬ 
mittee, after consideration of a bill to provide a bureau of aeronautics in the 
Navy Department, the committee unanimously approved a bill creating such 
a bureau. I am inclosing herewith a suggested amendment to the naval ap¬ 
propriation bill, and earnestly urge its incorporation in the pending measure. 
Long consideration has convinced the department that for the most efficient 
direction of this new and important branch of naval development, a bureau of 
aeronautics is essential. 

Sincerely, yours, Josephus Daniels. 

Hon. C. S. Page, 

Chairman Committee on Naval Affairs, 

United States Senate . Washington. 


SUGGESTED SENATE AMENDMENT TO NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL. 

That there is hereby created and established in the Department of the Navy 
a bureau of aeronautics, which shall be charged with matters pertaining to 
naval aeronautics as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy, and all 
of the duties of said bureau shall be performed under the authority of the 
Secretary of the Navy, and its orders shall be considered as emanating from 
him, and shall have full force and effect as such. 

There shall be a chief of the bureau of aeronautics, appointed by the Presi¬ 
dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the 
officers of the active list of the Navy or Marine Corps, for a period of four 
years, and who shall, while holding such position, have the corresponding 
rank and receive the same pay and allowances as are now or may hereafter be 
prescribed by or in pursunce of law for chiefs of bureaus of the Department 
of the Navy. 

An officer of the active list of the Navy or Marine Corps may be detailed as 
assistant chief of the bureau of aeronautics, and such officer shall receive the 
highest pay of his grade, and, in case of the death, resignation, absence, or 
sickness of the chief of the bureau shall, until otherwise directed by the 
President, as provided by section 179 of the Revised Statutes, perform the 
duties of such chief until his successor is appointed or such absence or sick¬ 
ness shall cease. 

There shall be a chief clerk at a salary of $2,250 per annum. 

The Secretary of the Navy is authorized to transfer to the Bureau of Aero¬ 
nautics such number of the civilian, technical, clerical, and messenger personnel, 
together with such records, equipment, and facilities now assigned for aero¬ 
nautic work under the various bureaus of the Department of the Navy or Marine 
Corps as in his judgment may be necessary. The unexpended and unobligated 
portion of all moneys heretofore appropriated for any bureau of the Deparement 
of the Navy or Marine Corps used in connection with aeronautics, including the 
appropriation “Aviation, Navy,” is hereby made available for the use of the 
Bureau of Aeronautics. 

The number of officers and enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps 
detailed to duty in aircraft and involving actual flying and to duties in connec¬ 
tion with aircraft shall hereafter be in accordance with the requirements of 
naval aviation as determined by the Secretary of the Navy. 


The Secretary of the Navy, 

Washington, February 18, 1921. 

My Dear Mr. Chairman : I wish to bring to the attention of your committee 
with all earnestness the importance of adequate appropriations for aviation in 


34772—21 


6 





82 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


the bill now under consideration. In the World War we learned, as few had 
ever dreamed of before, the potential force of lighting in the air. There are 
people on both sides of the ocean who believe that with the perfection of aircraft 
it is destined soon to become the most effective engine of war. It is of para¬ 
mount importance that our Navy be equipped with suitable craft, and that the 
aircraft cooperating with our fleets on and under the sea shall not be inferior 
to those of any country in the world. Indeed, we should lead in development as 
we led in conquering the air. 

The prime duty of the Navy at this hour is, by experiment and development 
and construction, to perfect lighting ships in the air. The naval bill which 
passed the House and which is now before your committee carries a total of 
only $6,913,431 for naval aviation. This sum is allocated for the maintenance of 
activities as they now exist or planned, practically nothing for experiment and 
development on a scale commensurate with its importance. No appropriation is 
made for the construction of new aircraft or for new projects. 

I do not think it was the purpose of the House to cut the aviation appropria¬ 
tion to so small an amount as contained in the bill, because the Naval Com¬ 
mittee of the House unanimously recommended the appropriation of $8,914,750 
for new construction. However, the bill approved by the Naval Affairs Com¬ 
mittee has not been considered in the House and my information is it will not 
come up at this session of Congress. Therefore, it is necessary, if our Navy 
is to have even a respectable strength in the air. that the Senate shall make 
such increase of appropriations ;is are absolutely necessary. Careful considera¬ 
tion has been given to the smallest amount that will enable the Navy during the 
next fiscal year to conduct its operations, developments and experiments on a 
scale commensurate with its importance will be $22,259,590. This sum is abso¬ 
lutely necessary unless we shall go backward in aviation instead of going 
forward. 

The limited funds contained in the House bill would make it necessary to 
abandon the erection of a rigid dirigible in this country. This ship has been 
authorized by Congress, and a considerable sum of money has already been 
spent upon the design of the vessel and upon the procurement and the fabrica¬ 
tion of materials for the construction thereof. The Joint Board of the Army 
and the Navy has placed the development of rigids in the hands of the Navy 
and the abandonment of this project would involve the abandonment of the 
lighter-1 lian-air development in so far as the construction of rigids in the United 
States is concerned, carrying the wastage of the money already expended upon 
this vessel. 

Unless there is an increase in appropriations for aviation there will be no 
funds available to supply modern radio equipment to our aircraft. I need not 
speak of the importance of securing ready communication between aircraft, 
surface and subsurface vessels. 

I wish to urge upon your committee the importance of appropriating for the 
construction of airplane carriers vessels regularly equipped for carrying planes 
in connection with fleet activities. The best experts in this country and abroad 
believe that unless vessels of this class are placed with the fleet full power 
of organization can not be developed and our forces would be at serious dis¬ 
advantage if engaged with forces of other nations provided with these essentials 
to a fleet. 

The impelling reason of adding aircraft carriers for the fleet will be brought 
to your attention in their personal hearings by Admirals Coontz, Griffin, and 
Taylor, and I wish to approve their recommendation. 

The department feels that failure at this time to provide the fleet with ade¬ 
quate aircraft would be to deny it what is recognized as an essential part of a 
modern fleet. Indeed, without suitable aircraft and aircraft carriers our great 
fleet would not only lack its eyes but would be seriously handicapped and 
could not develop its full power needed in war. Economies should be effected 
everywhere possible, but I venture to submit that it would not be economy to 
cut to the bone in that new arm of naval service which some of the ablest naval 
experts in the world believe is destined to soon become quite as effeetiv as any 
other part of the fleet, if indeed it may not be found superior in fighting effl- 
cinc-y to other units hitherto deemed to be the most effective parts of a fight¬ 
ing fleet. 

Sincerely yours, Josephus Daniels. 

Hon. Carroll S. Page, 

Chairman , Committee on Karat Affairs, 

United States Senate, Washington, D. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


83 


AVIATION—NAVY. 

For aviation, to ho extended under the direction of the Secretary of the 
Navy, for procuring, producing, constructing, operating, preserving, storing, 
and handling aircraft, establishment and maintenance of aircraft stations- for 
experimental work in development of aviation for naval purposes, and for the 
purchase or manufacture and issue of special clothing, wearing apparel, and 
similar equipment for aviation purposes, $22,259,590, to be expended as follows: 
Necessary heavier-than-air craft, at a total cost not to exceed $4,906,500; neces¬ 
sary lighter-tlmn-air craft, at a total cost not to exceed $670,000; necessary 
equipment for such aircraft, at a total cost not to exceed $988,470; for aircraft 
and accessories in course of construction or manufacture on June 30, 1921, 
$1,440,000; for new construction, buildings, and improvements at air stations, 
at a total cost not to exceed $3,114,000 (as follows: Cape May, $25,000; Coco 
Solo, $402.000: Hampton Roads, $78,000; Lakehurst, $460,000; Pearl Harbor, 
$210,000; Pensacola, $130,000; San Diego, $164,000; Dutch Flats, $75,000; 
Quantico, $50,000; Great Lakes, $20,000; Guam, $50,000); for navigational, 
photographic, and aerological equipment, including repairs thereto, for use with 
aircraft built or building on June 30, 1921, $49,250; for maintenance, repair, 
and operation of aircraft factory, helium plant, air stations, fleet activities, 
testing laboratories, and for overhauling planes, $7,286,120; for continuing 
experiments and development work on all types of aircraft, $3,405,000; for 
drafting, clerical, inspection, and messenger service for aircraft stations, 
$400,000; and any moneys appropriated for aviation, except moneys appro¬ 
priated for heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air craft, and for new construc¬ 
tion. buildings, and improvements at air stations shall be disbursed and ac¬ 
counted for in accordance with existing law, as “Aviation,” and for that pur¬ 
pose shall constitute one fund: Provided, That no part of this appropriation 
shall be expended for maintenance of more than six heavier-than-air stations 
on the coast of the continental United States: Provided further , That no part 
of this appropriation shall be used for the construction of a factory for the 
manufacture of airplanes: Provided further, That all funds appropriated for 
the fiscal year 1922 for the purchase and construction of aircraft and for new 
construction of stations and buildings shall be available until expended. 


AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. 


Referring to the naval appropriation bill, H. R. 15975, as passed by the 


Page 45, after line 15, add the following: 

“Increase of the Navy: The construction of two airplane carriers is hereby 
authorized, at a cost not to exceed $24,600,000 for each vessel for hull and 
machinery, to be available until expended.” 

Page 45, line 16, insert, between the words “heretofore” and “authorize,” 
the word “ herein.” 

Page 45, line 17. change amount “$53,000,000” t<* “$70,000,000.” 

Page 45, line 23, change amount “ $33,000,000 ” to “ $35,000,000.” 

Page 46. line 2, change amount “ $90,000,000 ” to “ $109,000,000.” 

Page 46, line 5, after words “ contracted for,” add the words “ except for 
the aircraft carriers herein authorized.” 


February 18, 1921. 

My Dear Mr. Chairman: During the last session of Congress the sum of 
$2,000,000 was made available for the erection of a rigid hangar on the west 
coast of the United States. The Navy has gone to great length# in searching 
for and deciding upon a site for this structure. A committee of Congress has 
recommended a location, and I have to urge upon you the importance of pro¬ 
curing a suitable site at an early date, in order that the sum appropriated for 
the construction of the building may be utilized. 

I have to recommend that the following clause covering this matter be 
inserted in the appropriation bill: 

“ That the Secretary of the Navy be, and he is hereby, authorized to accept, 
free of cost to the United States, a tract of land containing twenty-five acres, 
more or less, upon which to erect a rigid hangar on the west coast of the 
United States: Provided further, That the Secretary of the Navy, in his 
discretion, is authorized to purchase a tract of land of 800 acres, more or less, 




84 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


adjacent to said twenty-five acres, for the purposes of a lighter-than-air 
station on the west coast of the United States. For the purchase of such 
land the sum of $ 80 , 000 , or as much thereof as may be necessary, is author¬ 
ized to be expended from funds already appropriated for the purposes of naval 
aviation.” 

Very truly, yours, 

Josephus Daniels. 

Hon. C. S. Page, 

Chairman Naval Affairs Committee, 

United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL CHARLES B. McVAY, JR. 

The Chairman. Admiral, we will be glad to hear what you have to 
say as to the ordnance features of the bill. 

Admiral McVay. Mr. Chairman, in order that what I have to say 
may have a little more weight than it appears it did have before the 
other committee, I would like to inform you that in the Bureau of 
Ordnance there are 14 officers, 12 of whom are chiefs of sections and 
the assistant chief of the bureau and myself. Of those 14 officers, 
who have those positions, every one has served afloat during the war, 
and 12 of the 14 served abroad. Each one has been identified with 
ordnance for a number of years and all of those who are young 
enough to have been able to take postgraduate courses have taken 
them. 

Those officers are particularly well qualified to take advantage of 
the lessons learned from the war. Most of them saw all of these 
various materials used during the war. We have no record of any 
ordnance material which is not equal or superior to any material 
made by a foreign country, and yet we have not any ordnance mate¬ 
rial which could not be improved in some manner, and, I think, 
without exception, the tests that we have conducted have been 
brought to the point where we are now using those lessons practi¬ 
cally, and I do not mean to say that we are going to do this or that, 
but that we are actually doing it. 

As you know all of the material for new vessels is covered by the 
appropriation for armor and armament. The general appropriation 
under which all material for old ships or improving material on 
hand and for running all the ordnance stations—of which there are 
about 35—comes under the appropriation for ordnance and ordnance 
stores. The Bureau of Ordnance, which, as you know, is different 
from the other bureaus of the departments, not only designs mate¬ 
rial, but manufactures it, and we run a great many manufacturing 
plants. We now make all of our powder; we make practically all 
of our torpedoes; we make a large percentage of our guns; we are 
making our projectiles, and, I might say, we are making projectiles 
of a character such that I do not know of any place where they are 
made better. As a matter of fact, it is a general manufacturing con¬ 
cern in addition to carrying on design work, and I assure you that it 
is fully up to date. 

The various sections submitted to me a request for material which 
totaled $26,000,000, and I want over that and decided that in view of 
the known desire for economy, to limit the amounts they had asked 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 85 

for to that appropriated last year. I out that myself to $ 17 , 500 , 000 , 
which was what was given last year, and all of which will be used. 

The Appropriations Committee cut that to $14,000,000. Notwith¬ 
standing that the board of bureau chiefs, presided x>ver by the Chief 
of Operations, permitted the $17,500,000 to go through exactly as 
asked for. Yesterday the Secretary said he thought under the condi¬ 
tions and after listening to the members of the House Naval Com¬ 
mittee—and to whom the rest of us listened, too he thought the 
$14,000,000 should stand, but this morning I told him of some changes 
I was making in the shell, and he authorized me to say that he be¬ 
lieves that this should be increased to $15,000,000. 1 think that the 
amount asked for originally—that is, $17,500,000—should be allowed, 
in order to carry out all of the work. 

Senator Swanson. What work is cut off now to reduce it to 
$14,000,000? 

Admiral McVay. The $14,000,000 will carry on the routine work 
and permit me to put modern power-controlled instruments on a few 
of the destroyers and battleships, but it will slow down the other 
work—the other improvements. 

Mr. Chairman, I realize the necessity for economy, and I want to 
play the game, and I think I can get along with $15,000,000. 

Senator Swanson. What do you want that other million for? Do 
you want it for experimental purposes? 

Admiral McVay. No, sir. T will come to that later. It is actually 
a manufacturing proposition. There were some words eliminated on 
page 18, as follows: 

Provided, That quarterly reports on all gasoline passenger and freight auto¬ 
mobiles shall be made on form No. 124, and one copy of each report shall be 
filed in the Bureau of Yards and Docks. 

That went out on a point of order. So far as I am concerned, that 
point of order may stand. It would serve no useful purpose that 
I see. 

Senator Hale. What is the point about it ? 

Admiral McVay. I do not know. Mr. Britten had it put in last 
year and had it taken out this year on a point of order. 

The next thing is “ Experiments, Bureau of Ordnance.” 

The Chairman. Hoav about the item for smokeless powder; is that 
all right? 

Admiral McVay. That is all right. There is nothing else under 
the Bureau of Ordnance that was put out under a point of order. 

With regard to experiments, Bureau of Ordnance, I asked for 
$500,000 under experiments. The Secretary of the Navy cut it down 
to what it was last year, $200,000. The Souse raised it to $250,000. 
and I believe it is the only amount that was raised by the House. I 
can use the $500,000 very profitably. 

Senator Keyes. The House appropriated $50,000 more than was 
estimated ? 

Admiral McVay. More than was approved by the department, but 
the committee said they were heartily in favor of experiments. Of 
course, we have to do a great deal of it and it is very expensive. T 
spent over a thousand dollars just to get this one shell back, the 
projectile I was telling you about. It cost a thousand dollars to dig 
that out. 


86 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Senator KL\le. Was it their idea that this $50,000 would enable 
you to carry on the experiment ? 

Admiral McVay. Some of them; yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. Of course, it would not in any way be adequate 
for what you want ? 

Admiral McVay. No, sir. What I was speaking about before was 
production, this being a new thing, testing, and all sort of thing. 
We could use $500,000, and I would be glad to get it. 

Senator Keyes. What do you suppose the House would say to us 
if we increased it when they had already increased it over the 
request ? 

Admiral McVay. If they meant what they told me, I think they 
would be glad. If they meant what they put down here, I think 
they would not be pleased. But we may be able to get along with 
this $250,000. So long as you do not change the wording of the bill 
it does not make any difference to me, because I asked them to permit 
me to employ technical people under it—experts. That Avas not put 
in, so it might as well stay at $250,000. But if this committee Avould 
put in a proviso that this money may be used for the employment of 
technicists, then I would like to haA-e it increased to $500,000. 

Senator Keyes. Unless they put in that amendment, you are sat¬ 
isfied ? 

Admiral McVay. It would not do any good, because $250,000 
covers material. I would like to employ those people, because we 
are behind in our work. When Ave go before the General Board it 
demands a certain thing on a neAv ship, and Ave haA'e to lay work 
aside in order to get at the new drafting work. 

The Chairman. That is for the employment of- 

Admiral McVay. Technical assistants. I have fUe of them noAv, 
all I can get, Avorking on a fuse; five people from commercial life 
trying to get it and other things, and I am held up. 

The Chairman. If you can employ them under the existing Laav 
Avhy would you need any additional express authority? 

Admiral McVay. Because I would employ them in connection with 
experiments. 

The Chairman. HaA^e you not authority to do that under existing 
laAv if you had the money ? 

Admiral McVay. No, sir; because it is limited, if you Avill notice 
on line 8, of page 18: 

“ That the sum to be paid out of this appropriation under the 
direction of the Secretary of the Navy for chemists, drafting, inspec¬ 
tion, Avatchmen, and messenger sendee in naA r y yard, naval stations, 
na\ r al ordnance plants, and naval ammunition depots,” etc., shall not 
exceed $2,000,000. 

In other Avords, it is limited. 

The Chairman. But that does not include necessarily technical 
ordnance men ? 

Admiral McVay. Under the legislature bill there is a limitation of 
the amount that can be spent in the District of Columbia: that is, to 
be spent by the NaAyy Department. 

The Chairman. That is under the legislative bill; that has not 
passed yet. 

Admiral McVay. But it has been in eA^ery year in the legislative, 
executive, and judicial bill. 



NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 87 

The Chairman. Oh. I thought you meant the naval legislative 
bill. 

Admiral McVay. No, sir; the general bill. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, there is another thing here with regard to a 
word on line 9, of page 18. Within that limitation of $2,000,000 is 
the word u watchmen/’ I would like to have that stricken out 
because if there is an emergency and the marines have to be drawn 
from the stations and sent abroad, or anywhere else, it leaves the 
stations without any guards, and I would not be able to employ them 
if that word is in there because the amount to be expended is limited 
to $2,000,000. I think it is a rather dangerous thing to have in there. 

Senator Swanson. How does leaving “ watchmen ” in there affect 
it? 

Admiral McVay. It places them within this limitation. 

Senator Swanson. If you leave it out you will not have the right 
to employ them at all. 

Admiral McVay. Yes, sir; I could employ them under general ap¬ 
propriations. 

Senator Swanson. All of these limitations were put in years ago. 
They got so that they would let the appointments roll up and put 
them in sometimes 30 days before election or 60 days before election, 
and we politicians were worried almost to death. 

Admiral McVay. You may rest assured I am not going to pay 
money for a watchman when I can buy something else with it that we 
need more. 

Senator Swanson. That was the reason those limitations were put 
in some years ago. 

Admiral McVay. Yes; I know why, and incidentally I spoke to 
the Secretary about that and he said there was no use taking them 
out*. But I talked it over with Gen. Lejeune, and he says if the 
marine force is reduced he will give us as many marines as he can 
spare. 

Senator Swanson. I know that trouble has arisen in the past on 
account of this being in there. 

Admiral McVay. There was a time at the outbreak of the war, I 
think, when there was a good deal of trouble about it. You raised 
the appropriation. 

Senator Swanson. We are trying to reduce the appropriations. 

Admiral McVay. But by not increasing the appropriations you 
are apt to reduce the marines and then we would not have anybody. 
I would like to have that come out. It would not add any more 
money to the appropriation. It is simply the elimination of a word. 

Mr. Chairman, I have nothing else with respect to ordnance ex¬ 
cept “ Increase of the Navy, armor, and armament.” 

The Chairman. Is there*anything in the bill as it is on the House 
calendar, providing legislation for the Navy, that you want to call 
to the attention of this committee, or have you examined it? 

Admiral McVay. Yes, sir; I have examined it; I have nothing. 
As I have said there is nothing that is liable to come out on a point 
of order. 

There is only one thing that I have urged for a number of years 
and that is that the assistant chiefs of the bureaus ought to get more 
pay. I was an assistant chief of bureau any everybody thought I 
got extra pay. but I did not get any, because the controller said that 


88 NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

what everybody thought was pay was allowance and that is the way 
they are now. 

The Chairman. I am speaking with regard to this legislative naval 
bill—whether there is anything which ought to be added to it or 
whether there is any particular part of it you are interested in hav¬ 
ing enacted. 

Admiral McVay. In this bill under discussion? 

The Chairman. The legislative bill—H. R. 15975—perhaps you 
have not examined it ? 

Admiral McVay. Yes, sir; I have. 

The Chairman. Is there any part of it that it is important to pass 
or not to pass ? 

Admiral McVay. There is one important part there—very im¬ 
portant—where there is a limitation of the amount to be expended 
in Washington for- 

The Chairman. You are thinking about a different bill. 

Admiral McVay. Oh, I understand now. No, sir; there is nothing 
in here. 

The Chairman. I was going to say if you have not already ex¬ 
amined it, I think you should. 

Admiral McVay. There is nothing in here that strikes us. I 
have nothing else but “ Increase of the Navy, armor and armament ” 
in this bill. Do you want to take that up now ? 

The Chairman. Yes; we would like to take that up. What page 
is that on? 

Admiral McVay. It is the last page, 45. Under “ Increase of the 
Navy, armor and armanent,” is that part of new construction in 
which the Bureau of Ordnance is interested. It starts on line 14, 
which is the part that is of interest to the Bureau of Construction 
and Repair and Bureau of Engineering; we all three are together 
on that. The request was for $184,000,000 required this year for the 
1916 building program as already laid down. 

The Chairman. That is for all three of those items? 

Admiral McVay. Yes, sir. Beginning on line 14 is “ Increase of 
the Navy, construction and machinery ”; then “ Increase of the Navy, 
torpedo boats ”; and “ Increase of the N avy, armor, and armament,” 
the estimated appropriation for the three being $184,000,000. 

Ninety million dollars was allowed by the House. We asked, as I 
have said, for the $184,000,000, that is for the three material bureaus. 
The chairman of the House Appropriations Committee figured on a 
basis of $100,000,000 under the new construction for the three 
bureaus. Nobody in the Navy Department and nobody^ in any 
bureau as far as I know, agreed that the work could continue logi¬ 
cally and reasonably for that amount. The other bureaus, of course, 
could speak for themselves. 

The Chairman. Let us hear from you particularly as to the item 
that refers to your bureau. 

Admiral McVay. That is what I was going to do. I spoke of 
Admirals Taylor and Griffin about this- 

The Chairman. I see the department estimated $55,000,000 and 
the House allowed $33,000,000. 

Admiral McVay. Yes, sir; our estimate was $55,000,000, which I 
thought was necessary to carry on the work properly and within a 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


89 


reasonable cost. If $100,000,000 had been granted, which was not, 
that would be $37,000,000 instead of $33,000,000. 

Senator Hale. One minute, while you are on that. The estimates 
here only add up to $174,000,000. How do you make it $184,000,000 ' 

Admiral McVay. Because they have cut out $10,000,000 that I 
asked for ammunition for these new ships. 

Senator Hale. That is not in the bill at all. 

Admiral McVay. Yes, sir; it is to be found at the top of page 46. 

The Chairman. What was that $10,000,000 for ? 

Admiral McVay. Ammunition for these ships already authorized. 

Senator Hale. What have you that is available for this purpose? 

Admiral McVay. We have a certain amount available under 
ammunition, and we can proceed with the production of it, but not so 
rapidly as we could if we had gotten this money. 

Senator Swanson. Have you a right good supply of ammunition 
now left over from the war ? 

Admiral McVay. Not of this type; no, sir; this ammunition is for 
the 16-inch guns for the new construction. 

Senator Swanson. What is the difference in the ammunition for 
a 16-inch gun and, say, a 14 or 12 inch gun? 

The Chairman. Two inches. 

Admiral McVay. It is just as the chairman says—2 inches. There 
is a difference in the size of the powder. 

Senator Swanson. What is the difference in the size of powder—in 
the grain of the powder ? 

Admiral McVay. Yes, sir; in the openings you have to have. In 
each grain of powder there is an opening, the number and size of 
which depends on the rapidity of burning; you have to have a certain 
rapidity of burning, or rather to limit rapidity of burning in order 
that you will not have it burn too quickly and get up a high pressure 
in the guns. 

Senator Swanson. Is that in connection with the fuse ? 

Admiral McVay. No, sir; that is only in connection with limiting 
the pressure in the gun so the gun will be safe. If you take rifle 
powder and try to fire it- 

Senator Swanson. I mean when you make powder for 12 or 14 inch 
or 16 inch guns, is there right much difference in the constitution of 
that powder ? 

Admiral McVay. No, sir; there is no difference in the constitution 
of the powder, but there is a difference in the size of the grains; that 
is, the length and diameter, and in the number of longitudinal holes. 

Senator Swanson. That is the amount of powder you put in and 
the different phases of it, but do you mean there is a difference in the 
size of powder for the 12-inch gun ? 

Admiral McVay. Y"es, sir; each gun must have a separate grain. 

The Chairman. And it is for the 16-inch guns that you are talking 
about that you wanted to get the powder for ? 

Admiral McVay. No, sir; that we want the projectiles for. That 
has been eliminated from the bill. 

Senator Swanson. That $10,000,000 covered the projectiles; I un¬ 
derstand about that. But you said ammunition. 

Admiral McVay. That is part of the ammunition; the rest of it 
would be powder. But, as I have said, I am quite willing for that to 
go out, because we have some money left over, a balance, which they 



90 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


permitted us to have during the coming year, and I would rather 
have that ammunition go on this $33,000,000. We were allowed 
$45,000,000 last year. We have spent it all practically, and as we 
have now reached the point where the expenditures are about what 
they will be—that is, four and one-half million dollars a month—we 
really need the $45,000,000. 

Senator Swanson. All of this money is for projectiles manufac¬ 
tured by the Government itself, is it not ? 

Admiral McVay. No, sir; very little of it. 

Senator Swanson. There is very little manufactured in your own 
shops ? 

Admiral McVay. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. Where do you get them from mostly? 

Admiral McVay. Well, as to the projectiles, the Washington Steel 
& Ordnance Co. has made a good many, and it is just finishing. The 
Crucible Steel Co. has made a good many, and it is just finishing; the 
Midvale Steel Co. made a good many, and when I say a good many, I 
mean three or four thousand projectiles each, each one of them, the 
contract is completed. The only outstanding contract is one with a 
concern in Dayton, Ohio. It has a contract for 3,500, and the other 
is ordered with the Naval Ordnance Branch at South Charleston. 
'We were expecting to make about 5,000 of them there. But it is a 
small proportion. That is all in GoA r ernment plants and is a very 
small proportion of the amount made. The rest of them are made 
by commercial concerns. Now, after talking it over with Admiral 
Taylor, who is going to ask for an increase under naval construction 
and machinery, in order to keep pace with him I would like to have 
this $33,000,000 raised to $40,000,000. 

Senator Hale. Would you take it off of other things? If we are 
only going to give you $90,000,000, where would you take it off ? 

Admiral McVay. I would not take it off anywhere. I thought of 
economy, too, and instead of asking for the whole $45,000,000 and 
$10,000,000 for ammunition I thought to sacrifice it to the extent of 
$15,000,000. 

Senator Swanson. This runs from the 1st of July, 1922. Now, 
what ships will be completed for which these projectiles and ammu¬ 
nition must be supplied each year by that time ? 

Admiral McVay. I have ammunition on hand now for those ships 
which will be completed next year; that is, the Maryland and Cali¬ 
fornia. But, Senator, you know we have to anticipate. You see 
this covers not only projectiles but armor. We have to anticipate 
the delivery of the ships. The contractor for the ships will call, for 
instance, a certain part of the barbette or turret at a certain time, and 
we have to meet that requirement. In fact, we have to anticipate 
the probable time of delivery. 

Senator Hale. As I understand, you would not need ammunition 
or projectiles. I understood you to say you have ammunition and 
projectiles for those two ships? 

Admiral McVay. Yes, sir; I have it for them. 

Senator Hale. What you want it for is armor ? 

Admiral McVay. Armor, fire-control instruments, torpedoes and 
different things like that. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1022. 


91 


Senator Hale. What armor under contract have you for those two 
ships and when will delivery he made for the ships to be constructed 
by the 1st of July, 1922? 

Admiral McVay. That is all delivered for the Maryland and Cali¬ 
fornia, I think. 

The Chairman. I think that is all, Admiral. 

Admiral McVay. Mr. Chairman, there is just one more matter. 
Admiral Coontz was talking about destroyers in reserve. He asked 
me to mention the fact that when you put the destroyers in reserve, 
if you put them out of commission, you land all the ammunition and 
all the torpedoes. When you lay them up in reserve with a small 
crew they have only part of their torpedoes on board; the rest are 
landed. In order to use these vessels—they are only made for the 
purpose of firing torpedoes—you must have on board of them men 
who know how to look out for torpedoes, and that you have not 
to-day, and you won’t get it until after we can educate the men. 
They are being educated as fast as possible at the torpedo station in 
Newport from the Atlantic Fleet and at the torpedo station at Key- 
port from the Pacific Fleet, but we have to be very sure of the men 
who can handle torpedoes, and that is one great reason for having 
these vessels in reserve instead of having them in ordinary with no¬ 
body aboard. It is a highly important thing. Even the active 
destroyers, except those which are abroad, generally carry only one- 
half of their torpedo allowance. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT E. COONTZ, UNITED STATES 

NAVY. 

The Chairman. Admiral Coontz, there is a provision here under 
the heading limiting the appropriation to ships that are now being 
constructed, or have been heretofore contracted for, that would elimi¬ 
nate 12 torpedo destroyers and 6 fleet submarines. Senator Gerry 
called attention to the very small number of submarines that we have 
or that are included in the program. I notice in the statement I got 
from Admiral Badger that the total of those that are authorized, 
including what we have in hand, make a total of 12. 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is, if the respective programs of the several 
nations are completed in 1927, we would only have 12 fleet sub¬ 
marines; Great Britain will have 35 and Japan will have 56. Now, 
I would like to get a little more light as to the advisability of such 
a limitation as that in the bill, or the abandoning of the authority 
which has been created by Congress to construct these additional 6 
fleet submarines, which, if constructed, will only give us 12 alto¬ 
gether, as compared to 35 for Great Britain and 56 for Japan. 

Admiral Coontz. The suggestion regarding that is this, that we do 
not believe the destroyers should be constructed. Personally, I be¬ 
lieve a transport ought to be built. We have been for a year and a 
half trying to get something out of the Army or the Shipping Board, 
without success. 

The contracts have been advertised for and bids have been in for 
a long time, but we have not accepted any of them. 

Of the 12 fleet submarines, 3 are being built at the Portsmouth 
Navy Yard and 3 under contract. The other six, of course, we need. 


92 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


We have cut them out just as we cut the destroyers and transport, 
because the airplane carriers are the greatest need of the day, and 
we thought if that was the only way we could get them, we would 
gladly sacrifice that fifty-odd million dollars until the times became 
better to complete the submarines. 

Senator Swanson. What is to be the radius of those fleet sub¬ 
marines ? How far will they go ? 

Admiral Coontz. Five thousand miles. 

Senator Swanson. What is the radius of the largest one we have ? 

Admiral Coontz. About five thousand. 

The Chairman. Have we any fleet submarines at all now? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes; we have the T-l, T-2, and T-3. 

The Chairman. And their rating, as I understand, is 5,000 miles ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. Are they fleet submarines? 

Admiral Coontz. You know we make those big submarines so fast 
that we change the title. Those older one Avould be fleet submarines. 
Later on there will be larger ones yet, but we feel that if necessary 
we could forego them on the economic basis. In time, of course, we 
will need them, there is no doubt about that if the Navy is to be 
properly kept up. 

Senator Swanson. What was the experience during the war as to 
the advisability of a whole lot of fleet submarines? Were they very 
effective, the submarines operating from a base? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. I think the need of them was shown 
during the war, both for ability to go far from base, their stability 
and ability. I think that one out of each lot ought to be big enough 
to have quarters for the man in charge, so he could run everything 
from navigation down. 

I think that is a bad clause to be in the bill, but as I say, we were 
driven to the wall on it and that was the only way to do it. 

The Chairman. What is the limit of cost of the big submarines 
under this program? 

Admiral Coontz. The limit of cost on these is two and a half 
million, is it not, Admiral Taylor? 

Admiral Taylor. It is not fixed. 

The Chairman. What do you estimate it, about? 

Admiral Taylor. Four million dollars apiece. 

Senator Hale. Four million apiece? 

Admiral Taylor. That was the rating to the department, but it has 
not been accepted as yet, because the bids were too high. 

Senator Gerry. What would that appropriation mean for this 
year; how much would the appropriation have to be for the first 
year if they were constructed? 

Admiral Coontz. For the six submarines, it would be about one- 
third the first year. 

The Chairman. About $8,000,000? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. With your present submarines and destroyers, 
do you look on these fleet submarines as very urgent now ? 

Admiral Coontz. Well, we are pretty well fixed in destroyers, and 
in the other submarines, and I do not feel that under the circum¬ 
stances it is necessary to put it in this year’s bill. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 93 

The Chairman. We will now turn to the Bureau of Yards and 
Docks. 

Senator Gerry. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call attention to 
some amendments that will have to be put in on page 45 if you 
decide to build two airplane carriers. I will submit them to the 
chairman. 

The Chairman. We will take these up when we come to act on the 
bill. 

Senator Gerry. I simply wanted to call them to your attention. 
1 did not know whether you would desire to ask any questions about 
them of the different heads of departments now before you. 

The Chairman. Well, as long as you are here, we will hear any¬ 
thing that you have to say about it. As to the matter of airplane 
carriers, we have had a hearing on that. What about the next 
amendment in line 16? Do they all relate to the same items—all 
these amendments? Or do they just refer to two airplane carriers? 

Senator Gerry. They refer to two airplane carriers. I simply 
thought it might be convenient for the committee to have them now. 

Senator Hale. That is simply a division of the appropriation? 

Senator Gerry. It is simply a division of the appropriation; yes, 
sir. 

The Chairman. We will take them up later. The committee will 
now hear from Admiral Parks, Chief of the Bureau of Yards and 

Docks. 


STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL CHARLES W. PARKS, CHIEF 
BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS, NAVY DEPARTMENT. 

The Chairman. Admiral, we would like to hear your observations 
with respect to Yards and Docks. 

Admiral Parks. Mr. Chairman, the first item is on pages 19 and 
20, under the caption “Maintenance, Bureau of Yards and Docks.” 
That is an item that has been carried for a great many years 
under that title, but in this year’s bill, now before you, an addition 
has been made of what before has been carried under “ Repairs and 
Preservation.” 

The Chairman. Where is that item? 

Admiral Parks. That is beginning on line 7 on page 19. 

The Chairman. Do you mean the entire item of “Maintenance, 
Bureau of Yards and Docks.” is a new item? 

Admiral Parks. No, sir; it has been amplified by adding repairs 
and preservation to it and carrying no separate appropriation for 
repairs and preservation. 

Senator Hale. When was that done? 

Admiral Parks. That was done by the Appropriations Committee 
this year. 

Senator Hale. This year? 

Admiral Parks. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. Where is the item? 

Admiral Parks. Lines 24 and 25 on page 19. 

Senator Ball. While it is apparently an increase of $1,000,000, 
yet when you take the two together it is a saving of two millions? 

Admiral Parks. It is a decrease of $2,000,000; yes, sir. 


94 NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

The Chairman. I want to understand exactly what Admiral Parks 
is referring to. 

Admiral Parks. I am referring to page 19, line 24, “ and for 
repairs and preservation at navy yards, fuel depots, fuel plants, and 
stations.” 

Those are the new words in this item. 

The Chairman. Where do you want to put those in? 

Admiral Parks. They are already in lines 24 and 25. 

The Chairman. What do you want to add them again for if they 
are already in? 

Admiral Parks. The reason I referred to them is because they 
have been carried separately in bills and acts prior to this year, and 
separate appropriation has been made for that purpose. 

Senator Ball. You want it to stay as it is now, do jmu? 

Admiral Parks. I do not object to its staying as it is now. It will 
reduce accounting; it reduces the expense of operation, but the 
amount that is appropriated should take that combination into con¬ 
sideration. The $7,500,000 given on line 1 of page 20 is not suffi¬ 
cient to cover the work that should be charged to that appropriation. 

Senator Hale. Is it not more than you got last year? 

Admiral Parks. No, sir; last year we got nine million and a half 
for those two appropriations. 

Senator Hale. Then this estimate here is not correct ? 

Admiral Parks. Xo; the estimate is for the maintenance part 
without repair and preservation. 

Senator Swanson. What is the total you have this year? 

Admiral Parks. Nine and one-half millions. Then in addition 
to that we found deficiencies necessary of $633,000, making the total 
estimate for the years expenditures $10,133,000. 

Senator Ball. What are you asking for now? 

Admiral Parks. We ask for nine and one-half millions, that the 
$7,500,000 be increased to $9,500,000. 

Senator Hale. That is really not a fair estimate. It is taking the 
estimate in the appropriation bill of last year and splitting it. 

Admiral Parks. That is all. It does not show without explana¬ 
tion what it means. 

The Chairman. What was the amount appropriated last year for 
the item for repair and preservation at navy yards, fuel depots, fuel 
plants, and stations? 

Admiral Parks. $3,000,000. 

The Chairman.. $3,000,000 last year for that and $6,000,000 for 
this? 

Senator Swanson. It is $2,000,000 less than it was last year; that 
is right, is it ? 

Admiral Parks. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. And you want it what it was last year? 

Admiral Parks. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. And at that, you had a deficit? 

Admiral Parks. Yes, sir; things were charged to general expenses 
that ought to have been charged to this appropriation. 

Senator Ball. I understand that of the $9,500,000 you had last 
year you had about $700,000 or $800,000 deficit? 

Admiral Parks. Yes, sir; and conditions are such at certain places 
that repairs should be made even to the extent of creating an addi- 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 95 

tional deficit. But they have been delayed until the next funds be¬ 
come available. 

Now, aside from desiring to change from $7,500,000 to $9,500,000, 
there is an item on page 20, lines 10 to 13, as follows : 

Provided further, That the expenditures from appropriations contained in this 
act for the maintenance, operation, and repair of motor-propelled passenger¬ 
carrying vehicles, including the compensation of operators, shall not exceed 
$150,000. 

By stating the “act,” this limitation covers not only the automo¬ 
biles operated under the Bureau of Yards and Docks, but those under 
Medicine and Surgery and Aviation and Ordnance in the Navy 
directly, and those operated by the Marine Corps. 

Senator Hale. How does this include them ? 

Admiral Parks. It means that under all of these separate appro¬ 
priations the limit must be $150,000. It makes no division between 
the several activities. 

Senator Ball. It is stated here that you have 375 passenger-carry¬ 
ing automobiles in the service? 

Admiral Parks. Yes, sir. Now, that $150,000 would not be enough 
to take care of over 33 J per cent of the passenger automobiles that 
we operate under Yards and Docks. We give the figures for those 
automobiles, amounting to $453,000. We did not have the figures for 
the Ordnance and Medicine and Surgery and Aviation and Marine 
Corps. Those would have to be added to the $453,000 to find the 
total cost. 

Now, the Secretary of the Navy has said that he is not willing 
to ask for an increase in that limit, and he is willing to have a modi¬ 
fication on page 20, line 12, after the word “ vehicles,” to insert 
“ except those used by the Marine Corps outside of the continental 
limits of the United States.” As the limit now stands, the operations 
of the Marine Corps might be very materially restricted in expedi¬ 
tionary forces, and in some other matters that Gen. Dejeune will 
doubtless mention. 

Senator Ball. You want to add after the word “vehicles” what? 

Admiral Parks. The words “ except those used by the Marine 
Corps outside of the continental limits of the United States. 

Senator Hale. Why does not this last clause in this section take 
care of the matter of automobiles, Admiral? 

Admiral Parks. The bill reads: 

That during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1922, operators of motor vehicles 
who were carried on the pay rolls of other bureaus prior to July 1, 1920, shall 
be continued to be so carried where their employment shall be found necessary. 

That is simply the designation of the appropriation that shall 
carry the cost of operators. It does not help the limit at all of what 
can be expended out of the $150,000. 

Senator Hale. You mean then that you would have to come within 
$150,000? . 

Admiral Parks. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Coontz. It is a drastic law that practically takes them all 
out; it does not allow anything else. It reduces the operation down 
to almost nil. 

The Chairman. What is the intention, to go back to horse-drawn 
vehicles? 


96 NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Admiral Coontz. To get them down to the absolutely necessary 
use. 

Senator Swanson. How many are there in your department? 

Admiral Parks. Three hundred and seventy-five when we made up 
the list in November. 

Senator Swanson. In Yards and Docks. What did it cost you to 
operate them? 

Admiral Parks. $453,000. 

Senator Swanson. A year? 

Admiral Parks. Last year. 

Senator Swanson. Possibly they intended to apply this not to this 
act ” but to this provision. They possibly meant to limit this to 
you. It says, “ this act,” but if they were to limit it under this pro¬ 
vision, it would not give you more than about one-half of what you 
have now. 

Admiral Parks. It would give us about one-half. 

Senator Swanson. I think they intended to put in there “ this pro- • 
vision.” 

Senator Hale. No; they did not. 

Senator Swanson. That this “ act ” would cover this whole appro¬ 
priation ? 

Admiral Parks. It covers the whole thing. 

Senator Hale. No; such a clause shows that they were particu¬ 
larly talking about other bureaus. 

Admiral Coontz. It is very drastic. Personally, I think it is too 
drastic to cut down that amount. 

Senator Hale. How do you think it would be to read: 

“That expenditures from appropriations contained in this pro¬ 
vision for the maintenance, operation, and repair of motor-propelled 
passenger-carrying vehicles, including the compensation of operators, 
shall not exceed $150,000 ” ? 

Admiral Parks. That would be all right, but the particular thing 
that is being injured is the marine operations. 

Senator Hale. Do you expend $150,000 in your particular opera¬ 
tions ? 

Admiral Parks. $453,000. 

Senator Hale. Could you cut it down to $150,000 ? 

Admiral Parks. We would have to cut it down. 

The Chairman. Would it help some to make that $350,000 instead 
of $150,000? 

Admiral Parks. It would help a great deal. That would do for the 
whole establishment. 

Admiral Coontz. If you had to cut it down, you ought not to cut 
it down all at once. It would cripple us in many ways. 

The Chairman. What is the next matter ? 

Admiral Parks. The next item is on page 20, line 23, changing the 
period to a semicolon and inserting thereafter the following: “ Dredg¬ 
ing, to continue, $100,000 ; in all, $140,000.” 

As to this dredging, I will say by way of explanation, it is because 
the Tennessee has been aground and additional dredging is needed. 
That estimate was submitted by the department originally, but at the 
hearings before tlie House committee, in view of the large reduction 
that had to be made in the estimates, I thought that the dredging 
might go over a year, and right after the hearing I found that the 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 97 

Tennessee' had been aground and that the dredging was necessary 
now. So it ought to be put back in the bill. 

The Chairman. What is the amount estimated for dredging ? 

Admiral Parks. One hundred thousand dollars. The yard’s esti¬ 
mate is $200,000, but $100,000 is enough for that now. 

On page 21, line 21, after the semicolon, insert the following: 
“ Extension of Pier No. 4 ”- 

Senator Hale. Pardon me. If, as you say, $100,000 is enough, 
why was $200,000 estimated? 

Admiral Parks. I think they estimated entirely too high a rate in 
the yard. 

Senator Hale. Who made the estimate? 

Admiral Parks. That is the yard estimate. 

Senator Hale. Don't you go by the yard’s estimate? 

Admiral Parks. Yes; but I know what there is there, and $100,000 
ought to give us that amount of dredging at the present prices, and 
prices, perhaps, are coming down, but it ought to give the dredging 
we need at present prices. I have an idea that the estimate was 
put in with the idea of having it cut in two. 

Senator Hale. Is that the practice in making these estimates? 

Admiral Parks. It is not the practice on public works’ estimates. 

Senator Hale. Do you think it would be a safe way for us to go 
about it by cutting all the estimates? 

Admiral Parks. That has been claimed, but it is not true of the 
public works’ estimates. Whatever it may be in other cases I can 
not say. 

To continue: “Extension of Pier No. 4, $530,000; rifle range for 
small arms, including purchase of land, $93,000; also strike out the 
figures $1,405,000 and insert the figures $2,028,000.” 

Those are items at Puget Sound. The first one is necessary on 
account of the large part of the fleet now being in the Pacific, and 
there is a lack of mooring facilities at the yards or on the coast. 

Admiral Coontz. I would like to call attention to the fact that 
Senator Ball and Senator Keyes saw that very dock and walked 
down on it. They landed there at the end of the yard and saw all 
that congestion—hundreds of ships there and no place to put them. 
I think those two gentlemen are familiar w T ith that situation. 

Admiral Parks. The total berthing space at that yard is 5,910 
feet. 

Senator Ball. Does this provide for extending the sea wall up ? 

Admiral Parks. No; that rebuilds the Pier No. 4, which you know 
is in bad condition. 

The Chairman. How does that berthing space compare with other 
yards? 

Admiral Parks. Mare Island has 11,100 feet of bertlnnsr space, 
but I was going to add that the net length of ship based at Bremer¬ 
ton is 26,554 feet, about five times as much net length of ships as 
berthing space available. 

So it is rather important to increase the berthing space at that 
yard as soon as it can be done. 

The other item, $93,000, for rifle camps, is with a view of pur¬ 
chasing 320 acres of land a few miles from the torpedo station at 
Key port. The land proposed is comparatively flat and surrounded 


34772—21 



98 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


by high land and is in such shape that 185 targets could be installed 
and be useful at the same time. 

The estimate is for the purchase of land, $30,000, and preparation 
of the ranges, $63,000, in view of part of the fleet being based at 
Bremerton. 

Senator Ball. What does that make your total there ? 

Admiral Parks. $ 2 , 028 , 000 . It is desirable to have a sufficient 
range within easy access of the naval station at Puget Sound. 

The Chairman. I would like to interpolate n question there of 
Admiral Coontz, who has been commandant of this yard, as to why 
a rifle range is needed at that point? 

Admiral Coontz. We have no rifle range on the Pacific coast ex¬ 
cept a small one of the marines, it being 11 miles south of Bremerton. 
It is very small and impossible to get to in the wintertime on ac¬ 
count of the mud. For many years we searched for a proper place 
for a rifle range out there and finally found this place back of the 
hills, about five years ago, after looking at some 30 sites. Battle¬ 
ships can anchor within about 1 mile of it. You simply have to go 
over the hill. We happened to find this level place in between the 
hills. We had no trouble with the inhabitants. At that time I 
think we got an option on it for about $22,000, but land lias gone up 
since. We have been able to use that for quite a time free. 

The Chairman. What is the advantage to the fleet of having a 
rifle range accessible to it? 

Admiral Coontz. Training in the use of small arms is essential 
for the Navy, both in developing skill in rifle firing in connection 
with possible operations ashore and also in stimulating those quali¬ 
ties of precision and care that are so important in other activities on 
board ship, particularly in producing good material for the pointers 
of large guns. 

At present it will be noted that there are no adequate Navy facili¬ 
ties for fleet training in small arms on the Pacific coast, where large 
numbers of men may engage in rifle and pistol practice in the open, 
and the need for a suitable Navy range in those localities is obvious. 

The Chairman. Outside of this small rifle range of the marines 
that you speak of, what is the nearest rifle range available to the 
Navy in the country? 

Admiral Coontz. I do not know of any available to the Navy ex¬ 
cept that small one at Mare Island, and even that may have been 
abandoned. Up there we have to borrow from the Army and for 
awhile we were able to use Camp Lawton. I do not know whether 
they keep it up. We used this course for many years. As I have 
said, it was given to us free, but we can no longer encroach upon it. 

Senator Hale. How many are there on the east coast—the At¬ 
lantic coast? 

Admiral Coontz. On the Altantic coast I should say there are 
about six or seven very good ones; one near Annapolis—1 think they 
call it Camp Meade. 

The Chairman. Pardon me, I am talking about the Navy. 

Admiral Coontz. Oh, the Navy. Why, I believe we are down 
to two. 

The Chairman. Are they in active use ? 

Admiral Coontz. There are two that we still use: One at Annapo¬ 
lis'and the other is—where is that. Admiral Parks? 


99 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Admiral Parks. One at Virginia Beach, I think. 

Senator Hale.. Are they used all the time for the Navy ? 
Admiral Parks. Oh, yes; they are for the Navy and Marine use 
altogether. 


SMALL-ARM RANGES IN COMMISSION. 

Small-arm ranges are maintained by the Navy at present at the following 
places: Naval station, Guantanamo; Naval Academy, Annapolis; navy yard, 
New York; navy yard, Philadelphia ; training station, Great Lakes; navy yard, 
Mare Island; naval station, Olpngapo. I*. I. 

Of these, only the first two are of sufficient size to be considered as proper 
ranges and as having facilities suitable for lleet use, except that the range at 
Olongapo serves fairly well for the present size of the Asiatic Fleet* The 
ranges at the navy yards mentioned cover only the shorter ranges, and in 
some cases are under cover, unsuitable for proper training. 

The range at Guantanamo is located on property allotted to the Navy within 
the limits of the naval station, and is the largest and best range in our pos¬ 
session. It comprises ranges up to 1,000 yards, and has about 310 rifle and 
105 pistol targets. Its equipment is in fair condition, but lack of funds has 
prevented proper upkeep during the past year. It is the main training range 
for the Atlantic Fleet and is used extensively for that purpose and by the 
marines stationed at Guantanamo or based in that locality from time to time. 

The range at Annapolis is primarily for the use of the midshipmen, but 
is also used by visiting vessels and by the marines near by. It is a smaller 
range, but is fairly up to date in equipment. It is located across the Severn 
River from the Naval Academy, and has ranges up to 1,000 yards, and about 
100 targets. 

No mention is made of Marine Corps ranges. 

Senator Hale. I want to know if it is the custom to send sailors 
to these ranges or whether this is a new idea ? 

Admiral Parks. Oh, no, sir; it is an old idea. 

Senator Ball. It is questionable whether it is an advantage, I 
should say. 

Admiral Coontz. It is customary to do it. When we get one on the 
west coast we utilize it, but of course on this side we have the ad¬ 
vantage of Guantanamo. While the Atlantic Fleet is down there 
they utilize them every hour of the day. 

The Chairman. Have they a good rifle range there? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What, in your judgment and your familiarity with 
the yard, is the importance of this extension of Pier No. 4 that 
Admiral Parks speaks of? 

Admiral Coontz. I consider it of the utmost importance, because 
we are short there on wharfage. We have the ships there and they 
have to lie in the stream on account of the small number of wharves. 
They are continually being moved around by tugs. When this com¬ 
mittee was out there there were, I suppose, ships four deep alongside 
of those wharves, and I think it is a distinct necessity in the line 
of repairs and in the line of stores. 

The Chairman. What is the next proposition, Admiral Parks? 

Admiral Parks. On page 23, lines 4 and 5, strike out the words 
“ to complete ” and insert in lieu thereof the word “ toward.” 

A million dollars has already been appropriated for this training 
station, which is intended to be the training station of the Pacific 
coast—and one that was planned to have a capacity of 4,500 men in 
training and 500 in detention, at an estimated cost of $4,500,000. We 
have reduced the estimated cost on account of falling labor and 


100 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


material markets, and it can now be expected that it will cost con¬ 
siderably less than $4,500,000, but it can not be carried out to the 
extent proposed for $2,000,000. The training station is located on 
land secured by the citizens of San Diego and presented to the United 
States for its use. 

The Chairman. Is the $1,000,000 estimated about all you can ad¬ 
vantageously spend in one year there? 

Admiral Parks. That is it. We simply want to change the words 
“to complete” to “toward.” 

Senator Hale. Is this the first appropriation made for that sta¬ 
tion? 

Admiral Parks. No, sir; it is the second 

Senator Hale;. And when the other one is put in will we know we 
will only need a million to complete it ? 

Admiral Parks, No, sir; four and a half million was estimated at 
that time. 

Senator Hale. How much has been spent so far ? 

Admiral Parks. Nothing has been spent. I expect to award the 
contract about the first or second day of March. 

Senator Hale. What do you estimate it will cost to complete the 
proposition ? 

Admiral Parks. The probability is it will be somewhere in the 
neighborhood of three and a half million. They reduced the price. 

Senator Hale. Then it could not complete the proposition, possi- 
bly* 

Admiral Parks. It can not complete the training station to the 
extent that it should be. On page 23, after line 6, I have a certain 
clause to be inserted, if it is required to carry out the recommenda¬ 
tions of the joint committee on Pacific coast stations. I will insert 
the proposed amendments in the record. 

The Chairman. They will be inserted. 

(The suggested amendments are here printed in full, as follows:) 

On page 23, after line 6, insert the following: 

“ The Secretary of the Navy is authorized to accept from the city of Alameda, 
California, free from encumbrances and without cost to the United States 
Government in excess of $1, a certain tract of land on San Francisco Bay, 
containing five thousand three hundred and forty acres, more or less, for use 
as a site for a naval base, being the land described in a certain deed made the 
5th day of February, 1920, by and between the city of Alameda and the United 
States of America. Also to accept free from encumbrances and without cost 
to the United States Government in excess of $1 certain other land adjoining 
said tract, being the land lying between the southwesterly boundary line of said 
tract and the pierhead line in front thereof. 

“ The Secretary of the Navy is authorized to accept from the city of Los 
Angeles, California, free from encumbrances and without cost to the United 
.States Government in excess of $1, a certain tract of land in the harbor of 
Los Angeles, California, containing two hundred and twenty-five acres, more or 
less, for use as a site for a naval submarine base. 

“ The Secretary of the Navy is authorized to accept from King County, State 
of Washington, free from encumbrances and without cost to the United States 
Government in excess of $1, a certain tract of land containing four hundred 
acres, more or less, located at Sand Point, on Lake Washington, for use as a 
site for a naval aviation base. 

“ The Secretary of the Navy is authorized to acquire one thousand acres, more 
•or less, at or near Camp Kearny, California, for a site for a lighter-than-air avia- 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


101 


tion station ancl to pay for the same an average price of not exceeding $100 
per acre out of any funds appropriated for aviation purposes. 

“ Naval air station, Sand Point, Washington: Toward development for 
heavier-tlian-air equipment, $600,000; toward grading, tilling, and clearing, 
$200,000; in all, $800,000. 

“ Naval submarine base, San Pedro, California : Toward development of a 
submarine base, $1,500,000. 

“Naval base, Alameda, California: Toward dredging, excavating, and grad¬ 
ing, $1,500,000; toward water-front development, $1,500,000; toward construc¬ 
tion of one dry dock, $1,000,000; toward construction of a supply base, $1,000,- 
000; toward construction of destroyer and docking base, $500,000; in all, 
$5,500,000.” 

This appropriates for those items if authorizations are enacted. 

The Chairman. At what amount do you estimate that? 

Admiral Parks. For the naval air station, Sand Point, Wash., 
$800,000; submarine base, San Pedro, Calif., $1,500,000; naval base 
at Alameda, Calif., $5,500,000. 

Senator Ball. Do you think it will be necessary to put in the five 
and a half million for Alameda at this time? 

Admiral Parks. It is a question as to how much you w T ant to start 
with at this time. This particular improvement would start with 
the excavation and grading and the water front. Those have got to 
be done anyway, and it is a question whether you do not want to 
make a start on a dry dock in the same bill. 

Senator Bat.l. You provide for $1,500,000 for dredging, excavat¬ 
ing, and grading, and $1,000,000 toward the construction of a dry 
dock; toward the construction of a supply base, $1,000,000; and 
toward the construction of destroyer and docking base, $500,000. 
Would it not be better to start only on the dredging and the develop¬ 
ing, which would only be $3,000,000? 

Admiral Parks. That was a question. After reading the report 
of the committee it was thought well to prepare the other three items 
for the consideration of the committee; but there would not be much 
done except on the water front and the dredging and filling during 
the first year. 

Senator Ball. I should think $3,000,000 would be all there was 
any occasion for. 

Admiral Coontz. The department is perfectly willing to that. 
You asked what it would take for the frontage and we told you, ancl 
it is up to your judgment what you would put in. 

Senator Ball. I will say that the committee found that the deed 
was already deposited with the Secretary of the Navy for this land, 
the moment the department could properly accept it, or the moment 
the project is accepted. 

Admiral Coontz. The moment you legislate. 

Mr. Chairman, you asked me about that hospital ground. I will 
say that Mr. Kettner, a representative from California is present, 
and wants to say a word about that. 

The Chairman. We will be glad to hear him. 

Senator Ball. Do we legislate for the hospital in the legislative 
bill? 

Admiral Parks. That item is here, and I was going to suggest that 
this be incorporated in this bill. 

The Chairman. Let us hear what Mr. Kettner has to say. 


102 NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM KETTNER, A REPRESENTATIVE 
IN CONGRESS FROM SAN DIEGO, CALIF. 

Mr. Kettner. Mr. Chairman, the people of San Diego have always 
been ready to turn everything over to the Navy. In 1917 when they 
wanted room for the hospital, we turned over the city park where we 
held the exposition in 1915. The Navy is still using it. They have 
some 300 patients there, and when the fleet Avas divided and the Navy 
reached the conclusion that they must build a hospital there, we gave 
them 18 acres of the finest and highest land we had in the park, and 
we were led to believe that they would proceed to put up buildings 
immediately so we could use the exposition building. We are making 
arrangements now to have them every winter as soon as you have 
accepted the land and have let small contracts toward building the 
hospital. But there is no provision in the bill in that regard. We 
passed it in the House; that is we put it in the legislative bill but 
will never be able to bring it into the floor of the House and I hope 
you gentlemen will make a provision to finish the hospital so we 
can use the park, which we would have to do this winter. 

Senator Swanson. How much is included in the legislative bill ? 

Mr. Kettner. We simply made the authorization—that is all we 
are required to do—of $1,900,000. Now, I do not want to say that 
you should appropriate that, but I do believe the committee should 
take some action to appropriate a small sum for which to go ahead 
with the hospital—make the authorization, or, rather, make the ap¬ 
propriation, so it will go ahead. 

Senator Hale. What was the total cost of the hospital to be ? 

Mr. Kettner. Admiral Parks, I presume, can tell you about that. 

The Chairman. The total cost authorized in the House bill was 
$1,975,000. 

Mr. Kettner. That is in addition to what has been let. They had 
some money in a general fund; and a contract was let, I believe, for 
$716,000, which work is going on at the present time. The hospital, 
I was informed, was to cost about two and a half million. 

Senator Swanson. Was this land given for hospital purposes or 
any Navy purpose? 

Mr. Kettner. It was given for hospital purposes, but there was 
no proviso. It is the very finest land. 

Senator Ball. It is the most beautiful site around San Diego. 

Senator Swanson. What hospital facilities have you for the entire 
Pacific Fleet; where are your hospitals located ? 

Mr. Kettner. I believe there is a small one at Mare Island and 
one at Bremerton. 

Senator Swanson. Are those the only two? 

Mr. Kettner. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. Is it the intention to make this the main hos¬ 
pital of the Pacific Fleet? 

Mr. Kettner. That is what I understand. They have 300 patients 
there in the park buildings, and have had since 1917. 

Senator Swanson. Do you mean they are to complete the base on 
San Francisco Bay and have their hospital at San Diego; is that it? 

Mr. Kettner. We always have had three hospitals out there. 

Senator Swanson. Is the main one to be there? 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


103 


Mr. Kettner. Not necessarily the main one. On the Bremerton 
hospital they just built one and stopped. Mare Island they re¬ 
built in 1898 after the earthquake destroyed it. That leaves three 
hospitals for the entire coast, and in the meantime the naval hos¬ 
pital was open to all those incapacitated men. We fill them up as 
fast as we can. 

Senator Swanson. How much space have you more than the Navy 
needs in your present hospitals out there? 

Mr. Kettner. I should say the two most northernmost hospitals 
are used pretty well up to their limit. I have not been to the Mare 
Island hospital for some time. Of course, during the war I know 
they were; and this will make only three hospitals on the Pacific 
coast. 

Senator Swanson. Is it your idea to build hospitals to be open to 
the general public? 

Mr. Kettner. No, sir: except 1 think that you enacted a law that 
requires the Army and Navy to take in any of these war heroes. 

Senator Swanson. You refer to the class of the men who served in 
the war? 

Mr. Ivi sttner. Yes, sir. We have opened every hospital, I think, 
for that purpose. 

Senator Swanson. But not to the general public ? 

Mr. Kettner. No, sir. 

Senator Swanson. Simply those general hospitals? 

Mr. Kettner. Yes, sir; open to everybody. May I explain that 
San Diego is now building a marine base, naval training stations, 
flying stations, repair bases, and a warehouse and the torpedo fleet. 
As I say, they have 300 patients there now and are making arrange¬ 
ments, I believe, for 800 patients. 

The Chairman. Is that due to the climate, that such a large num¬ 
ber of patients are cared for ? 

Mr. Kettner. Senator Poindexter has visited San Diego and can 
answer the question for himself. 

Senator Swanson. My idea is that you ought to have a main hos¬ 
pital where your main base is and good and complete facilities at 
this and other places. What I want to know is, are they going to 
make the largest and most expensive hospital at San Diego? 

Mr. Kettner. I do not know. 

Admiral Coontz. Can you state the cost of those others, Admiral 
Parks? 

Admiral Parks. No, sir; I can not. 

Admiral Coontz. The destroyer base is at San Diego, the sub¬ 
marine base is at San Pedro, and the fleet itself will base on three 
points—Puget Sound, Mare Island, and San Pedro; at times they will 
stay south and at times will go to Puget Sound for drills and 
maneuvers. Of course, we think we ought to have three hospitals 
on the Pacific coast, as compared to the vast number on the Atlantic 
coast, as the fleet will be based there. 

Senator Swanson. What are the facilities to be provided for the 
hospital at San Francisco—how many beds? 

Admiral Coontz. I do not know, but I can find out. 

Mr. Kettner. I hope that you will not forget, gentlemen, the 
position that it leaves us in. We are perfectly willing to turn over 
everything to the Navy. We have shown that by giving them some 


104 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


3J miles of our best water front, and we have given them the finest 
land, as I have stated, in the park, and we hope you will make some 
proviso to continue this hospital. As it is now, it is subject to a point 
of order in the House. 

Senator Hale. And those men are in those rooms? 

Mr. Kettner. Some of them. 

Senator Hale. Could you not give us the building? 

Mr. Kettner. Well, if the Senator will ever visit San Diego, I 
think he will be satisfied with what we have already given the Navy. 
I think Senator Ball and Senator Keyes will both tell you about it. 

The Chairman. Are those buildings that are now occupied erected 
on the land which has been donated ? 

Mr. Kettner. No, sir. We have given you 18 acres of the finest 
land in the park. 

The Chairman. Are there any buildings on those 18 acres? 

Mr. Kettner. None at all. They are building a hospital there now 
with money out of the general fund. The first contract was made, 
but there has been no proviso made to continue it, and we haA T e no 
money on hand to continue it. 

Senator Swanson. How much would it take to complete what they 
have at present built? 

Mr. Kettner. The $1,900,000. 

Admiral Parks. That is, $1,900,000 based on the capacity that is 
estimated to be necessary at that place. That is, if there were 50,000 
men in the fleet on the Pacific, there would be hospital facilities for 
2,500, and it is purposed to make the capacity 800 in at least one of 
the hospitals to be located at San Diego, and San Francisco Bay and 
Puget Sound will have the others. 

Mr. Kettner. That is all I care to say, Mr. Chairman, and I thank 
the committee. 

Admiral Parks. Now, that item, I think, should be introduced on 
page 3 at line 6, to modify it in accordance with a statement made by 
a member of that committee—at a total cost not to exceed $1,975,000. 
The estimates for each plant was two million and a half. We are 
spending a little over $700,000 now. So I think that those figures 
ought to be changed—at a total cost not to exceed two and a half mil¬ 
lions. The}^ have made that $1,975,000 in addition to what we now 
have under contract. 

Senator Ball. Your idea would be to make an appropriation for 
the completion now? 

Admiral Parks. I believe the appropriation ought to be made 
pretty soon, but it is a good idea, I believe, to get this authorization 
in and some of the money toward it. If we had enough money to 
make one half of the capacity in this year’s bill, I think it would be 
all right. So if an item were put in authorizing a total cost of two 
and a half millions and appropriating a million toward that we would 
get along all right this year. 

Senator Ball. There is an item, I think, of $164,000 in the legis¬ 
lative bill of the House for buildings at Camp Kearney, San Diego. 

Admiral Parks. In the bill H. R. 15994, section 7, it is provided: 

That the appropriation of $750,000 for water-front improvement, navy yard, 
New York, N. Y., contained in the naval appropriation act for the fiscal year 
1919 is hereby suspended until July 1, 1923. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


105 


At present that fund is suspended until July 1 , 1922, and it is per¬ 
fectly satisfactory to have that introduced in this bill suspending it 
for another year. 

The Chairman. What section is that ? 

Admiral Parks. Section 7, on page 5, of the bill H. R. 14994. 

Senator Hale. The same thing is on page 20 of the committee 
print. It is suspended until 1923. 

Admiral Parks. In this bill it is suspended until 1922. That is 
all right. 

Senator Hale. But you want it suspended until 1923. 

Admiral Parks. I do not care. I do not think we will be really 
ready to use it next year. 

Senator Hale. Let us cut it off, then, until 1923. 

Senator Ball. Mr. Chairman, I introduced another amendment to 
the bill, the repeal of the appropriation for a dry dock at Charleston. 
The Secretary of the Navy, 1 think, has written a letter in opposition 
to the repeal. That was made as a result of the investigation of the 
special committee appointed by the naval committee, consisting of 
Senator King, Senator Keyes, and myself. We went down to 
Charleston. They have a very good small dry dock there now, a 
concrete dock. It is 5664 feet long, but they have never had a boat 
or a ship of any kind there for repair, or for the building of any 
anywhere near the capacity of the dry dock they have. The Atlantic 
coast has a number of thousand-feet dry docks; in fact, they have in 
all 18 dry docks, and the Pacific coast has in all only 4. 

Senator Hale. That includes private docks. 

Senator Ball. I am talking about the Navy. All the dry docks on 
the Pacific coast are small. In fact, there is only one larger than the 
Charleston dry dock on the Pacific coast not privately owned- 

Senator Hale. At Hunters Point. 

Senator Ball. At Hunters Point there is a privately owned dry 
dock which the Government has certain rights to use. But the Gov¬ 
ernment owns no dry dock on the Pacific coast more than eight hun¬ 
dred and some feet, and that is at Bremerton. The rest are all small, 
practically less than 400 feet in length, two of them. 

Now, it appeals to me very strongly that the money—since the fleet 
is divided half on the Pacific coast and must be cared for—that it is 
very urgent that what money is expended at this time for a base of 
that kind and dry docks, that we may take care of our Navy, should 
be expended. 

Senator Swanson. The Panama Canal has dry-dock facilities? 

Senator Ball. A thousand feet. 

Senator Swanson. They have a good one there ? 

Senator Ball. Yes. 

Senator Swanson. And then they have one at Hunters Point and at 
the Hawaiian Islands? 

Senator Ball. And at Mare Island and at Bremerton. 

Senator Swanson. And the one at Hawaii ? 

Senator Ball. Yes; but that is several miles away. It is not on the 
Atlantic coast. 

The Chairman. When we go into executive session if you will pre¬ 
sent that to us we will take it up for consideration. 

Senator Ball. I think in taking up the amendments you had better 
have a record of that amendment also. 


106 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Senator Swanson. I think we should let both of the Senators from 
South Carolina be heard fully and completely on the subject. 

The Chairman. Yes; that should be done. Are there any further 
remarks, Admiral Parks ? 

Admiral Parks. There is an amendment, Mr. Chairman, that was 
intended to be proposed by Senator Fletcher. It has reference to Key 
West, Fla., providing for the submarine base, to continue, $800,000 
to be made immediately available. 

Senator Hale. Is that in the bill ? 

Admiral Parks. No; it is not in the bill. 

The Chairman. Senator Fletcher has an amendment, and he re¬ 
quested to be heard on the amendment. 

Admiral Parks. We have an authorization of $2,500,000, with an 
ippropriation of $1,000,000, and under that authorization we have 
entered into a contract which amounts to more than $1,700,000, and 
to complete that contract, which is due for completion this next sum¬ 
mer, we would require one million seven hundred and odd thousand 
dollars. There were certain other incidental expenses making it 
necessary to have available $1,800,000 to complete the work now 
under way, which is all harbor work. The shore stations’ work has 
not been undertaken, and that would have been done under the 
difference between the present contract and the authorization. 

In the House committee it was thought that we might not have 
immediate use for a submarine base at Key West and that it would 
be profitable to cancel this contract and not complete that base at 
this time. The chairman of the subcommittee stated that he would 
take that up with the House Naval Committee and secure legislation 
in the other bill. But I do not find that legislation in that bill. 

Senator Hale. What are your views about it? 

Admiral Parks. My views are that we have not a very good propo¬ 
sition down there under our present contract, and that to make it 
thoroughly satisfactory we will have to have a larger authorization 
than two and a half million, and I feel inclined to agree with the 
chairman of the House committee on this particular project. But we 
have got to have the money to close up the contract. 

The Chairman. What can we get out of it for? 

Admiral Parks. If it is made immediately available, with instruc¬ 
tions by Congress to close the contract, I believe we can get out of it 
for not over a million and a quarter. But every day that it is 
allowed to run the expenses are mounting up rapidly. 

The Chairman. When was this authorization granted? 

Admiral Parks. That was in the act of 1919, as I recall it. 

Senator Swanson. I think it was earlier than that—1918. 

Admiral Parks. Well, the authorization was during the war. 
(Act of July 1, 1918.) 

The Chairman. What would this million and a quarter loss con¬ 
sist of if you dropped the matter now; where would we be liable for 
the million and a quarter? 

Admiral Parks. For work that has been done under the contract, 
and we would probably have to pay some prospective profits under 
the settlement if the contract is not carried out. 

The Chairman. What was the original limit? 

Admiral Parks. $2,500,000. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


107 


Senator Swanson. 1 wish the Navy people would not change so 
often. They came to us with the bill and insisted that they needed 
a submarine base down in the Panama section of the country. They 
went and examined it and decided that that was the best place to have 
a submarine base for operations down in the West Indies. Now, 
where would you have a base if you did not have that? 

Admiral Parks. As far as I can see, that is the best*place for it. 

Senator Swanson. I confess I am a little tired of this way of 
coming here and getting appropriations, forcing us into it—that 
you are bound to have a base; that you could not protect the Panama 
Canal nor the Gulf of Mexico, and going to the expense of half the 
money and then coming and wanting the balance of it, and not need¬ 
ing it. They ought to have a policy one way or the other. The Chief 
of Operations of this fleet insisted with Senator Lodge and myself 
that if we did not put a base down there the whole place would be 
defenseless. Now, they come here and want to abandon it. 

Admiral Coontz. I still insist on it. You will find a letter from 
the Secretary of the Navy asking that this project be completed. As 
far as the submarine base is concerned, there is no desire to abandon 
it. If there is any doubt about it, send somebody down there. 
Everybody is of the opinion that there must be a submarine base in 
that part of the country and that Key West is the best place for it. 

Senator Hale. Where would the alternative be? 

Admiral Coontz. Somewhere in the Caribbean, where we do not 
own anything. 

Senator Swanson. Or one at Cuba. 

Senator Hale. Or at Guantanamo? 

Admiral Coontz. We could not safely put it at Guantanamo, be¬ 
cause it does not come to us except under certain conditions. My 
judgment would be with regard to this, to finish it up as cheaply as 
possible, leave out the shore part and the marine base. If you are 
going to go in there at some future day, you can leave that to take 
care of itself. 

The Chairman. How is the bottom of the water there for sub¬ 
marine purposes ? 

Admiral Coontz. The water is all right. You only go a short 
distance until you get out into the blue limpid waters of the Gulf 
Stream. It is climatically and in every other way a very good place, 
and before we abandon it and let any of that money go I would cer¬ 
tainly hesitate until we got plenty of evidence to the contrary. As 
far as I know, it is all right, but, as I say, I am perfectly willing to 
leave out the marine railway and the shore facilities, but I certainly 
would not stop and leave the other. 

The Chairman. Admiral, I wish you would have prepared for 
us—or maybe Admiral Parks can prepare for us—some figures 
showing the minimum amount for which this work that has already 
been done can be completed and perfected so as to make it service¬ 
able as a submarine base without these shore improvements that the 
admiral has referred to. 

Admiral Parks. That is a very difficult proposition, for one rea¬ 
son. I do not know whether that embankment that we are putting 
up for the breakwater is going to stand or not. The Florida east 
coast engineers, who have had some experience with that kind of 
shore work, stated that the coral embankment, covered with a cer- 


108 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


tain number of feet of marl, would stand a hurricane. Now, what 
we have had so far in our excavation has been coral broken up so 
fine that it all goes through the suction dredge. 

I am not familiar with that work on the Florida coast, but when 
we have completed this embankment and covered it with marl, it 
may stand. I should be very much pleased to see that it does. But 
most breakwaters have got to be heavy, and coral is not heavy. 

The Chairman. I would be glad if you would get us some definite 
information by to-morrow, if you can, on that subject, with a view 
to alternative in case it be decided to complete the contract in hand, 
and get a base limited to as small an investment as possible. 

Admiral Parks. That would be the $800,000 that we have here. 
That is the minimum. 

The Chairman. Admiral Coontz, I would like to have the views 
of the Department about that, and also about this proposed dry 
dock at Charleston. S. C. 

Senator Keyes. We have a report from the Secretary on it. 

Admiral Coontz. Yes; the Secretary has made a report on that. 

The Chairman. I mean if you have any further information in 
addition to that. 

Senator Swanson. In fixing up this report on Key West when 
that was located there—it w 7 as done at the request of the Chief of 
Operations, and the General Board and all went down and investi¬ 
gated that, for the purpose of having a submarine base in the West 
Indies, and I would like to see if you could find a better one. We 
would not take it at Cuba because we would have to have the Army 
to protect it, and Panama might lose it, and I want to see why the 
Navy continues to change its bases. 

Admiral Coontz. As far as I know the Navy has not changed one 
iota, that Key West was the base. I have never heard anybody say 
to the contrary. 

Senator Swanson. I wish you would get the statement of what 
the Navy officers told the committee, 

COPY OF MEMORANDUM FILED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY IN CONNECTION 
WITH HIS HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE NAVAL COMMITTEE ON JUNE 4. 101 8. 

Subject: Improvements in Key West Harbor. 

Reference: H. It. 100G9, “An act making appropriations for the construction, 
repair, and preservation of certain'public works on rivers and harbors, and for 
other purposes.” 

1. The above-mentioned bill contains in it a clause for the appropriation of 
a certain sum of money to be devoted to the improvement of the harbor of Key 
West, Fla. As the development of Key West is a matter in which the Navy 
has been interested for a long time, it is deemed appropriate at this time to 
indicate concisely the Navy Department’s policy. 

2. Fortunately, in the past the United States has not been forced to conduct 
a major campaign in defense of its shores. For this reason, largely, and perhaps 
to an extent because Key West is a somewhat advanced and isolated position 
on our own coast, its strategic and tactical importance has not been so much 
to the fore as other localities in the world. However, the Navy Department has 
always appreciated the military importance of this particular site as a base for 
naval operations, in case we were ever forced to conduct operations on or near 
our own coast. 

3. A radius of 1,100 miles sweep from Key West as a center includes within 
the circumference of the circle nearly all the following positions: The entire 
Mexican, Central American, Canal Zone, and Colombian coasts, the islands of 
Curacao, Cuba, Haiti, Porto Rico, and St. Thomas, Bermuda, the Bahamas, 
and the coast of the United States to New York. All of the more important 


109 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

passages leading from Europe into the Gulf of Mexico are included in this 
sweep. Its strategic importance as a base for naval operations is therefore 
clearly shown. 

4. The present war may, before its close, find hostile submarines of the 
cruising type operating on this side of the ocean. All of the shipping from the 
Gulf of Mexico, including the tank steamers carrying that most vital neces¬ 
sity—oil—must pass through this area. 

This shipping should be protected, when the necessity arises, by every means 
in our power. Except for Habana, which is small, and a few anchorages behind 
the reefs, there are no harbors where the above shipping may take refuge from 
a submarine except at Key West. As a base for offensive operations against 
submarines Key West is ideal, and the Navy Department has taken advantage 
of this fact to mobilize certain of its forces there, and is taking steps to further 
expand the facilities of the port. 

5. With the above in view, the Navy Department has no hesitancy in saying 
that both for the future and for the immediate present the improvement of the 
natural harbor facilities of Key West is regarded by it with favor, as a step 
in the right direction and one which will further its development as a naval 
base. 

The Chairman. The committee will now adjourn until to-morrow 
morning at 10.30 o’clock. 

(Whereupon, at 5.20 o’clock, p. m., the committee adjourned until 
to-morrow, Saturday, February 19, 1921, at 10.30 o’clock a. m.) 


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NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1921. 

United States Senate, 

Subcommittee of Committee on Naval Affairs, 

W ashington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10.30 o’clock 
a. m., in committee room, Capitol, Senator Miles Poindexter pre¬ 
siding. 

Present: Senators Poindexter (acting chairman), Lodge, Hale, 
Ball, McCormick, Keyes, Swanson, Walsh of Montana, Gerry, and 
King. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. FULLAM, UNITED 
STATES NAVY, RETIRED. 

The Chairman. The inquiry that we had in view in calling you 
was in regard to the question of the policy of the country with regard 
to battleships, and the question as to whether or not it was sound 
policy or practicable to suspend the 191G building program that is 
now in progress. That is the general question on which w T e ask to 
have you make a statement. You need not confine yourself abso¬ 
lutely to that, but we would like to hear from you on that subject. 

Senator Lodge. Of course, the admiral is aware that the committee 
has recommended the construction of two plane carriers in its report . 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. Before I begin my statement I wish 
to say that I am very much embarrassed, because I love battleships 
and surface ships. I have spent all my life in them, and I despise 
submarines, mines, torpedoes, airplanes, and all these other develish 
contraptions that have recently appeared on the seas; but they are 
here; we can not ignore them, and, therefore, with me it is a ques¬ 
tion of deciding how to utilize them and what their power is. 

I am in favor of a very strong Navy, a Navy that will be very 
strong in 1922, and thereafter, instead of one that may be weak. If 
the people o.f the country w T ould give us all the money required to 
build all of* the ships for the 1916 program, and in addition the 
money which it seems to me is absolutely necessary for submarines 
and airplanes, then I would never lift a finger against the 1916 
program, but I fear that they have not the money to give us for 
everything, and the question therefore is with me how best to utilize 
the money that may be available. 


Ill 



112 


NAVAL APPKOPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


I am afraid that naval officers demand too much, that we may 
lose our influence with the people. They say that we are not satis¬ 
fied, that we are unreasonable, and that we demand things that 
may in a short time prove to be ill-advised, and that we lose much 
more than we gain. Therefore, I have come down to just explain 
that my view is that the Navy must operate now on three planes, 
on the surface of the sea, beneath the surface, and above the surface. 
It is a 3-plane, a 3-idea thing, from this time on. You can not get 
away from it. If we get on one idea we will have a 1-idea Navy, 
a 1-plane Navy, instead of a 3-plane Navy, and that is the whole 
basis of my statement. 

Senator Lodge. You do not think, Admiral, that anybody is sug¬ 
gesting that we should operate only on one plane ? 

Admiral Fullam. Not most people, sir, but many are rather an¬ 
chored on that. 

Senator Lodge. I think that is certainly not the view of the com¬ 
mittee. 

Admiral Fullam. I do not suppose it is, but I have seen indica¬ 
tions that the two upper and lower planes have been rather subordi¬ 
nated too much. 

Senator Hale. You do not want to give up any one plane? 

Admiral Fullam. No, sir; but I want to have them all working 
and coordinating together, hitched together, and just now we can 
not tell which plane is dominant. We have got to study it very 
carefully, and it is now chaos. My idea is to proceed carefully and 
not to put too much emphasis on any one plane until we see where 
we are at. I will proceed now with my statement. 

1. Our fighting fleet to-day: The United States battle fleet com¬ 
prises 8 dreadnaughts— Utah , Florida, Delaware, North Dakota, 
'Wyoming , Arkansas, New York, and Texas, and 8 superdread- 
naughts— New Mexico, Idaho , Mississippi, Tennessee , Pennsylvania, 
Oklahoma, Nevada , and Virginia . All other battleships in the 
Navy are practically obsolete. Thus we have 16 modern fighting 
dreadnaughts. This is a strong force. 

Next to the dreadnaught fleet in importance, we have about 300 
modern destroyers. This is a very powerful asset. 

Under construction, dreadnaughts: There are 11 superdread- 
naughts under construction. Of these, 6 are between 25 per cent 
and 90 per cent completed, as follows: California, Colorado, Mary¬ 
land, Washington, West Virginia, and South Dakota . It would 
appear good policy to complete these 6 ships, which would give us 
a very powerful battle fleet of 21 dreadnaughts. 

The remaining five dreadnaughts are less than 25 per cent com¬ 
pleted, as follows: Indiana, Montana, North Carolina, Iowa, and 
Massachusetts. It would appear wise to suspend further construc¬ 
tion on these five ships for at least six months while it can be de¬ 
termined whether or not they may be obsolete in the near future or 
if changes in their design may be advisable. They might, for in¬ 
stance, be completed as airplane carriers or they might be given 
armored decks to protect them from bombing. 

Inasmuch as we will have 22 dreadnaughts without these 5, we may 
wisely wait six months. These ships are not needed, and may not be 
needed in the future. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


113 


Under construction, cruisers: There are s’x battle cruisers under 
construction, as follows: Lexington , Constellation,Saratoga,Ranger, 
Constitution , and United /States. These six ships are less than 
10 per cent complete. It would, therefore, be wise to suspend con¬ 
struction on them for six months at least, or continue construction 
only on their hulls and machinery, so that they may, if necessary, be 
changed in design or be transformed into airplane carriers as circum¬ 
stances may dictate. 

There are 10 scout cruisers under construction, from 30 per cent to 
80 per cent completed, as follows: Omaha , Milwaukee , Cincinnati , 
Raleigh , Detroit , Richmond , Concord , Trenton , Marblehead , and 
Memphis. These cruisers should all be completed as soon as possi¬ 
ble. Our Navy is sadly in need of cruisers. No matter what may 
happen as regards capital ships, cruisers of this type will always be 
needed. 

Under construction, submarines: There are 47 submarines under 
construction. They should be finished without delay. We are 
fatally short of submarines. There are no submarines in our Navy 
capable of cruising and fighting with the fleet. It is an amazing 
and perilous situation. There is not one long-range up-to-date sub¬ 
marine cruiser or mine layer in the Navy. 

Senator Lodge. I hate to interrupt you, but I think that that is 
giving an impression that is different from what we had. We are 
building four fleet submarines, as they are commonly called, of the 
large type, are we not? 

Admiral Fullam. I do not know, exactly; they are not in the Navy 
to-day. 

Senator Lodge. Oh, no; you were describing how many were being 
built, as I understood you ? 

Admiral Fullam. My statement is there is not one long-range, 
up-to-date submarine cruiser or mine layer in the Navy to-day. 

Senator Swanson. T understand we have three- 

Admiral Fullam. There is a small number. 

Senator Swanson. I understood you to say there was none. 

Admiral F ullam. I am stating what has been told me by a sub¬ 
marine officer. 

Senator Lodge. We want to get the accurate information. I sup¬ 
posed we were building four fleet submarines, and if I am wrong in 
mv supposition I want to be corrected. 

Admiral Fullam. I think Admiral Coontz and others could tell 
you about the details, with which I am not fully familiar. What I 
am referring to now is what the situation is as it exists. 

Senator Gerry. I understand we have one fleet submarine in com¬ 
mission now, and that there are two more very near complete, which 
would make the three fleet submarines. 

Admiral Fullam. I hope that is so. If devoid of submarines and 
air forces a surface fleet, no matter how powerful, will be practically 
helpless if it meets a fleet properly supplied with these modern 
weapons. c 

A powerful surface fleet: From the abovb it will be seen that we 
have now, on or near completion, a powerful surface fleet. Even 
without the battle cruisers it is strong, because we have a vastly 
larger destroyer force than any nation except England. This force 


34772—21-8 


114 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


is so strong that if well manned and well handled it would so 
threaten a hostile fleet and so well screen our own fleet that, with 
scout cruisers and airplane carriers we may not need battle cruisers.. 
It is more than probable that the airplane and the torpedo-plane 
carrier will soon be recognized as a capital ship, quite equal to a 
battle cruiser in usefulness and fighting power. 

Briflv reviewing this subject of our surface fleet, we find that with 
22 dreadnaughts, 300 destroyers, and 10 scout cruisers our Navy wiil 
stand next to that of England ; it will be at least 30 per cent stronger 
than that of Japan, and omitting Great Britain, it will be more 
powerful than the combined navies of all Europe. 

In the face of these facts it can not be truthfully said that in sus¬ 
pending w r ork on five battleships and six battle cruisers, we are 
advocating a weak navy, inadequate for national defense. On the 
contrary, suspension of work temporarily on these vessels will safe¬ 
guard us against a policy that will produce a weak navy as the only 
return for the expenditure of hundreds of millions ol dollars. A 
surface navy alone is a one-idea navy. Such a navy is weak to-dav,, 
and it will be still weaker in the near future. It is necessary at this 
point to consider the limitatiorfs of a surface navy. 

Limitations of a surface fleet: Those who advocate large addi¬ 
tions to our surface fleet before providing the submarine and air 
force in which we are fatally weak are constantly asserting that the 
battleship is the “ backbone ” of the fleet; that we need a “ powerful 
navy ” to “ control the sea,” to protect our commerce, etc., and they 
insinuate that the advocates of air and submarine forces are not 
impressed with the importance of a “ backbone ”; that they are 
“little Navy men”; that they would not protect our commerce and 
would give up the control of the sea. But with all due respect it 
may be said that a “ backbone ” alone will not suffice; it does not 
constitute a powerful navy; it can not control the sea; it can not 
protect commerce, in fact, a navy composed of “ backbones ” alone 
is a weak navy: it can go nowhere and it can do nothing. The boot 
is on the other foot. 

Let us consider briefly this much used—ignorantly used—term 
“ control of the sea.” 

On page 21 of Admiral Sims’s book, referring to the condition 
existing on the English coast in April, 1917, when the unequaled 
navy of England, supported by the navies of France, Italy, and 
Japan, might have been supposed to command the sea, inasmuch as 
the German fleet was blockaded, w T e find the following: 

It was not until the spring of 1917 that we really awoke to the actual situa¬ 
tion ; it was not until I had spent several days in England that I made the all- 
important discovery, which was this—tkat Britain did not control the seas. 
She still controlled the seas in the old Nelsonian sense; that is, her Grand Fleet 
successfully “ contained ” the German battle squadrons and kept them, for 
the greater part of the war, penned up in their German harbors. In the old days 
such a display of sea power would have easily won the war for the Allies. But 
that is not control of the seas in the modern sense; it is merely the control 
of the surface of the seas. Under modern methods of naval warfare sea control 
means far more than controlling the top of the water. For there is another 
type of ship, which sails stealthily under the waves, revealing its presence only 
at certain intervals, and capable of shooting a terrible weapon which can sink 
the proudest surface ship in a few minutes. The' existence of this new type of 
warship makes control of the seas to-day a very different thing from what it 
was in Nelson’s time. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


115 


As long as such a warship can operate under the water almost at will—and 
this was the case in a considerable area of the ocean in the early part of 
1917—it is ridiculous to say that any navy controls the seas. For this sub¬ 
marine vessel, when used as successfully as it was used by the Germans in 
1917. deprives the surface navy of that advantage which Inis proved most 
decisive in other wars. That is, the surface navy can no longer completely 
protect communication as it could protect in Nelson’s and Farragut’s times. 

Senator Lodge. I dislike to interrupt von, Admiral, but did the 
Nelsonian navy ever control the seas so* that the commerce of Eng¬ 
land was not preyed upon and destroyed? 

Admiral Fullam. It controlled the seas. It may not have been 
perfect because the seas cover three-fourths of the globe. 

Senator Lodge. The submarine did, of course, chiefly destroy com¬ 
merce, but has the battle ever been won by commerce destroying 
alone? 

Admiral Fullam. Oh, no. 

Senator Lodge. Commerce destroying in the Nelsonian sense were 
privateers as in the War in 1812 , and the English Channel. 

Admiral Fullam. Nelson controlled the sea; as Admiral Mahan 
said, his control of the sea was in a war sense. 

Senator Lodge. In a military sense. 

Admiral Fullam. In a military sense, and that was the cause of 
the downfall of Napoleon. 

Senator Lodge. Did not England in the last war have a pretty 
fair military control of the sea? 

Admiral Fullam. It did not prevent her from being nearly 
starved. 

Senator Lodge. That is commerce destroying; but is commerce 
destroying sufficient ? 

Armiral Fullam. If it starves your enemy in war. You may win 
a war without fighting a battle if you starve your enemy. I am 
getting straight at the target now. What is the object of war? It 
is to beat the enemy. If we can beat him by starving him there is no 
use in fighting. 

Senator Lodge. Did the German submarines succeed in starving 
England, as a matter of fact? 

Admiral Fullam. I am coming to that. They came pretty near it. 

Senator Swanson. If the German fleet had been stronger than the 
English fleet they would have been starved at once. 

Admiral Fullam. I am coming to all that; if you will really let 
me finish the statement; I think you will be better pleased with 
what I have to say. 

Senator King. Is this still a quotation from Admiral Sims that 
you are reading? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes. [Reading:] 

The surface vessel no longer guarantees a belligerent its food, its munitions, 
its raw materials of manufacture and commerce, or the free movement of its 
troops. It is obviously absurd to say that a belligerent which was losing 
800.000 or 900,000 tons of shipping a month, as was the case with the Allies in 
the spring of 1917, was the undisputed mistress of the seas. Had the German 
submarine campaign continued to succeed at this rate, the United States could 
not have transported its Army to France, and the food and materials which we 
were sending to Europe, and which were essential to winning the war, could 
never have crossed the ocean. 


116 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


A little study of this subject will give to some people who talk 
glibly about “ control of the sea ” a fundamental knowledge of the 
subject. 

Subsequent to the armistice and two years after Admiral Sims 
went to England a new naval force, then in its infancy, has been 
rapidly developed—the naval air force. And to-day this force oper¬ 
ates with other forces to decide who shall and who shall not control 
the sea. This force, moreover, operates with the submarine to impose 
still other limitations upon the surface fleets of Nelson and Farragut. 
The “ backbone ” needs still more assistance. The surface fleet in the 
hitherto easy task of “ controlling the sea ” needs another ally—a 
force above it as well as a force below it. Without these two forces— 
if the enemy possesses one or both—the surface fleet can “ control ” 
nothing. 

A three-plane navy: It must be evidence that a modern navy will 
operate on three planes—the surface, above the surface, and beneath 
the surface. These forces must exist in due proportion, and must be 
coordinated strategically and tactically to win a modern naval battle. 
The navy which lacks force on the upper and lower planes will be 
seriously menaced. A one-plane navy can not win against a three- 
plane navy. The Navy of the United States to-day is practically a 
one-plane Navy. The minds of many naval officers and legislators 
are fixed upon one, or, at most, two planes. This condition imperils 
the Nation. 

Sanity is demanded in the discussion of our naval policy. Extrem¬ 
ists with single-track minds must not control. 

In the fighting navy of to-day battleships alone will not suffice, 
submarines alone will not suffice, air force alone will not suffice—we 
must have all three in proper proportion. 

Recognizing this basic principle as the key to the problem for the 
present, the first thing to do is to determine whether or not this prin¬ 
ciple is conserved in the legislation that now shapes our building 
program. After supplying forces in the three planes it may, of 
course, develop in the months and years to come that the force on 
some one plane is of paramount importance. In that event we can 
modify the building program to suit a new condition. 

Submarines in the World War: The following facts should be 
studied in connection with the subject of “ control of the seas ”: 

1. The Germans employed only 10,000 men in their submarine 
forces. 

2. There were never more than 30 submarines adrift at any one 
time, manned by not more than 1,500 men. 

3. This small force was opposed by the navies of all great nations 
outside central Europe—England, France, Italy, Japan, and the 
United States—at least 1,000,000 men; and yet this insignificant force 
of 10,000 Germans nearly won the war by starving England. 

4. It is no argument to say that the submarine was finally defeated 
when we consider the odds against it. Germany was fenced in by 
England and France. England lay across her front door. There 
were but two exits for her submarines to reach the Atlantic. About 
5,000 antisubmarine craft were employed daily against the 30 sub¬ 
marines at sea. No such condition of disadvantage will embarrass 
our future enemy, whose submarines may be free to roam the sea. 
And we may not have the navies of the civilized world allied with 



NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


117 


jur own. Can we alone place 5,000 antisubmarine craft upon the 
sea and strew depth charges over every ocean? Will we have 
1,000.000 men with a navy equal to the combined navies of England, 
France, Italy, and Japan?. If not, the task of downing the sub¬ 
marine of our future enemy will be much more difficult than was that 
of subduing the German submarine in the World War. 

It is positively amazing that many naval officers have already for¬ 
gotten or ignored these facts, and, having realized hesitatingly the 
importance of aviation, the Navy Department, and Congress as well, 
have suggested that we cancel the contract for submarines in order to 
get money for aviation. This is robbing Peter to pay Paul. Can not 
two ideas coexist in a naval mind? W r e must have a strong sub¬ 
marine force, and a strong air force, too. Without both of these 
forces our surface fleet will be hopeless. The submarine single handed 
nearly won the greatest of all wars. It has proved its prowess, and 
yet the United States practically ignores it. 

The uses of submarines: 1. Coast defense. Small short-range sub¬ 
marines are invaluable for coast defense. Fifty of these can be built 
for the price of one superdreadnaught. 

2. To defend far-away possessions. The Philippines, Guam, 
Samoa, Hawaiian Islands, etc. A battle fleet can not safely approach 
a coast well defended by submarines. 

3. Attacking the enemy’s commerce and protecting our own con¬ 
voys. It is the most useful of all weapons for this purpose. 

4. Service with the fleet. It protects the fleet. It menaces the 
enemy’s fleet. 

All these uses are most important. Space forbids a discussion of 
each. 

Advantages of submarines: 1. Submarines have great sea endur¬ 
ance. A long-range submarine can remain at sea three or four months 
and cruise 25,000 miles. Imagine such an enemy in the lanes of com¬ 
merce. Vastly more efficient than the Emden , or other surface ships 
that were soon sighted, then corned and destroyed. No surface ves¬ 
sel can maintain itself so long at sea. 

2. Submarines are self-supporting. The battleship can not go to 
sea or anchor in port without protection by destroyers, cruisers, and 
air forces. The submarine needs no such protection. It takes care 
of itself. 

3. The submarine, in addition to fighting with its guns and tor¬ 
pedoes, may act as a most efficient mine layer, carrying 46 mines, with 
a sea range of 15,000 miles. 

Let us now consider the weakness of our submarine force and what 
must be done to bring this invaluable adjunct to the proper stand¬ 
ard of efficiency in modern naval warfare. 

This was given to me by an officer, and I do not know of any other 
who ought to know more about the condition of submarines than he 
does. If it is wrong, it can be corrected. 

Our submarine force: The following is the condition of our sub¬ 
marine force: 

1. There are about 30 boats from 300 to 450 tons, all unsuitable 
for offshore work. They are fit only for training. 

2. There are about 50 coastal boats from 350 to 550 tons now in 
fair condition but not intended for distant service. 


118 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


3. There are about 50 boats of 800 tons and above, some uncom¬ 
pleted. A few of these may be efficient, but as a class they are 
failures. 

I think the contracts have been held up. 

It appears, therefore, that in three years following the armistice 
the Navy Department has failed to develop any long-range boats 
such as the Germans sent to our coast in 1918. We have spent ap¬ 
proximately $130,000,000 on submarines, and the Navy has not one 
submarine to-day fit for service with the fleet. 

In this the Navy Department ignores the past, neglects the pres¬ 
ent, and fails utterly to anticipate the future. 

It is estimated that not less than $100,000,000 are needed to-day 
to supply this country with an adequate submarine force. This is 
the price of three dreadnaughts. In view of the fact that we have 
prospectively 22 dreadnaughts in our surface fleet, shall we add still 
further to the battleship force before we supply ourselves with sub¬ 
marines? It is a matter of common sense. How will the money be 
most wisely spent ? Shall we put so much money into the craft that 
did not “ control the sea ” in the World War that we shall have no 
money to provide us with the weapon that fought single handed 
and nearly won against the combined navies of the world ? 

So much for the force that operates on the lower plane of a modern 
3-plane navy. It remains to consider the force that operates on 
the upper plane. 

Naval aircraft: At present the United States naval air force is 
pitifully inadequate to meet modern conditions. What we have is 
good and the personnel is efficient and brave, but the force is so 
small that a hostile fleet supplied with adequate air forces could com¬ 
pletely command the air above our surface fleet and subject it to 
constant bombing from above, and constant attack from torpedo 
planes from above and below. Nothing will justify our leaving our 
surface fleet to such a fate. 

It is estimated that not less than $120,000,000 will be necessary to 
provide two modern airplane carriers, together with the bombing 
and torpedo planes, to place our naval air force in condition to op¬ 
erate effectively with the fleet in modern war. This is the approxi¬ 
mate price of four dreadnaughts. Without an air force our surface 
fleet, no matter how powerful, can not exist and operate effectively 
if the enemy command the air. As in the case of submarines, shall 
we continue to build dreadnaughts before we have provided the air 
weapons that are essential for both offensive and defensive naval 
warfare? It is once more a question of the most economical invest¬ 
ment of our money. If we have a powerful surface fleet, with no air 
or submarine fleets, money spent upon our Navy will be wasted. It 
will be a weak Navy in every sense of the word. 

Senator Hale. Where did you get the figures, $120,000,000? 

Admiral Fullam. They were prepared for me by the best author¬ 
ity on aviation in this country. 

Senator Hale. The evidence that we have before us is that we can 
get two carriers for $48,000,000. 

Admiral Fullam. I accept that. 

Senator Hale. Where is the rest of it consumed ? 

Admiral Fullam. I had a statement of it but did not put it all 
in. It comes in supplying bombing planes, torpedo planes, and all 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


119 


the paraphernalia, together with repairs, etc., that would be needed 
to make up an air force—the forces which we have not got. When 
you get your airplane carriers you want some airplanes for them to 
carry. 

Senator Hale. But you assume it would cost $70,000,000 for that 
purpose ? 

Admiral Fullam. I did not assume it. I asked an officer of high 
rank, whom I think you all would admit is well informed. 

Senator Hale. But you are giving us the figures that we have 
never heard suggested before. 

Admiral Fullam. I am only telling you how I got them. I will 
ask the officer who gave me those if I may divulge his name to the 
committee. You can correct these if you choose. I do not pretend to 
say that I can swear under oath to every statement I make here. 
There may be many inaccuracies. I said it is estimated, Senator. 

Senator Hale. But is so entirely different from any statement we 
have had heretofore, or estimate, that I want to know how you 
got it. 

Admiral Fullam. I will have to leave that to Capt. Craven and 
the officer who gave this to me. I understood it was a liberal esti¬ 
mate of what we needed for airplane purposes. 

Senator Hale. You mean an estimate by somebody whose busi¬ 
ness it is to estimate or just a general guess by somebody? 

Admiral Fullam. He consulted with other officers, whose business 
it is to estimate. I do not like to betray his confidence by giving the 
name. I discussed the matter with him. I think, however, he would 
be very willing to permit me to do so, and later on I can tell you, if 
you wish to know. 

Briefly considered, an air force with the fleet will be required rV- 
observation and scouting; for “spotting,” or controlling long-raru*i» 
gunfire; for bombing the enemy; to torpedo the enemy by means ox 
the torpedo plane; to place a barrage of mines around a hostile fleet; 
and last, but not least, to subject the decks of enemy ships to bom¬ 
bardment by means of nonrecoil guns, which are now being mounted 
in airplanes. Thus airplanes will bring four weakons to beat upon 
surface ships—bombs, torpedoes, mines, and guns. 

Can a force so varied and powerful be ignored while we add with¬ 
out limit to the surface fleet, so vulnerable to attack from above and 
below ? 

In this connection it is important to note that England, I ranee, 
and Japan are strenuously seeking the fullest possible development 
of air forces. These nations see the handwriting on the wall. They 
realize that air power is a necessary adjunct of sea power. Indeed, 
we may assert that sea power hereafter can only exist with the aid 
of air power. The fleet or the ship which loses the control of the 
air above itself can not “ control ” the sea. 

Battle fleets in the World War: Having considered the part played 
by the submarine in “controlling the sea” between 1914 and 1918, 
and having noted that it nearly won the war against the combined 
power of the surface fleets of the world, it is important to note the 
part played by battleships while England faced starvation in order 
that we may form an intelligent idea of the probable role of battle¬ 
ships in the future. 


120 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


It will be conceded that the grand fleet of Great Britain, in the 
early months of the war, before the submarine fleet of Germany was 
fully developed, prevented an early victory for the Central Powers. 
It probably saved France, and the world as well, from German 
domination. England’s surface fleet drove Germany’s surface navy 
off the sea and bottled up her main force. The sea in the early 
months of the war was controlled as in the days of Nelson, Farra- 
gut, and Dewey by a powerful surface fleet. 

But when the submarines appeared in large numbers—even to 
the correspondingly small number of 30 at any one time—we have 
seen from the quotation from Admiral Sims’s book that the grand 
fleet lost control of the sea for all practical purposes. It simply 
blockaded Germany’s surface fleet, while the submarine dominated 
the situation to the extent that it brought England to the verge of 
starvation. 

The grand fleet and the high seas fleet both remained in port 
except for short cruises, when they steamed at high speed, protected 
by cruisers, submarines, and destroyers. They did not protect com¬ 
merce; they did not influence the food supply of England, except 
that each fleet kept for its own protection large forces of auxiliary 
craft that might have supported or combated the submarine in its 
deadly w T ork. 

In June, 1916, the Battle of Jutland was fought. This was the 
only battle in which battleships took part, and in this they were only 
incidentally engaged, with little result to either side. 

After this, as before, battleships remained at their bases, taking no 
part in the struggle that involved the starvation of England and the 
winning of the war. 

Has this fact been fully appreciated by those who are shaping the 
building policy of the United States Navy? And while the grand 
fleet was watching the high seas fleet—its paramount duty, to be 
sure—did the battleships of France, Italy, and the United States in¬ 
fluence the result in any wav? Did they chase or combat the sub¬ 
marines that were starving England? They did not, because they 
could not. It would have been folly. The seven United States bat¬ 
tleships sent to Europe remained in port, waiting with the grand 
fleet for the battle that never came. The sea meanwhile w T as con¬ 
trolled by other forces. 

Not only this, but all the Allies stopped building battleships and 
feverishly augmented their fleets of destroyers and small craft. The 
United States suspended the 1916 building program and started, very 
tardily, to build 250 destroyers, only 8 of which ever got into the 
war. It was largely a post-mortem contribution. It did not influ¬ 
ence the World War, but, fortunately, we can use these destroyers in 
the future against the one weapon—the submarine—that may seek 
to control the sea in the future, as it most certainly controlled the sea 
during the dark days of 1917-18. 

It is clear that had the Navy Department intelligently anticipated 
our entrance into the World War it could best have prepared by 
stopping the 1916 program even earlier—yes, before it was ever out¬ 
lined—and concentrated upon destroyers and small craft to combat 
the enemy which the department had been watching for two years 
in the deadly work of “ controlling the sea.” 




121 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

And now, in 1921, four years later, the Navy Department again 
goes back to the 1916 program, which did not provide ships to fight 
against Germany. It proposes to double the number of ships that 
could not fight submarines then and can not fight them now. One 
would imagine that submarines had been abolished. But they still 
exist, though not in our Navy in the numbers required to “control 
the sea. 7 

It is interesting to consider what would have been England’s wisest 
course had the high sea fleet been completely destroyed at Jutland. 

It -will be admitted'that England’s dreadnaughts, as well as ours 
would not have searched the sea for submarines, nor would they have 
been assigned to the duty of escorting merchant vessels and trans¬ 
put ts. Had they gone to sea would they not have been compelled 
to take with them for their own salvation the protecting screen of 
cruisers and destroyers that are most efficient in combating the sub¬ 
marine? From this, is it not manifest that the wisest thing to have 
done would have been to lock England’s battleships, as well as our 
OAvn, safely in protected harbors and then send for about 100 de¬ 
stroyers and many cruisers that were needed to save England from 
starvation ? 

Aow. what would Germany have done had she lost the high seas 
fleet at Jutland, or what could she have done if she had even attempted 
to maintain a useless surface fleet after she entered the war? She 
probably could have doubled the number of her submarines, in which 
case there is good reason for saying she would have Avon the war. 

It will thus be seen that the battleship was little used, and Avas, in¬ 
deed, of little use, especially after June, 1916. Battleships did not 
attack the German bases. Would Ave have sent our battleships to 
attack the coast of Germany and Austria, even if those powers had 
possessed nothing but submarines? 

Battleships were used to no aA^ail in the Gallipoli campaign. Tur¬ 
key had no naA T y and the Allies had an overwhelming force of second- . 
line battleships and at least one superdreadnauglit. But they failed. 
The allied navies never succeeded in fully controlling the submarine 
in the Adriatic or the Mediterranean. 

It is not intended in this article to contend that our battleships are 
useless to-day and should be scrapped. Not at all.. But it is con¬ 
tended that their power and usefulness ha\ T e been greatly limited of 
late; that they are seriously menaced; and that a full discussion of 
their probable and possible role in future warfare is necessary at this 
time. Surely w 7 e may assert that the battleship, even as a “ back¬ 
bone,” will not suffice to control the sea. 

In concluding this subject it must be remembered that in future 
warfare the submarine will be allied with aviation—bombs, torpedoes, 
mines, and guns from above. The battleship in the World War was 
comparatively immune from air attack. It is now between two fires. 

The solution, for the present, of this problem of naval chaos would 
appear to be a “ three-plane Navy,” and the importance of each plane 
must be judicially decided. 

It has been shoAvn that in completing six battleships and leaving 
five uncompleted Ave will have a poAverful force of 22 dreadnaughts. 

It has been showm that for the price of three battleships we can sup¬ 
ply an air force. Will the people give us the money to complete all 
the battleships and in addition the money to supply submarines and 


122 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


air forces? If not, what shall we do? Would it not be wise to take 
the money from uncompleted surface ships and use it for the two 
forces without which surface ships can not exist upon the sea? 
Would it not be the part of wisdom to supply ourselves with a three- 
plane rather than a one-plane Navy at this time? This is the one 
question that must be answered. 

Submarine versus surface ships: It has been stated that German 
submarines sank few men-of-war. This statements demands investi¬ 
gation. 

Senator Ball. Before you leave that, would the submarines have 
been of any more benefit in war to the United States than the battle¬ 
ships, if Germany had no ships to destroy- 

Admiral Fullam. I understand what you are getting at, Senator. 
The Germans lost about 30 or 40 of their submarines by attack from 
submarines. The English and American submarines and allied sub¬ 
marines sank about 30 or 40 of the German submarines. If we had 
had plenty of submarines we would have materially combated Ger¬ 
many’s submarine policy generally. 

Senator Ball. You think the submarine is more deadly to sub¬ 
marines than the destroyer? 

Admiral Fullam. No; I did not say that. I do not say anything 
against the destroyer. I am mighty glad we have those 300 destroy¬ 
ers. I believe, sir, that if we took those 300 destroyers in our Navy 
and put the lads on board that we have in our Navy, and would give 
them full crews and skilled torpedo men, that there will no navy go 
monkeying around us without thinking twice. We have the lads, we 
have the men that can take those 300 destroyers and make any fleet 
sit up and take notice, even without a battle cruiser. We have an 
overwhelming fleet of destroyers. 

Senator Swanson. You believe in a defensive fleet? 

Admiral Fullam. No, sir; I believe in offensive first, last, and all 
. the time. 

In a lecture delivered at the Naval War College by Capt. T. C. 
Hart, United States Navy, we find the following. This is to show 
you why the submarine did not attack our convoys and did not at¬ 
tempt to sink battleships during the war. This is a lecture delivered 
by Capt. Hart at the Naval War College recently: 

It has been learned from captured instructions, from quizzing prisoners from 
German submarines, and from evidence since the armistice that the criterion 
of efficiency held up to them was the amount of tonnage put on the bottom; 
all the promotions, decorations, etc., were based on that. They were told what 
kind of ships counted most from their standpoint; at the head of their list 
were tankers; and warships did not stand high. Incidentally, although tor¬ 
pedoes from German submarines accounted for 62 of the 134 surface ships that 
the British Navy lost and 8 large French and Italian ships, submarines seem 
rarely to have gone out of their way to make such attacks. It was all a matter 
of estimate; they reasoned that they would win the war by the destruction of 
merchant tonnage. Their submarines having run the gauntlet to their operat¬ 
ing grounds strove to put down a ship with every torpedo; they could hope to 
do that only with easy shots; and they found they could stay out long enough 
to get an easy shot for each torpedo. A transport coming west was an easier 
shot than while going east because she was not strongly escorted, and they 
estimated that in the long run it wouldn’t make much difference whether she 
was loaded or not; at least not enough difference to make it profitable to face 
extra risk. 

In other words, the German submarines did not attempt to sink 
men-of-war. They did not pretend to waste ammunition and let 



NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


123 


their shots go to waste when they could get decorations and promotion 
by sending helpless merchantmen to the bottom in the one mission 
which they had, namely, to starve England. It was Von Ilinden- 
berg’s opinion in December, 1916, and he so told the Kaiser that Ger¬ 
many could bring Great Britain to starvation in six months if she 
would concentrate her submarine warfare, and having started to do 
it they were not going to be fools enough to change their mission and 
go to fighting destroyers and surface vessels when they could go and 
plunk a torpedo very easily into a merchant ship and contribute to 
the starvation of England. 

Senator Ball. What would have been the moral effect if they had ? 

Admiral Fullam. I am coming to that. 

Senator Swanson. Do you think that starvation in this country 
is a problem that we would ever have to consider—an attempt by 
an enemy to starve this country? 

Admiral Fullam. No; we can not be starved. 

Senator Swanson. Therefore the problem of warfare is different 
with us from what it is with England? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. I am coming to that later. 

Senator Swanson. How about a battleship attacking New York 
or some seaport on the southern coast? 

Admiral Fullam. If a battleship came around our coast, if we 
would send some submarines and airplanes out against her, she will 
get away. If she wants to bombard New York, the best way would 
be to send an airplane carrier- 

Senator Swanson. Would it not be better to have a battleship? 
Which would you feel safer, if you were in New York and you were 
attacked bv a fleet of battleships, if you were defending with a fleet 
of battleships or with aircraft and submarines? 

Admiral Fullam. If the enemy had airplanes and submarines, I 
should feel very much safer if I were with the enemy. 

Senator Hale. Without battleships? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

A study of Capt. Hart’s statement is essential to a knowledge of 
what the submarines did and are capable of doing. It appears that 
they sank 62 English men-of-war and 8 large French and Italian 
ships—TO in all, or more than half of the men-of-war that were lost. 
And yet it was not their first mission to attack fighting ships. 

It is frequently stated that the torpedo sank but one British battle¬ 
ship—the Marlioroufjlx —at Jutland. Granted. But gunfire sank 
but one German battleship—the old Pommem . As far as battle¬ 
ships were concerned, therefore, the torpedo and the guns were 
equal. 

Senator Bx\ll. Did not the guns put more out of commission than 
the submarines did? 

Admiral Fullam. No; the battleships did not put them out of 
commission. 

Senator Ball. I am talking about the fleet in general. 

Admiral Fullam. I am coming to that. 

The truth is that battleships proper were not seriously engaged 
in the Battle of Jutland. The battle was largely between battle 
cruisers and scouting forces. The British lost three battle cruisers 
by gunfire, and three of the German battle cruisers were badly bat- 


124 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


terecl. Of these the Lutzow sank. She was hit by a torpedo as well 
as by guns, and the Seydlitz was also torpedoed. 

It is important in this connection to note that Admiral Jellicoe 
showed proper respect for the torpedo by turning away for 10 min¬ 
utes when attacked by a German flotilla. He was not alone in taking 
such precaution at Jutland and should not be criticized for it. 

Senator Walsh of Montana. He has been severely criticized. 

Admiral Fullam. Yes; he has by parlor strategists, who can sit 
at a table like this, with all the maps, with all the positions, with 
the ships prettily plotted there, with all the knowledge which Ad¬ 
miral Jellicoe did not have, in a nice comfortable library, and these 
strategists will say that this admiral, on his bridge there, who could 
not see 3 miles, who did not know where anything was much, made 
a mistake. I submit to you, sir, that an admiral ought not to be 
subjected to that kind of criticism. 

Senator Walsh of Montana. You think it is not well founded? 

Admiral Fullam. Well, no. I think it is a very proper thing for 
everybody to study that battle and to be interested in it and to form 
his own conclusions. But I think he ought to be a little careful 
before he goes to work and criticises severely the action of the man 
who had the responsibility there, and who could see very little in the 
mists and conditions that existed. Neither one of them could see the 
other half the time. 

Senator Walsh of Montana. That is practically a normal condi¬ 
tion in the North Sea. is it not? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

Senator Walsh of Montana. One must take those things into con¬ 
sideration. 

The Chairman. Let us reserve our opinion as to Admiral Jellicoe. 

Admiral Fullam. Recent reports show that Van Hipper’s ships 
turned away from British destroyers several times, and, in his latest 
comment on the battle, Von Shier states that he did not return to 
the attack at night nor again early in the morning because he feared 
that the British destroyers which had not expended their torpedoes 
in the day action might come out of the darkness in the mist of the 
morning and attack his battleships. Thus we see that, even admitting 
that few battleships were sunk by torpedoes, their use, or threatened 
use, contributed to make the battle indecisive. 

Senator Hale. That was torpedoes or destroyers? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. Not submarines? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

Senator King. May I inquire whether or not submarines and torpe¬ 
does were as well known, and their efficiency as well developed, or if 
they were developed to as high a degree of efficiency, at the time of the 
Battle of Jutland, as later? In other words, was not the torpedo 
and was not the submarine rather in their incipient stages in 1916 
when the Battle of Jutland was fought? 

Admiral Fullam. The submarine was developed a good deal after 
that—but not very much. 

Senator Hale. But the torpedoes were practically as well known 
as now ? 

Admiral Fullam. Practically; submarines took little part in the 
Jutland battle. But one can not forget that the two powerful battle 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


125 


fleets, quite intact, returned to their bases on June 1 , 1910, and 
awaited there until the armistice for the battle which never came; 
while the submarine, regardless of the battle fleets of live great 
nations, proceeded to “ command the sea ” for more than a year, 
bringing England to the verge of starvation. Does this record put 
a naval crown upon the battleship or upon the submarine? Which 
deserves the reward in the show-down? 

A consideration of all of these facts is respectfully submitted to 
those who, shall we sav blindly, adhere to the 1916 program without 
reservations. A program—a child born during the battle of Jut¬ 
land, we might say, ignores the awful events that followed its birth, 
and continues to live in comparative indifference to the daily lessons 
and teachings of the past five years. 

r l he failure at Gallipoli: The Gallipoli campaign is a good example 
of the possible uses of submarines and of air forces. I would like to 
ask anybody here if the Turks had had submarines and air forces, 
could the English transports have run up to the beach and landed 
their men in safety? Will any naval officer say that such a thing 
would be possible? Would battleships have protected the landing 
against submarines and airplanes? If not, why not? 

Xow, let us take the other side: Suppose the British had had a 
strong air force with heavy bombing planes and torpedo planes at 
Gallipoli. Would not their chances of driving the Turks from that 
narrow peninsula have been much better? Would they not have 
saved thousands of brave men, needlessly sacrificed? The history of 
warfare proves that the fire of guns from fleets can not reduce forts; 
but heavy bombs might have, done so. The British battleships at 
Gallipoli accomplished little. To be sure, the attempts of the Eng¬ 
lish to bomb the Goshen and Breslau failed, but it is said the failure 
was due to small and improvised bombs. The English air forces 
were totally inadequate. 

A careful study of this disastrous campaign uncovers the weakness 
of battleships in the work of reducing fortifications, and in the at¬ 
tempt to land and support invading forces. At the same time it 
demonstrates the vital necessity for submarines and aircraft, both in 
landing and in repelling a landing. 

The bugbear of invasion: Decent developments in the offensive 
and defensive attributes of aviation, mines, torpedoes, and subma¬ 
rines conspire to make it impossible to send large armies across the 
Atlantic or the Pacific in helpless transports, however they may be 
escorted, against any nation properly supplied with these weapons 
of under-water and above-water attack and defense. In other words, 
it would appear that large armies will be employed hereafter only 
in continental, not in intercontinental, wars. The United States can 
not be invaded from Europe or Asia. Similarly we can not safely in¬ 
vade European or Asiatic countries. The size of our Army, after 
properly garrisoning our far-away possessions, may therefore be de¬ 
termined by the probable dangers at home or on the American Conti¬ 
nent. This statement challenges contradiction. 

The fact that we sent 2,000,000 men to France lias been cited to 
prove that the submarine is not very dangerous. This is a fallacy. 
Our men escaped simply because our transports going east were not 
attacked as a rule. Five returning transports were attacked because 
they were not strongly protected. It is known now that IJ-boat cap- 


126 


NAVAL APP110PK1ATION BILL, 1922. 


tains were rewarded and be-medaled on the basis of the tonnage they 
sent to the bottom. It was their mission to starve England. This, 
was the one object of unrestricted warfare. 

Senator Hale. They attacked transports, however, whenever they 
got a chance, did they not? 

Admiral Fullam. No, sir; not going east. 

Senator Hale. Going west? 

Admiral Fullam. Not going east. Going west if they were un¬ 
protected. 

Senator Halei. They only got five in the whole period ? 

Admiral Fullam. They did not attack, them. 

Senator Hale. Why not? 

Admiral Fullam. Because they were starving England, Senator. 
As I told you they got medals; they were plastered with iron crosses 
all over both their breasts. 

Senator Hale. Were they told not to attack transports going west? 

Admiral Fullam. They did attack a few. 

Senator Hale. Therefore, if they did attack a few, it was their 
policy to attack as many as they could ? 

Admiral Fullam. When they were helpless. 

Senator Hale. And they only attacked and got five? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir; they did contrive to do that. 

Senator Walsh of Montana. The argument was, as I understood, 
that they did not want to waste their torpedoes. 

Admiral Fullam. They were starving England; that was their 
mission. 

Senator Lodge. It woidd seem as if it would have been of some 
importance to them to stop the troops going to Europe. 

Admiral Fullam. They could not do two things simultaneously, 
at once, Senator. 

Senator Lodge. They thought that the attempt to starve England, 
in which they were failing, was better than to try and stop the 
troops ? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir; that was the whole business. They 
made every torpedo and every shot count to that end. They only 
attacked men-of-war when they were cornered, or under favorable 
conditions. They had short-range torpedoes. To fight men-of-war 
would have been foolish. It would have expended their ammunition 
uselessly and defeated the main purpose; to starve England. 

Had the situation been different, and had they used long-range 
torpedoes, can anybody doubt that they would have attacked our 
big convoys at long range with frightful effect? Will any naval 
officer in his right mind deny this? And had they done so, what 
would have been the effect upon the people of the United States 
after a few transports carrying thousands of men had been sunk? 

It is wrong, therefore, to deceive the people of the United States 
by the cry that we must have a big surface Navy to repel invasion. 
Previous to the World War invasion of the United States would have 
been perfectly possible had an enemy possessed a surface navy strong 
enough to defeat our fleet and command the sea under conditions 
existing at that time. But we made no preparations against it. 

Neither the administration nor the people could be aroused by the 
danger when it really existed. Our Army was small and our Navy 
inadequate, but the Nation refused to lift a finger. 


127 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

But to-day we hear the cry of “ Wolf! Wolf!” And yet we may 
assert that with an Army and Navy smaller than in 1914—yes; even 
without any surface Navy at all—no nation could land a large army 
on the coast of the United States, and I want to emphasize that, 
either in the Atlantic or Pacific, if we were supplied with an efficient 
submarine fleet and a powerful air force. The attacking fleet with 
its helpless transports could not bring with it across the sea an air 
force sufficiently strong to maintain the command of the air above 
itself. Its air defense could be smothered and its ships and its army 
could be subjected to a merciless attack from the air above and from 
the sea below. The enemy could not land. It would be impossible 
and inhuman, and I want to emphasize that. The submarine and the 
air force, therefore, discourage war overseas, especially as far as the 
transport of armies is concerned. In this respect they are elements 
of peace. 

Senator Ball. I he air force could be purely a land air force. 

Admiral Fullam. If the Navy had it you could go out some dis¬ 
tance. 

Senator Ball. It would not be necessary; the land forces could do 
it as well. 

Admiral Fullam. You had better begin to knock them to pieces 
before they get to the land. But you can put it that way. I have no 
objection. 

Senator Ball. The land forces could do it as well. 

Admiral Fullam. Yes. 

Senator Ball. As far as that is concerned, why have any Navy? 

Admiral Fullam. I want the air force up with the fleet, if the 
enemy has a surface fleet. I am not giving up the surface fleet. I 
am only very humbly and with very much embarrassment trying to 
show that the surface fleets, that I love so dearly, needs to be pro¬ 
tected. 

Senator Lodge. Nobody on this committee is arguing against that 
proposition that I am aware of. 

Admiral Fullam. I do not assume so. 

Senator Swanson. We recognize fully the importance of both the 
submarine air craft and destroyers. 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

It would appear that this self-evident fact, demonstrated by the 
World War and the Gallipoli campaign, is ignored alike by many 
naval officers and legislators in framing our building program. They 
insist on building the most expensive and the least useful craft, while 
depriving us of the submarine and air forces that are vital in modern 
war. They build upon the conditions of 1916. They are blind to the 
conditions of 1921. They would give us not a strong Navy, but a 
weak one. 

What I mean to say is this, that we have no air force now. And we 
hear it said that there is war in the air; that we may have war pretty 
soon. 

Senator Swanson. How much of an expenditure would you recom¬ 
mend? 

Admiral Fullam. I would rather not say. I do not want to go 
into that. 

Senator Hale. You have already stated it would take $120,000,000. 


128 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Fullam. Yes. A submarine man made the statement to 
me that we needed at least $100,000,000 for submarines, and the best 
authority on air navigation I know of anywhere said we needed 
about $120,000,000. 

Senator Hale. For two air carriers and their complements? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. That would be $220,000,000 for submarines and 
air forces? 

Admiral Ftjllam. That is a mere estimate. Please do not assume 
that I am giving it exactly. I leave that to you. 

The navy of the future: In the light of their war experience, and 
from a practical consideration of modern weapons, naval minds in 
Germany are not bemoaning the loss of their surface fleet. And 
why should they? The high seas fleet fought a good fight at Jutland, 
but it was glad to get back to its base. It gave little return for the 
billions spent upon it, whereas their submarine fleet nearly won 
the war. 

Admiral von Scheer, who commanded at Jutland, has recently ex¬ 
pressed the following opinions: 

•1. Surface ships are tremendously expensive, and yet they are very 
vulnerable. 

2. Hitherto only a few nations could afford these big ships, and so 
they ruled the seas. But the submarine has knocked all this into a 
cocked hat, and “ fear of the British fleet as a fighting weapon has 
gone.” 

3. That a good surface fleet can no longer protect a coast or over¬ 
seas commerce. 

4. That submarines can best defend or attack a coast and can best 
protect or destroy commerce. 

5. In short an adequate submarine navy will enable a compara¬ 
tively weak nation to pursue an overseas policy “ without worrying 
about a surface fleet.” 

Senator Hale. The submarine can best attack a coast? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes; because it will prevent any enemy navy 
from coming away from that coast. The battleship can not attack 
a coast. A battleship is not supposed to attack a coast. The battle 
fleet is to roam the seas, not to defend a coast nor to attack a coast. 

Senator Hale. You think the submarines can coop up a fleet? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. After you get all through with me— 
I do not want to take so much of your time—I wish you would get 
some of the admirals from the Navy Department, the General Board 
and elsewhere arid ask them in executive session, in secret, what they 
would do with our battle fleet if we had a war with a certain power in 
the Pacific, or with a certain power in the Atlantic, where they would 
send it, if those powers had- 

Senator Lodge. The trouble with your argument, it seems to me, is 
that you are proceeding on the assumption that we are going to do 
nothing about the air and nothing about submarines. We are as 
capable of doing it as they are. 

Admiral Fullam. Senator, if I have created that impression, 
please pardon me. 

Senator Lodge. That seems to me to be the whole drift of your 
argument. 


129 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Admiral Fullam. I have made a mistake, then, because the trend 
has been so strongly in this 1916 program toward the emphasizing 
of what I think to be a needless, a too great addition to a fleet of 22 
dreadnaughts, 10 scout cruisers, and 300 destroyers which I think 
just now will suffice. But they want to go and build all the rest of 
them, spend three or four hundred million dollars on them, when 
with but $220,000,000 we can build the necessary requirement for 
these two other planes. That is all, Senator. You pay your money 
and you take your choice. That is all it is with me. 

These conclusions of Von Scheer are shared by many distinguished 
officers and statesmen in England and elsewhere. For instance, Lord 
Rothmere, formerly director of England’s air force, makes the fol¬ 
lowing assertions in an article entitled “ The folly of the big battle¬ 
ship.” 

Referring to the United States and Japan: 

1. They are obviously building against each other and not against us. Great 
Britain can not afford to spend money on naval construction at present. 

Senator Hale. Who is saying that ? 

Admiral Fullam. Lord Rothmere, the former director of Eng¬ 
land’s naval air forces. 

2. If the United States and Japan persist in pursuing antiquated forms of 
warfare, that is no proof that capital ships will survive. 

3. No nation henceforth will enjoy naval supremacy. It is a nasty pill, but 
we must swallow it. 

Senator King. Is that still his statement? 

Admiral Fullam. He has just stated it. Von Scheer says the same 
thing. He says the little nation has now come into its own; that 
without a surface fleet at all they can take submarines and air forces, 
and they need not be afraid of any enemy fleet coming around its 
coast. 

These assertions, based on experience in the World War—that sub¬ 
marines and aviation have revolutionized naval warfare—can not 
be ignored. The gist of it is that surface ships are between two 
dangerous fires—one from below and the other from above. 

Are these modern theories being intelligently considered in Wash¬ 
ington by those who are urging the unrevised completion of the 
“ building program of 1916 ”—a program five years old? 

The opinion of Chief Constructor Taylor, United States Navy. 
In an article published recently by the Franklin Institute, Rear 
Admiral Taylor, Chief Constructor of the Navy, makes the follow- 
predictions : 

Although we must conclude that the present tendency is toward increased size 
and cost, one can not overlook the fact that this very tendency, under the 
present financial, economic, and political conditions in the world, may actually 
result in the long run the disappearance from future building programs of 
these very types and the substitution for them of smaller and cheaper units 
made possible by new developments in science and engineering. 

To meet this condition there never was more need than at the present time 
of vision and imagination on the part of the fighting forces afloat and the naval 
designers ashore, for that nation which can develop weapons which will render 
obsolete the present great ships and can substitute for them a smaller and 
cheaper unit, capable of defeating them, will win in the new area of the com¬ 
mand of the seas, which this war has shown is so important to ultimate victory. 

Senator Lodge. Do vou call a plane carrier a cheap unit? 


34772—21-9 


130 NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Admiral Fullam. Senator, you have got me there. No, sir; but it 
Carries with it a cheap unit. 

Senator Lodge. You can not have planes without carriers. 

Admiral Fullam. Not to go far to sea; no, sir. 

From this it is plain that our chief constructor sees the hand¬ 
writing on the wall. He expresses himself cautiously, which is 
natural for an officer in his position. He is liberal and wise. 

Admiral Taylor. It seems to me you are quoting from the Tribune 
and not from me. 

Admiral Fullam. No, sir; this is from the Franklin Institute 
article. 

Admiral Taylor. That was from an article in the Tribune. 

Admiral Fullam. Gentlemen, may I call your attention to just 
one thing, right here, which is not in my statement. Sir John 
Fisher, the British admiral, was the father of the dreadnaught. 
Before building a dreadnaught, instead of imposing his opinion and 
his will, as he might have done, upon the British Admiralty, he 
called together a body of naval officers of distinction, and of civilians 
as well, great civilian and naval architects, naval constructors, ex¬ 
perienced civilian builders, and discussed with these men whether 
the dreadnaught was a good type. They decided with him that it 
Avas, and he built it. It was the start of the dreadnaught era. I 
think it was in 1903 or 1904, if I am right. Before he died in 1919 
Sir John Fisher said that aviation and the submarine had sounded 
the doom of the dreadnaught, and he said “ scrap the lot; the navy 
goes up into the air.” I do not agree with it, but I am merely telling 
you what he said. 

Not only that, but Sir Percy Scott did more to make the di*ead- 
naught powerful, in conjunction with Fiske and Sims than any 
other three men in the world to-day. Fiske invented the telescopic 
sight that enabled guns to shoot long distances. Percy Scott showed 
how to use the telescopic sight in gunnery training. And Sims 
got from Percy Scott the system that taught the British Navy how 
to shoot. Up to that time it had not been able to hit the side of a 
barn. Our navy at Santiago made just 3 per cent of hits—3 per cent. 
Sims took Scott’s system and introduced it into our Navy, and that 
made the deadnaught this terrible power that it has proved to be. 

Now then, it is a curious thing that Fisher and Scott and Fiske 
and Sims, all those four men that influenced not only the efficiency 
of the British Navy but our own, have either come out flat-footed 
to say that the deadnaught is doomed, or they'see that is has limita¬ 
tions, and that we had better discuss the matter- 

Senator Hale. Admiral Fiske and Admiral Sims take the ground 
that we ought not to stop in our program of building. 

Admiral Fullam. That is all right. I feel in sympathy with 
them, because we have got only a surface navy. The navy can not 
jump overboard off the only thing we have got and go to swimming 
around the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, when we have neither an 
air force nor a submarine force to get aboard of. We can not do it. 
That is why I advocate the completion of the ships which would 
give us 22 dreadnaughts. I do not want to abolish the battleship. 
I want the 22 dreadnaughts, the 10 scout cruisers, and 300 destroy¬ 
ers. I am not at all afraid as far as the surface navy goes, but I 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 131 

think we had better get busy and look out for thess other two 
places, that is all; nothing more. 

Admiral Sir Percy Scott, eminent naval authority, has come 
out in opposition to the building of more battleships for the wars 
of the future and in favor of smaller craft and more attention to 
the auxiliary arms of the Navy. At least, that is the deduction 
drawn from a letter from him, which is published in the Evening 
Standard. In it he sums up the naval lessons learned in the war. 

Sir Percy promises to enliven the discussion on British and world 
naval matters, some of his deductions being bound to excite hostility 
in certain quarters. He has just refused to appear before the com¬ 
mittee on imperial defense and give his opinions on building small 
craft instead of battleships. He gave as his reason that he would be 
muzzled. 

In his published letter he say that, naturally. Navy officers advo¬ 
cate the building of battleships, because if they did not they would 
commit professional suicide. He says the British learned the fol¬ 
lowing things from the war: 

If Germany had possessed more submarines at the beginning of 
the war, they would have won. 

The German battleships were of no use to them. 

The weapons that nearly defeated the allies were the mine and the 
torpedo. 

The foremost of the British battleships in the Mediterranean were 
sunk. 

After the appearance of the submarine in the Mediterranean, the 
British battleships, which had not been sent to the bottom did very 
little useful work. The British battleships could not get through the 
Dardanelles. They were stopped by mines and not by battleships. 
Our leviathan battleships in the North Sea did not bombard any of 
the enemy's fortifications or seaport towns or harbors. Assailants 
can hide themselves behind smoke screens. What is probably the 
most effective weapon against battleships was not employed during 
the war—the airplane with a torpedo. This new device can attack 
battleships both at sea and in harbor. 

Senator Hale. Is not that somewhat conjectural ? 

Admiral Fullam. I was going to give you an example. 

It is not safe alone and must have nurses in the form of airplane 
and surface vessels to keep down submarines. 

The British could not protect their commerce on the sea. In a 
war between a country with a long coast line, and battleships for 
defense, and another country with a large number of submarines, 
Sir Percy says an hour after hostilities were declared the country 
with the submarines would be sending them to trade routes, where 
they would be guided and advised as to the whereabouts of merchant 
vessels by water planes. 

Other aircraft would drop torpedoes on battleships while the sub¬ 
marines would be planting mines at harbor entrances. He does not 
think any armada would dare pass five days at sea under such circum¬ 
stances. 

Senator Lodge. They did not succeed in hitting London very well; 
so I suppose it may be somewhat difficult to hit a rapidly moving- 
vessel. 

Admiral Fullam. That may be true. 


132 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Senator Lodge. I do not say they are not going to do it. T want 
something to defend us in the interval. 

Admiral Ffllam. You are quite right. I have an account of a 
recent experiment in England which I have not got in print here. It 
was at one of their harbors. Eight torpedo planes flew over the 
land preceded by a few bombing planes with smoke bombs. They 
dropped those smoke bombs around near the head of the torpedo 
plane, and the eight torpedo planes came along behind this screen 
and fired eight torpedoes at the English battleships anchored there, 
and six of those torpedoes took effect. 

Senator Lodge. They were all anchored ? 

Admiral Ftjllam. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lodge. Was somebody shooting at the torpedo planes ? 

Admiral Ffllam. They could not see them. They got there before 
they knew it. They make 125 miles an hour. 

Senator Lodge. Yes; I know that. 

Senator Hale. Then, you know, they have been able to develop 
smoke screens for airplanes? 

Admiral F fllam. 1 am only telling you what took place. This was 
an article written by the editor of The Airplane, a leading air-nautical 
journal, sent over to this side, and it described this event. The 
event has been referred to by others. I have no doubt that in our 
Naval Intelligence Office they have a full account of it. 

Furthermore, it has been intimated very strongly that England has 
a torpedo plane carrying a torpedo of tremendous power. I don’t 
know about that. I am only bringing out these points because it is 
wise to consider them. 

Senator Hale. But tne testimony that we have had from Capt. 
Craven, the head of our naval aviation, is that we have not got smoke 
screens that airplanes can use, up to the present time. 

Admiral Ffllam. I would not assume to discuss the matter with 
Capt. Craven, because he knows a great deal more about that sort of 
thing than I do. 

Now, gentlemen, I have come to the final little chapter here. We 
are told we have got a fleet of dreadnaughts to guard us from war. 
Consider what our present fleet is doing. We have 16 dreadnaughts 
now. 

The fleet of the United States is not merely a one-plane, or sur 
face fleet, instead of a modern three-plane fleet as it should be, but it 
is unorganized and unprepared for war even as a one-plane force. 
Those two fleets are down there now in the Pacific. They have not an 
airplane with them. There are some airplanes that stay at the canal. 
There are a few submarines at the canal that have been recently in¬ 
spected and are not hardly fit for peace maneuvers, let alone war 
maneuvers. This battle fleet has a comparatively small force of 
torpedo destroyers that are not in really war condition. 

The battle fleet has been divided into two equal parts, the two 
parts being 5,000 miles distant from each other. The Navy Depart¬ 
ment has announced to naval recruits that this division of our only 
fighting surface fleet will be perpetuated, and that one part will go 
to Australia and the other to South Africa next June, thus increasing 
the distance between them to about 10,000 miles. 

This division of our existing Navy violates the fundamental prin¬ 
ciples of naval strategy. As far as the naval strategy and naval 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


133 


policy of the United States are concerned, Admiral Mahan lived, and, 
wrote in vain! The Navy Department has ignored him. In a mili¬ 
tary sense it is reprehensible to divide a strong force, but to divide 
a weak force is worse. It is claimed that our present 1-plane Navy 
is not strong enough, and yet the Navy Department deliberately 
divides this inadequate force. It is declared that we must be pre¬ 
pared for war and must add tremendously to our surface fleet, and 
yet the Navy Department proposes to separate its two fleets bv a 
distance of 10,000 miles. 

Senator Lodge. That is a question of operation, is it not, even if 
we had the submarines and torpedoes? 

Admiral Fullam. \es, sir. It is only to show that if we are in 
danger of war, why don’t we take what we have got and get it ready 
for war pretty quick. It is perilous. 

Senator Lodge. That is a question of administration. 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

It is no exaggeration to state that if our present surface fleet is 
weak, if it needs to be doubled in strength, if there is danger of war 
within one or two years—if those things are true, then the division 
of this weak force imperils the Nation; it is a capital offense! 

And it may therefore be asserted that this surface fleet should be 
immediately united; that it should be fully manned and drilled night 
and da} 7 as one fighting machine. Otherwise it will remain as it is 
now—unprepared for war. Moreover, it will take at least six 
months—more likely a year—to reassemble, reorganize, train, and 
prepare in all respects the battle fleet and torpedo flotillas of our 
surface fleet for war. 

Instead of crying loudly for more dreadnaughts and more men, 
we should first prepare our existing forces for war. Sophistry alone 
can defend the present condition of our fleet. 

The two parts might be attacked and defeated in detail. The 
existence of the Panama Canal is no defense for this blind policy. A 
few bombs might block the canal. This would be the first move of 
our enemy. Moreover, the united fleet of the United States should 
be stationed in the Pacific for the present. It is not needed in the 
Atlantic. We must learn immediately how to maintain the fleet in 
the Pacific. It is folly to say that our bases there are insufficient to 
maintain our fighting forces. If we can not maintain it there now 
in time of peace, how in the name of common sense can we hope to 
maintain it there in time of war ? Is it impossible for us to wage 
a naval war in the Pacific? If so, what shall we do? 

The Navy base at Alameda will not be finished in time to maintain 
a fleet in the Pacific if we wanted to maintain a war there in the 
Pacific. 

Senator Hale. When? 

Admiral Fi llam. I say it will not be finished in time. 

Senator Hale. What do you mean hy “in time”? 

Admiral Fullam. I say, if we are to have war in five years, if we 
are to have war in the Pacific, we have got to maintain this inade¬ 
quate surface fleet, we have got to maintain it there now with the 
conditions that exist there. And the sooner we learn how to do it the 
better it will be for us. 

That comes in in conjunction with this subject to this extent, that 
it is folly to come here and ask Congress and the people for 20 more 


] 34 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


big fighting ships when we do not take those we have got and 
organize them and man them and drill them and get them ready for 
war that some people seem to think is right on top of us. I don’t 
believe it. I don't believe there is any nation in Europe that can 
go to war with us, or that wants to go, unless we force it on them. 
Whether it is so on the other continent is for you to decide. If it is 
so over there then we had better use the forces we have. 

I would most earnestly request you to let me show you one or two 
little things here, and then I do not want to take any more of your 
time. Here is an article written by a naval officer showing the at¬ 
tack of a three-plane fleet, how it is formed, when it moves. It has 
the battle cruisers and everything else in it, with airplanes, sub¬ 
marines, lots of destroyers, and lots of cruisers. It is a three-plane 
fleet. It is a wonderful description of a battle under modern condi¬ 
tions. I should like to submit that. 

Now, sirs, if you will look at that. Talk about torpedoes attack¬ 
ing a fleet. Just imagine a submarine with a 10,000-vard torpedo 
coming along here. From a distance of 5 miles this torpedo is 
effective. If the fleet is advancing 15 miles an hour that torpedo 
could be fired at approximately a distance of 8 miles at this tre¬ 
mendous fleet, and I don’t think a torpedo could get through a fleet 
formed in that way without hitting one of those ships. I don’t be¬ 
lieve you could get it through there. 

Senator Lodge. There is lots of room in the ocean. 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir; but the battleships are occupying that 
room. 

Senator Lodge. What is the distance between them in that fleet 
formation ? 

Admiral Fullam. About 600 yards. 

Senator Lodge. A torpedo might get through. 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir; but the ship is 600 feet long. 

Senator Lodge. I understand. 

Admiral Fullam. So that one-third of your target is ships and 
other two-thirds is open water, and therefore you have one chance 
in three of hitting. It is well that Admiral Jellicoe turned away as 
he did. In doing so he presented the stern of his ships, and 20 
torpedoes went through his line, and only one ship was sunk or hit. 
If he had not turned away there might have been more hits. 

Senator Walsh of Montana. Did not a distinguished admiral say 
at one time “ Damn the torpedoes ” ? 

Admired Fullam. Yes, sir. They were mines, and he was going 
in a harbor and he could not have done anything else. There was 
no room to turn. It was fatal for him to stop or fatal for him to 
attempt to turn. He was not in the open sea. Farragut would never 
have attacked anything that could have sunk his ships and run 
deliberately into it if he had been in the open sea. 

Now, just a minute. I do not want to take more of your time. As 
to attacking a fleet by the air force, Capt. Craven could tell you how 
he would do that. They come down the line from a height and the 
lateral dispersion will be small, because the deck plans of the ships 
will be about one-third of the whole column. Therefore your chance 
of hitting by a bomb from above in the line of march will be about 
one in three or four. Say it is 1 in 10. It is a pretty good chance 
of hitting. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


135 


Now, they say, if you are so high up, you can not hit anything. 
There is no reason why you should be high up. In the early morn¬ 
ing or in varying conditions of weather, or just before dark the 
planes can come down very close, and they can go so speedily that 
they can drop these big thousand-pound bombs in a way that would 
make things very unpleasant for the people on board these ships. 

Take the case of the bombing of the Indiana , where they merely 
laid the mine on deck- 

Senator Lodge. That was tied up. 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. It is merely to show the explosive 
effect; that is all. That is all that is necessary. The chance of 
hitting is something else. I don’t know. It ought to be found out. 
If we would take our battle fleet out here and line it up as a battle 
fleet would have to be lined up and let the airplanes attack it with 
sandbag bombs, you would find out something about the chances of 
hitting. 

The reason that appealed to me, sir, was that I saw 220 airplanes 
aloft at San Diego at one time, and they came over that harbor in 
successive waves, in battle formation, like flocks of geese. My ships 
were in there, and it made me sit up and take notice, and I just made 
up my mind that if those 220 planes, each of them had a good big 
bomb, going over, their chances of hitting might be very small, but 
I would just as leave not take the chances. 

Senator Lodge. You were at anchor ? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir ; but whether it makes it more difficult 
being under way is for experiment to determine. 

Senator Swanson. How effective are antiaircraft guns against 
these airplanes? 

Admiral Fullam. They brought down one-tenth of 1 per cent 
of the planes they used them against on the battle front in France. 
If you had to keep your crew on a battleship with eyes glued to air¬ 
craft night and day, they are going to be up against it. You can 
see a ship from up in the air much more easily than the ship can 
see the thing in the air. The ship is better outlined even after night 
on the surface of the water very clearly. 

There is one other thing I did not refer to except in an explana¬ 
tory way, and that is that you can have a certain number of your 
airplanes with mines, and if they see a fleet coming they can cut 
across the bows of that fleet and sow the ocean with mines in front 
of it. While some airplanes are dropping bombs and other torpedo 
planes are making their attack, others could be assigned to planting 
heavy mines on the sea right in front of the path of the fleet, so 
that the fleet has got to go through a nest of mines as well as it 
has got to protect itself from bombs and torpedo planes. 

I am merely pointing out why the battle fleet has got to be pro¬ 
tected. If it loses the control of the air above.it, if the control of 
the air above it is completely maintained by the enemy. I submit to 
you that it is a pretty serious matter. 

I want to say, gentlemen, as I conclude, that I am awfully embar¬ 
rassed, because, for a naval officer to get up in the presence of his 
fellows and say anything to depreciate the kind of craft that he has 
loved and served in all his life is a very disagreeable thing. 

Senator Swanson. Your idea is that the Navy should control the 
air, control the surface of the sea, and control under the sea? 


136 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. If it is defective in either one of those ele¬ 
ments it is dangerous. 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. We have talked previously about a 
well-rounded surface fleet. We wanted battleships, we wanted battle 
cruisers, we wanted cruisers, we wanted destroyers, and all those 
things. Now, we have got to get a fleet here that is on three planes, 
that has got to be well balanced. 

The Chairman. Have you more than one copy of this battle-fleet 
formation to which you have referred ? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Leave several copies for the members of the 
committee. 

Admiral Fullam. I wish you would look at it. 

The Chairman. Have you about concluded, Admiral? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir: I am afraid I have taken too much of 
your time, and I did not want to do it. But I do want once more to 
impress upon you that I have not said that we must scrap our fleet. I 
want those 22 battleships, those 10 scout cruisers, and those 300 de¬ 
stroyers to go with the kind of officers and men that we have got in 
the Navy, and I know what they are, because I have instructed 
nearly all of them, by Jove. There is not one here that I did not 
instruct—right there in that row. 

Senator Hale. Are you qualified as an expert to testify as to the 
degree of completion that has been reached in aerial experimenta¬ 
tion—in bombing and torpedoes? 

Admiral Fullam. Well, only by what I have been told by those 
who have. 

Senator Hale. You yourself are not an expert on that? 

Admiral Fullam. I do not pretend to be an expert. 

Senator Hale. You do not know how far along we have gotten 
with experiments? 

Admiral Fullam. I do not claim to be an expert at all. It is only 
that I have gotten this information from officers whom I know per¬ 
sonally to be absolutely reliable, and I do not believe there are any 
officers in the Navy who know any more about these particular 
things than they do. I would not myself have made the statements 
until I had consulted them. 

Senator Hale. A good many officers have testified that we have not 
reached a finish in these matters, and we do not know just what we 
can do with airplanes. 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. Have you any evidence to the contrary that you 
can supply that we are far enough along in aerial matters to justify 
us in going ahead? 

Senator King. You mean in aerial matters? 

Senator Hale. Yes. Have you any other evidence than that we 
have had before the committee? 

Admiral Fullam. You see, I am very much up in the air right 
now. I don’t know what you have had before the committee. I have 
only tried, in coming to you as I have, to give you all the information 
I have been able to obtain, and from it it appears that our air 
force is totally inadequate, our submarine force is totally inadequate, 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 137 

in the light of modern conditions, as developed in the late war and 
as developed since the late war. That is all I can say. 

Senator Hale. We all want to improve aerial conditions. But we 
want to know whether we are justified in giving up what we have 
and going ahead. 

The Chairman. That is what he has been talking about in the last 
hour and a quarter. 

Senator Ball. Have you any particular information that we have 
not got? 

Admiral Fttllam. As far as particulars go, I would have to leave 
that to the officers who are in charge of aviation. I know that this 
question of aviation was brought up in the Navy Department in my 
presence in 1913, and we did not get anywhere. We went into the 
war with only 45 aviators in the Navy. Our lads got over there 
and it was a year before they got a plane built in America to do any¬ 
thing with. And they were just getting started when the war was 
over. I think that aviation has been between the devil and deep sea. 
It has had no friend. It has been sprinkled uniformly all around 
the Navy Department, in half a dozen bureaus, and no one man was 
at the head of it, and nobody could coordinate all these things. 

The Chairman. You want to get to the deep sea, don’t you? 

Admiral Fullam. I want to be able to send the enemy to the 
bottom of the deep sea, down with Mr. McGinty. 

Senator Lodge. Admiral, I have got to get back to the floor, and if 
the chairman will allow me, I would like to ask a few questions. 
The committee, as I understand it, from the report they made the 
other day, are entirely agreed with the Navy on a development both 
under the sea and in the air. I do not think there is any question 
about it, and I do not think anybody disputes the necessity of doing 
it. One of the things we recommended in the report was that in¬ 
stead of making contracts for 12 destroyers and 6 submarines, which 
are not yet contracted for, to turn that money, which w T as $55,000,000 
toward the building of plane carriers. I do not think there is any 
difference of opinion in the committee at all as to the necessity of 
developing those branches of the service. 

The question that is before the committee is Avhat we shall do 
with the 1916 program now. Part of the dreadnaughts have been 
built, at least, they are very near completion. Those, I understand 
you to say we had better complete, bringing the number up to 22. 

Senator Hale. That does not mean all the dreadnaughts. 

Senator Lodge. No. I say those that are advanced to finish them, 
and bring the number up to 22 all told. 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir; as quickly as possible. 

Senator Lodge. The committee has felt, I know I have felt, that 
we had no battle cruisers, and that that was a deficiency in the surface 
portion of our fleet. And Admiral Sims, in his testimony here, was 
A~ery emphatic that those six battle cruisers ought to be built in order 
to complete the surface fleet. 

As to the others, we are anxious to do all Ave can in regard to the 
air, and under the water, as I understand it. But in the meantime, 
we do not want to leave the country undefended, and there does not 
seem to be anything better with which to defend it at the present mo¬ 
ment than the fleet. Is there? 


138 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Fullam. No, sir. That is why I want to get the fleet we 
have gotten ready for war right away; quick. 

Senator Lodge. That is a question of administration. 

Admiral Fullam. And I know Admiral Coontz is pining to do 
it, too. 

Senator Lodge. We are trying here to legislate simply with the 
view to construction. That is all the committee is engaged on. We 
have nothing to do with operation, fortunately. 

The Chairman. I think this committee will agree with Admiral 
Fullam that our fleet shall be an efficient one. 

Senator Lodge. Absolutely; there can not be two opinions about 
it. It does not behoove a layman to say it, but I have a sort of feel¬ 
ing that I think there ought to be only one fleet, and I feel just now 
that it ought to be in the Pacific. That is only a layman’s opinion. 
I do not think there is any danger in the Atlantic. 

But I want to know how we can best get through this time until 
these airplanes and torpedoes are perfected, which admittedly, they 
are not yet. 

Admiral Fullam. Well, Senator, if those battle cruisers were fur¬ 
ther along, I would not have butted in here with the suggestion that it 
might be well to suspend the work on them for six months. 

Senator Lodge. You know better than I do the expense there is 
attached to suspending work. 

Admiral Fullam. I understand. To stop the work on some of 
those ships would result in great loss—ten or fifteen million. 

Senator Lodge. Twenty-five. 

Admiral Fullam. Or twenty-five. We might lose twenty-five mil¬ 
lion and we might make two hundred million. That is the way I 
look at it. If they have got to be completed, it will take two or three 
years to complete them. By the time they are completed the advances 
in aviation and submarines, which are still in their infancy, may be 
•such that we will find we have made a mistake. 

The Chairman. The same thing applies to any craft, does it not ? 
If we build submarines or airplanes, by the time we get them com¬ 
pleted there may be improved types that will make them obsolete? 

Admiral Fullam. But the battleship has been developed about to 
the limit of its power, as Admiral Taylor says. 

Admiral Taylor. I beg your pardon; I did not say that. 

Admiral Fullam. I meant to say you admitted that in the future 
we may be forced to smaller units. 

Admiral Taylor. We may. 

Admiral Fullam. We may be; that is all. I am going on the main 
problem myself—the^fact that before you got these battle cruisers com¬ 
pleted that it might be proved that some change in their design would 
be desirable. I suppose construction may have pnmded them with 
protected decks, so that one bomb won’t blow them all to smithereens, 
as it did the Indiana. 

Senator King. Will we know very much more in six months than 
we know now? 

Admiral Fullam. Well, we might. I think things are going so 
fast in aviation that in six months we might know a good deal. Fur¬ 
thermore, I think in six months, when the new administration comes 
into power, it is very possible that there may be some arrangement 


139 


XAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


between nations which will possibly make it less of a chance for war 

T !i I P/ seIf into this whole case as a citizen of the United States, 
think it naval officers do not consider themselves first, last, and 

l im^ ftJ fi ln frm ltlZ !v S °t the TTnited States in discussing these 
tilings the first thing they know they won't know anything at all: 

tlHA will find the people will lose confidence in them. I know that 
the people are taxed to the limit. I know that it is a mistake for us 
to go into any building program that does not put that money where 
it will give the best possible return That is all. 

Now. as to whether you finish these battle cruisers, I would rather 
draw out of it, except that T did feel if they are only 3 per cent com¬ 
pleted we could afford to stop. Personally 1 would not drive a rivet 
m one of them, or in those 5 battleships; I would stop with those 11 
ships, and T would t^ke those 22 and mold them into a fightm* 0- ma¬ 
chine much stronger than Von Scheer’s at the Battle of Jutland" very 
mucn stronger: I would give them an air force and a submarine 
force, and then I would not worry at all. 

Senator Lodge. Let me come back to the line of questions which I 
vas asking. Jour opinion is clear that we ought to stop work on 
six cruisers for six months? 


Admiral Fitllam. I say temporarily. 

Senator Lodge. Oh. ves; temporarily. 

Admiral Ffllam. We might have to build them later on. Senator. 

Senator Lodge. If we are going to build them at all we had better 
keep on at it. That is merely my own interjection. But your opin¬ 
ion is that we had better stop work on them for the present, at least? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lodge. We are building a number of submarines. 

Admiral Ffllam. I think that was a mistake to stop building sub¬ 
marines, as I said in my paper. 

Senator Lodge. I am not suggesting that. My point is that we 
are covering the point about the undersea vessel in this program. 
Assuming that we are building the best submarine that can be 
built—of course, that I can not tell about- 

The Chairman. We added to the program in 1917. 20 submarines. 

Senator Lodge. Yes. Admiral Taylor, am I wrong in saying we 
have three fleet submarines? 

Admiral Taylor. We have three fleet submarines practically com¬ 
pleted, and three more under construction. 

Senator Lodge. Those are the largest sea-going submarines? 

Admiral Taylor. The last three are the largest. 

Senator Lodge. The latest thing in submarines; is that true ? 

Admiral Taylor. We think they are as good as can be built. 

Senator Lodge. We are also building some of the smaller type? 

Admiral Taylor. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lodge. Therefore that branch that you desire to develop 
is in process of development, and if we do not get the latest and most 
proficient submarine it is not the fault of the committee. 

Yow, what remains is the air. They are trying to take care of the 
surface fleet and under the water. What remains is the air. There 
the committee is very anxious to develop aviation and develop plane 
carriers. It is not a cheap thing to do; it is extraordinarily expensive. 
There is no saving of money, but it must be done, in mv judgment. 



140 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


But I do not think any of the countries have gotten very far, as far 
as I can learn, in regard to plane carriers. We want to do that. 

What I am trying to get at, and what, if you will allow me to say 
so, you did not quite meet, is what we are to do in the interval. Are 
we not to keep up our fleet on the surface? Ought we not to keep 
it up ? 

Admiral Fullam. Why, Senator, yes, sir; and I have said so. I 
would take these 22 dreadnaughts, these 300 destroyers, and these 
10 scout cruisers and I would rush them to a completion just as 
quickly as possible, get them all together, rally the officers and men 
aboard of them and cheer them up, and tell them they have got to 
get ready for the war in six weeks, and let them hump themselves. 

Senator Lodge. That answers my question. We have got to have 
a fleet. 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lodge. To carry us over the interval before we can perfect 
the air branch. 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lodge. I want to perfect the air branch, but I think that 
will take some time, and I think it will take other nations some time. 
But we can do it as well as they can. It would seem to me as if' 
your argument proceeded a little on the theory, if I may mention a 
childish anecdote. I was describing to my father once when I was 
a small boy what I was going to do should a burglar enter the house. 
I had perfect arrangements for shooting him and destroying him, 
and my father brought me down to hardpan by saying, “What do 
you think the burglar is going to be doing.” It seems to me the little 
defect in your argument is that you are imagining for the enemy 
these perfect fleets and do not seem to think we are going to do 
anything. 

Admiral Fullam. But, my dear Senator, I do not see how you can 
get any such idea from what I read. 

Senator Lodge. It seemed to me your argument was largely based 
on that. 

Admiral Fullam. Xot at all. I start right out here by providing 
for 22 dreadnaughts and for 10 scout cruisers. 

Senator Hale. You mean bv that, keeping up those we have got? 
Senator Swanson. r lhe battle cruiser seems to be the main point. 
Suppose we should have a war with either one of two of the largest 
naval powers; that one has four large battle cruisers which go about 
30 knots an hour, and they are opposed to our battleships in the 
Pacific. Suppose you were in command of the fleet and did not have 
any battle cruisers that could chase them down. They could scour 
the entire sea and your battleships could not catch ’them. They 
would drive commerce out of the Pacific. How, without some battle 
cruisers, could you wage war against those? 

Admiral Fullam. In the first place I would not have the com¬ 
merce running around. 

Senator Swanson. Tou would stop the commerce? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes; until those battle cruisers had been de¬ 
stroyed. 

Senator Swanson. How are you going to catch those battle cruisers ? 
Admiral Fullam. Senator, those battle cruisers could not get far 
from home without having to go back and get coal. If they came 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


141 


fussing around our coast we would plunk them full of holes and bomb 
them from the top side. 

Senator Swanson. How would you catch them? 

Admiral Fullam. With airplanes. If they did not come within 
reach we could l$t them roam the seas at their will and waste coal. 

Senator Swanson. That is with the idea that we would just 
abandon our entire commerce, have an embargo, have no trade on the 
ocean and simply live at home and let them drive us from the sea? 

Senator Lodge. That is the old Jeffersonian idea of stopping our 
commerce in order to save it. 

Senator Swanson. The committee’s idea, I think, is to have battle 
cruisers that will sail as fast as those of England or Japan and have 
as large guns, so that our commerce will not be driven off the sea. 

Admiral Fullam. If you give us the airplane carrier, I think the 
airplane carrier will be equal to the battleships. 

Senator Swanson. You are the only person I have heard of that 
thinks the battle cruisers should be abandoned. 

Admiral Fullam. Senator, I merely suggested stopping them be¬ 
cause they are only 3 per cent completed. 

Senator Swanson. I think it has been practically the opinion of 
everybody that regardless of their state of completion, that our fleet 
should not be absolutely without battle cruisers. 

Admiral Fullam. I do not think so, because we have 300 destroy¬ 
ers, and I believe if we sent 100 destroyers after those 6 battle 
cruisers, those 6 battle cruisers would go back home. 

Admiral Taylor. Our experience was we found they were unable 
to keep up over 12 knots. 

Admiral Fullam. You mean the destroyers? 

Admiral Taylor. Yes. 

Senator Swanson. The battle cruisers go about 30 knots, and the 
destroyers sIotv down too much? 

Admiral Taylor. Our latest destroyers which were with the Bal¬ 
four convoy had to slow down—or rather the convoy was slowed 
down because of the speed of the destroyers. In smooth water it is 
all right. But as soon as the water gets rough, the small vessel 
necessarily slows down. 

The Chairman. I suggest that our time is almost exhausted, that 
Admiral Fullam has covered this entire subject pretty thoroughly, 
but if there are any members of the committee that want to ask any 
other questions before we call anyone else, we will be glad to have 
them do so now. 

Senator King. I think that Senator Hale, either he or I. mis¬ 
understood your last answer. Your position is that there should be a 
suspension of work upon the battle cruisers and- 

Admiral Fullam. And five battleships. 

Senator King. And five battleships. 

Admiral Fullam. A suspension only for six months until we 
gather up—I find there is chaos in the Navy at sea as well as on the 
beach in this whole business. We are woozy, if I may use the word. 

Senator Hale. You feel we should take the money to be appro¬ 
priated for five battleships and put it into aviation? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir: I would, and right quick. Then I 
would decide later on, if the people will give you the money to build 
ships, to take it and build them if you want to, but I believe our 



142 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


paramount need now is for submarines and aviation, after you com¬ 
plete those six superdreadnaughts and the submarines that are under 
construction. That is all. 

Senator Gerry You do not attach, then, the same importance to 
the battle cruisers that the Japanese do? 

Admiral Fullam. No, sir. 

Senator Gerry. Because the Japanese at the present time have a 
program for eight additional battle cruisers. I think four are under 
construction and they have, of course, as you know, four battle 
cruisers that were built some time ago. So that by 1927 they will 
have 12 battle cruisers, and even if this 1916 program is carried out 
we will have only 6. 

Admiral Fullam. I will tell you what I think about it. I think 
with our 22 dreadnaughts, I will take six of them at the head of the 
line, put them ahead to do the duty of the battle cruisers. They are 
not so fast, but they are very much stronger in battle. 1 will put 
those six superdreadnaughts ahead, and let them look out for the 
battle cruisers in conjunction with the airplanes, and I am not worry¬ 
ing a little bit about the Japanese battle cruisers or the Japanese 
Navy—not a little bit. 

Senator King. Great Britain has but one of those huge battle 
cruisers, the Rood. 

Admiral Fullam. She has stopped building. 

The Chairman. She has six battle cruisers. 

Admiral Fullam. But they are so weak that three of them went 
down to join Mr. McGinty in a few minutes at the Battle of Jutland, 
by gunfire alone. 

Senator Gerry. That was by gunfire, was it not ? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. There are lots of things come into this 
business. I did not expect to take so much of your time. At long 
range the Invincible , I think it was, was sunk, at 19,000 yards; $30,- 
000,000 of battle cruisers was sunk at 19,000 yards. 

Senator Gerry. At the Battle of Jutland, as I understand it, there 
. were no airplanes used except one, and that was used by the British 
Government for scouting purposes and it was launched by lowering 
it into the sea. They did not launch it from the deck. But it came 
in too late to be of use. But Von Scheer used no airplanes in the 
Battle of Jutland, and no submarines. And I understand that in his 
testimony on July 4, to the German Admiralty, he stated that the 
capital ship was still the all-important factor. 

Admiral Fullam. July 4 when? 

Senator Gerry. And I saw a few days ago in the New York Times 
a statement from Admiral von Tirpitz that the submarine issue had 
rather clouded the real facts, and they were that the battleship was 
still the dominant factor, backing up Von Scheer. Whether that 
testimony is valuable or not is another question. 

Admiral Fullam. But Von Scheer recently has completely turned 
a double dack somersault and stated that the surface fleets, battle 
cruisers and battleships, no longer control the sea. 

Senator Gerry. I know. Admiral, that he has turned a back somer¬ 
sault on it, and that is why I stated I did not know how valuable his 
testimony was: only apparently he does not agree with Admiral von 
Tirpitz. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


143 


Admiral Fullam. I will tell you why that is. Von Tirpitz op¬ 
posed the submarine warfare. H& wanted to build up the surface 
fleet, and he does not want now to admit that he made a mess of it. 
He is still maintaining his previous argument that Germany’s first 
hope was her surface fleet, and he is now sticking to that. It is an 
open question. I do not say it is not. But Von Scheer does say re¬ 
cently that England’s fleet need no longer be feared. 

Senator Gerry. Of course, the fact remains that the English Ad¬ 
miralty are still in favor, for the present at least, of continuing the 
capital ship program. 

Admiral Fullam. They are not building any. 

Senator Gerry. That is for financial reasons, but the statement of 
the First Lord of the Admiralty- 

Admiral Fullam. And lie knows less about it probably than any¬ 
body that is discussing it. 

Senator Gerry. Which was the statement, he said, made by his 
naval officers, with which he was backing his statement, that they 
should continue their program, and also the fact is that the Japanese 
naval department are going forward with their battle cruisers and 
their battleship program, which would seem to prove that they at 
least do not abandon, for the present anyway, the idea of the im¬ 
portance of the capital ship. 

Admiral Fullam. Once more I wish to apologize if anybody 
thinks that I am opposed to capital ships now. I want 22 of them 
very badly. 

The Chairman. We have gone over all that matter several times, 
and as far as concerns the argument among members of the com- 
mittee % while we do not want to curtail it, we can postpone it. I 
want to interpolate this in the record, that this committee, in so far 
as the opinion of the majority of it has been indicated, is in favor of 
the appropriation of as much money as there is prospect of being 
able to get, for improving naval aviation, including two airplane 
carriers, and including an increased appropriation for the produc¬ 
tion of aircraft and money for carrying on experiments. 

In 1917 Congress, by an amendment that was put on in the Senate, 
which I had the honor of introducing, added 20 submarines to the 
1916 submarine program, and those submarines are now, with the 
exception of one of them, all under contract and in process of con¬ 
struction. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT E. C00NTZ, CHIEF OF 
NAVAL OPERATIONS. 

The Chairman. Admiral Coontz, I would like to have a brief 
statement from you as to what is the policy of the Navy General 
Board on the question of the development of the submarine and the 
air service in the Navy, those two branches,of naval strength? 

Admiral Coontz. The General Board believes that for the present, 
and as far as it can see, the battleships and battle cruisers should be 
built. It believes in submarines, as it has shown, and it believes in 
building submarines to the best development possible. It believes 
in getting at the present time two aircraft carriers. Only this morn¬ 
ing I got the final papers that they should be of the very highest 
and best types, the kind that will go from 32 to 35 knots and be be- 



144 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1022. 


tWeen 700 and 800 feet long. The exact characteristics have not 
yet been determined upon. 

It believes that the 300 destroyers that we now have almost com 
pleted will be sufficient for some time. It believes in developing the 
mine layers. It believes that a fleet to be properly rounded out should 
be as well outfitted with aircraft as is possible, not only with guns 
but with the planes that must go along. Of course there will be 
fights between aircraft as there will be between submarines, as there 
will between destroyers, and after all that is passed by that the 
country that has the battleships and battle cruisers still left floating 
will control. 

It believes in an offensive warfare, if necessary, and that fleets 
will move forward with training and all that goes therewith from 
date to date. 

It does not ask for greater air appropriations now only because 
the development is as yet uncertain, but always going forward. The 
General Board approves of the plan that we now have to make ex¬ 
periments with bombing and torpedo planes at sea, between now and 
the 1st of June, on battleships that are under radio control, that are 
out at sea, where there would be first a search, then a shoot, and then 
to see the effect. 

We do not believe that anything remarkably definite has come 
forth yet, but that we must study and try to develop everything in 
that line. Of course, that is what is going on all the time. But the 
General Board does not for one minute believe that a let-up for an 
instant on the battleships and battle cruisers is wise. 

Senator Swanson. What is your idea about the battle cruisers ? 

Admiral Coontz. I believe the need for battle cruisers is one .of our 
most urgent needs. I believe that every one of those six should be 
pushed to completion. Other nations have them and we have not; 
we are deficient. 

Senator Swanson. What would be our disadvantage in case of 
war with a nation that has battle cruisers and we have not ? 

Admiral Coontz. One of their chief assets is the fact they have 
got great speed. Some nations believe in the fifty-fifty program on 
battle cruisers; some believe in one to four. We are sticking to one 
to four. 

Senator Swanson. The Japanese plan is eight-eight? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. Until we have developed the air further 
I believe we should be as safe as possible. 

Senator Hale. Won’t they be of particular value against the 
enemy’s carriers? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir; they will be of particular value against 
enemy carriers. Of course, I differ from Admiral Fullam about 
commerce. I believe commerce must be kept up, and Ave must pro¬ 
tect it. 

The Chairman. Admiral Fullam spoke of abandoning, as I un¬ 
derstood him, the construction of 5 battleships and 6 battle cruisers, 
a total of 11. 

Admiral Fullam. Only suspending them temporarily. 

The Chairman. I misunderstood. During the suspension, at least, 
he said Ave would have left 22 dreadnalights. The most recent state¬ 
ment I have from the department is that if we continue with the 
construction of the entire program, including battle cruisers, we Avill 


145 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


only have 27 ships in the first line, and if you subtract 11 from that 
it only leaves 16. That is right, is it not ' ' 

Admiral Coontz. If those figures are correct, and 1 believe they 
are. Can you verify those. Admiral Taylor? 

Admiral Taylor. That is right. 

I he Chairman, My figures are that when the entire program is 
completed in 1927, if carried out on the present plans, we will have 
in the first line 21 battleships and 6 battle cruisers, or a total of 27. 

Admiral Taylor. That counts onlv the superdreadnaughts with 
16-mch guns. 

The Chairman. That leaves out the 12-inch guns? 

Admiral Fullam. I was not prepared to scrap those. Our 12- 
mch guns are pretty good guns. 

Admiral Coontz. We are not going to scrap them. 

Admiral Fullam. I know you are not. I am willing to count 
them in against Japan or any other nation. 

Senator Swanson. As I understand you, you think they ought to 
suspend or abandon the construction of these battleships and battle 
cruisers and let the money that would go in them, on account of your 
great interest as to aircraft, be diverted through this suspension of 
construction to aircraft and undersea craft? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. As soon as they are constructed would you re¬ 
sume the construction of this program? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir; if it is decided at that time it is wise 
to do so. In other words the submarine nearly won this war, de¬ 
spite the surface ships, and I can not throw the results of this war 
overboard. 


Senator Walsh of Montana. What submarine would you advise 
the construction of in addition to those outlined in the 1916 program 
together with the 20 additional ones? 

Admiral Fullam. We need all types. 

Senator Swanson. Are we to understand that in your opinion the 
submarines already constructed and those projected ought to be 
supplemented ? 

Admiral Fullam. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. By how many? 

Admiral Fullam. I don’t know how rnany^ but by a good many. 


STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID W. TAYLOR, CHIEF OF 
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR. 


The Chairman. Admiral Taylor, your opinion was quoted by 
Admiral Fullam and I would like to have a statement for the record 
from you as to your viewpoint of the present policy or proper policy 
of the Navy in regard to surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. 

Admiral Taylor. Senator, I think that statement in the New York 
Tribune which Admiral Fullam quoted was a very unfair statement 
of my position. If you will read my article in the Franklin In¬ 
stitute you will see I state distinctly that so far the capital ship is 
necessarily the backbone, so far as we can judge. The result of the 
war was to make them bigger and more complicated. I think I may 


34772—21-10 


146 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


quote in confirmation of that that a distinguished English naval 
architect has just brought forward a proposition for a 55,000-ton 
capital ship. 

I said it was desirable, and it has been ever since the capital ship 
was known, to have something better, something which could deal 
with the capital ship, which was cheaper and simpler. But I did 
not say that that was in sight. I said it was a consummation de¬ 
voutly to be wished. 

Admiral Fullam. I would not for a million dollars a minute mis¬ 
quote or put a wrong construction upon what Admiral Taylor said, 
lie said right there that he still considered the battleship as*the capi 
tal ship. He said the tendency is still toward larger units, but he 
said that further tendencies may be such that in the future we will 
be forced ultimately, by economy and other reasons, to return to 
smaller units, and that we should get busy the inventive talent of 
the Navy, ashore and afloat, and if possible develop those smaller 
units. 

The Chairman. I think everybody is agreed on that. 

Admiral Fullam. I said that Admiral Taylor was wise and con¬ 
servative, did I not, and that he was properly so. 

The Chairman. I understand the opinion of the First Lord of 
the British Admiralty—and probably he knows as little about it as 
you stated, but his views are based very likely on the technical advice 
of the technical men in the British Admiralty—he goes further than 
you do, and says that he is still adhering to the plan of capital ships 
in so far as the future is concerned; that the battleship might flv 
in the air or navigate under the surface, but he does not say that is 
a condition that can be dealt with at the present time. 

Senator King. 1 would like to ask Admiral Coontz one question. 
As I understand, the conclusions which you have reached mean 
this, that naval warfare of the future is going to be very much 
greater—the cost of it—than ever in the past; that Ave have got to 
keep up capital ships, submarines, torpedo boats, airplanes—have 
a three-plane system—so that the cost in the future with these 
enormous battleships of 55,000 tons, as Admiral Taylor just stated, 
which has been projected by England—it means, with those two 
additional elements in naval warfare, the air and under the sea, the 
cost of maintaining the Navy in the future is going to be overAvhelm- 
ingly greater than it has been in the past ? 

Admiral Coontz. It is going to be sIoavIv and steadily increased, 
Senator, unless Ave come to an agreement among nations for disarma¬ 
ment or partial disarmament. 

Senator King. The big Avar A T essels noAV cost from forty-five to 
fifty-five million dollars? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes. 

Senator Gerry. Forty million. 

Senator King. Well, these ne.Av large types of vessels will cost more 
than forty million. 

Admiral Coontz. Nearly that. 

Admiral Taylor. A little more than forty million for the Ken¬ 
tucky^ and that includes ammunition. 

The Chairman. I think you misunderstood Admiral Taylor. lie 
did not say he designed it. 


NAVAL APPROPRJ AT10N BILL, 1922. 


147 


Senator King. No; he referred to an English ship of 55,000 tons. 
So you see only constantly increasing naval expenditures unless 
there is an agreement between nations for the limitation of arma¬ 
ment. 

Admiral C oontz. I see the expenditures continuing high until we 
get these ships which we now have under contract. Then if we have 
some agreement for disarmament, of course they will fall away. 

Senator King. You can not give any assurance if we complete this 
1916 program that that will prevent demands for different types of 
ships in the future. 

Admiral Coontz. None whatever. 

Senator King. With increasing cost. 

STATEMENT OF CAPT. T. T. CRAVEN, DIRECTOR OF NAVAL 

AVIATION. 

The Chairman. Capt. Craven, what is your position with the 
department ? 

("apt. Craven. 1 am Director of Aviation. 

The Chairman. Will you give a statement, for the benefit of the 
committee, as to the present stage of development of aircraft and 
as to its effectiveness against battleships in time of war? 

Capt. Craven. During the re cent war the activities of aircraft 
were directed principally against the submarine, and they did not 
come into operation in connection with the ships until late during 
the war. when England saw the light and endeavored to place them 
with her fleets by commissioning carriers and improvising carriers 
which would enable these airplanes to have a place in the fleets. 
The planes to be used on these carriers were of the land type gen¬ 
erally. somewhat modified perhaps, but of the general characteris¬ 
tics of land planes. The war closed without the complete adapta¬ 
tion of aviation to the fleet. That is the processes were being car¬ 
ried on but it had not fully found itself in the fleet, T may say, at 
the end of the war, though one or two operations had been success¬ 
fully carried on by the fleet aviation, notably the bombing of certain 
German bases, coastal bases, attacked by aircraft conveyed by the 
fleet. 

I think that all nations are awake to-day to the fact that aviation 
is to take an important part in all fleets in the future. 

Senator Walsh of Montana. Was that the Zeebruggen? 

Capt. Craven. No, sir. I refer to the bombardment of Tengen, 
and there was another of Zeppelin bases. 

Senator Walsh of Montana. What did they accomplish? 

Capt. Craven. They destroyed the sheds and destroyed the ships 
in the sheds. 

Senator Walsh of Montana. It was an attack on an aviation base? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir. 

Senator Walsh of Montana. By seaplanes? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; by planes, probably land planes, or planes 
of the land type carried by ships. There is no doubt of the im¬ 
portance of aviation, and we see to-day every naval power seeking 
to augment its naval strength through the assistance of aviation. 
Several things seem necessary for us at this time. The first is a 
proper organization, which aviation has not yet had in the 10 years 


148 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922, 


or more which it lias been with-the Navy, for pushing itself along. 
It is a truth more or less fortunate, perhaps, that the big things in 
the Navy or in organizations attract the great attention. Hence, the 
battleships automatically get the greatest attention, not only in our 
Navy, but in all navies. As you go down the scale the lesser units 
in size receive less attention. 

Submarines had struggled for a position in the Navy for perhaps 
20 years, and until this war came along their importance was not 
appreciated not only in our Navy, but in all navies. Aviation has 
had a shorter life than the submarine, but I venture to suggest that 
unless steps are taken to give it an organization in the Navy which 
will enable it to force itself to its proper position in the Navy, its 
interest will be neglected in the future, as have the interests of the 
submarine in the past and of aviation in the past. 

The future of aviation is bright in the Navy. But it is largely 
in the imaginations and in the wishes of those who are seeking the 
light. To-dav we are doing the best we can with the materials at 
hand and with the resources which we have at our command. We 
can do nothing toward putting aviation definitely in the fleet until 
the ships which can properly carry the flying machines are present. 
With the advent of those ships we hope for improved flying ma¬ 
chines which will be useful for the purposes of the sailor which 
have not yet been developed. 

Senator Lodge. At that point may I ask you a question? How 
much can be done by improvised carriers such as you refer to that 
the British had in the war? 

Capt. Craven. We are improving one now, Senator, and have 
converted an old collier into a plane carrier, for experimental pur¬ 
poses and for laboratory purposes, for which she will go far; but as 
a ship to be useful in a war she would fill a very small hole. 

Senator Lodge. I asked the question merely to find out whether 
there was anything we could do until the proper plane carriers are 
built. 

Capt. Craven. I would submit, sir, that a large majority of the 
carriers that England attempted to convert during the war for 
aviation purposes were failures. 

Senator Lodge. Then other nations are no better off in that re¬ 
spect than we are? 

Capt. Craven. With the exception of England. England has 
these several ships now available as carriers 

Senator King. They are converted, are they? 

Capt. Craven. All except two. The two last are built for the 
purpose. Japan is laying one down now, and I am informed that 
one is in contemplation. I think it unwise to attempt to convert a 
ship for that purpose; that is, from the studies we have made in the 
department, unless she is in a very elementary stage of completion. 

Senator King. May I interrupt you right there ? Might not some 
of these cruisers or battleships, the hulls of which are scarcely laid, 
or if laid the progress toward completion is only a small per cent, 
be converted into carriers ? 

Capt. Craven. No, sir. Every one is entitled to his individual 
opinion in these matters, and you will find many opinions. I sub¬ 
mit that speed in capital ships is the most valuable asset. I fail to 
see how we could conduct a war on the other side of the Pacific, with 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


149 


the long lines of communication which would have to be maintained, 
unless we had ships of the light cruiser and battle cruisu* type, with 
a battery and speed able to cope with the vessels which Japan would 
put afloat with the view to cutting our lines of communication. 

Senator King. That was not exactly the question. 

Capt. Craven. Therefore I submit that we could ill afford to spare 
any of these battle cruisers which are now on the stocks. The battle¬ 
ships which are being laid down would be too slow to fulfill our re¬ 
quirements. 

Senator King. Coming back now to the question, assuming, and I 
only ask you to assume it, that we do not need all those battle cruisers 
and battleships which have been projected, the question I asked was 
whether or not you might convert some of those immature ships, the 
hulls of which have scarcely been laid into carriers? 

Capt. Craven. I think Admiral Taylor is more competent than 
myself to answer that question. I believe that the battleships are too 
slow, and it is a question of whether or not the cruisers would be 
adaptable. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you, in conclusion. Captain, as Chief 
of Aviation in the Xavy. and of course, required to study its effec¬ 
tiveness against surface ships, what is your opinion in the present 
stage of development of the two, as to the advisability of maintain¬ 
ing the battleship ? 

Capt. Craven. At the present time I do not think any naval officer 
would agree to the abandonment of the battleship. There is nothing 
to take its place. 

Senator Walsh of Montana. I would like to hear from Capt. 
Craven as to what he thinks about the possibility of the air service 
with proper air carriers, we will say, well equipped torpedo planes 
with proper carriers, on one side, and battleships on the other. Just 
assume that condition of things. That is, there is a fight now be¬ 
tween your airplanes, your torpedo carriers, and the battleships. 

Capt. Craven. To-da*y we could not have such a battle. What 
will be possible in the future T am unprepared to say; but my belief 
is that aviation will constantly forge itself to the front, and as time 
passes it is highly probable that we will see vast changes incorporated 
in the designs of our capital ships; and I think that aviation, the 
submarines, the nfnes. and other things will all be instrumental in. 
compelling those changes in the future as they have in the past. 

We are all confronted with the situation as it exists, and we c m 
not abandon the present situation and allow a gap to intervene. We 
have got to go along steadily and take advantage of progress as i 
develops. My thought is that we will have to retain battleships as 
they now exist for considerable time—certainly within the life of 
those which are now laid down. 

Senator Ktng But with your battleships vou have to have your 
aircraft, your submarine, vour torpedo craft? 

Capt Craven. Yes. 

Senator Ktng. A battleship would be a pitiful thing out on the 
high seas without a complement of airships, submarine, and torpe- 
does ? 

Capt. Craven. Absolutely. The character of war has been changed 
by the advent of the submarine, the mine, and the aircraft. We no 
longer wish to take capital ships to the coast of the enemy. You 


150 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1022. 


could not do it in the future as you have in the past with immunity. 
^ on must have these different planes which Admiral Fullam has 
described, and you must have crews capable of controlling those 
different planes; if you do not, as to any one of them, you are going 
to suffer. • 

Senator King. You could not send battleships and cruisers to 
Japan, for instance, or across the Pacific, unless you had your sub¬ 
marines, your aircraft, and your torpedo boats? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir: 1 think it would be as unwise to attempt 
to do that as to win a war against Japan with the submarine alone. 
In other words, I think you must have a superior force of any ele¬ 
ment which the enemy may have. 

Senator King. That means constant and mounting costs? 

Capt. Craven. It certainly does. 

Senator Gerry. Is it not true that one reason why the submarine 
was so effective in the late war was on account of the peculiar situa¬ 
tion of England, which rendered it very vulnerable to starvation? 

Capt. Craven. I believe so. For a time I was over there in a ship 
engaged in convoying vessels through the submarine waters from 
Gibraltar to the coast of England, and many a time I was kind of 
thankful that the British capital ships existed and prevented the 
Germany capital ships from coming out to interfere with our activi¬ 
ties. And it also assisted the activities of the allied craft in chasing 
the submarines of the enemy at the same time. If the German big 
ships had been allowed to come out. it would have very much inter¬ 
fered with our convoy system, and, of course, would have interrupted 
the activities of our smaller craft which were engaged in chasing and 
endeavoring to sink the submarines. 

Senator Swanson The listening devices and the depth bomb for 
destruction have rather reduced the efficiency of the submarine, have 
they not? 

Capt. Craven. The submarine is very dangerous. There is no 
weapon that has ever been discovered that has entirely done away 
with war. For every weapon that has been discovered in the past 
there has been a counter. But no weapon has been completely aban¬ 
doned. We used in this war clubs, spears, and bludgeons, as they 
used them thousands of years ago, and we will continue to use them 
supplemented with other weapons as they come along. 

Senator Gerryl Is it not true that with the present development of 
the airplane it would be very difficult to operate them at sea from 
a carrier if you had bad weather? 

Capt. Craven. Weather is always an important element in war 
which is frequently neglected. The condition of the weather is par¬ 
ticularly important with aviation. Aviation will suffer in bad wea¬ 
ther. and, of course, aircraft and air carriers will be handicapped 
at that time. 

Senator Gerry. Would you not have more difficulty of flying your 
airplane off your carrier or landing her on the carrier if the ship 
was rolling or pitching in a seaway? 

Capt. Craven. In any weather which gave the carrier great motion 
I should say it would be almost impossible, and it would be very dif¬ 
ficult at night. 

Senator Gerry. Would it not also render an attack by airplane 
torpedoes practically impossible in that condition? 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


151 


Capt. Craven. I think, sir, that you could probably fly off' the deck 
much easier than you could return to it, and if you had opportunity 
to deliver an attack you would go ahead and do it. 

Senator Gerry. After you got off and you attempted to attack 
would it be possible for the airplane torpedo to work at all in the 
heavy seaway? Are they not in a very experimental stage at the 
present time, anyway? Are they not very unreliable? 

Capt. Craven. We have not developed them to the point where we 
hope to see them as yet; but to answer the first part of your question, 
I would sav that in rough weather naturally the torpedo would not 
be so effective. On the degree of roughness, of course, depends, per¬ 
haps, the success of your attack. During the war several ships were 
sunk by torpedoes dropped from aircraft. They were merchant 
ships, and the torpedoes were small. We are using the small torpedo 
now, dropping it successfully by aircraft and making hits on moving 
targets. We have not yet developed the large torpedo, or the process 
for dropping the large torpedo, in our Navy. 

Senator Gerry. It is still in an experimental stage? 

Capt. Craven. But fairly well along. We are working with it. 

Senator Swanson. Let me ask you this question. As I understand 
it you have a bill here to create a separate bureau of aircraft in the 
Navy Department. Do you think it is very important to get air¬ 
craft in good shape at once? 

Capt. Craven. I think it is a most serious thing. 

Senator Swanson. As I understand, all branches of the Navy De¬ 
partment agree on this bill, that it is satisfactory, and they think it 
would be effective? Is that true? 

Capt. Craven. It is pretty hard to get many people to agree on 
any one thing. Senator. But I think the consensus of opinion is in 
favor of the bill. 

Senator Swanson. A large majority are in favor of it, and you 
think it ought to be put on this bill as an amendment? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; I urge it. 

Senator King. Don’t you think this would be the better plan, to 
have a sort of interdepartmental organization, an officer appointed 
by the War Department, one by the Navy, and one by the President, 
a civilian, a board of three, that would take charge of the aircraft 
of both the Army and Navy? 

Capt. Craven. No, sir. 

Senator King. Especially to preserve economies in construction? 

Capt. Craven. That is a big subject. 

Senator King. I know it is. 

Camt. Craven. I have been mixed up with the row for some time, 
and I would like to explain my views. 

Senator King. I do not ask that; I just wanted your answer. 

Senator Gerry. I would like to hear it. 

Capt. Craven. The Navy problem is one by itself and it must be 
solved by the Navy, because no soldier nor any civilian can be 
familiar with a naval problem. The naval airplane is yet to be 
properly developed. 

Senator King. That is true of land. 

Capt. Craven. The land plane is far ahead of the Navy. When 
the naval plane is developed, and it can be standardized, then I will 
say the time has come for a common production. But as long as you 


152 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


must take this thing and attempt to solve the many troubles which 
now arise, I can not see the advantage of a combine. 

Senator King. Then you would oppose a department of aero¬ 
nautics? 

Capt. Craven. Yes, sir; most distinctly. 

Senator King. Admiral Taylor, the program of the Navy, as I 
understand it, without recapitulating all that it calls for, involves a 
particular expenditure. When 1 say particular, as far as work can 
be done, an expenditure of more than a billion dollars, does it not ? 

Admiral Taylor. No, sir; something over nine hundred million. 
That is for the three-year program. 

Senator King. Have you taken into account with that nine hun¬ 
dred million the overhead expenses, taking into account the airplane 
and the creation of a bureau such as Capt. Craven has referred to and 
the development of the airplane? 

Admiral Taylor. You are speaking of the 1916 program? 

Senator King. The 1916 program plus what the Navy feels is im¬ 
portant in order to have an up-to-date Navy? 

Admiral Taylor. Of course, more than half of the 1916 program 
costs has been spent or appropriated, something over five hundred 
million. 

Senator King. How much has been spent? 

Admiral Taylor. The majority of it. There will be a slight 
balance on the 1st of July, but not much. 

Senator King. Then the 1916 program, plus what your experts 
now concede to be necessary for a well-rounded production of sub¬ 
marines and airplanes will cost more than a billion dollars ? 

Admiral Taylor. If you add more than enough to bring it up to a 
billion it would cost more than a billion; but we don’t know what 
we are going to spend yet. 

Senator King. As the Navy has outlined its needs for the construc¬ 
tion of the present capital ships, your scout cruisers, your submarine, 
and then taking into account the necessary aircraft, developed by a 
bureau, and the carriers, and all that, the cost would be more than a 
billion dollars? 

Admiral Taylor. If you add more than $100,000,000 to the 1916 
program, for construction, it would bring the total to more than a 
billion dollars. 

Senator- King. The consensus of the opinion of the officers in the 
Navy I understand would call for those additional appropriations 
for the development of aircraft and submarines, which would make 
it more than a billion dollars? 

Admiral Taylor. Not from the present time. Senator. That was 
given before the House committee. 

Senator King. I will put it this way : Are you not, and the various 
branches of the Government, recommending, in order to complete the 
1916 program, and to complete such other factors as are regarded as 
needed in a well-rounded Navy, such appropriations as would aggre¬ 
gate, with the 1916 program, considerably more than a billion 
dollars ? 

Admiral Taylor. Yes; if you add to the 1916 program. I would 
like to say that the information we gave Mr. Kelley was that the total 
expenditures and appropriations to date for 1916 program was 
$538,270,000. That is on page 553 of the House hearings, leaving a 
balance to be appropriated of $434,000,000. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 153* 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL CHARLES B. McVAY, Jr., CHIEF 
BUREAU OF ORDNANCE. 

The Chairman. Admiral McVay, will you state what is your po¬ 
sition with the department? 

Admiral McVay. Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. 

The C hairman. Will you give the committee your views as to the 
present state of development as between surface ships and aircraft 
and submarines, bearing on the question of the proposed abandon¬ 
ment of the program of construction of surface ships, abandonment 
or suspension ? 

Admiral McVay. Before going into the development of the air¬ 
craft part of it, I would say that it seems very unwise to me to slow 
down in the building program. So far as I know there are about 
two nations in the world that have 16-inch guns. So far as I know 
there is only one nation that has a battleship in commission with 
16-inch guns aboard, and that is not the United States. There will 
be one other such ship carrying 16-inch guns which will be in com¬ 
mission before we get one of our ships in commission. 

Senator King. Do any of these five battle cruisers or capital ships 
that are about to be completed carry 16-inch guns? 

Admiral McVay. They will. I say they have beat us now; we 
have been beaten by several months. Ours are coming along, but if 
you slow down any of them it gives some one else just so much ad¬ 
vantage over us. 

Senator King. But these five battleships which will soon be com¬ 
pleted, which are 60 per cent or more completed, they do carry 16- 
inch guns? 

Admiral McVay. They do. In the discussion of the question of 
the capital ships, I had occasion, as did all the chiefs of bureaus, to 
go before the General Board, where the subject is generally dis¬ 
cussed of building ships, the characteristics, what is to be expected 
of them, how to use them, and how to render them more safe from 
attack. I have read the statement of the General Board regarding 
the capital ships and the different ships that should comprise the 
fleet. Personally, I absolutely agree with everything that is recited 
there. I have inquired in the bureau of technical officers, and these 
are seagoing officers, and they agree that it covers the case abso¬ 
lutely. 

I have also read the report made by the committee of the Senate 
which covers the case, and there is not a thing in it which could be 
criticized. 

Senator King. Your program, and when I say “your program I 
mean the Navy Department program, as I understand it, would call 
for substantially a little more than a billion dollars. Then that 
does not include, of course, the annual maintenance, the upkeep of 
the fleet, the personnel, overhead expenses. That would amount to 
several hundred million, would it not? 

Admiral McVay. It would, but that is going into past history. The 
money, except for $100,000,000 has been appropriated and the plan 
laid down for pretty nearly five years; it cost us a good deal of money 
not to have had it before, and I think $1,000,000,000 is cheap. 

Senator King. Without expressing any opinion, whether cheap or 
whether costly, what I am interested in is trying to get the facts. As 


154 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


I understand it, your program calls for a billion or more of con¬ 
struction. At the end of two or three years, when that program shall 
have been completed, many of those vessels will probably be obsolete. 
That is not, perhaps, the particular ones that are being constructed, 
but those that are regarded as capital ships now. That is true, 
is it not ? 

Admiral McVay. Yes. 

Senator King. Then, in addition to the billion dollars which we are 
to spend, part of which has already been expended in the 1916 pro¬ 
gram, during the next two or three years we will require two or three 
hundred million dollars every year for the upkeep of the ships and 
the maintenance of the Navy? 

Admiral McVay. That is something, of course, that I don’t know 
anything about. 

The Chairman. Senator, let me read to you the estimate of the 
House committee, based on the testimony before it, as to the cost: 

The original estimated cost of the program of 156 vessels was $544,700,000. 

Senator King. That was when the capital ships were to cost $16,- 
000,000, and now they cost $45,000,000. 

The Chairman. You interrupted me before I had finished. 

It is now estimated that the program will cost to complete $972,931,000, of 
which $538,270,000 has been appropriated heretofore. 

Senator King. But not expended? 

The Chairman. And about $500,000,000 has been contracted for 
or expended. 

Senator King. In addition, we are now called upon, and I think 
we must spend, more for airplanes, for carriers, and for submarines, 
in addition to the 1916 program, which will necessarily cost several 
hundred million dollars. 

The Chairman. We can not go along for nothing, you know. 

Senator King. I am expressing no opinion about that. I am. just 
trying to figure where we are landing. With the development of the 
war and with the experiences of the war, with the supposed increase 
in our moral concepts, and all that, our naval program for the future 
is going to be more than half a billion dollars a year. 

The Chairman. No; I do not think it is. But we will discuss that 
later on. 

Senator King. The American people, in my opinion, will not sub¬ 
mit to it, and they ought not to. 

The Chairman. Will you go ahead, Admiral? 

Admiral McVay. I think those two statements referred to cover 
the question very well and very clearly. At the present time the 
airplane development has not reached the stage of development where 
there is a serious menace to the modern fighting vessel. We are try¬ 
ing to bring it to that condition. The Bureau of Ordnance is in the 
peculiar position of toting water on both shoulders. If anybody can 
sink a ship by a bomb, we have got to furnish a defense. If anybody 
builds a ship that can not be sunk by a present bomb, then we have 
to find the bomb. That is the way the thing is done. 

At the present time the capital ship is ahead of the airplane in its 
offensive power, and it will be for some time, so far as I can see. 
There is nothing that I have seen in any test—and we have made a 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


155 


great many, and are making more—that shows that an airplane can 
do more at present than local damage. It is not pleasant to have 
people dropping bombs on you that burst, flying over you, but the 
damage is purely local, and I should define the status of a bomb now 
as at present developed against a properly protected ship as a good 
deal like firing a gun at it without a projectile in the gun. 

Within a very limited space any explosion has a certain well 
defined effect throughout an area, not the same in every case. It 
would be more like your hand going out in which there would be 
possibly an area of considerable pressure along this line [ indicat¬ 
ing] and along that line [indicating], and you could stand here and 
escape the pressure entirely. Within a certain well-defined area 
any charge or explosive will give a certain pressure, and outside 
of a certain radius no damage will be done, either to the material 
or to the person. It happens that that pressure to do injury to 
human beings or living things is seven pounds. Within 100 feet of 
a detonation of 300 pounds of the most modern explosive, that pres¬ 
sure is not reached. Within 5 feet of that explosion the pressure is 
less by a considerable amount than that directly under the muzzle 
of a 12-inch gun. 

Senator Ktng. Is there any difference in the power and destruc¬ 
tiveness of a projectile from your torpedo destroyer, your boats, than 
from the air, assuming that the explosive substance in the air weighs 
as much as your projectile? 

Admiral McVay. Yes; there is quite a difference, because the ex¬ 
plosion under water has the weight of the sea water behind it, and 
that is a good deal like—if I can give you an example—with the 
force of the explosion you have the weight of the water over the 
torpedo- 

Senator King. I understand that. 

Admiral McVay. And a good force comes up, but the rest of the 
force would go toward the ship, which is the first to give. 

Senator King. Torpedoes which have been fired without going 
through the water, above the surface of the water, which have 
struck battleships and sunk battleships to the bottom- 

Admiral McVay. Xo; Senator. 

Senator King. Well, it has so injured them that some of them 
sunk. 

Admiral McVay. Xo. I don’t think I understand your question. 

Senator King. Do you deny that a torpedo fired from one of our 
destroyers has sufficient power to sink a battleship, if it is a good 
hit? 

Admiral McVay. From under water? 

Senator King. Xo; from the surface? 

Admiral McVay. Oh, yes; it would simply collapse. It has no 
strength whatever. It has no penetrative power. If it struck, it 
would simply collapse and explode, and you have a local explosion. 
It would damage things within the vicinity, local damage, but that 
is all. 

Senator King. You think that no torpedo could be fired from a 
torpedo boat above the surface'that would injure a battleship, except 
locally ? 

Admiral McVay. Xo, sir. 

The Chairman. I think there is some misunderstanding. 



156 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral McVay. I don't know whether you mean firing this tor¬ 
pedo from a torpedo boat and it goes under water and then hits the 
battleship—that is one thing. Or supposing you could drive a torpedo 
into a destroyer from the air, which you can not- 

Senator King. I was assuming that. 

Admiral McVay. It would be just the same as dropping it. 

Senator King. That is what I was trying to get at. 

Admiral McVay. That would be the same as dropping, and 
would do nothing except local damage. Hitting under the water 
is another proposition. But above water the damage is nothing but 
local. 

Senator King. How about the I ndianaf 

Admiral McVay. The Indiana is an old ship, and the experiments 
were conducted with the view to determining some problems which 
the Bureau of Ordnance has been conducting with the Bureau of 
Construction for over seven years. 

Senator King. When dropped from an altitude of several hundred 
feet or several thousand feet the damage would be greater than if it 
were just laid upon the surface? * 

Admiral McVay. It would be less, except by accident. Those bombs 
were placed in position where they would do the most damage. It 
was done for the purpose of obtaining information in the building 
of new ships. There is rather a misunderstanding as to what can 
be done by anything dropped in the air. 

Senator King. You think no explosive is powerful enough dropped 
from the air to destroy a battleship; do I understand you to sav that ? 

Admiral McVay. No. I said there is no bomb developed which 
can carry sufficient explosives to do other than local damage to a 
battleship. A great many people have an idea that if you get 10,000 
feet in the air, or 20,000 feet in the air. or 30,000 feet in the air, and 
a bomb is dropped down it is going to have such a velocity that it 
can go through something. That is not correct. 

The higher you go the more air resistance you encounter on the 
way down, and your bomb blows up. You can get 500 foot-seconds 
velocity, less than 500 feet velocity, dropping a bomb from a height 
of 4.000 feet, and no more. You "get up to 10,000 feet and you will 
get 800 foot-seconds velocity and no more. You keep on going up 
higher and you may get 1,200 foot-seconds, and you may get 1.500 
foot-seconds, but that is all. 

Senator King. This is rather in opposition to the Newtonian rule 
as to gravitation? 

Admiral McVay. No; they are all based on dropping in a vacuum. 
They have nothing to do with dropping a bomb in the air. When 
you get a bomb which will penetrate the vitals of a ship you have 
a bomb of such a type that you come back to an armor-piercing pro¬ 
jectile. The weight of the projectile, the weight of the explosive, 
is very limited. When you get beyond that and get up to a high 
weight of explosives, then you lose your wall thickness and vou fail 
to penetrate. 

Senator King. What is it that when you hurl a projectile from a 
battleship from a great distance makes it a destructive force ? 

Admiral McVay. You give it a very high muzzle velocity and a 
long range,, and then you obtain your penetration; then you have 
your explosion. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


157 


Senator King. Exactly. 

Admiral McVay. But the explosion, as I say. for a particular pro¬ 
jectile which can penetrate armor, your explosive charge must be 
limited. On the other hand, if you had a light projectile with a large 
explosive charge it would just hit and stop and explode, and you 
would get but little damage from the velocitv of the gas, and that 
is all. 

The Chairman. How do you reconcile that statement. Admiral, 
with the destruction of the solid turreted Belgian forts by German 
howitzers with high-explosive projectiles? I understand the de¬ 
struction there was tremendous. 

Admiral McVay. T imagine that was due to hitting in the vicin¬ 
ity— 

The Chairman. They hit not only in the vicinity, but the object 
itself. 

Admiral McVay. They could crack the plate; you could crack a 
plate, but not penetrate. I am told those were concrete. 

Senator Gerry. Was not that true of the Battle of Jutland—that 
the English used shells that exploded on contact, wdiile the Germans 
used a shell that penetrated and then exploded? 

Admiral McVay. That is so reported, and that we had adopted a 
method of making projectiles, that was suggested and strongly urged, 
bv which we would have found ourselves in the same position we 
are now in. 

The Chairman. That was the Tsham shell? 

Admiral McVay. And other similar shells. 

Senator King. May T inquire whether the photograph in the New 
York Tribune of Sunday, January 23, 1921, showing the condition of 
the Indiana —the upper and lower decks, that resulted from a bomb 
explosion of 900 pounds—is substantially accurate? 

Admiral McVay. There were certain photographs—these tests 
w 7 ere conducted by the Navy Department and were of the most con¬ 
fidential nature. No authority was ever given for making them 
public. It is possible that these are the photographs; and if so, they 
were not published with any permission, so far as I know. 

Senator King. I asked you whether these substantially represent 
the havoc which was wrought on all the decks by the explosion of 
just one bomb? 

Admiral McVay. I am going to answer your question by saying 
these are copies of the official photographs taken. 

Senator King. Does it correctly represent the damage? 

Admiral McVay. Tt does. 

Senator King. And there was damage not only on one deck, but it 
extended down three or four decks? 

Admiral McVay. Tt is all local. It does extend from one deck, a 
very light deck, through that deck and down to the other, just as 
an explosion of a gun would cause damage. 

Senator King. Even on the last and lowest deck it shows that the 
iron beams and the frame structure were badly injured and damaged. 

Admiral McVay. This, Senator, substantially shows the action of 
the bomb; and, as I said before, it is purely a local explosion and 
limited to the distance within which an explosion would act. In this 
case it was on a thin deck, and it extended a certain distance. 1 have 



158 NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

not measured those distances, but it is possibly, I think, something like 
10 or 15 feet. 

The Chairman. Were those bombs dropped from an airplane or 
were they placed.? 

Admiral McVay. No; they were placed, but it would have made 
no difference, so far as the effect was concerned, unless the deck was 
thin enough and the bomb was strong enough to come through the 
deck. But that is not a modern ship, of course. 

There is one thing I want to change in an answer to your question, 
in which I spoke about the photographs, that there was no authority 
for showing the photographs. What I meant to say was there was 
no authority for giving out the data which accompanied the photo¬ 
graphs. The Navy Department gave permission that those photo¬ 
graphs should be published, but not permission to publish data that 
accompanied them. 

The Chairman. Admiral Taylor, I would like to hear your com¬ 
ment on the amount of damage done to the Indiana, as shown by 
these photographs. 

Admiral Taylor. I want to say, Senator, as I have had occasion 
to look up those tests as to the damage done to the Indiana bv that* 
enormous bomb, the total weight of which was 1,600 pounds, of which 
the major portion was high explosives, there was a big hole blown 
in the light upper deck where this bomb was located, and a great deal 
of destruction done for a certain radius in that plane. The next 
deck below, which was the main deck of the ship, had a compara¬ 
tively small hole in it. The deck below that, which was a protected 
deck, was not affected. The bomb would never have sunk the whole 
ship. As a matter of fact, she had been sunk before the bomb was 
set off, and was lying on the bottom. 

A careful examination of the photographs and of the report indi¬ 
cate that the protected deck was practically intact. 

The Chairman. Would the engine and the vital machinery of the 
ship have been injured? 

Admiral Taylor. No, sir; the vital portions of the ship would not 
have been affected. 

The Chairman. Would the hull of the ship have been affected or 
damaged? 

Admiral Taylor. There was a great deal of damage done to the 
hull. One 8-inch turret was completely put out of action. A great 
deal of damage was done to the light superstructure deck and to all 
the fittings in that vicinity. 

The Chairman. I may not understand what a hull is. I mean- 

Admiral Taylor. You mean the part in the water, T take it. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Taylor. There was no damage done below water as far as 
I can discover. You can not sink a ship unless you destroy its 
buoyancy, and that requires letting water in below the water level. 
This damage was practically all above the water. 

Senator Gerry. It Avas a A T erv old ship, was it not? 

Admiral Taylor. It Avas the Indiana, the battleship Indiana. Her 
design was 30 years old. 

Senator Gerry. That explosion would not have had the same effect,, 
probably, on a modern ship? 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

: • < 7 


159 


Admiral Taylor. 1 think not. Our modern ships have a good deal 
higher freeboard. They have at least one more deck before von get 
to the protected deck, and two in many cases. 

Senator King. Without having you divulge anything you think 
ought not to be repeated, we have heard repeatedly of a very high ex¬ 
plosive that has been discovered, the effect of which would be, if you 
dropped a small bomb from an airplane over Berlin, it would blow 
up the whole city; that that has been stated by Mr. Baker and by 
experts from the War Department who were working in the explo¬ 
sive and war-gas branch of the Army. You did not use that new 
explosive, did you? 

Admiral Taylor. Senator, I know nothing about that. I saw the 
same statements. That refers to a new poison gas, not an explosive. 

Senator King. 1 understand both. Admiral McVay, can you tell 
us about it? What did you use? 

Admiral McVay. T. X. T. There is no such explosive as you men¬ 
tion so far as T know. 

The Chairman. The subcommittee will meet at 2.30 to continue 
consideration of the naval appropriation bill, and this session will 
now be adjourned. 

(Thereupon, at 1.40 p. m., a recess was taken until 2.30 o’clock 
p. in.) 

AFTER RECESS. 

The committee reassembled at the expiration of the recess. Sena¬ 
tor Miles Poindexter, chairman, presiding. 

Present: Senators Poindexter (chairman). Hale, Ball, Swanson, 
and Gerry. 

The Chairman. The committee will be in session. Admiral Parks 
has just handed me the statement in regard to the question that Ave 
were asking him with reference to when the committee adjourned the 
other day—the submarine base at Key West. I would like to put the 
statement into the record. 

(The statement referred to is as folloAvs:) 

Navy Departmen t, 

Bureau of Yards and Docks, 
Washington, D. (\, Fehrna.ru 19, 1921. 

My Dear Mr. Chairman : Reference to amendment intended to be proposed 
by Mr. Fletcher to the bill (H. R. 15975) making appropriations for the naval 
service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1922, and for other purposes, viz, 
at the proper place insert the following: 

“Naval Station. Key West, Fla.: For the development of a submarine base, 
to continue. $800,000, to be immediately available.” 

On the 31 st of October, 1919, a contract was entered into with the Snare & 
Tries Co. for the construction of a breakwater and piers and the dredging of 
the harbor, at an estimated cost of $1,705,730. During the progress of the 
work it has been necessary to make additions amounting to $43,401.05. 

During the progress of the work the material excavated from the harbor 
lias not proven to be as favorable for breakwater construction as Avas ex¬ 
pected and it is not now thought that the material remaining to be exca\ r ated 
will materially better than that so far excavated. 

It is reported that the engineers of the Florida East Coast Railroad have 
been able to make'satisfactory shore protection by covering the character of 
material noAv being excavated at Key West with a thick layer of marl, and to 
cover the breakwater now on. the contract with a layer of marl 8 feet thick 
will cost $115,500, making a total cost of approximately $1,805,000. If the 
results are satisfactory this amount will represent the total cost of construct- 


160 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1022. 

ing the harbor and piers. If the experience with two or three severe hurri¬ 
canes should show an unstable condition of the breakwater, it would then be 
necessary to drive sheet piling at an estimated cost of $180,000. This esti¬ 
mate is based upon current-market prices for labor and material, and is prob¬ 
ably in excess of the cost that would be incurred at the time the sheet piling 
would be driven. 

At the present time the bureau believes that with work now under contract 
and the addition of sheet piling a permanent harbor can be constructed for 
$2,050,000. If. however, the work is not in a properly protected condition at 
the time of the next hurricane considerable of the breakwater will be washed 
out at the expense of the contractor, and without doubt the contractor will 
claim damages if the Government suspends his operations. 

The value of a submarine base at Key West in time of war has been fully 
recognized, and the only reason for abandoning work under the present contract 
would appear to be that under another and perhaps more favorable contract a 
sutticient base would be established before it becomes necessary for the United 
States to enter into another war. This, however, is not at all certain. 

This project was appropriated for in the act of July 1, 1918, and reads: 

“For the development of a submarine base (limit of cost $2,500,000), 
$ 1 , 000 , 000 .” 

Sincerely, yours, C. W. Parks, 

Chief of Bureau. 

Hon. Miles A. Poindexter, 

Chairman Subeommittee on Naval Affairs, 

United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 

The Chairman. I notified Senator Smith of South Carolina that 
this matter of the Charleston dry dock was to come up Monday morn¬ 
ing, Senator Swanson, probably, in order to give him an opportunity 
to be heard if he desired to be heard. 

Admiral Coontz, there is a bill pending before the committee and 
there will be an amendment offered to the bill providing for a naval 
base and defenses at Guam. Will you advise the committee what the 
views of the Navy General Board are on that subject? 

Admiral Coontz. The Navy General Board are of the belief that 
the commencement of the making of Guam a base should be started 
just as soon as the Congress feels that the necessary funds can be 
provided. This bill, as we asked the House to pass it, provided for 
an appropriation at Guam for $1,499,000, which included various am¬ 
munition houses, shell houses, war-head storage, mine storage, 13 
two-gun service ammunition storage, and 5 four-gun service ammuni¬ 
tion storage, and a submarine and destroyer base. 

Those items were recommended by the board on navy yards and 
navy bases, and the General Board has many times stated its views 
regarding Guam. 

In connection with that matter I would like to ask the committee to 
look at this map of the Pacific, showing Guam in blue and the various 
American and other possessions. I think that in the hearing you had 
on Guam I gave about all that I knew about it, except to call your 
attention to what the Navy Department recommended in the bill, and 
those items were left«out by the House committee. 

Senator Hale. Your recommendation was substantially in line with 
what was recommended at the hearing? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes. sir; and that we should start in as early as 
possible there, especially with reference to the submarine base. I 
have the submarines ready to move at any time. 

The Chairman. The next subject in the bill is the Bureau of Medi¬ 
cine and Surgery. Is there anybody here representing that bureau 
who cares to make any comment on it? 

Admiral Peopi.es. They ask for no increase. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


161 


Admiral Coontz. They said they were satisfied with the bill. 

BUREAU OF SUPPLIES AND ACCOUNTS. 

The Chairman. The next subject is the Bureau of Supplies and 
Accounts. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL C. J. PEOPLES, ACTING PAY¬ 
MASTER, UNITED STATES NAVY. 

Admiral Peoples. The appropriations under the Bureau of Sup¬ 
plies and Accounts, Mr. Chairman, have to do primarily with the 
maintenance appropriations which depend upon the number of men 
that were in the service, the number of ships to be kept in commis¬ 
sion which affect the fuel, and the amount of provisions to be con¬ 
sumed. 

Taking up, first, the appropriation for Pay of the Navy, on page 
20, line 21, $133,202,263 is provided. 

That was predicated on the passage by the House of section 6 of 
the bill 15994, which provides: 

That hereafter no enlisted man in the Navy shall be paid a reenlistment 
gratuity, or any proportionate part thereof, in excess of an amount equal to one 
month’s pay for each year of service in the last expiring enlistment of such 
enlisted man. 

Senator Hale. That is the House legislative bill ? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. That is section 6. If section 6 is in¬ 
cluded by the Senate Naval Affairs Committee in the bill no change 
will be necessary under this item. If, however, it be not included 
there will have to be added $2,056,650. That is for that particular 
item. 

The Chairman. Is that an estimate? 

Admiral Peoples. That is a very close estimate, as close and as 
accurate as can be made, sir. 

There is another contingency, and that is with reference to section 
5 of another bill which was under consideration by the House Naval 
Committee. 

The Chairman: What was the other bill? 

Admiral Peoples. The other bill was No. 15954, which provided 
that the annual retainer pay of members of any class of the Naval Re¬ 
serve Force, except the Fleet Naval Reserve, after confirmation in 
rank or rating shall not exceed one month’s base pay of the corre¬ 
sponding rank or rating in the Navy, and that when any such mem¬ 
bers of any class of the Naval Reserve are on active duty, except 
active duty for training only, they shall receive only the active duty 
pay and allowance of the corresponding rank or rating for service 
in the Navy. 

In other words, that bill, if enacted into law, would reduce the 
retainer pay for all classes of reserves except the fleet Naval Reserve. 

The Chairman. What is the status of that bill? 

Admiral Peoples. That bill is still in the House Naval Committee, 
but the Appropriations Committee, when it agreed upon the esti¬ 
mate for pay of the Navy, based it on only one month’s retainer pay 
for all members of the reserve force outside of the fleet Naval Re- 


34772—21-li 


162 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


serve; and if that proviso be not incorporated there will have to be 
another addition of $5,810,222 for that purpose. In other words, it 
changes the present law. The present law allows $5,810,222 more 
than is carried by the House bill. 

Senator Hale. What would be the effect if it were cut off? Would 
it be harmful to the reserve if we include the provision that is in the 
House legislative bill ? 

Admiral Peoples. That is a matter of policy, Senator, which I 
think Admiral Washington, under whom the training of the reserves 
comes, is better qualified to discuss than I am. 

But if the law be not changed, there should be that sum of money 
added to the pay of the Navy. 

Senator Hale. How much would be added ? 

Admiral Peoples. $5,810,222. That will change the total from 
$133,202,263 to $141,069,045 to allow for a Navy of 100,000 men and 
the pay of officers and men, including the members of the reserve 
force who were entitled to be paid at rates now authorized by law. 

Senator Ball. What difference would there be in the amount if 
the Navy were to consist of 110,000 men ? 

Admiral Peoples. For a Navy of 110,000 men there should be 
added the sum of $7,688,400. For a Navy of 120,000 men, just double 
that amount, or $15,376,800. 

The Chairman. Does that include the two items you have just 
spoken of? 

Admiral Peoples. It will be in addition to them, sir. 

The Chairman. I understand that these figures that you have just 
given us are based on the estimate of 100,000 men? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Will those figures remain the same for 110,000 
men and 120,000 men ? 

Admiral Peoples. With those two items added to them. 

Senator Ball. It would not change those two items ? 

Admiral Peoples. No, sir. 

Senator Hale. Those two items refer to the reserves and to the 
regular number? 

Admiral Peoples. To the Reserves and those men who reenlist. 
provisions, navy. 

The Chairman. What is the next item. Admiral? 

Admiral Peoples. The next item is “Provisions, Navy,” pages 27 
and 28. The sum total is given on line 7, page 28. The amount 
carried by the House bill is based on a 50-cent ration. 

Senator Ball. For 100,000 men? 

Admiral Peoples. For 100,000 men. The Navy’s estimate on the 
cost of the ration for 1922 was originally based at 68 cents per ration. 
In the hearings before the House Appropriations Committee that 
figure was revised to 60 cents per ration. The House Appropria¬ 
tions Committee, however, reduced the estimate to 50 cents per ration 
on the assumption that the market costs of foodstuffs in 1922 will be 
50 cents in lieu of 60 cents and also for the further reason that they 
had fixed the Army ration at 42 cents. The ration for both the 
Army and Navy is fixed by law; that is, the component parts are 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


163 


stipulated by law, it being set forth as to how much of each article 
must be isued to each enlisted man. The Navy ration is approxi¬ 
mately 35 per cent larger in quantity by law than is the Army ration. 

Senator Ball. Why is that? 

Admiral Peoples. For many years the Army ration was aug¬ 
mented by post-exchange funds and also it was found by experience 
that men who live at sea eat larger quantities of food than men who 
live on shore. 

Using the same unit of costs, the Navy ration for the same com¬ 
ponent parts cost exactly 49.14 per cent more than the Army ration, 
or, in other words, approximately 50 per cent. Fifty per cent on 
top of 42 cents allows for a 63-cent ration. 

Senator Hale. This is a matter, Admiral, that under the law you 
have a right to take care of in a deficit? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir; under the law a deficiency can be in¬ 
curred if necessary, the law recognizing the fact that it is very 
largely a question of quantities and not so much a question of values, 
although from the best information that we can obtain right now 
and on the closest estimate that can be made for the ration in 1922 
it is on the basis of 60 cents per man, providing three full meals each 
per day. 

The Navy ration costs more in many respects than does the Army 
ration, for the reason that it is to a large extent prepared for over¬ 
seas shipment, and a body of men on shore, in a barracks, can buy 
food more cheaply than can an equivalent body of men at sea. 

Senator Hale. Of course, it is not all used for sea rations ? 

Admiral Peoples. Oh, no, sir. 

Senator Hale. So that you will probably have a greater ration 
per day for those on shore than you need in certain cases ? 

Admiral Peoples. Every advantage is taken of the markets for 
fresh foods, which, of course, are cheaper. 

Senator Hale. But if you have that amount to spend, you will 
spend that amount for those on shore as well as at sea ? 

Admiral Peoples. No; because it is a question of quantities and 
not values. In other words, the men must be given a certain quantity 
of food each day, which determines the amount of the appropriation. 
The best that we can figure it, on the basis of 60 cents- 

The Chairman. Sixtv cents, not 63 cents? 

Admiral Peoples. We think it ought to be 63, but on the basis of 
60 cents we think the appropriation should be increased- 

Senator Hale. How much will that increase the provision? 

Admiral Peoples. It will make the total $25,055,267. 

Senator Hale. For 110,000 men how much does it amount to? 

Admiral Peoples. Do you wish the total, sir, or just the increase? 

Senator Hale. The increase in each case. 

Admiral Peoples. $2,190,000. 

Senator Hale. For 110,000 men? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. For 120,000 men the increase will be 
just double that, or $4,380,000. That is in addition to the $25,000,000. 

It is also recommended that section 9 of the bill 15994, as provided 
by the House Naval Committee and now pending on its calendar, be 
included. 




164 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


The Chairman. What makes you think the ration costs .60 cents? 
On what do you base that, when the House thought it would be 
50 cents. 

Admiral Peoples. It is very largly a matter of opinion, Mr. Chair¬ 
man. The ration last year cost about TO cents. It cost more after the 
war than it cost during the war, very largly due to the fact that the 
Government control of foodstuffs was taken off. Of course it is a 
mere estimate as to what the cost of foodstuffs is going to be, say, a 
year or a year and half from now. 

The Chairman. These supplies and rations are purchased in large 
quantities, are they not? 

Admiral Peoples. They are bought in season in as large quantities 
as is consistent with the condition of the market. 

The Chairman. And the market for staple articles of food has 
gone down and is going down? 

Admiral Peoples. We have noticed some reduction, but not so 
much of a reduction as to warrant us in the conclusion that the 
estimate should be reduced as low as 50 cents. You take three full 
meals per day at the rate of 20 cents per meal, and that is a very 
conservative estimate. 

maintenance, supplies, and accounts. 

The Chairman. What is the next item ? 

Admiral Peoples. The next item, sir, is maintenance, supplies, and 
accounts. 

The Secretary has recommended that there be no increase in the 
total, that it be left to stand as it is, but the limitation referred to on 
page 29 be increased to $5,200,000. The letter from the Secretary, 
dated February 14, 1921, goes into great detail in order to show the 
necessity for increasing that limitation. 

Senator Ball. You ask for no total increase? 

Admiral Peoples. No, sir; leave the total as it stands. $5,200,000 
is the same' amount as for this year, if the deficiency bill which passed 
the Senate yesterday is accepted by the House, which we understand 
will be. 

Senator Hale. Then, you would say, Admiral, that if we do not in¬ 
crease the $5,200,000 we could cut something off of the $9,000,000, 
could we not? 

Admiral Peoples. That is the assumption; yes, sir; but the amount 
is too low, Senator, as the Secretary states. 

Senator Hale. Apparently the appropriation is in the wrong 
place. 

Admiral Peoples. It is. The Secretary says that the cut was made 
by him inadvertently, it was not justified, and is out of all propor¬ 
tion to the cuts which he made under the classified force for the 
other bureaus of the Navy Department. 

The Chairman. We have his letter here. 

Admiral Peoples. It proves detail by detail, step by step, sir, 
exactly where this force is employed and the reasons why. He com¬ 
pares the expenditures for 1921 and 1922 with the expenditures in 
1916, and shows conclusively why that sum.is wholly insufficient. 

The Chairman. What is the chief insufficiency there, as to chemists 
or as to messengers? 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


165 


Admiral Peoples. It is as to the clerical force and cost inspectors. 

The Chairman. How do they happen to put chemists and mes¬ 
sengers in the same class? 

Admiral Peoples. It comes under the general term which covers 
the classified force of all of those people who are under the Civil 
Service. That has been the wording under that limitation for years 
and years, sir. 

The Chairman. That includes practically the whole Civil Service 
force of the Navy? 

Admiral Peoples. All under the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts 
in the navy yards and stations and the cost inspection force at all 
shipbuilding plants where cost-plus contracts are in force. 

The Chairman. This is not confined to the Bureau of Supplies 
and Accounts; it applies to all the bureaus, under the direction of 
the Secretary of the Navy, in the supply and accounting depart¬ 
ment of the Navy, navy yards, navy stations, and disbursing offices? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I suppose that would be under the heading of 
the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, would it not? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The Secretary’s letter goes into detail on that, and 
we will consider it. 

Admiral Peoples. It goes into the greatest detail, Senator. 

FREIGHT, BUREAU OF SUPPLIES AND ACCOUNTS. 

The Chairman. What is the next item? 

Admiral Peoples. The next item is “Freight, Bureau of Supplies 
and Accounts.” This appropriation covers the total charges of all 
freight or materials that are used by all bureaus and offices in the 
Navy Department. It is all centralized right here- 

Senator Ball. All except coal ? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. Coal is such a large item by itself, 
that it is covered by a separate appropriation. 

Under the appropriation, “ Freight,” the expenditures for 1921 are 
at the rate of $7,600,000. The amount carried in the pending bill is 
$4,000,000. which we think is too large a reduction if a deficiency is 
to be avoided. 

I might go into detail showing the anticipated movements of 
freight as to rail and coastwise water shipments, etc., if the com¬ 
mittee wishes. 

The Chairman. That is only $1,000,000 under the estimated 
amount? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. The estimated amount was $5,000,000. 

The Chairman. And it is twice as much as was appropriated last 
year ? 

Admiral Peoples. With a deficiency, Senator, of $5,000,000 this 
year. In other words, $7,000,000 has been appropriated- 

The Chairman. How is there such a discrepancy between the esti¬ 
mate and the expenditure ? 

Admiral Peoples. The Secretary thought that $2,000,000 would 
be sufficient, sir, but it was wholly insufficient, necessitating a second 
appropriation carried in this present bill of $5,000,000, or a total of 
$7,000,000. 


166 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


The Chairman. What is your best judgment as to what the cost 
will be this coming year? 

Admiral Peoples." My best judgment, sir, is that it will require 
$5,000,000, because there has been an increase in freight rates. If 
there should be a reduction in freight rates, of course it will affect 
this. 

Senator Hale. Is there a letter from the Secretary on that ? 

Admiral Poeples. Not on that particular point, sir; no. The Sec¬ 
retary preferred that I bring up that item of $1,000,000 additional, 
under “Freight,” in discussion before the committee. He did not 
cover it by a separate letter. 

The Chairman. You have covered it all in your statement? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The next item is “ Fuel and transportation.” 

FUEL ANI) TRANSPORTATION. 

Admiral Peoples. Under the heading of “Fuel,” this appropria,- 
tion covers so man} r thousands of tons of coal and so many million 
barrels of oil. There are certain other minor items of charge, but 99 
per cent of it is for coal and oil. The amount of coal and oil that the 
fleet is going to consume will depend entirely upon the number of men 
in the Navy which will affect the number of ships in commission. In 
other words, the quantity of coal and oil to be consumed will depend 
entirely upon the number of ships in commission and the amount of 
steaming to be done by each one of those ships. 

No change of policy is contemplated with respect to the amount of 
steaming of the fleet which will be required in 1922 as compared with 
1921, or, in fact, with 1920. 

The amount carried by the present bill in line 7, page 30, of $17,- 
500,000 is wholly inadequate to furnish the amount of fuel that is re¬ 
quired. 

The original estimate for fuel was $37,000,000. There was some dis¬ 
cussion before the House Appropriations Committee as to the amount 
of steaming that would be required by the fleet in 1922, as a result of 
which the Chief of Naval Operations, who is responsible for the 
operation of the fleet, and the Acting Paymaster General, who is re¬ 
sponsible for the amount of provisions to be furnished for the fleet, 
had prepared a statement which should be inserted in the record in 
order that the conditions can be fully explained. 

The Chairman. Let it be inserted. 

Admiral Peoples. It explains it in detail. Do you wish it read, 
sir? 

The Chairman. No; it is not necessary. 

Admiral Peoples. It explains in detail the exact situation. 

(The statement referred to will be found at the end of Admiral 
Peoples’s testimony of this date.) 

The Chairman. What have you to say with regard to the comment 
of the House committee to the effect that the lessened number of men 
provided for in the House bill lessens the amount necessary for 
fuel, and that the Chief of Naval Operations stated in the hearings 
that the general principle governing the expenditure for fuel is based 
on a vessel’s spending about two days in port to one day steaming at 
sea? 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


167 


Admiral Peoples. That is fully explained in the memorandum 
which I have referred to. The expression “ a day’s steaming at sea ” 
is open to two interpretations. The Chief of Naval Operations had in 
mind a full day of 24 hours. The estimate was based on a steaming 
day, which comprises six and two-thirds hours steaming at the rate of 
15 knots. In other words, the two factors are entirely different. The 
estimates were based on the actual consumption of the fleet for 1921. 
The estimates for 1922 are based on the same factors, which are fixed; 
that is, the actual consumption of the fleet itself. 

• The Chairman. I would like to ask Admiral Coontz in that im¬ 
mediate connection to what extent the reduction of the personnel, in 
case it should be reduced, would affect the consumption of fuel. 

Admiral Coontz. The reduction in personnel, Senator, would re¬ 
duce the number of ships in commission or in reserve and. corre¬ 
spondingly, the number of men at sea, and therefore those ships 
would fali out of the steaming. 

The Chairman. Does it not take just as much coal to keep a ship 
steaming with a few men on board as it does with a good many? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. Naturally, though, if we cut down in 
the personnel we have got to lay up some of the ships. 

I should like to explain that this was a most unfortunate thing that 
came up in the committee. When at sea we speak of a day as 24 
hours, and we have got to steam at night as well as in the daytime. 
Apparently, Mr. Kelly had the idea that as I said we would steam 
only one day in three we intended to do less steaming. He conse¬ 
quently cut the appropriation about half. 

Admiral Peoples. Even on tha basis I can not reconcile the amount 
for fuel of $17,500,000 with any of the figures which appeared in the 
testimony before the House Appropriations Committee. 

The Chairman. What is the minimum amount, according to your 
•Judgment, that you will absolutely require? 

Admiral Peoples. The Chief of Naval Operations has furnished a 
fist of the ships to be kept in full commission!, with a Navy of 
100,000 men: that is, 317 ships in full commission, 66 ships in re¬ 
serve. The fleet will burn in coal, oil, and gasoline $29,275,604 worth. 

Senator Hale. That is on the 100,000 basis? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes. sir. On the basis of 110.000 men it will be 
$32,223,134. 

Senator Hale. How about 120,000 men? 

Admiral Peoples. The total will be $34,250,660. 

I have here some tables of figures showing by dreadnaughts, cruis¬ 
ers, destroyers, submarines, etc., the actual quantities of coal required. 

The Chairman. Will you put that into the record ? 

Admiral Peoples. Aye, aye, sir. 

(The tables referred to will be found at the end of Admiral Peo¬ 
ples’s testimony.) 

The Chairman. Is there anything further under this head that 
you wish to call to our attention ? 

Admiral Peoples. There is an important item that was omitted by 
the House committee. For several years there had been a proviso in 
the appropriation bill which reads as follows: 

Provided. That the United States Shipping Board shall not require payment 
from the Navy Department for the charter hire of vessels furnished or to be 


168 


NAVAL. APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


furnished from July 1, 1918, to June 30. 1921, inclusive, for the use of that de¬ 
partment when such vessels are owned by the United States Government 

That is. for vessels taken over from the Shipping Board on a bare 
basis the Shipping Board has not been reimbursed against the naval 
appropriation. There are five such Shipping Board tankers now 
under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department, the Alameda , Patoka , 
Ramapo , Sapelo , and Trinity . 

We recommend that the date be extended to June 30, 1922, which 
will save $1,365,000, which sum should be added to the totals I have. 
already given you, sir, if that provision be not incorporated into' 
the bill. 

The Chairman. Those tankers are now under the control of the 
Navy Department? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir: they are and have been. 

The Chairman. They are being used by the Navy? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Oil tankers ? 

Admiral Peoples. Oil tankers for carrying fuel oil from point to 
point. The number of naval tankers at the disposal of the Navy 
Department are inadequate to handle the amount of oil that is to 
be moved. 

Senator Hale. And that will save $1,365,000? If this is added 
it will mean that we can reduce the appropriation? 

Admiral Peoples. Just the other way around, Senator. If it is 
not added, $1,365,000 will have to be added to the totals which I 
have given, sir. 

The Chairman. Is that all, Admiral? 

Admiral Peoples. The is another item, Mr. Chairman, that is in 
the bill 15994, section 3. The Secretary has addressed a letter to the 
committee recommending that the clothing and small stores fund 
be increased out of any funds in the Treasury not otherwise appro¬ 
priated so as to equal the value of the stock on hand in the clothing 
and small stores account on March 31, 1921. The wording in the 
Secretary’s letter is the same as the present law. This proviso was 
put into the 1921 bill in order to avoid an appropriation amounting 
to about $7,000,000, and the naval bill as it passed the House con¬ 
tains no such proviso. For many years the law lias authorized an 
outfit on original enlistment to every enlisted man amounting to 
about $100- 

Senator Swanson. You mean that you want us to put in the same 
language that was in the bill last year ? 

Admiral Peoples. Except this, that we think it is better, if that 
be done, to adopt the language as proposed by the Secretary. 

Senator Swanson. What is the difference? 

Admiral Peoples. The proposition as submitted by the Secretary 
will be to increase the amount of the clothing fund from $42,500,000 
up to the total value of the stocks on hand which are now, or, rather, 
on March 31, 1921, will be about $61,000,000. The amounts of those 
stocks will be reduced year by year, depending upon the number 
of enlisted men to be outfitted. 

The Chairman. What would be the effect if this section 3 is not 
incorporated ? 


169 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Admiral Peoples. If that be not incorporated, sir, every newly 
enlisted man in the Navy will not be given his outfit of $100 worth of 
clothing. 

Senator Hall. He will be in the same situation that he is in now? 

Admiral Peoples. No; he gets it now, up to June 30, 1921. 

Senator Swanson. You have a large amount of clothing which 
you have accumulated for a great many years? 

Admiral Peoples. During the war. 

Senator Swanson. You outfit every newly enlisted man from 
what you have accumulated during the war? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. Instead of getting an appropriation to pay him 
$100 and buv the clothes, you just take them out of the clothing that 
you have accumulated? 

Admiral Peoples. Out of the fund on hand. 

The clothing and small stores fund in the Navy, different from 
the Army, has been a self-sustaining fund ever since it was originally 
established 20 or 30 years ago. The enlisted man in the Navy must 
pay out of his own pocket for the cost of his uniforms, with the ex¬ 
ception of his first outfit, which is furnished him b} 7 the Government 
at a cost of not more than $100. 

We recommend that it be inserted there, because it will affect 
the recruiting very seriously and will take away from every enlisted 
man something which he has now. 

The Chairman. Are they not furnished with this clothing under 
a permanent law? 

Admiral Peoples. The permanent law establishes the clothing 
fund, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. It authorizes and provides what shall be allowed 
to an enlisted man ? 

Admiral Peoples. This year only. 

The Chairman. This year onty. Is there not a permanent provi¬ 
sion? 

Admiral Peoples. No; the amount of clothing furnished the en¬ 
listed men has been authorized by law for about 20 years. 

The Chairman. It is still in effect and will remain in effect unless 
it is repealed, will it not? 

Admiral Peoples. No; it has'been carried into the appropriation 
law. 

The Chairman. It ought to be put on a permanent basis. It ought 
not to be necessary every year to pass a law on that subject. 

Admiral Peoples. That is true, sir. 

The Chairman. I wish you would consider that. This does not 
affect the allowances to the men. The law 7 providing for what the 
men shall be allowed is still in effect? 

Admiral Peoples. It does not affect in any way, Senator, the 
authorization under permanent law that every newly enlisted man 
is entitled to an outfit amounting to $100. That was increased from 
$60 about four years ago; but the clothing fund must be reimbursed 
by appropriations or otherwise. For the outfit to first-enlisted men 
up to 1921 there has been a special appropriation to reimburse the 
clothing fund. 

The Chairman. It is not so much a question of what the men get 
as it is a question of taking care of the clothing fund? 


170 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Peoples. That is it, exactly, sir. 

The Chairman. I understand it now, I think. 

Senator Swanson. You want to make it permanent instead of 
temporary ? 

Admiral Peoples. The permanent law authorizes an allowance of a 
hundred dollars to each enlisted man. What we are trying to do 
is- 

The Chairman. I understand it, Senator. I think I can state it in 
very plain language. 

When we take $100 worth of clothing and equipment out of the 
stock on hand and supply a man with it, the clothing and small stores’ 
fund should be credited with that amount. 

Senator Swanson. You have a fund from which you furnish cloth¬ 
ing, and it is a revolving fund ? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. When you give a newly enlisted man his first 
suit, you want to charge that to that fund ? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. How are your reimbursed ? 

Admiral Peoples. That is the point, Senator. Sooner or later, 
five, six, or seven years after the stocks of clothing on hand are re¬ 
duced, year by year, down to some point which will determine the 
total amount of the fund, it will then be necessary to make a direct 
appropriation to reimburse the fund. 

Senator Swanson. But it will save you an appropriation up to this 
time. That is what we did last year and you want it done this year? 

Admiral Peoples. Exactly, sir. 

The Chairman. Are there any other points to which you desire to 
call our attention? 

Admiral Peoples. Senator, I have here a statement showing in 
condensed form the total increases under the various appropriations 
which I have covered for 110,000 men and 120,000 men. The sum 
total increase will be $14,076,400. 

The Chairman. For how many men? 

Admiral Peoples. One hundred and ten thousand men; and $25,- 
231,800 for 120,000 men. 

The Chairman. Have you an extra copy of that? 

Admiral Peoples. I will put that right into the record. 

The Chairman. I want it to go into the record, but I thought that 
if you had an extra copy I would like to have it now,/ 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. 

(The statement referred to is as follows:) 


Comparison of estimates for 1922 under cognizance of Supplies and Accounts. 


Basis of 
100,000 men. 


110,000 men. 


120,000 men. 


Pay of the Navy. 

Increase. 

Provisions, Navy. 

Increase.. 

Maintenance, Supplies and Accounts. 

Increase. 

Freight. Supplies and Accounts. 

Fuel and transportation. 

Increase. 


$ 141 , 069,045 


25 , 055,267 


9 , 000,000 


5 , 000,000 

29 , 275,000 


$ 148 , 757,445 
7 , 688,400 
27 , 245,267 
2 , 190,000 
9 , 2 . 50,000 
250,000 
5 , 000,000 
32 , 223,000 
3 , 948,000 


14 , 076,400 ! 

1 


$ 156 , 445,845 
15 , 376,800 
29 , 435,267 
4 , 380,000 
9 , 500,000 
500,000 
5 , 000,000 
34 , 250,000 
4 , 975,000 


25 , 231,800 


Total increase. 





















NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


171 


Admiral Peoples. There is one point, Mr. Chairman, that I did 
not bring: out when I was discussing: “ Maintenance, Supplies and 
Accounts.” For 110,000 men there will have to be $250,000 added to 
the total of $9,000,000, and for 120,000 men there will have to be 
added $500,000. That is under “ Maintenance, Supplies and Ac¬ 
counts,” sir. That is dependent, to a certain extent, but to a minor 
extent, upon increases in personnel. 

On that particular point, Senator, I wish to point out this fact, 
that under the freight and fuel provisions which we have been dis¬ 
cussing: the statutes authorize that in case of absolute necessity or 
where the appropriations are insufficient, deficiency appropriations; 
but a deficiency is not authorized by law under “ Maintenance, Sup¬ 
plies and Accounts.” Therefore it is vital that the appropriation be 
sufficient to cover the supply, accounting and disbursing activities 
of the Navy. 

Under the centralized system of supply and accounting and dis¬ 
bursing, all the business of the Navy Department and at the navy 
yards must necessarily be handled through and under this limita¬ 
tion which we have asked to be increased, as stated previously in 
the hearings; that is, to $5,200,000, which is the sum plus deficiency 
for 1921. It will be impossible to get along with a less sum than 
that. We tried to do it this year. Cuts were made on the 1st of 
July and about the 1st of September, and the chief of every bureau 
in the Navy Department complained to the Secretary that they were 
not getting the reports necessary by which they could control ex¬ 
penditures under their appropriations by reason of the fact that 
they were not getting reports from the accounting officers at the 
navjr yards; pay rolls were delayed; ships were not fitted out 
promptly, and there had been complaints all along the line—so much 
so that the Secretary authorized, under the act of 1906, an increase 
in the limitation, and to go to the Congress this year to increase that 
by law, which was done. The first deficiency bill carries with it 
$5,200,000. That is an increase of $1,700,000 over the three and a 
half millions carried in this bill. That sum we ask for 1922. It 
would be impossible to get along with a sum less than that, sir. 

The Chairman. Admiral Coontz, I wish you would take a copy 
of this bill, H. R. 15994, that provides for naval legislation, and be 
prepared to advise us on Monday morning, if you can, what por¬ 
tions of it, if any, are important to be enacted at this session of 
Congress. 

Admiral Coontz. Very good, sir. 

Admiral Peoples. I would like to insert in the record, with your 
permission, the Secretary’s letter with reference to “Maintenance, 
Supplies and Accounts,” because it is very vital. 

The Chairman. I would like to have that put in. 

Admiral Peoples. It is rather lengthy, and intentionally so, in 
order that the committee might know exactly why the money is 
necessary, and where it is going, place by place and point by point. 
It does not increase the force: it merely permits us to maintain the 
present force we have. 

Senator Swanson. What did the House do? 

Admiral Peoples. They made the same mistake that was made last 
year. 

Senator Swanson. How much do you want? 


172 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Peoples. $5,200,000. 

The Chairman. I understand on some of the other accounts you 
incurred deficiencies, but not in this? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. You did incur it last year? 

Admiral Peoples. We did incur some tremendous deficiencies, as 
shown in the item of fuel. There was $10,000,000 appropriated. 
The first deficiency bill carried $20,000,000 deficiency, making a total 
of $30,000,000 in 1921. 

Senator Hale. How do you distinguish between an item as to 
which you can incur deficiency and one where you do- 

Admiral Peoples, The special statute authorizes deficiency in fuel, 
subsistence, and transportation.* r 

Senator Hale. I am aware of that, but you incurred deficiencies 
in the others just the same? 

Admiral Peoples. No, sir. 

Senator Hale. Did you not in this particular case ? 

Admiral Peoples. No, sir. 

Senator Hale. I thought you said you did last year. 

Admiral Peoples. We were running beyond the limitation but 
keeping within the total of the appropriation, Senator. 

Senator Swanson. I notice that nearly all of these estimates have 
some deficiency. Are they all allowed under the law ? 

Admiral Peoples. Deficiencies are allowed under the law only 
with reference to freight, fuel, subsistence, transportation of officers 
and men and commodities, and losses on exchange. 

(The papers submitted by Admiral Peoples are as follows:) 

Navy Department, 
Washington, February 15, 1921. 

My Dear Mr. Chairman: Certain changes and increases are necessary in the 
naval bill (H. R. 15975) as it passed the House of Representatives, under 
items pertaining to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, in order to make 
appropriations which are in balance with the remainder of the naval bill, and 
it is recommended that these changes be made when the bill is taken up for 
consideration by your committee. 

PAY OF THE NAVY. 

For “ extra pay to men reenlisting under honorable discharge ” the sum of 
$4,390,800 is provided. The estimate submitted by the Bureau of Supplies 
and Accounts, based upon the reenlistment gratuities authorized under existing 
law, was $6,447,360, and this amount was reduced by the House Committee on 
Appropriations, as is shown at page 826 of the hearings, in the sum of $2,056,650, 
with the idea that legislation would be passed so that men who had served 
only two years and reenlist would be paid a two-months’ gratuity instead of 
a four-months’ gratuity. Unless existing law is changed, the increased amount 
will be necessary to pay the reenlistment gratuity to men expected to reenlist 
during the fiscal year 1922. 

The proposed legislation on which the reduction of $2,056,650 was based 
appears as section 6 in the bill (H. R. 15994) reported to the House of Repre¬ 
sentatives February 4, 1921, which reads as follows: 

“ That hereafter no enlisted man in the Navy shall be paid a reenlistment 
gratuity, or any proportionate part thereof, in excess of an amount equal 
to one month’s pay for each year of service in the last expiring enlistment of 
such enlisted man.” 

Under the item for “ retainer pay and active service pay for members of the 
Naval Reserve Force” the sum of $17,490,307 was originally estimated as 
required; but, as a result of reductions in numbers of Reserve officers expected 



173 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

to be on active duty, the probability that practically none of the reservists 
would perform active duty under training: during: 1922, and anticipated legis¬ 
lation reducing the retainer pay for officers and men confirmed in rating 
to one month’s pay instead of two or more months’ pay, and by making practi¬ 
cally no provision for the payment of $1 a month to members of the Naval 
Reserve Force not confirmed in their rating, the total was reduced to $7,000,000 
by the House. A comparative statement of the original estimate and the 
revised estimate based on a reduced number of officers and the reduction of 
the retainer pay by one-half is as follows: 


No. 

Item. 

Original 

estimate. 

Revised 

estimate. 

1 

Pay of officers on active duty. 

SI, 714,557 

11,017,000 

2 

Retainer pay: 

Officers’ active-duty pay under training. 

854,105 

854,105 

3 

Officers confirmed.'... 

3,416,422 
120,000 

1,708'211 

4 

Officers not confirmed. 

120,000 

5 

Enlisted men, active-duty pay. 

2,461'200 

2,461' 200 

6 

Enlisted men confirmed.. 

8' 204', 023 
720,000 

4 ' 102 ' 011 

7 

Enlisted men not confirmed. 

' 720 ; 000 




Total. 

17,490,307 

10,982,527 




Of the foregoing revised estimates, items 1, 3, and 6 were allowed in the 
House, with an additional sum of $172,778 to give the round figure of $7,000,000 
for active duty and retainer pay of the Naval Reserve Force. 

The House Committee on Naval Affairs had under consideration at the 
present session legislation for reducing the retainer pay of officers and enlisted 
men of the Naval Reserve Force who have been confirmed in their ratings to 
one month's base pay in lieu of the retainer pay authorized under existing law, 
but decided not to recommend such legislation at this session, hi the absence 
of such legislation the amount provided for retainer pay and active-service pay 
of members of the Naval Reserve Force should be increased by the sum of 
$5,810,222 so as to make the total $12,810,222, instead of $7,000,000 as carried 
in the bill. 

If neither of the legislative provisions referred to above are incorporated in 
the naval bill or become law at the present session, the foregoing increases 
should be made and the total appropriation increased by $7,866,782, or from 
$133,202,263 to $141,069,045. 

PROVISIONS, NAVY. 

For subsistence of the Navy the House of Representatives has allowed $20,- 
609,672.50, the report stating that the reduction under the estimates is due to 
providing for fewer men and allowing 50 cents instead of 68 cents as the cost 
of the ration. It also states that the prices of provisions were extraordinarily 
high in 1918 and it does not seem unreasonable to anticipate a decline very 
near to the 1918 level during the next fiscal year. 

It is correct that the original estimates provided for the subsistence of 
143,000 men and that a reduction in the appropriation could be made because 
of providing for only 100.000 men. There is, however, no apparent justifica¬ 
tion for computing the cost of the ration in 1922 at 50 cents. As a matter of 
fact, during the fiscal years 191S and 1919 the prices of provisions were fixed 
by the Government, and in 1920, immediately after the cessation of price fix¬ 
ing, the prices of practically all food materially increased in cost to the Navy, 
which is in part responsible for the increased cost of the ration during 1920 
and the current fiscal year. The cost of the Navy ration during 1920 was 
$0.7055, and during the first quarter of 1921 was $0.7454. Preliminary returns 
received for the second quarter of the current fiscal year indicate decreases in 
cost in some instances and increases in others There is no information avail¬ 
able upon which to base a positive statement or estimate that the Navy can be 
subsisted during 1922 at a less cost than 68 cents per man per diem, and there 
is every reason to believe that the sum of 50 cents per ration will be totally in¬ 
adequate 

The latv authorizes a larger quantity of provisions per diem to the Navy’s 
enlisted man—amounting approximately to 35 per cent more—than to the 
Army’s enlisted man Using the same units of cost, the quantities authorized 


























174 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


by law for the enlisted man of the Navy will cost 49.14 per cent more than the 
quantities authorized by law for the enlisted man of the Army These figures 
are actual, from the actual costs of the ration components and the Army ration 
for 1922 having been fixed at 42 cents, the Navy’s ration should be at least 63 
cents, due allowance being given to the fact that concentrated foods cost more 
than fresh foods; and because there is a larger proportion of small units in 
the fleet, it costing at least 25 per cent more, in proportion, to maintain a small 
mess of 100 men, as on a destroyer, than it does a battleship mess of 1,200 men. 

The enlisted man of the Navy is accustomed to a certain standard of food; 
his contract of enlistment with the Government provides that a certain quan¬ 
tity shall be issued to him. The quality of the Navy’s food is and has been 
such as to establish its reputation as the best-fed Navy in the world. 

The only way to reduce the cost of the Navy ration—other than such reduc¬ 
tions as can be made through reductions in prices and by careful purchasing— 
would be to reduce the quantity and the quality and such a step would, it is 
believed, be disastrous. 

A further item of reduction by the House was in lixing 60 cents as the 
amount to be charged against “ Provisions, Navy,” and credited to the Naval 
Hospital fund on account of sick in hospital, as against $1 recommended in the 
estimates—the actual cost of subsistence of sick in hospital being in excess of 
$1 per diem, because of the special diets which have to be provided. 

The House Committee on Naval Affairs in the bill (H. R. 15994) as re¬ 
ported to the House February 4, 1921, in section 9 recommends the fixing dur¬ 
ing the fiscal year 1922 of the commuted ration for officers and men at $0.68 
per diem, for midshipmen at $1.08 per diem, and for sick in hospital at $1 per 
diem, which, with the exception of the commuted ration on account of sick 
in hospital, is the same as for the current fiscal year. 

The following is a comparison of the details of the amount allowed by the 
House and the amount recommended to be allowed on a basis of 63 cents as 
the cost of the ration, with commutation at the rates specified in the preceding 
paragraph: 


No. Item. 


1 100,000 men Regular Navy and 2,500 marines serving afloat, total 102,500 

men. 

2 1,510 warrant officers entitled to rations. 

3 2,500 midshipmen entitled to rations at $1.08 per diem ($394.20 per 

annum). 

4 1,300 general court-martal prisoners at 30 cents per diem ($109.50 per 

annum). 

5 90 nurses on detached duty at $2.50 per diem ($912.50 per annum). 

6 624 nurses at hospitals at $1 per diem ($365 per annum). 

7 Difference account $1 and 63 cents per diem for 1,475,000 sick in hospitals. 

8 Subsistence of men on detached duty: 

Per year. 


10, at $5 per day. $10,250 

200, at $4 per day. 292,000 

15, at $3 per day... 16,425 

1,500, at $2.50 per day. 1,368,750 

600, at $1 per day. 219,000 


At 50 cents. 


$19,218,750 
283,125 

965,500 

142,350 
82,125 
227,760 
14,750 


At 63 cents. 


$23,569,875 

374,782 

965,500 

142,350 

82,125 

227,760 

545,750 


9 


Total (2,325). 1,914,425 

Less subsistence in kind at 50 cents. 435,095 

Less subsistence in kind at 63 cents. 534,405 


Labor at navy yards handling provisions 


Less value of stocks estimated to be on hand June 30, 1921, in excess of 
requirements for 100,000 men.... 

Amount required. 


1,479,330 
600666’ 
23,033,690 
1,800,000 
21,233,690 


1,380,020 

600,000 

27.908.162 
1,800,000 

28.108.162 


The amount actually carried in the House bill is $624,017.50 less than the amount 
shown above as required on the basis on which the appropriation is supposed to be 
made and the reason for this further reduction is not known. 

The appropriation ‘‘Provisions, Navy,” should be increased from $20,609,672.50 to 
not less than $26,100,000, and it will be possible to keep within this latter amount 
only in the event of a decided decrease in prices of foddstuffs during 1922. 



































NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Maintenance, Supplies, and Accounts. 


175 


With respect to the appropriation “Maintenance, Supplies, and Accounts, 1922,” 
it is recommended that the limitation for pay of chemists, and clerical, inspection, and 
messenger services be increased from $3,500,000 to $5,200,000 without increasing the 
total of the appropriation. 

The reasons for this increase are as follows: 

(a) The amount expended for this purpose for the fiscal year 1920 was $10,125,000. 
The estimate submitted, originally, by the Paymaster General of the Navy was 
$5,900,000, but was reduced by me to $3,500,000, in the hope that expenditures could 
be kept within that limitation; but subsequent developments have conclusively 
shown this sum to be insufficient and that the reduction made was not justifiable and 
was out of proportion to the reductions for classified employees for 1921 as compared 
with the amounts expended in 1920 for other bureaus, indicated as follows: 

Per cent reduction. 


Bureau of Construction and Repair. 11. 4 

Bureau of Engineering. 25. 01 

Bureau of Ordnance. 35. 7 

Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. 62. 7 


(6) Under the centralized system of supply, disbursing, accounting, and cost 
inspection in the Navy, this appropriation renders combined service for every bureau 
and office of the Naval Establishment and not specially for the benefit of the Bureau of 
Supplies and Accounts. All funds appropriated for the maintenance and upkeep of 
the Fleet and of navy yards and stations, both in personnel and materiel, are directly 
reflected in the work under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, 
and it must necessarily be allowed sufficient funds for its maintenance. Otherwise, 
the other bureaus of the department can not control the appropriations under their 
cognizance. 

(c) Effective July 1, 1920, allotments under the Supplies and Accounts limitation 
were reduced so as to keep within the limit of the approrpiation for the fiscal year 
1921, the working forces being reduced from 40 to 76 per cent. Toward the end of 
August, 1920, complaints were made to me by the various bureau chiefs that they 
were not receiving the data necessary to permit proper control by them over their 
work in the navy yards or over their appropriations. Also delays were complained 
of in making issues of supplies to the fleet and to industrial departments and delays 
in payment of the mechanical forces and to contractors for material delivered, all 
brought about through the reduced forces in the disbursing, accounting, and supply 
departments at the various yards and stations. As the result of this condition and 
with the concurrence of the" advisory council, authority was granted September 2, 
1920, to make allotments for classified forces at navy yards in excess of the limitation 
in the appropriation, so as to bring the work up to date and keep it current, this 
authority being issued under section 3679 of the Revised Statutes as amended by the 
act of February 27, 1906. 

(d) No reductions have been made in the amount allowed for classified employees 
for 1922 under the appropriations of the other bureaus, and because of reduced appro¬ 
priations for various objects of expenditure it will be necessary to furnish more de¬ 
tailed reports in order to permit closer supervision over expenditures from naval 
appropriations so as to get the greatest benefit from them. For this reason the present 
force in supply, disbursing, and accounting departments at the yards and stations 
can not be materially reduced. 

(e) To indicate further this fact, a comparison of the services required under this 
appropriation in the year 1916, as compared with the year 1922, will be made. 

Since 1916 there have been added new activities, namely: 

1. Cost-inspection forces at shipbuilding plants responsible for determining 
the costs under cost-plus contracts for battleships and battle cruisers 
aggregating $270,000,000 in value. The cost-inspection force alone under 

this limitation costs, for 260 employees...-.- $390, 000 

2. By transfer from other appropriations (Construction and Repair, Engi¬ 
neering, Ordnance, and Yards and Docks) the cost of the clerical forces in 
the yard-accounting departments,centralizing them under “Maintenance, 

Supplies and Accounts,” for the present year amounts, for 705 employees, to 1, 056,500 

3 By transfer from the appropriation ‘‘Pay, miscellaneous”, to “Mainte¬ 
nance, Supplies and Accounts, ” of the clerical force in Navy purchasing, 
disbursing, allotment, and retainer pay offices amounts, for 565 employees. 

.. 883,000 

4. Naval supply station, Hampton Roads, 133 employees. 221,400 









176 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


5. Naval aircraft factory, Philadelphia, 98 employees. $147,000 

6. Navy supply depot, south Brooklyn, N. Y., 335 employees. 475, 000 

7. Naval ammunition depots and naval hospitals. 40 employees. 60. 000 


Total new activities, 2,136 employees. 3,132, 900 


The following statement shows the activities under this appropriation for 1916 and 
1922, both years at current rates of pay: 



1916 

1922 


! Employees. 

Salaries. 

Employees. 

Salaries. 

Engaged on supply and disbursing work. 

Engaged on accounting work in navy yards. 

i 

574 

25 

$955,268 

37,500 

1,385 

117 

$2,077, 500 
175,500 

Total limitation. 

599 

992, 768 

1,502 

2,253,000 

SUMMARY. 

Original activities. 

Additional activities. 

599 

250 

992, 768 
398, 480 

1,502 

2,136 

2, 253,000 
3,132, 900 

Total. 

i 

849 

1, 391,248 

3,638 

5,385, 900 


Of the 3,638 employees for 1921, 1,271 are required for entirely new work and offices 
and 865 are accountable for by transfer from other appropriations—“Pay, miscel¬ 
laneous,” “Construction and Repair,” “Engineering,” “Ordnance,” and “Yards 
and Docks”—since 1916, making a total of 2,136 employees to be provided for under 
“Maintenance, Supplies and Accounts, 1922,” which, under the practice obtaining 
in 1916, would have been paid for under the annual appropriations of all the bureaus. 
Storemen, stockkeepers, and store laborers were not a part of the classified force in 
either of these years. In so far as the appropriation “Maintenance, Supplies and 
Accounts ” is concerned, therefore, the classified force of 849 employees in 1916, as 
compared with the 3,638 for 1922, has increased 4:3 times, and the cost at actual current 
rates has increased from $1,391,248 in 1916 to $5,385,900, or 3.9 times as much for 
1922; whereas the original activities chargeable in 1916 have increased only 2.5 
times. 

(/) The foregoing shows conclusively that the sum of $5,200,000 for the classified 
forces chargeable to this appropriation during the fiscal year 1922 is reasonable, 
economical, and justifiable by direct comparison with the charges under this appro¬ 
priation in 1916. The sum of $3,500,000 is wholly insufficient. 

(q) That the increase requested under the limitation for “Maintenance, Supplies 
and Accounts” is not excessive is further shown by a comparison of the limitations 
for classified employees under the various annual" appropriations for 1916 and the 
limitations for 1916 adjusted on the basis of work transferred to “Maintenance, Sup¬ 
plies and Accounts” from other appropriations to 1922: 


Title of appropriation. 

1916. 

| 

Adjusted 

I on basis of 
current 

I rates of 
pay. 

1 

1922 appro¬ 
priations. 

Increase on 
adjusted 
basis. 

Amount. 

Adjusted 

amount. 1 

Pay, miscellaneous. 

$290,000 
958,100 
650,000 
468,000 
425,000 
643,000 

$189,000 
881,100 
615,000 
430,000 
399,000 J 
920,000 

$310,400 
1,409,760 
984,000 
688,000 
638,400 
1,391,248 

$1,750,000 
3,450,000 
2,500,000 
2,000,000 
1,300,000 
3,500,000 

2.6 times. 

2.5 times. 

2.6 times. 
2.9 times. 
2.0 times. 
2.5 times. 

Construction and Repair. 

Engineering. 

Ordnance. 

Yards and Docks. 

Supplies and Accounts. 

Total. 

3,434,100 

3,434,100 

5,421,808 

13,500,000 

2.5 times. 



1 On basis of work transferred to Supplies and Accounts from other appropriations. 


(h) The foregoing comparison shows that the appropriation for 1922—with no 
allowance for the 1,271 employees on new activities which require $1,903,500—is just 
sufficient to take care of the increase in the work of the 1916 activities and that the 
additional amount requested is for the purpose of taking care of the new activities 






















































NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 177 


assigned to Supplies and Accounts since 1916 for which no provision was made in the 
$3,500,000 limitation for 1922. 

Sincerely yours, 


The Hon. Carroll S. Page, 

Chairman Committee on Naval Affairs, 

United States Senate. 


Secretary of the Navy . 


Navy Department, 
Washington, February 12, 1921. 

My Dear Senator: It is my duty to invite your attention to the inadequacy of 
the amount provided for under the appropriation “Fuel and transportation,’’ as 
contained in the naval appropriation bill for 1922, recently passed by the House of 
Representatives. 

The attached sheets indicate the estimated requirements for fuel of the fleet to be 
in commission in the Navy during the fiscal year 1922, and the estimates are based on 
actual consumption of the vessels now in commission. 

While there was some discussion during the hearings before the Appropriation 
Committee of the House concerning the policy of the Navy Department with regard 
to the amount of cruising to be required of the fleet during the fiscal year 1922, no 
change in the present policy is contemplated; in fact, none is possible if the interests of 
the United States are to be properly safeguarded. 

The appropriation bill as passed omits the following provision which appeared in the 
appropriation for 1921: 

“ Provided, That the United States Shipping Board shall not require payment from 
the Navy Department for the charter hire of vessels furnished or to be furnished from 
July 1, 1918, to June 30, 1921, inclusive, for the use of that department when such 
vessels are owned by the United States Government.” 

This proviso was recommended for inclusion in the appropriation for 1922 for the 
reason that it would save the Navy appropriation the sum of $1,365,000, representing 
the charter hire on a bare boat basis in the case of the Shipping Board tankers Alameda, 
Patoka, Ramapo, Sapelo, and Trinity, all of which tankers will be required during the 
entire fiscal year 1922. 

The fleet to be kept in commission for 1922 with 100,000 men will approximate the 
Fleet of 1921 with an average of 120,000 men. The fuel consumption of 1921 will 
amount to $38,450,000; that for 1922 is estimated to be $34,982,749.72, a conservative 
estimate. The appropriation as passed by the House of $17,500,000 is obviously 
wholly inadequate. To appropriate this sum only would seriously affect the cruising 
efficiency of the fleet, and I urge that the Senate increase the appropriation to the 
sum of approximately $34,000,000 and also restore the provision relative to employ¬ 
ment of Shipping Board tankers by the Navy, as quoted in the preceding paragraph. 

Sincerely, yours, 


The Hon. Carroll S. Page, 

Chairman Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, 

Washington, D. C. 


Secretary of the Navy. 


February 17, 1921. 

Subject: Statutory limits for repairs and changes to vessels of the Navy. 

My Dear Senator: The naval act of March 2, 1907, contained the following pro¬ 
vision relative to repairs and changes on vessels of the United States Navy: 

“That the Secretary of the Navy shall hereafter report to Congress at the commence¬ 
ment of each regular session the number of vessels and their names upon which any 
repairs or changes are proposed which in any case shall amount to more than $200,000, 
the extent of such proposed repairs or changes, and the amounts estimated to be 
needed for the same in each vessel; and expenditures for such repairs or changes so 
limited shall be made onlv after appropriations in detail are provided for by Congress. ’ ’ 
The naval act of August 29, 1916, contained the following provision: 

“The statutory limit of $200,000 for repairs and changes to capital ships of the Navy, 
as provided in the act making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1908, approved March 2, 1907, is hereby changed to $300,000.” 


34772—21 


12 






178 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


In view of the provision in the naval act of August 29, 1916, quoted above, the 
present statutory limit for repairs and changes to ships of the Navy is $300,000. The 
cost of labor and materials has materially advanced since the enactment of the pro¬ 
vision of August 29, 1916, and the vessels of the Navy are much larger in size than 
were the vessels at the time the limit of $300,000 was fixed. 

Under the present law the department may expend upon a steel vessel in one year 
up to 20 per cent of her value provided the fixed limit, per act of August 29, 1916, is 
not exceeded; so, for vessels of less than $1,500,000 value, we can spend up to 20 per 
cent, while for the largest vessels now in service we can spend only 2 per cent in one 
year, an obviously inadequate amount. 

In view of the foregoing it is strongly recommended that there be inserted, on page 
30, following line 4, of the naval appropriation bill (H. R. 15975), as passed by the 
House, the following provision: 

“The statutory limit of $300,000 for repairs and changes to capital ships of the Navy 
as provided in the act making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1917, approved August 29, 1916, is hereby changed to $500,000.” 

Sincerely, yours, 


Josephus Daniels, 
Secretary of the Navy 


Hon. Carroll S. Page, 

Chairman Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, 

Washington, D. C. 


Revised estimate for consumption of coal and fuel oil , fiscal year 1922, based on vessels 
being in a status of approximately 10 days at sea and 20 days in port. 



Coal. 

Oil. 

Battleships: 

17 in commission 1 year. 

2 in reserve 1 year.!. 

Tons. 

45,257 
5,994 

10, 920 
8,440 

Barrels. 

779, 945 

Cruisers: 

1 in commission 1 year. 


2 in commission lO'months.. 
1 in commission 9 months... 

37, 500 
33, 750 

1 in commission 8 months... 

5,768 

2 in commission 7 months... 

52, 500 

2 in commission 6 months... 
1 in commission 5 months... 

4, 450 
2,810 

22,500 

1 in commission 4 months.. . 

15, 000 

1 in commission 3 months... 

1, 710 

2 in commission 2 months... 
Destroyers: 

96 in commission 1 year. 

1, 120 

7,500 

1,042,196 
548, 228 

95,000 
2,000 

202 in reserve 1 year. 


Submarines: 

131 in commission 1 year. 


8 in reserve 1 year .A. 


Destroyer tenders': 

4 in commission 1 year. 

2 in commission 1 year. 

27, 840 

41,314 

15,493 

17,640 ! 

1 in commission 8 months .. 


Submarine tenders: 

2 in commission 1 year. 


3 in commission 1 year. 

12,240 

1 shore base 1 year'. 

7,080 

2 shore base 1 year. 

9, 240 

9 Eagles... 

26,742 

42,756 

Fleet, repair vessels: 

2 in commission 1 year. 


1 in commission 1 year. 

9, 000 

Hospital ships, 2 in commission 

1 year. 

9,360 


Supply ships: 

1 in commission 1 year. 

15,960 

3 in commission 1 year. 

7,920 

Target repair ships, 2 in commis¬ 
sion 1 year. 

4, 920 

2,880 


Radio repair ships, 1 in commis¬ 
sion 1 year. 




Coal. 

Oil. 

Aircraft tenders, 1 in commission 

1 year. 

Tons. 

Barrels. 

21,378 

Aircraft carriers, 1 in commission 

1 year. 

8, 520 

Mine layers, 2 in commission 1 
year... 


42,756 

Colliers, 8 in commission 1 year.. 
Oilers: 

9 in commission 1 year. 

39, 064 


254, 574 
18,858 

1 in commission 8 months... 


Transports (cargo): 

7 in commission 1 year. 

31, 978 

1 in commission 1 year. 

25,718 

56, 000 

9.325 

6.325 

Ammunition ships, 2 in commis¬ 
sion 1 year. 

7,325 

46, 476 

2,125 

8,760 

19, 300 

25, 740 

Gunboats: 

14 in commission 1 year. 

1 in commission 9 months.... 
Survey ships, 2 in commission 1 
year. 

Fish commission, 2 in commis¬ 
sion 1 year. 


Station craft: 

11 in commission 1 year. 


2 in commission 1 vear. 

14,100 

Experimental ships, 1 in reserve 

1 year... 

3, 468 

Eagles, 40 in reserve 1 vear. 

33,050 

205, 800 

Mine sweepers and tugs: 

35 in commission 1 year. 


18 in reserve 1 year.'. 


26,460 

117,600 

14, 000 

Seagoing tugs, 30 in commission 

1 year. 

10,800 

Harbor tugs, 60 in commission 1 
year. 

Miscellaneous, 35 in commission 

1 year... 

33,150 



Total. 

406, 575 

3, 649, 048 



406,575 tons coal, at $7.65 per ton. 

3,649,048 barrels oil ,at $3.85 per barrel 


$3,110,298.75 
14,048,834.80 




























































































179 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Navy Department, 

Office of Naval Operations, 

Washington, February 7, 1921. 

MEMORANDUM ON FUEL CONSUMPTION FOR OPERATING FORCES. 

In the hearings before the subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 
a statement was made by the Chief of Naval Operations that the fuel consumption of 
the fleet was based on vessels operating one day at sea to two days in port. A later 
statement from the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts representative before the sub¬ 
committee, relative to the basis for the estimates actually submitted for fuel con¬ 
sumption, indicated that the estimates were based on operations contemplating one 
day in port to two days at sea. 

It appears that these two apparently contradictory statements have misled the 
committee into the possible belief that there was contemplated a change of policy in 
regard to operating vessels, which would reduce their cruising by one-half the amount 
which was used as a basis for estimating the fuel needs of the fleet for the coming 
fiscal year. In pursuance of this belief it appears that the allowance for fuel and 
transportation, in the bill reported out from the committee, was radically reduced 
from the original estimate. 

As a matter of actual fact the two apparently conflicting statements are not actually 
in conflict when analyzed. There is no change of policy contemplated in operating 
the vessels of the fleet during the coming fiscal year. The actual estimates submitted 
to the committee were based on past performances and represent the estimated fuel 
consumption next year, based on the actual fuel consumption of vessels of the fleet 
over a period of about 18 months preceding September, 1920. 

It has been found that the actual fuel consumption of the active fleet in the past 
amounts to what would have been consumed, if the vessel steamed six and two-thirds 
hours per day at 15 knots for 20 days and remained in port for 10 days. Roughly 
stated, this is two days steaming to one day in port, but it should be clearly under¬ 
stood that this rule was an outcome of information obtained after actual fuel used had 
been figured out, and that it contemplated six and two-thirds hours at 15 knots as 
constituting a steaming day. 

The statement made by the Chief of Naval Operations to the effect that fuel can be 
calculated roughly on the basis of a ship steaming one day and remaining in port 
two days, is also capable of a similar kind of proof. In other words, a vessel steam¬ 
ing at economical speed—say 9 to 10 knots for 24 hours a day for 10 days, will burn 
about the same amount of fuel as a vessel steaming 20 days at six and two-thirds 
hours per day at 15 knots. Both rules are rough and ready means of making an esti¬ 
mate and they furnish a means of indicating for vessels of the active fleet the relative 
amount of steaming at sea and lying in port. The rule cited by Admiral Peoples 
has as its basis a steaming day which comprises six and two-third hours steaming 
15 knots and it yields exceedingly accurate results where vessels of the battleship 
fleet are involved. It had its origin in data derived from actual performances in 
the fleet. The rule cited by the Chief of Naval Operations is more practical for a 
mixed force of vessels, including auxiliaries and small craft not capable of 15 knots 
speed. It was not cited to justify the estimates, but merely to give a rough idea 
of the cruising activities of the fleet. The actual estimates originally submitted to 
Congress are derived from actual past performances of the vessels involved, or the 
performances of vessels of a similar type to those involved. This fact should be 
clearly understood, and it should also be thoroughly understood that no change in 
the policy of operating the vessels of the fleet has been contemplated for next year, 
so far as the operations at sea are concerned. 

The appended table contains comparative estimates showing the application of 
the two rules, as well as the estimates which would proceed from a misinterpreta¬ 
tion of what might be called the “fuel-consumption” rule as compared with the 
“fleet-operations’ ’ rule. 

R. E. Coontz. 

0. J. Peoples. 


180 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Statements in re estimates for the fiscal years 1921 and 1922 under the appropriation “ Fuel 

and transportation .” 

FISCAL YEAR 1921. 

Consumption based on actual expenditures to Dec. 31, 1920: 

Coal, 1,198,000 tons, at $7.60. $9,104, 800. 00 

Fuel oil, 7,092,464 barrels, at $2.97. 21,135, 237. 38 

Gasoline, 6,658,216 gallons, at 27 cents. 1,797, 712. 32 

Maintenance, coaling plants. 2, 985, 600. 00 

Tug and vessel hire, water, ice, and miscellaneous. 3, 426, 740. 00 


Total. 38,450,089. 70 


Supplies and Accounts, “two days at sea and one day in port”: 

Coal, 1,143,267 tons, at $7.60. 8, 688, 829. 20 

Fuel oil, 7,053,050 barrels, at $2.97. 20, 947, 558. 50 

Gasoline, 6,658,216 gallons, at 27 cents. 1, 797, 712. 32 

Maintenance, coaling plants. 2, 985, 600. 00 

Tug and vessel hire, water, ice, and miscellaneous. 3,426, 740. 00 


Total. 37,846,440.02 

Appropriated act of June 4, 1920. 10, 000, 000 

Deficiency bill Feb. 1, 1921. 20, 000, 000 


Total.,. 30,000,000 

Navy Department deficiency estimate. 27,438, 000 


FISCAL YEAR 1922. 

Consumption of fuel according to formula—-“Two days at sea and one 
day in port”—(i. e., a vessel steams 100 knots each day at sea at 
speed of 15 knots: 

Coal, 894,500 tons, at $7.65. $6, 842, 925.00 

Fuel oil, 5,176,200 barrels, at $3.85. 19, 928,370.00 

Gasoline, 7,744,436 gallons, at 27 cents... 2, 090, 997. 72 

Maintenance coaling plants.. 2,142, 857. 00 

Tug and vessel hire, water, ice, and miscellaneous. 3, 977, 600. 00 


Total. 34,982,749.72 

Consumption of fuel based on “two days in port and one day at sea” 

(i. e., a vessel steams 100 knots each day at sea at speed of 15 knots), 
as submitted by committee’s instructions: 

Coal, 406,575 tons, at $7.65. 3,110, 298. 00 

Fuel oil, 3,649,048 barrels, at $3.85... 14, 048, 834.00 

Gasoline, 7,744,436 gallons, at 27 cents. 2, 090, 997. 72 

Maintenance coaling plants. 2,142, 857. 00 

Tug and vessel hire, water, ice, and miscellaneous. 3, 977, 600. 00 


Total. 25,370,586.72 


stated by Admiral Coontz (i. e., a vessel while at sea steams 24 hours 
each dav at economical speed): 

Coal, '805,790 tons, at $7.65.$6,164, 293.50 

Fuel oil, 5,958,552 barrels, at $3.85. 22, 940,425. 20 

Gasoline, 7,744,436 gallons, at 27 cents. 2, 090, 997. 72 

Maintenance of coaling plants. 2,142, 857. 00 

Tug and vessel hire, water, ice, and miscellaneous. 3, 977, 600.00 


Total..’. 37,316,173.42 

Amount of appropriation bill as reported to House. 17, 500. 000. 00 


















































181 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Estimates of funds required under the appropriation “Fuel and trans¬ 
portation; 1922,” based on information furnished by the office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations relative to status of vessels for varying 
number of personnel: 

. 100,000 men, 317 ships in full commission, 66 ships in reserve— 


Coal, 600,000 tons, at $7.65 per ton. $4, 590, 000. 00 

Fuel oil, 4,279,000 barrels at $3 85 per barrel. 16, 474,150. 00 

Gasoline, 7,744,436 gallons, at 27 cents per gallon. 2, 090, 997. 72 

Maintenance coaling plants. 2,142,857. 00 

Tug and vessel hire, water,, ice, and miscellaneous.. 3, 977, 600. 00 


Total.,. 29,275,604.72 


110,000 men, 324 ships in full commission, 264 ships in reserve— 

Coal, 662,200 tons, at $7.65 per ton. 5,065,830. 00 

Fuel oil, 4,921,000 barrels, at $3 85 per barrel. 18, 945, 850. 00 

Gasoline, 7,744,436 gallons at 27 cents per gallon. 2,090, 997. 72 

Maintenance coaling plants. 2,142,857. 00 

Tug and vessel hire, water, ice, and miscellaneous. 3, 977, 600. 00 


Total. 32,223,134.72 


120,000 men, 366 ships in full commission, 242 ships in reserve— 

Coal, 662,200 tons, at $7.65 per ton. 5,065, 830. 00 

Fuel oil, 5,447,630 barrels, at $3.85 per barrel. 20, 973, 375. 50 

Gasoline, 7,744,436 gallons, at 27 cents per gallon. 2,090, 997. 72 

Maintenance coaling plants. 2,142, 857. 00 

Tug and vessel hire, water, ice, and miscellaneous. 3, 977, 600. 00 


Total. 34,250.660.2? 


Status of vessels under varying number of personnel according io information receiled 
this date from the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. 



Personnel. 


Personnel. 

100,000 

men. 

110,000 

men. 

120,000 

men. 

100,000 

men. 

110,000 

men. 

120,000 

men. 

IX COMMISSION. 




IN COMMISSION—contd. 




Battleships, first line. 

13 

13 

13 

Ammunition ships. 

2 

2 

2 

Cruisers (miscellaneous).. 

5 

8 

8 

Flagships for foreign sta- 




Destroyers, first line. 

80 

80 

122 

tions (Ctah and Flor- 




Submarines. 

87 

87 

87 

ida). 

2 

2 

2 

Destroyer tenders. 


7 

7 

Patrol craft. 

19 

19 

19 

Submarine tenders. 

5 

5 

5 

Auxiliaries (survey ships) 

2 

2 

2 

Shore-based submarine 




Fish Commission ships... 

2 

2 

2 

tenders. 

5 

5 

5 

Special duty craft (sta- 




Repair ships. 

2 

2 

2 

tion craft). 

13 

13 

13 

Hospital ships. 

2 

2 

2 





Store ships 

0 

6 

6 

Total. 

317 

324 

366 

Auxiliaries: 








Target repair. 

2 

2 

2 

VESSELS IN RESERVE. 




Radio repair. 

1 

1 

1 





Aircraft tenders. 

2 

2 

2 

Experimental ship (Ohio) 

1 

1 

1 

Aircraft carriers. 

i 

l 

1 

Batt leships (midshipmen) 

6 

6 

6 

Mine layers. 

2 

2 

2 

Destroyers (50 per cent 




Mine sweepers and fleet 




complements). 


198 

176 

tugs (12 for use with 




Submarines (training and 




mine force). 

35 

35 

35 

reserve complements).. 

22 

22 

22 

Colliers 

9 

9 

9 

Eagles. 

19 

19 

19 

Oilers 

11 

11 

11 

Mine sweepers. 

18 

18 

18 

Transports and cargo 





— 


— 

ships 

6 

6 

6 

Total. 

66 

264 

242 
























































































182 NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

4» 

Estimate of coal and fuel oil needs . fiscal year 1922, on basis of 100,000 men. 





Coal. 

Type of vessel. 

Num- 

Period. 



ber. 

Tons. 

Value. 

Dreadnaughts: 

In commission. 

4 

1 year. 

80,000 

*612,000 

Do . 

9 

4 

.'do. 

In reserve... 

...do. 

55, 700 

426,105 

Do. 

2 

.do. 


Cruisers: 

Tn commission. 

1 

10 months. 



Do 

1 

9 months.. 



Do 

2 

7 months.. 



Do. 

1 

6 months.. 



Do 

l 

4 months.. 



Do . 

1 

2 months.. 



Destroyers in commission . 

80 

1 year. 



Submarines: 

In commission.... 

87 

...do. 



In reserve. 

22 

.do. 



Tenders (destroyer): 

In commission.... 

2 

. .do. 



Do. 

1 

8 months.. 



Tenders (submarine): 

In commission.. 

2 

1 year. 



Do. 

3 

...do. 

20,000 

153,000 

Shore based (tenders): 

Tn commission 

l 

.do. 

Do . 

2 

.. .do. 

12,000 

91,800 

Eagles in commission .... 

2 

.. .do. 

Repair ships in commission. 

2 1 

.. .do. 

5,000 

38, 250 

Hospital ships in commission. 

2 

.. .do. 

14', 000 

32,000 

107,100 

Store ships: 

In commission. 

5 

.. .do. 

244, .800 

Do. 

i 

.. .do. 

Auxiliaries: 

Target repair, in commission. 

Radio repair, in commission. 

2 

1 

.. .do. 

...do. 

5,000 

4,500 

38,2.50 
34,425 

Aircraft tenders, in commission. 

1 

. .do. 

'600 

4,590 

Aircraft carrier, in commission.... 

] 

. .do. 

Mine layers, in commission. 

2 

...do. 



Mine sweepers and fleet tugs: 

In commission. 

35 

.. .do_.__ 



In reserve. 

18 

.. .do. 



Colliers, in commission. 

9 

.. .do. 

97.000 

742,050 

Oilers: 

In commission. 

9 

.. .do. 


Do. 

1 

...do. 

12,000 

91,800 

Do. 

1 

8 months.. 

Transports, cargo: 

In commission. 

5 

1 year. 

44,000 

336,600 

Do. 

i 

.. .do. 

Ammunition ships, in commission.... 
Flag ships, foreign stations, in commis¬ 
sion. 

Patrol craft, in commission. 

2 

...do. 

10,000 
23,000 

76,500 

2 

...do. 

175', 950 

19 

.do. 

113,500 

868, 275 
44,370 

Survey ships in commission. 

2 

.. .do. 

5,800 

Fish commission in commission. 

2 

...do. 

25,000 

191,250 

Station craft: 

In commission. 

11 

...do. 

38,000 

290,700 

Do. 

2 

.. .do. 

Experimental ships in reserve. 

1 

.. .do. 

3,000 

22,950 

Eagles in reserve. 

19 

.. .do. 





Total. 



600,000 

4,590,000 


1 



Fuel oil. 


Barrels. 

Value. 

127,000 
871,000 
151,000 
142,700 

*488,9.50 
3, 353,350 
581, 350 
549, 395 

.50,000 
45,000 
70,000 
30,000 
20,000 
10,000 
1,139, 000 

192.500 
173,250 
269, .500 

115.500 
77,000 
38, 500 

4,3&5,150 

63,000 
5, 500 

242,5.50 
21,175 

95,000 
40, 500 

365, 750 
155,925 

50,000 
12, 000 

192, 500 
46,200 

7,000 

26,950 

11,900 
80,000 

45,815 
308,000 



55,000 

211,750 



15,000 

26,000 

75,000 

57,750 
100,100 
288,750 

286,000 

36,000 

1,101,100 
138,600 

455,900 

1,755, 215 

18,000 

69, 300 

76,000 
70,000 
73,000 

292,600 
269,500 
281,050 

25,000 

96,250 


19,000 
28," 500 


4,279,000 


73,150 
"i 09," 725 


16, 474, 150 
4,590,000 


21,064,150 


If personnel of 110,000 men is authorized, the following changes in the foregoing will 


be necessary: 

Add for 3 cruisers, 32,200 tons coal. $246, 330 

Add for 4 destroyer tenders, 30,000 tons coal. 229, 500 

Add for 198 destroyers in reserve, 642,000 barrels oil. 2, 471, 700 


2, 947, 530 

Plus estimate for ships on basis of 10,000 men. 21, 064,150 


24, Oil, 680 










































































































































183 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

If personnel of 120,000 men is authorized, the following changes from the estimate 
for fuel needs of vessels based on 110,000 men will be necessary: 

Add for 42 destroyers in commission, 597,954 barrels oil; deduct lor 22 
destroyers in reserve, 71,324 barrels oil; add the difference, 526,630 


barrels oil. $2,027, 525. 50 

Plus estimate for ships on basis of 110,000 men. 24, 011, 680. 00 


26, 039, 205. 50 





Coal. 

Fuel oil. 

Type of vessel. 

Number. 

Period. 





Tons. 

Value. 

Barrels. 

Value. 




D readnaughts: 

In commission. 

G 

1 year. 

111,000 

$849,150 

205,300 

$790,405 
3,907,750 

Do. 

11 

.... .do. 

1,015,000 

In reserve. 

2 

. .do.. 

8, (XX) 

61,200 

Cruisers: 

In commission.... 

2 

3 

.do. 

87, (XX) 

665,550 



Do. 

6 months 

45' (XX) 

344,250 



Do. 

1 

9 months.. 

45| 000 

344,250 



Do. ... 

L 

3 months 

15,000 

5,000 

114; 750 
38,250 



Do. 

1 

1 month... 



Destroyers: 

In commission. 

196 

1 year. 

1,355,000 
655,000 

95,000 

5.216.750 

2.521.750 

365,750 
7,700 

In reserve. 

202 

.do. 



Submarines: 

In commission 

131 

.do. 



In reserve.. 

8 

.do. 



2,000 

Tenders (destroyer): 

In commission. 

4 

.do. 

30,200 

231,030 

500 

1,925 

Do 

2 

.do. 



95,000 

365,750 

Do. 

1 

8 months.... 



40,000 

154,000 

Tenders (submarine): 

1 n commission. 

2 

1 year. 



50,000 
12,000 
7,000 

192,500 
46,200 

Do. 

3 


20,000 

153,0(X) 

In commission (shore base).. 

Tn commission 

1 

...do. 



26,950 

2 

..do. .. 

12,000 

91,800 

Tn commission (Ragles) 

9 

.do__ 

53,500 

20.5,975 

Repair (fleet): 

In commission. 

1 

.do. 

5,000 
9,000 

38,250 

30,000 

115,500 

Do 

1 

. .do. 

68,850 



Do 

1 

.do. 


50,000 

192,500 


2 

do 

14,000 

107,100 



Supply: 

Jfl commission 

1 

.do. 

55,000 

211,750 

Do 

3 

. .do .... 

18,400 

5,000 

140,760 


Repair (target): 

2 

do 

38,250 




1 

.do 

4,500 

34; 425 



Tender (aircraft),in commission. 
Carrier (aircraft), in commission. 

1 

_do. 

600 

4, 590 

15,000 

57, 750 

1 

..do _ 



26,000 

75,000 

100,100 

2 

...do . 



2S8,750 

Colliers, in commission. 

Oilers: 

8 

9 

.do. 

.do. 

86,300 

659,195 


4.55,900 

1,755,215 

Do 

1 

. _do. 

12,000 

91,800 


Do 

1 

8 months.... 


18,000 

69,300 

Transport cargo, in commission. 
Ammunition ships, in commis¬ 
sion. 

Gunboats: 

In commission. 

Do. 


124 500 

952,425. 
76,500 

445,230 
15,300 
44,370 

2 

14 

1 

2 

.do. 

.do. 

9 months.... 
1 year. 

10', 000 

58,200 
2,000 
5,8()0 

70,000 

15,000 
10JXX) 

269,500 

57,750 

3 -ca; 

Fish Commission, in commission. 
Station craft: 

2 

^ do 

25 000 

191,250 

290,700 



n 

2 

.do.. 

38,000 



Do 

_do. 

19,000 

73,150 


1 

40 

35 

18 

30 

60 

60 

do 

3,000 

22,950 



Experimental, in reserv e. 

Eagles, in reserve. 

Mine sweepers and tugs: 

In commission. 

In reserve. 

Tugs (seagoing): 

In commission (harbor). 

In commission. 

Submarine chasers, in commis- 

do.. 

60,000 

231,000 

do . 



286,000 

1,101,100 

do 



36,000 

138,600 

.do. 

do 

30,000 

229, ,500 

350,000 
20,000 

1,347,500 

77,000 

do 



• 


65,000 

497, 250 



sion. 

Miscellaneous, in commission.... 









894,500 

6,842,925 

5,176, 200 

19,928,370 






















































































































































































184 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

» • i ■ ' . . ' r • 

Principal contracts and Navy orders at present in effect for delivery of coal , fuel oil , ant/ 

gasoline. 

, COAL. 


Contract 
or Navy 
order No. 


Supplier. 


Quantity 

per 

month. 

Principal delivery 
points. 

Present 

delivery 

cost. 

Expiration 

Tons. 

4,649 

Hampton Roads, Va.. 

Per ton. 
$6. 80 

C 1 2 ) 

3,400 

.do. 

6.80 

C 1 ) 

9,050 

.do. 

6.80 

( l ) 

9,200 

.do. 

6. 80 

0) 

10,000 

New York, N. Y. 

7.85 

0) 

1,800 

Hampton Roads, Va.. 

6.80 

C 1 ) 

11,350 


7. 224 

0) 

3,200 

.do. 

6. 80 

0) 

1,300 

.do. 

6.80 

G) 

18,750 

.do. 

7. 20 

G) 

4,250 

.do. 

6.80 

G) 

5,550 

.do. 

7. 40 

0) 

1,700 

New York, N. Y. 

7. 85 

0) 

4,950 

.do. 

7.85 

0) 

1,150 

Philadelphia. Pa. 

New York, N. Y. 

7.43 

0) 

2,850 

8.09 

0) 

200 

Philadelphia, Pa. 

7. 43 

0) 

1,000 

New York, N. Y. 

8.09 

0) 

2,650 

Philadelphia, Pa. 

7. 67 

0) 

750 

New York, N. Y. 

8. 24 

0) 

4,300 

Hampton Roads, Va.. 

7.25 

0) 

950 

Philadelphia, Pa. 

7.63 

0) 

550 

New York, N. Y. 

6.19 

G) 

3,050 

Philadelphia,Pa. 

7. 43 

G> 

2,900 

New York, N. Y. 

7. 85 

G) 

2,350 

.do. 

8.17 

G) 

1,650 

Hampton Roads, Va.. 

7. 24 

G) 

9,580 

Philadelphia, Pa. 

7.91 

G) 

550 

.do. 

7. 83 

G) 

1,050 

.do. 

7. 43 

G) 

1,150 

.do. 

7. 69 

G) 

2,300 

Hampton Roads, Va.. 

7. 43 

G) 

500 

.do. 

7.92 

G) 

1,150 

.do. 

7. 20 

G) 

1,400 


6.80 

G) 

1,100 

New York, N. Y. 

7.85 

G) 

2,250 

Hampton Roads, Va.. 

7.15 

G) 

400 

Philadelphia, Pa. 

7. 43 

G) 

950 

New York, N. Y. 

6.92 

G) 

1,650 

.do. 

8.04 

G) 

1,250 

Philadelphia, Pa. 

7. 25 

G) 

950 

.do. 

7. 79 

G) 

350 

.do. 

7. 82 

G) 

350 

.do. 

7. 68 

G) 

1, 050 

.do. 

7. 75 

G) 

100 

.do. 

7.68 

G) 

2, 550 

.do. 

7. 43 

G) 

250 

Hampton Roads, Va.. 

6.80 

G) 

1,236 

.do. 

6.80 

G) 

500 

.do. 

6.80 

G> 

300 

.do.1 

6.80 

G) 

1,550 

.do.I 

6. 80 

G) 

100 

.do.1 

7.10 

G) 

2,450 

.do. 

6.80 

G) 

150 

.do.1 

6. 80 

G) 

1, 700 


7. 47 

G) 

1, 250 

.do.I 

6.80 

G) 

100 

.do.| 

6.80 

G) 

700 

.do.1 

7.21 

G) 

450 

.do.i 

6.80 

G) 

850 

.do. 

6. 80 

G) 

200 

.do.j 

6. 80 

G) 

350 

.do. 

6. 80 

12, 000 

New Orleans, La. 

2 7.60 

Mar. 31,1921 

108, 000 

Great Lakes, 111. 

8 4. 888 

Mar. 21,1921 


N.O. 6111 
N. O. 6112 
N.O. 6113 
N.O. 6114 


N. O. 
N. O. 
N. O. 
N. O. 
N. O. 
N. O. 
N. O. 
N. O. 
N. O. 
N. O. 
N. O. 
N.O. 


6115 

6116 

6117 

6118 

6119 

6120 
6122 

6123 

6124 

6125 

6126 
6127 


N 0.6128 


N.O 

N. O 

N.O 

N.O 

N. O 

N.O 

N.O 

N.O 

N.O 

N.O 

N.O 

N.O 

N.O 

N.O 

N.O 

N.O. 

N.O. 

N.O. 

N.O. 

N.O. 

N.O. 

N.O. 

N.O. 

N.O. 

N.O. 

N.O. 

N.O. 

N. O 

N.O. 

N.O. 

N.O. 

N. O. 

N.O. 

N.O. 


. 6130 
. 6132 
. 6133 
. 6136 
. 6137 
. 6138 
. 6139 
. 6140 
. 6141 
. 6143 
. 6145 
. 6147 
. 6150 
. 6151 
. 6152 
6153 
6157 
615S 
6181 
6182 

6183 

6184 

6185 
6168 

6191 

6192 
6194 
6239 

6315 

6316 

6317 

6318 

6319 
6322 


N. O. 6324 
N. 0.6327 
N. O. 6328 
N.O. 6330 
N. 0.6331 
N. O. 6334 
N. 0 . 6335 
N. O. 6343 
N.O. 6346 
N. 0.6347 
C. 50S54 
C. 50676 


W. C. Atwater & Co.. 

C. & O. Coal & Coke Co. 

Crozier-Pocahontas Co. 

Ber wind-White Coal Mining 
Co. 

C. G. Blake Co. 

Castner, Curran & Bullitt.... 

C. & O. Coal Agency. 

New River Coal Co. 

Pocahontas Fuel Co. 

Smokeless Fuel Co. 

Houston Coal Co. 

Consolidation Coal Co. 

J. H. Weaver & Co. 

Quemahoning Coal Co. 

Pennsylvania C. & C. Co. 

LoganCoal Co. 

Thorne, Neale & Co. 

Pennsylvania C. & C. Co. 

Flat Top Fuel Co.. 

Imperial Coal Corporation.... 
Henriette Coal Mining Co.... 

Peale, Peacock & Kerr. 

Rock Hill Iron & Coal Co.... 
Stineman Coal & Coke Co.... 
Central Pocahontas Coal Co... 

Davis Coal & Coke Co. 

W. H. Piper & Co. 

Shoemaker Coal Mining Co... 

Inland Coal Co .... 

Pocahontas Coal S. Co. 

Eastern Coal & Export Co.... 
Fayette Smokeless Fuel Co... 

Decide Coal Co. 

Consolidation Coal Co. 

L. A. Snead Co. 

W. H. Bradford & Co. 

W. A. Marshall Co. 

Sterling Coal Co. 

Baker-Whiteley Coal Co. 

Mller Goal Co. 

Hatfield & Hilles. 

Argyle Coal Co. 

Mountain Coal Co. 

Argyle Coal Co. 

C. A. Hughes & Co. 

A. McNeil & Sons Co. (Inc.).. 

Dexter & Carpenter. 

Pawama Coal Co. 

Algonquin Coal Co. 

Raleigh Smokeless Fuel Co... 
Hulmer Coal & Transporta¬ 
tion Co. 

Interstate Coal & Dock Co.... 

Meadow Fork Fuel Co. 

S. J. Patterson Co. 

Wyatt Coal Sales Co. 

Nottingham & Wrenn. 

Milwaukee Coke & Gas Co.... 

Amherst Fuel Co. 

Bottom Creek Coal Co. 

Lanark Coal Co. 

Stover Coal Co. 

W. G. Cojde & Co. 

Chicago, Wilmington & 
Franklin Coal Co. 


1 Navy orders will remain in effect until law provisions revoked or suitable contracts are entered into. 

2 Total amount of contract, $9. 

8 Total amount of contract, $5,336. 

Note.— The above delivery cost per ton includes freight rates of $2.80 per gross ton to Hampton Roads, 
V a .; $3.18 per gross ton to Philadelphia, Pa.; and $3.60 per gross ton to New York, N. Y. Where delivery 
costs of $6.80 per gross ton for delivery at Hampton Roads, $7.85 for delivery at New York, and $7.43 for 
delivery at Philadelphia ae shown, the suppliers concerned have not furnished sufficient data to enable 
modification of orders to cover recent advance in min ers’ wages. 









































































































































































185 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Principal contracts and Nary orders at present in effect for delivery of coal , fuel oil, and 

gasoline —Continued. 

FUEL OIL. 


Contract 
or Navy 
order No. 

Supplier. 

Quantity 

per 

month. 

Principal delivery 
points. 

Present 

delivery 

cost. 

Expiration. 



Barrels. 


Per barrel. 


C-52458 

Standard Oil Co. of California. 

302,625 

San Pedro, Calif. 

$2.00 

Mar. 31,1921 

52460 

Union Oil Co. 

225,000 

Port San Luis. 

2.00 

Do. 

52461 

Associated Oil Co. 

168,750 

San Francisco. 

| 2.00 

Do. 




(Port Costa). 

52463 

General Petroleum Corpora- 

100,875 

San Pedro. 

2.00 

Do. 


tion. 





52477 

Atlantic Refining Co. 

166,000 

Philadelphia. 

3.185 

Sept. 30,1921 

52456 

Gulf Refining Co. 

962,000 

Port Arthur. 

2.45 

Do. 

52457 

Texas Co. 

2,00()’ (XY) 

.do. 

2. 47 

Do. 

52476 

Tidewater Oil Sales Corpora- 

235,000 

New York. 

3.17 

June 30,1921 


tion. 





2853 

New England Oil Corporation. 

3,000,000 

Fall River, Mass. 

3.246 

( 2 ) 


2 Upon completion delivery. Contract renewable for 3,000,000 barrels at unit price of $3 per barrel. 


GASOLINE. 


52459 

Standard Oil Co. of California. 

Gallons. 
543,000 

San Pedro, Calif. 

Per gallon 
$0.255 

Mar. 31, 1921 

52462 

Associated Oil Co. 

250,000 

San Francisco (Avon). 

.245 

Do. 

52469 

Atlantic Refining Co. 

150,000 

Philadelphia, Pa. 

.265 

June 30, 1921 

52470 

Standard Oil Co.of New Jersey 

975,000 

New York. 

.275 

Do.' 

52471 

Standard Oil Co.of New York. 

950,000 

.do. 

.30 

Do. 

52472 

Tidewater Oil Sales Corpo- 

300,000 

.do. 

.2825 

Do. 

52473 

ration. 

Texas Oil Co. 

600, 000 
8,000 

Port Arthur. 

.23 

Do. 

52474 

Magnolia Petroleum Co_ 

Fort Worth, Tex. 

.26 

Do. 

52475 

2853 

Gulf Refining Co. 

170,000 
8, 400, 000 

Key West, fda. 

.30 

Do. 

New England Oil Corporation 

Fall River, Mass. 

.20 

( 3 ) 


3 Upon completion delivery contract renewable for 8,400,000 gallons at $0.20 per gallon. 


“Fuel and transportation , fiscal year 1922.” 

Consumption of fuel according to formula “2 days at sea and 1 day in 
port,” i. e., a vessel steams 100 knots each day at sea at speed of 15 


knots: 

Coal, 894,500 tons, at $7.65. $6, 842, 925. 00 

Fuel oil, 5,176,200 barrels, at $3.85. 19, 928, 370. 00 

Gasoline, 7,744,436 gallons, at 27 cents. 2, 090, 997. 72 

Maintenance of coaling plants. 2,142, 857. 00 

Tug and vessel hire, water, ice and miscellaneous. 3, 977, 600. 00 


Total. 34,982,749.72 


a vessel steams 100 knots each day at sea at speed of 15 knots, as 
submitted bv committee’s instructions: 

Coal, 406,575 tons, at $7.65. 3,110, 298. 00 

Fuel oil, 3,659,048 barrels, at $3.85. 14, 048, 834. 00 

Gasoline, 7,744,436 gallons, at 27 cents. 2, 090, 997. 72 

Maintenance and coaling plants. 2,142, 857. 00 

Tug and vessel hire, water, ice and miscellaneous. 3, 977, 600. 00 


Total.. 25,370,586.72 








































































186 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Consumption of fuel based on "2 days in port and 1 day at sea’’ (as 
stated by Admiral Coontz); i. e., a vessel while at sea steams 24 hours 


each day at economical speed: 

Coal, 805,790 tons, at $7.65.. $6,164, 293. 50 

Fuel oil, 5,958,552 barrels, at $3.85... 22, 940. 425. 20 

Gasoline, 7,744,436 gallons, at 27 cents. 2, 090, 997. 72 

Maintenance for coaling plants. 2,142, 857. 00 

Tug and vessel hire, water, ice and miscellaneous. 3, 977, 600. 00 


Total. 37,316,173.42 


Amount of appropriation bill as reported to House. 17, 500, 000. 00 


STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL D. W. TAYLOR, UNITED 
STATES NAVY. 

The Chairman. We will take up the matter of Bureau of Con¬ 
struction and Repair. 

bureau of construction and repair. 

Admiral Taylor. The first item, Mr. Chairman, under that head¬ 
ing, is on page 31, line 22, an item of $22,500,000. There is a letter 
from the Secretary recommending that it be made $29,400,000. 
Our original estimate for 143,000 men was $35,800,000, as you see. 

When we revised the estimates on the basis of 100,000 men and 
reduced them, we made them $31,400,000, and that was the basis 
of the discussion before the House committee. Included in that 
$31,400,000 was a provision for building yard craft, the construction 
of 10 self-propelled barges which the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts 
is very anxious for and which the Secretary has directed to be in¬ 
cluded in the estimates. 

The House cut that out, leaving in an amount for the keeping in 
condition of hulls of the vessels of the Navy of $29,400,000, accord¬ 
ing to the revised estimate. They cut that to $22,500,000, which is 
entirely too small, and it will be a question of incurring deficiency or 
leaving out very necessary work all through the next year. 

Senator Hale. Is there any letter explaining that? 

Admiral Taylor. There is a letter explaining that and recom¬ 
mending $29,400,000. 

I would like to say that every dollar you add to that $29,400,000 
will be so much help. We ought to have the full amount in order to 
keep the ships in proper condition. 

The Chairman. Does that include money for any new construc¬ 
tion? 

Admiral Taylor. No, sir; it is simply to keep in condition the 
hulls of existing ships, with this exception—— 

The Chairman. The heading of it is “ Construction and repair.” 
It does not include any construction? 

Admiral Taylor. It authorizes the construction of odd craft, such 
as small boats. 

I should explain that included in this item of clerical, drafting, 
etc., that is a matter of statute law which has existed for about 10 
years. 














NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


187 


Page 32, after line 9, add the following provision: 

The statutory limit of $300,000 for repairs and changes to capital ships of the Navy 
as provided in the act making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1917, approved August 29, 1916, is hereby changed to $500,000. 

There is also a letter from the Secretary on that. That statutory 
limit was originally $200,000, which was approximately 5 per cent 
of the cost of a new capital ship at that time. 

The law’ provides that we may spend on any steel ship 20 per cent 
of her cost, except that v'c must not exceed this total limit. The 
result is that on a destroyer costing $1,500,000, in round figures, we 
may spend $300,000, or 20 per cent. 

On a battleship costing $15,000,000 we are at present restricted 
to $300,000, which is only 2 per cent of the cost of the ship. 

The original idea in putting in the $200,000 was to make it not 
more than 5 per cent of the cost. This $500,000 will only he 33 £ per 
cent of the cost of a $15,000,000 ship. 

We are being hampered more or less by that provision. I think 
Admiral Coontz has told me of some troubles that w r e have had- 

Senator Hale. It makes all the ships the same ? 

Admiral Taylor. No, sir: it simply raises the limit for the larger 
ships. We are really held now to 2 per cent, which is inadequate. 
We do not spend that every year, but we would like to put the ships 
in good condition every two or three years. 

The Chairman. Does the letter of the Secretary explain the reason 
for this increase to limitation ? 

Admiral Taylor. Yes, sir. I think the clerk has the letter, sir. 

That is all, Mr. Chairman, except a matter in w r hich Admiral 
Griffin is equally interested- 

The Chairman. Before we go to that we will suspend a moment to 
hear Senator Brandegee. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK B. BRANDEGEE. 

Senator Brandegee. I w r ill speak to the committee but for a few 
moments, Mr. Chairman. I did not realize that you were engaged 
in a hearing. I came because I talked with you yesterday and I 
thought I might get in a w r ord. 

The Chairman. It is very convenient to hear you now. 

Senator Brandegee. Last year, in May, I offered on the floor of 
the Senate an amendment appropriating $50,000 for the completion 
of a submarine base at New London yard. The local commander 
had estimated $130,000 as necessary for the installation of sidewalks 
and railroads to get from one end of the yard to the other, etc. It 
was not a formal estimate by the Secretary of the Navy. Senator 
Sw r anson and others on the floor very kindly allowed an amendment 
to the bill for $50,000. I did not desire to ask for the w'hole $130,000 
because, it not being a formal estimate, I v r as not sure of the neces¬ 
sity of it mvself. It w'ent to conference and was agreed to. 

At that time the admiral who was at the head of the proper bureau 
wrote a letter to Senator Page, chairman of the Naval Affairs Com¬ 
mittee, approving of it, and it was retained in conference. 

This year the Assistant Secretary of the Navy has sent to the com¬ 
mittee a letter recommending $100,000 for the same station, part for 
the purchase of land and part for the completion of these improve- 


188 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


ments. The letter is signed by Assistant Secretary Woodbury. I do 
not care to read it to the committee. 

The amendment is: 

Submarine base, New London, Connecticut: $00,000 toward completion of sub¬ 
marine base; purchase of additional land, $40,000. 

The Chairman. That has been printed, Senator? 

Senator Brandegee. It is a printed amendment introduced by me 
and referred to this committee. The Secretary has written a letter 
indorsing the project, giving an estimate for it and showing what 
it is for. 

It is one of the principal, if not the principal, submarine bases on 
the Atlantic coast. The commandant at the base made an estimate 
last year, and the Secretary has had it reestimated this year, and he 
indorses that $100,000 appropriation. There is here the complete 
estimate made by the commandant last year showing $130,000. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether it is included in the naval 
estimates ? 

Senator Brandegee. No; it is not, but the department has always 
advocated it. Assistant Secretary Roosevelt last year indorsed the 
appropriation of $50,000 and instructed Admiral Parks to write a 
letter in favor of it. 

Senator Swanson. How much land is there ? 

Senator Brandegee. Three tracts of land. 

I ask that the committee give this matter its careful consideration. 

(The amendment referred to by Senator Brandegee and the letter 
of Assistant Secretary Woodbmy with reference thereto are as 
follows:) 

Navy Department. 


My Dear Mr. Chairman: I desire to invite your attention to the importance of 
an appropriation in the current naval bill of $100,000 to continue most urgent items of 
development, and to purchase certain small parcels of land, at the submarine base, 
New London, Conn. 

The funds are required to carry to completion the underground distributing system, 
to continue the building of very necessary roads and walks, to continue laying railroad 
tracks, and to continue the building of necessary minor structures for housing the shop 
and storehouse activities. Sewage-disposal works are also required at this station in 
order that the action of the United States Government at this station may not be out 
of harmony with the sanitary laws of the State of Connecticut. Certain small parcels 
of land, seven in number and privately owned, should be acquired by the Navy. 
They would simplify the naval boundaries, facilitate traffic between the mine base 
and the submarine base, and give the mine base direct access to the water front of the 
submarine base, which it now does not have. The mine-depot land should also be 
continued to Crystal Lake to afford additional security and better policing. In addi¬ 
tion, miscellaneous minor items of improvement are necessary. 

This appropriation would enable the work to be conducted more efficiently, and it 
is estimated that an actual saving in annual operating expense of about $10,000 will 
result when proper distributing lines can be installed. It is recommended that the 
appropriation be worded as follows: 

“Submarine base, New London, Connecticut, toward completion of submarine 
base, $60,000; purchase of additional land, $40,000.” 

Sincerely yours, 


Woodbury, 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy. 

Hon. Carroll S. Page, 

Chairman Naval Affairs Committee , United States Senate. 


189 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


[H. R. 15975, Sixty-sixth Congress, third session.] 


AMENDMENTS Intended to be proppsed by Mr. Brandegee to the bill (H. R. 15975) making appropria¬ 
tions for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1922, and for other purposes, vie: At the 
proper place insert the following: * * ’ 


Submarine base, New London, Connecticut: Toward the completion of a sub¬ 
marine base at New London, Connecticut, $60,000. 

For the purchase of additional land, $40,000. 

The Chairman. We will hear from you further, Admiral Taylor. 


STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL D. W. TAYLOR—Continued. 


Admiral Taylor. I will refer to page 45, 11 Increase of the Navy.” 

I just want to say one word, Mr. Chairman, about the situation. It 
ought to be in the record, I think. There was a good deal of dis¬ 
cussion before the House committee as to the rates at which we 
would make progress, etc. 

Referring to the items “ Increase of the Navy, construction and 
machinery,” and “ Increase of the Navy, torpedo boats,” they both 
cover the same field. The total amount which we will have available 
for the 19 months from the 1st of December—I am talking now of 
actual balances—‘this appropriation will be $146,000,000, which 
means an average expenditure of seven and two-thirds million dollars 
per month. 

For the five preceding months, from the beginning of last July up 
to trie 1st of December, the total expenditure was a little over 
$45,000,000, or $9,000,000 per month. So that the result of this will 
be a real slowing down from the $9,000,000 per month which we spent 
for the first five months this year to an average of seven and two- 
thirds millions per month. 

The figure which is provided in the bill is only a little over one-half 
of what we would normally spend if the money were available. 

The Chairman. Do you know how the House arrived at the con¬ 
clusion that this would enable you to proceed at the same rate of 
construction as you did last year ? 

Admiral Taylor. Because last year we did not proceed at such a 
rate as we have been proceeding this year. We were spending last 
year largely in finishing destroyers and other things out of other appro¬ 
priations, and we were just beginning to start to spend largely on 
this program. It is a real slowing down, and as I understand the 
situation we will have a good deal of difficulty in meeting con¬ 
tractors and dealing with them, and we hope to get the support of 
you gentlemen. 

Senator Hale. You do not expect an increase in the amount of 
the nine millions ? 

Admiral Taylor. We are not expecting that, sir. That amount 
would have to be increased in connection with the airplane carriers 
if they are authorized. That is already provided for in the amend¬ 
ment which the clerk has. 

The only other matter that we have further is on page 46, after 
line 5, where we ask to have inserted: 

The limits of cost of vessels heretofore authorized and below enumerated are 
increased as follows: 

Battleship No. 44, from $12,750,000 to $14,750,000. 

Battleship No. 46. from $15,000,000 to $16,000,000. 


190 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


These battleships are approaching completion, and we find that to 
complete them it will be necessary to increase the limit of cost. We 
are not asking at this time to have the limits raised on the later ships, 
because we are on a falling market, and we do not like to have the 
limit any bigger than is absolutely necessary. One shipyard has 
recently, on the 14th of February, reduced its wages 10 per cent and 
made other changes, which enables us to hope that there will be a 
real reduction in later vessels, but these to which I refer are so near 
completion that they will not get the benefit of the falling market. 

I have nothing more, Mr. Chairman. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT S. GRIFFIN, UNITED 
STATES NAVY. 

Admiral Griffin. On page 32, line 21,1 would like to have inserted, 
and the Secretary has written a letter to that effect, after the last 
word and before the semicolon, the words “ including not to exceed 
$2,500 for the purchase of land necessary for radio shore stations. 

This appropriation bill has always carried a provision of that kind. 
Last year the limitation was $20,000. It is very necessary to have 
a small amount of money in case we have to purchase land to estab¬ 
lish a shore radio station. Just now we are establishing a great many 
stations. The expenditures are small, but it is necessary to have 
something, otherwise we would not be able to do it. Last year I 
think we spent only $1,100 for that purpose. It does not increase 
the appropriation. 

The Chairman. Have you prepared an amendment? 

Admiral Griffin. Yes, sir; and the Secretary has written a letter 
with reference to it. 

The Chairman. Where do you propose to insert it? 

Admiral Griffin. In line 21, on page 32, after the last word and 
before the semicolon. 

On page 33, line 15, we would like to have an increase from 
$20,500,000 to $28,000,000. The Secretary has written a letter re¬ 
questing that. The original estimate, based on 143,000 men was 
$33,670,000. When a reduction to 100,000 men was contemplated 
I made a new estimate of $30,625,000. The House bill carries only 
$20,500,000. We will not be able on that to keep the machinery of 
the fleet in repair and do the other work that we have to do. The 
ships will pile up in the yards for repairs which the yards will be 
unable to give them. 

Furthermore, 1 may say in connection with that $28,000,000 that 
I had not contemplated that Congress was going to reenact the 
bonus for navy yard employees, which has been done, and which 
will add about- 

The Chairman. Does the pay of those employees come under this 
item ? 

Admiral Griffin. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. No. Any bonus that goes to the Navy people 
is taken into consideration. The bonus is paid out of the appropria¬ 
tion carried in that bill. 

Admiral Griffin. In which bill, Senator, the legislative bill ? 

Senator Swanson. Yes, sir. They make a lump sum there which 
pays the amount they fix for the bonus. 



NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


191 


Admiral Griffin. I thought it applied to the clerical employees. 

Senator Swanson. It applies to them too, as I understand it. 

Admiral Griffin. Then that will be all right. 

Senator Swanson. They have a lump sum that covers the appro¬ 
priation. 

The Chairman. Are you sure about that. Senator ? 

Senator Swanson. I am sure of it, Senator. The Secretary has 
written a letter on that basis and it has been put into the record. 

Admiral Griffin. Between lines 15 and 16 I would like to have 
inserted a provision which was contained, in the estimates but which 
Mr. Kelley would not consider because it was legislation, and as the 
Naval Committee of the House did not hold a hearing on this appro¬ 
priation it does not appear in the legislative bill; that is, an appropria¬ 
tion for the reengining or renewal of the engines of certain sub¬ 
marines, L-l to L-Jf., L-9 to L-ll, and M-t, making eight sub¬ 
marines in all, $2,000,000 being required for the eight. 

The reason for that is that those engines were designed 10 years 
ago when the knowledge of Diesel engine design was very limited. 
Tne engines are the same as those in the K-boats. 

We recognized at the beginning of the war that those engines 
would not do, and we started to build new engines for them. We 
completed them during the war, but as the boats were engaged in 
service at the time they were not installed until after the armistice. 
They have now been installed and the boats have been in commission 
and are proving very satisfactory. 

These engines are identical in design with the ones replaced in the 
K-boats and they should be replaced for the same reason, as the 
boats are now of no military value. They have been laid up on 
account of engine troubles. 

The Chairman. Will they be of military value if these new engines 
are put into them ? 

Admiral Griffin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What is their radius of action ? 

Admiral Griffin. About 4,000 or 5,000 miles. 

The Chairman. How about the submarines that we have already 
constructed ? 

Admiral Griffin. Those S-boats, you are referring to ? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Griffin. There have been troubles with the engines also. 
It is a mechanical difficulty that can be corrected and the contractors 
are proceeding along that* line now. It is something that the con¬ 
tractors will have to make good. We have refused to accept those 
boats with the engines as they now are, and the contractor is required 
to make good. He is proceeding with the work now. 

The Chairman. How many of those are there?. 

Admiral Griffin. All together there are 31 involved, 1 think. 

The Chairman. They have not been accepted, then? 

Admiral Griffin. One has been accepted preliminarily, but not 
finally. 

The Chairman. You think the difficulty can be remedied? 

Admiral Griffin. Oh, yes; it is susceptible of remedy. 

The Chairman. What is the next item, Admiral? 

Admiral Griffin. The next item goes back to a provision that has 
appeared in the naval appropriation bill for the past three or four 


192 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


years. It has been an appropriation for the investigation of fuel 
oil and other fuel, and for other purposes. 

The Chairman. That should go in under “Fuel,” should it not? 

Admiral Griffin. No; it belongs before “Contingent,” on page 
4—any place along there it should go in. 

We have always had a provision for about $30,000 to carry on this 
work. It covers the employment in the field of the people who are 
looking out for the naval reserves in California and for certain ex¬ 
penses at the fuel-oil testing plant in Philadelphia. 

The Secretary has written a letter on the subject which is before 
your committee. We consider it very necessary that that should be 
incorporated, 

The Chairman. What amount is that?. 

Admiral Griffin. $30,000. 

The Chairman. You regard that as important? 

Admiral Griffin. It is very important now, because of the fuel 
situation and the price of oil. It is very necessary that we investi¬ 
gate questions involved in the burning of lower grade oils. It is 
difficult to get those lower grade oils which wifi meet our requirements 
of smokeless combustion, so that we have to experiment along that 
line to devise means for doing it. 

That is all, sir. 

STATEMENT OF J. A. LEJEUNE, MAJOR GENERAL COM¬ 
MANDANT UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS. 

Gen. Lejeune. Mr. Chairman, the question before the Marine 
Corps is the amount of money necessary to support them, and I 
would like to have Admiral Coontz say a few words about it and 
about the number of men that we should have in the Marine Corps. 

The Chairman. We would be very glad to hear anything that 
Admiral Coontz wishes to state in regard to the matter. 

Admiral Coontz. I have not very much to say on the subject, 
Senator, except that I realize that they are going to be cut down as 
the Navy apparently is, and my suggestion would be to carry out 
the rule that the Marine Corps should have one-fifth the number that 
we have in the Navy. That has been the rule, I think, for some time. 
Whatever the Navy gets, the marines will have to try to get along 
with that percentage. We work very closely together on that and 
as to all the details of the various ships and stations, and so on, and 
practically all of our business is transacted along those lines. 

The marines were allowed 27,500 men, while the Navy was allowed 
143,000. So that whether we have 120,000 or 110,000 or 100,000, 
my suggestion would be to give them their regular percentage of that 
amount. 

Gen. Lejeune. The appropriation bill as passed by the House, 
Mr. Chairman, purports to appropriate for 20,000 enlisted men of 
the Marine Corps and the full quota of officers. As a matter of fact, 
while the appropriation under the heading of the Paymaster’s De¬ 
partment is sufficient for 20,000 men, the amounts under the different 
subheads of the Quartermaster’s Department are sufficient for only 
approximately 15,000 men, and under every subhead except the one 
item, “Repair to barracks,” the amount is insufficient for 20,000 men. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


193 


The Secretary of the Navy has written a letter to the chairman of 
the committee in which he points out the deficiencies under these 
different subheads and asks also that the proviso which has been 
contained in the bill for the last eight years, but which was struck 
out this year, making appropriation under the various subheads of 
the Quartermaster’s Department one fund, be restored to the bill. 
It is extremely difficult to administer these small sums under the 
subheads. 

The Chairman. What limitation of personnel, if any, is fixed by 
this bill ? 

Gen. Lejeune. Twenty thousand, sir. There is no limitation in 
the text, any more than there was a limitation in the text for the 
Navy, but on the back of page 37 it says: 

The authorized enlisted strength of the Marine Corps is fixed by law at 27,400 men, 
and the officer strength is limited to 4 per cent of the total authorized enlisted strength. 

The accompanying bill appropriates for a force of 20,000 enlisted men, the number 
appropriated for for the current year, and for the entire number of commissioned offi¬ 
cers which the law authorizes. 

That is a statement that was contained in the report of the Appro¬ 
priations Committee of the House. 

The Chairman. It does not change the authorized strength ? 

Gen. Lejeune. It does not change the authorized strength at all, 
sir. The authorized strength remains fixed by law, 27,400 men. 

Senator Hale. You say that this does not appropriate a sufficient 
amount? 

Gen. Lejeune. I say it purports to appropriate for 20,000 men, 
but as a matter of fact, under the Quartermaster’s Department the 
appropriation is only sufficient for 15,000 men. I nder the Pay¬ 
master's Department it is sufficient for 27,000 men. 

Senator Swanson. The situation in the House, as I understand it, 
was that they could not change existing law. The existing law 
provided for 27,500 men, and that is the reason for that. 

Gen. Lejeune. Just as they did in the Navy. The strength of the 
Navy is 143,000, and they have appropriated only enough money 
for 100,000. 

Senator Swanson. They did not change the law? 

Gen. Lejeune. They did not change the law at all. It is a ques¬ 
tion of money, entirely, in this bill. 

Senator Swanson . Let me ask you how many men the Marine 
Corps would have if the Navy is put at 120,000. 

Gen. Lejeune. Twenty-four thousand men. 

Senator Swanson. And if it is put at 110,000? 

Gen. Lejeune. Twenty-two thousand men. 

Senator Swanson. In 'making it 22,000 men and fixing up the 
corps there would be an odd number. That would not make any 
difference in the organization of the corps, would it ? 

Gen. Lejeune. 1 would like to make a statement in regard to that 
matter. 

I would like to bring to the attention of the committee the fact 
that 20,000 enlisted men are inadequate to enable the Marine Corps 
to-perform the duties assigned to it. In addition to what may be 
termed its ordinary duties, it has two missions of great importance 
to fulfill. First and foremost is the war mission with the fleet. The 


34772—21-13 


194' 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922, 


fleet can not operate without bases. When the fleet has passed 
beyond its own shores and its own possessions, it will become neces¬ 
sary to seize advance or temporary base^. 

The primary war mission of the Marine Cops is to seize, occupy, 
fortify, and defend such bases. The force to engage in this duty is 
termed an advance-base force. It should consist of infantry, machine 
guns, artillery (heavy and light), signal, engineers, portable search¬ 
light and other technical organizations. This force must be ready 
to embark and to sail with the fleet immediately upon the outbreak 
of war or when war appears to be imminent. It can not be recruited, 
organized, and trained after the emergency arises. It must be trained 
to the minute, and it must be constantly prepared for prompt and 
vigorous action. 

In peace this force is used for expeditionary duty in various parts 
of the world. 

The Marine Corps has been used as a kind of international police 
force since the time of its organization by practically every adminis¬ 
tration that has been in power, particularly since the Spanish- 
American war. Expeditionary forces have been sent to various 
places. It is a kind of an international police and fire department 
which our Government has used from time to time. This advance- 
base force which I have spoken of as being under training is always 
in readiness, and unless we have it we have not anything to use. 

A strength of 20,000 is insufficient to provide this force. The table 
of complements approved by the Navy Department distributes the 
Marine Corps approximately as follows: 


Foreign and sea service.. 9, 000 

Aviation. 1,000 

Guard duty at navy yards, ammunition depots, radio, submarine, and air sta¬ 
tions, etc., in United States.. 4 , 000 

Recruits under training... 3* 000 

Recruiting duty, permanent detachments at training stations, clerks at head¬ 
quarters, staff offices, etc. 2,000' 

Ineffectives, such as men en route to and from foreign stations, sick in hospitals, 
etc... 500 

That makes a total of 19,500. With 20,000 we have just 500 men 


for the advance, base or expeditionary forces, which is our real pre¬ 
paredness force and which is a force "that we have to use in case of 
any emergency arising anywhere in time of peace. The strength of 
this force should be approximately 8,000 men. 

From the above, it will be seen that a reduction to 20,000 men 
means practically the disbandment of the force which is intended to 
carry out the primary war mission of the corps. It means that the 
historic regiments, the Fifth and Sixth Marines, which served over¬ 
seas will cease to exist. I can not urge too earnestly or too strongly 
the importance of maintaining the Marine Corps at sufficient strength 
to enable it to be in readiness to fulfill its mission should an emergency 
arise. 

The Chairman. Can we not maintain the Fifth and Sixth Marines 
and make a proportionate reduction by skeletonizing the organiza¬ 
tion? 

Gen. Lejeune. We would have to skeletonize the organization by 
any reduction below- 

The Chairman. If you skeletonize the organization would it be 
necessary to disband the Fifth and Sixth ? 









NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


195 


Gen. Lejeune. We could not keep them at 20,000 men, because 
they are used for other purposes; 19,500 men are used for other 
purposes, and those forces have been reduced down to the bone. 

When I was appointed commandant I took up right away the 
establishment of complements at shore stations in the United States, 
and with a view of reducing them I detailed an officer of experience who 
visited all the stations and who made a study of it. I then appointed 
a board, of wffiich he was the senior member, and my instructions to 
the board w T ere to cut them down as much as they could. They 
actually cut them down to 2,000 men. That is what we are working 
on now. Every day I get letters from some station urging an increase 
of their complement. I had one yesterday from Mare Island. It 
was a most urgent request for men to look out for the different activi¬ 
ties at that point. Every one of these requests I have had to refuse 
because we have not the men to give them. 

So that even if w T e do not increase any. of these complements, which 
already represent a reduction of what we had up to the 30th of last 
June, we still use up 20,000 men. There is no room for any further 
curtailing. 

Our advance base force has to learn how to handle heavy guns. 
They have got to get them on the transport within 24 hours after an 
emergency arises; sail with all their outfit, landing at some place 
where there are no docking facilities, handle these guns, lower them 
into boats, and lower them ashore, get them on the beach, transport 
them to a land position, mount them, establish a fire control, and be 
in readiness to use them on a few hours’ notice, which requires lots 
of practice. 

The Chairman. What caliber of guns ? 

Gen. Lejeune. We are handling 6-inch guns. We may go up to 
7-inch guns if we can get them on board ship. 

We have to have with those men infantry, of course, to hold the 
landing places, also machine-gun units and light artillery. We have 
to have companies trained in the use of light artillery and signal corps 
work, which is all communication work, connecting up all the dif¬ 
ferent detachments at the base, and the engineer organizations which 
are required for building bridges and roads and various things that 
engineers do. Then there is the question of portable searchlights 
for the purpose of illuminating the beaches so as to be able to prevent 
landings at night. We tried a great many of those things out in 1914 
and got a pretty good line on what we had to do. The war has shown, 
in fact, it has been known always, that a base is a necessity to the 
fleet, and that we must have a military force to defend it; and if you 
do not have us you have got to have somebody else. 

Senator Hale. Can you not cut down the 19,500 proportionately? 

Gen. Lejeune. I might say, Senator, that that represents a cut. 
I do not see how we can cut it any further. 

Senator Swanson. How do you divide them up ? 

Gen. Lejeune. Nine thousand at foreign stations, 1,000 in avia¬ 
tion, 4,000 at shore stations in the United States, 3,000 recruits 
under training—we might reduce them a little—2,000 men who do 
the Marine Corps overhead work, the permanent detachment at the 
training stations, and we have to have noncommissioned officers at 
power plants to run machinery at different stations. We have them 
at Quantico. Also we have to have men on recruiting duty. A 
large part of our clerical force at staff offices, depots, and so forth, aro 


196 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


furnished by enlisted men. We always have from five hundred to a 
thousand men who are ineffectives, sick in hospitals, or traveling 
back and forth, or in confinement subject to court-martial. A cer¬ 
tain percentage of men are going back and forth at sea to the Far 
East or to Haiti or to Santo Domingo or Cuba. 

Senator Swanson. Flow many have you on various duties in the 
United States ? 

Gen. Lejeune. Four thousand men. 

Senator Swanson. Where else have you men in foreign service ? 

Gen. Lejeune. Some in Cuba. We have about 500 men in Cuba. 

In Peking we have 350 men. In Hawaii we have about 400, and in 
Guam we have 500. 

Senator Hale. We are obliged to cut down the personnel of the 
Army and the Navy. 

Gen. Lejeune. We would like to have the whole force, but I 
realize the necessity of economy just as much as you gentlemen do, 
and we will get along with what you have to give us. I do hope that 
you will give us over that amount. 

Senator Sw T anson. You want us to keep up the one-fifth propor¬ 
tion ? 

Gen. Lejeune. We will do the best we can with whatever you 
give us. 

Senator Hale. That will be 22,000 if the naval strength is 110,000 
men, and 24,000 if the naval strength is 120,000 men? 

Gen. Lejeune. We will get along with it and be able to keep our 
nucleus for training purposes. 

The Chairman. Two thousand would make quite a difference? 

Gen. Lejeune. The difference between 500 and 2,500 is tremen¬ 
dous. 

Senator Hale. Can you show us, General, where these items are 
lacking in making appropriations for 20,000 men ? 

Gen. Lejeune. Yes, sir; I have the figures here. 

The Chairman. Can you file a paper for the record showing what 
changes would be needed in the different items for the different 
estimated force ? 

Gen. Le.jEUNe. Yes, sir; I have the whole thing right here, sir. 
Here is the paymaster’s estimate. Lie did not come down because 
there was nothing to change. There is another one that goes with 
that. 

The Chairman. Give them to the reporter and include them in the 
record. 

(The papers referred to are as follows:) 


Estimates, maintenance, Quartermaster's Department, Marine Corps, 192%. 


Subheads. 

20,000 men. 

21,000 men. 

22,000 men. 

22,500 men. 

Provisions 1 .... 

$4,796,402 
1,856,690 
1,000,000 
757,400 
946,000 
450,000 
120,000 
3,185,200 

$5,015,402 
2,000,000 
1,006,000 
757,400 
1,006,500 
450,000 
120,000 
3,385,000 

$5,234,402 
2,000,000 
1,012,000 
825,000 
1,066,000 
450,000 
120,000 
3,585,000 

$5,343,902 
2,000,000 
1,015,000 
825.000 
1,096,000 
450,000 
120,000 
3,685,000 

Clothing 2 . 

Fuel. 

Military stores 2 . 

Transportation and recruiting. 

Repairs of barracks. 

Forage..... 

Contingent. 

Total. 

13,111,692 

13,740,302 

14,292,402 

14, 534,902 



1 60-cent ration. 

3 Does not represent cost of clothing a marine, as stock on hand is taken into consideration. 




















NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 1§7 


Estimates, maintenance. Quartermaster's Department, Marine Corps, 1922 —Con. 


Subheads. 

23,000 men. 

24,000 men. 

25,000 men. 

27,400 men. 

Provisions 1 .. 

$5, 453,402 
2,000,000 
1.018,000 
825,000 
1,126,500 
450,000 
120,000 
3,785,000 

$5,672,402 
2,250,000 
1,024,000 
900,000 
1,186,000 
475,000 
120,000 
3,985,000 

$6,011,852 
2,250,000 
1,030,000 
900,000 
1,246,500 
475,000 
120,000 
4,185,000 

$6,537,452 
2,500,000 
1,042,000 
1,000,000 
1,367,500 
500,000 
120,000 
4,585,000 

Clothing 2 . 

Fuel. 

Military stores 2 . 

Transportation and recruiting. 

Repairs of barracks. 

Forage. 

Contingent. 

Total. 

14,777,902 

15,612,402 

16,218,352 

17,651,952 



1 60-cent ration. 

2 Does not represent cost of clothing a marine, as stock on hand is taken into con¬ 
sideration. 


February 7, 1921. 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT. 

Subject: Estimates, pay, Marine Corps, 1922. 

1. To provide for increases as indicated below, H. R. 15975, should be amended as 
follows: 

For 21,000 enlisted men, change $11,550,300.76, line 25, page 38, to $12,075,000; 
and $17,533,891.90, line 3, page 41, to $18,058,591.14. 

For 22,000 enlisted men, change $11,550,300.76, line 25, page 38, to $12,595,000; 
and $17,533,891.90, line 3, page 41, to $18,578,591.14. 

For 23,000 enlisted men, change $11,550,300.76, line 25 page 38, to $13,110,000 
and $17,533,891.90, line 3, page 41, to $19,093,591.14. 

For 24,000 enlisted men, change $11,550,300.76, line 25, page 38, to $13,620,000; 
and $17,533,891.90, line 3, page 41, to $19,603,591.14. 

For 25,000 enlisted men, change $11,550,300.76, line 25, page 38, to $14,105,000; 
and $17,533,891.90, line 3, page 41, to $20,088,591.14. 

For 27,400 enlisted men, change $11,550,300.76, line 25, page 38, to $15,408,680.50; 
and $17,533,891.90, line 3, page 41, to $21,392,271.64. 

February 8, 1921. 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT. 

Subject: Estimates, pay, Marine Corps, 1922. 

1. To provide for an enlisted strength of 22,500 men, H. R. 15975 should be amended 
as follows: Change $11,550,300.76, line 25, page 38, to $12,852,500, and $17,533,891.90, 
line 3, page 41, to $18,836,091.14. 


February 16, 1921. 

My Dear Senator: I deem it my duty to submit, for vour information, a statement 
concerning the effect on the Marine Corps of the provisions relating to the Marine 
Corps which are contained in the naval appropriation bill as passed by the House of 
Representatives on February 14, 1921. 

The amount allotted to the Marine Corps for the Paymaster’s Department, m the 
bill as passed by the House, $17,533,891.90, is sufficient for the needs of that depart¬ 
ment for 20,000 men. 

The amounts allotted under the various subheads to the Quartermaster s Depart¬ 
ment with th e exception of the item * ‘ R epair to barracks, ’ ’ are not enough to maintain 
the Marine Corps at an enlisted strength of 20,000 men. If the lump-sum system oi 
making the appropriation were continued, it would, with most rigid economy, suppoi t 
approximated 15,000 enlisted men. However, your attention is inMted to the fact 
that the provision which has heretofore appeared in the annual appropriation bills 
under the heading “Maintenance, Quartermaster’s Department, Marine Coys, 
constituting the monev appropriated for that department as one fund, has been 
eliminated from the bill as passed bv the House. fjnless this clause be restored, the 
difficulties of administering the Quartermaster’s Department will be greatly increased 
and a deficiencv will inevitably be caused in some of the subheads, as it, is impossible, 
on account of the various duties of the Marine Corps, and on account ot the lact, that 
it is so widely scattered in all parts of the world, to accurately estimate in advance the 
exact amount necessary under each subhead. 
























198 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Heretofore when the entire appropriation constituted one fund, it was possible to 
prevent the creation of deficiencies in the various subheads, provided the total amount 
appropriated was sufficient to meet the needs of the corps, as surplus funds under 
some of the subheads could be utilized to provide for deficiencies under others. It is 
strongly urged that this provision be restored to the bill. If this be done it will not 
only have the tendency to prevent deficiencies but will greatly simplify accounting 
and the disbursement of public funds, and will be in the interest of an economical 
administration of the Quartermaster’s Department. 

Under the subhead ‘‘Provisions, ” the amount contained in the bill as passed by the 
House is $3,958,950. In that bill the cost of the ration for the ensuing fiscal year is 
fixed at 50 cents per diem per man. At that rate the item for provisions should be 
increased to $4,148,527. At present the cost of the ration is approximately 68 cents 
per diem. 

Clothing: The amount contained in the bill, $1,000,000, is not sufficient to clothe 
20,000 men. Taking into consideration the stock of clothing now on hand, this item 
should be $1,856,690. While there is a considerable stock of clothing on hand, the 
intermediate sizes, which are the ones used by a large majority of enlisted men, have 
been exhausted, making it necessary to manufacture these sizes. 

Fuel: The amount contained in the appropriation bill is $590,000. This item 
should be $1,000,000. Unless increased a deficiency will be certain in this item. 

Military stores: The amount contained in the appropriation bill is $500,000. This 
should be $757,400. In this connection your attention is invited to the fact that there 
has been included in the bill under this subhead an allotment of $125,000 for voca¬ 
tional schools. This item was approved by the subcommittee of the House in the 
hearings, and if authorized will reduce the funds available for military stores proper 
to $375,000 unless the appropriation be increased as herein requested. This amount 
manifestly will not meet the needs of the corps. 

Transportation and recruiting: The amount contained in the bill is $750,000. It 
should be $946,000. 

Repair of barracks: The amount contained in the bill under the subhead ‘ 1 Repair 
of barracks, ’ ’ $450,000, is equal to the amount estimated to be necessary. 

Forage: The amount contained in the bill is $100,000. It should be $120,000. The 
estimates for this item were based not on men but on animals actually now in use, 
and any reduction will necessitate either disposing of animals in use by expeditionary 
companies in the field or in the creation of a deficiency. 

Contingent: The amount contained in the bill is $2,000,000. It should be $3,185,200 
This item is an extremely important one, as it provides for a vast number of absolute 
necessities, chiefly the ordinary comforts of life for enlisted men. Under the law a 
deficiency under this subhead can not be created, and unless a sufficient amount be 
appropriated it will be impracticable to keep the corps at a strength of 20,000 enlisted 


The original estimates submitted by the Quartermaster for his department, on a 
basis of 20,000 men, have been gone over carefully and every not absolutely necessary 
expense eliminated, causing a reduction of nearly $4,000,000 to $12,463,817. This is 
an irreducible minimum, and any decrease in this amount can only result in either 
creating a deficiency or in reducing the strength of the corps to below 20,000 men. 

Your attention is invited to the following provisions, contained in lines 16 to 22 of 
the appropriation bill as passed by the House: 

“That no part of any appropriation contained in this act shall be used for the pur¬ 
chase of passenger-carrying automobiles: Provided further , That expenditures from 
appropriations contained in this act for the maintenance, operation, and repair of 
motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicles, including the compensation of operators, 
shall not exceed $150,000.” 

It is recommended that this proviso be amended by adding thereto the following: 

“This shall not apply to the motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicles operating 
with Marine Corps expeditionary forces in the field outside of the continental limits of 
the United States.” 

Under the wording as now contained in the bill as passed by ihe House it is appli¬ 
cable to all motor transportation of the Marine Corps, and unless such application is 
removed it will greatly handicap the operations of the corps in Cuba, Haiti, Santo 
Domingo, and such other places in the field where it may be called on to serve. 

Very sincerely, 


Hon. Carroll S. Page, 

Chairman Committee on Naval Affairs , 

United States Senate. 


Josephus Daniels, 
Secretary of the Navy. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


199 


Gen. Lejeune. Before I stop, Mr. Chairman, there are one or two 
other little things that I would like to speak of. In this legislative 
act, H. R. 15994, on page 4, lines 6 and 7, it prohibits the expendi¬ 
ture of any money for aviation on land not owned by the Govern¬ 
ment. That is the intent of it. Our aviation activity is very largely 
in foreign countries. Whenever we have an expedition we have to 
take our aviation unit along with us and they have to squat somewhere 
in foreign countries. We do not own land and we have to spend some 
money in order that the aviation may function. Our station down at 
Quantico is on rented ground and we would have to close that up. 

The Chairman. I suppose it is that very thing, the fact that you 
built a great camp down there on rented ground, that caused hte 
House to put in that provision. 

Gen. Lejeune. I do not know what caused the House to put it in. 

The Chairman. They probably wanted to avoid a repetition of it. 

Gen. Lejeune. I think it is a bad principle to spend money on 
rented ground, but this place is down there and they have spent 
several hundred thousand dollars on it. 

Senator Swanson. You own all of it except- 

Gen. Lejeune. Except that little plot of land where the aviation 
is. We own Quantico itself. 

The Chairman. I understood you to say it was all rented ? 

Gen. Lejeune. Oh, no; the post is on Government land. 

Senator Swanson. Was there a provision in last year’s bill, or the 
year before, for operation in foreign countries of the Marine Corps 
in connection with aviation ? 

Gen. Lejeune. Not that I know of. 

Senator Swanson. I know it was discussed. This same thing was 
in the bill last year. We cut it out last year. After it came oyer 
from the House we cut it out on account of your operating in foreign 


countries. 

Gen. Lejeune. I was not here at the hearings last year. Down in 
Haiti and Santo Domingo now we have two units and they are very 
useful. 

Senator Swanson. You would not want to buy land there? 

Gen. Lejeune. No, sir. We spent some money in training the 
men and putting up temporary establishments. 

The Chairman. You do not put up any permanent establishments 
there ? 

Gen. Lejeune. Absolutely nothing of a permanent nature. 

Senator Swanson. The bill in the House last year would not even 
allow you to rent some land for tents down in Haiti? 

Gen. Lejeune. That is what this will result in, too, if it goes 

through. , . 

There is another thing, Mr. Chairman. The Marine Corps warrant 
officers were authorized in 1916. It is provided that they have the 
same pay and allowances as warrant officers of the Navy, but there 
is no provision which permits of their promotion to chief warrant 
rank as is done in connection with the Navy. So this year the 
Secretary of the Navy wrote a letter to this committee and asked 
for a bill incorporating that provision. The bill was introduced 
by Senator Page, at his request, and it simply does justice to theso 
men. It will cause no increase in the appropriation whatever at 
this session. It simply puts them on the same footing. 



200 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Senator Hale. Where will that go in ? 

Gen. Lejeune. Just before the Quartermaster’s Department is 
reached, page 38. 

(Gen. Lejeune submitted a letter in this connection, which is as 
follows:) 

Navy Department, 
Washington , December 9, 1920. 

My Dear Mr. Page: I have the honor to recommend that you introduce a bill 
reading as follows: 

‘ That warrant officers of the Marine Corps shall be commissioned chief warrant 
officers under the same conditions, and shall haA'e the same rank, pay, allowances, 
and other benefits, as are now or may hereafter be prescribed by law for commis¬ 
sioned warrant officers of the Navy. That pay clerks are graded as warrant officers 
with the same rank, pay, allowances, and other benefits as are above provided for 
other warrant officers of the Marine Corps, and provided that nothing herein contained 
shall be construed to reduce the pay. allowances, emoluments, or any other benefits 
that any person now in the service would have received but for the passage of this 
act. ” 

The purpose of this legislation is to place warrant officers of the Marine Corps in 
the same status as regards rank, pay, allowances, and other benefits, as warrant offi¬ 
cers of the Navy enjoy. Similar proposed legislation failed of passage last year; it 
is recommended again in order that justice may be done to these officers. 

Josephus Daniels. 

Senator Carroll S. Page, 

Chairman Naval Affairs Committee, Washington, D , C. 

Gen. Lejeune. There is another item in the bill that I want to say 
a word about. It is not ordinarily my affair, but it affects the 
Marine Corps very vitally. 

On page 46 of the appropriation bill there occurs this clause: 

Provided, That no part of this appropriation can be expended except on vessels now 
being constructed or heretofore contracted for. 

That will eliminate the construction of transport No. 2 , which was 
commissioned in the 1916 building program. The Henderson was 
the first one built. We have men down in Haiti and Santo Domingo 
and Cuba and are likely to have them in other places. We have 
always had them, and the only transports available for the use both 
of the Navy and the Marine Corps are the Henderson and the Hancock. 
The Hancock is an old ship which has been reported as being unsea¬ 
worthy. She is a single-screw ship, without any double bottoms. 
Her machinery is practically worn out and she is absolutely unsafe 
to carry men around stormy waters- 

The Chairman. Why can you not get a ship from the Shipping 
Board that will serve the purpose ? 

Gen. Jejeune. Admiral Coontz will tell you that the Secretary of 
the Navy and he have made every effort to get ships, not only from 
the Shipping Board but from the War Department, and have been 
turned down repeatedly. Each one says they have no ships they can 
let us have without paying for them. 

The Chairman. As a matter of fact, what I thought you were going 
to say when I asked you that was that the Shipping Board ships are 
not adapted for transport service. They are not, are they ? 

Gen. Lejeune. They would have to be converted at an expendi¬ 
ture of a considerable sum. But we have not been able to get them. 

Senator Swanson. The transportation that we have to Guam and 
Porto Rico and to the Philippine Islands and China justify us in 
having first-class transport ships ? 



NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


2G1 


Gen. Lejeune. Absolutely. The Hancock has got to go out of 
service in the next few months, and we will have only one transport. 
Gen. McCauley will give you the details. 

Senator Swanson. Have you taken it up with the Secretary of the 
N avy at all ? 

Gen. Lejeune. Yes, sir; repeatedly at conferences. Admiral 
Coontz has brought it up and we have all chimed in. 

Admiral Coontz. Senator, it is just a case of putting it off. It 
should be done. We run some old tubs out to various places. We 
really need a first-class ship. 

Senator Hale. If you could get one of these fine new ships that the 
Shipping Board has you would not object to it? 

Admiral Coontz. We would not object if we can get it fixed up. 

Senator Hale. It could be fixed up so that it would be all right ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes. 

The Chairman. Did you cover in the papers you have put in all the 
different changes ? 

Gen. McCauley. The papers filed with the stenographer, Mr. 
Chairman, cover the amounts that will be required under the appro¬ 
priation and maintenance of the Quartermaster’s Department for 
20,000 men, and up to 27,400 men. 

The Chairman. Have you an extra copy of that paper? 

Gen. McCauley. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It has already been filed, has it not? 

Gen. McCauley. Yes, sir. In the appropriations for this year 
Congress gives $11,691,510, to which was added a deficiency appro¬ 
priation of $3,000,000, making a total of $14,691,510. 

This bill only carries a total appropriation for the Quartermaster’s 
Department, for the same number of men, presumably, of $9,348,950. 
There is a difference there of nearly $5,000,000. So it is utterly im¬ 
possible for us to operate owith 20,000 men under this figure in bill. 
Of course the amount we require depends entirely upon the number 
of men in the corps. It is almost a mathematical calculation. 

We have reduced these figures even since the hearings before the 
House committee, so that we have cut them down, I think, to bed¬ 
rock. I do not see how we can go any lower. 

The Chairman. The amounts are not sufficient for 20,000 men ? 

Gen. McCauley. Not nearly by $3,762,742. The Secretary has 
written a letter about that asking that the amounts be restored to 
those figures for 20,000. He would not go beyond that. 

There are just two things, Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me to 
speak further, in the appropriation for contingent on page 43, line 15. 

Recently the system of washing the men’s clothing has been author¬ 
ized by law because the clothing belonged to the Government. It 
was issued to the men during the war and was retained as Government 
property. Now we have restored the old clothing allowance, and we 
think the washing of clothing ought not to be continued any further. 
In making the statement the other day to the Appropriations Com¬ 
mittee they readily agreed to it and took out of the amount under 
contingent, $500,000, which was stated to be necessary for that 
item, but they did not take out the wording of the appropriation. 
They did not change it, although we urged it. 

The Chairman. What words need to be taken out? 


202 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Gen. McCauley. I am suggesting that you omit “washing and 
cleaning bed linen, towels, and articles of regulation clothing in use by 
enlisted men,” and substitute therefor “washing bed linen, towels, 
or other articles of Government property.” 

If that is left in and no appropriation is made for it, the men will 
probably have a claim for having their clothing washed, and there 
will not be any money to pay it with. I think it would be better to 
restore it to the way it was originally before that provision was 
enacted. 

Another item at the end of the appropriation for the Quarter¬ 
master’s Department. I simply want to urge what Gen. Lejeune has 
already recommended; that is, the restoration of the provision which 
has been in the law for the last eight years, making the appropriation 
for the Quartermaster’s Department one fund. I will just file a little 
statement here. 

The Chairman. Where would that come in ? 

Gen. McCauley. On page 45, line 11, just before the total. 

Senator Swanson. The exact language of the bill last year? 

Gen. McCauley. The exact language of the bill last year. It has 
been very strongly urged. The Secretary has urged it, the Treasury 
Department has urged it, and it makes for economy and simplification 
of administration. 

(The statement referred to is as follows:) 

The removal of the provision at the end of the appropriation “ Maintenance, Quuj 
termaster’s Department, Marine Corps,” constituting the money appropriated as ‘one 
fund,” will result in deficiencies every year under the various subheads of the appro¬ 
priation of the Quartermaster’s Department, Marine Corps, which have been 
eliminated since this provision of law was enacted (act Mar. 4, 1913). Owing to the 
widely scattered duties of the Marine Corps in all parts of the world, it is impossible 
accurately to estimate each subhead, and in many cases not enough money is appro¬ 
priated under one item when there is ample under another, brought about by the 
exigencies of the service, and by transfers deficiencies can be avoided. The United 
States Treasury advocated this system as a simplification of bookkeeping, as many 
times in the past a few dollars had to be asked for under a deficiency in one item, 
where there were many thousands of balance in another. It is strongly urged that 
this provision be restored to the bill and the quartermaster allowed to disburse his 
funds in.the same manner as the paymaster. It is a business proposition. 

The Chairman. The committee will be at recess until 10.30 o’clock 
Monday morning. 

(Whereupon, at 5 o’clock p. m., the committee took a recess until 
Monday, February 21, 1921, at 10.30 o’clock a. m.) 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


MONDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1921. 

United States Senate, 

Committee on Naval Affairs, 

Washington, D. C. 

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10.30 o’clock 
a. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator Miles Poindexter 
presiding. 

Present: Senators Poindexter (acting chairman), Hale, Ball, Keyes, 
and Swanson; also Senators Smith of South Carolina, and Dial. 

The Acting Chairman. The committee will come to order. The 
committee understands that you desire to be heard, Senator Smith. 

DRY DOCK AT CHARLESTON, S. C. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ELLISON D. SMITH, A SENATOR FROM 
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, I had hoped that after mature deliberation on the 
part of the committee it would hardly deem it necessary to have any 
further hearings in reference to this matter, but allow the authoriza¬ 
tion to stand. 

The situation as it now is, that the authorization for a dry dock 
of the larger type at Charleston, S. C., is still on the statute books. 
The present Secretary of the Navy, perhaps with the Naval Board 
that is now existant, were responsible for the action of the committee 
in reporting favorably the authorization which resulted in the law 
being passed making the authorization. With the outgoing of the 
present Secretary of the Navy there will come one who, of course, will 
not utilize the authorization unless in his judgment he thinks that 
it is necessary. It is my purpose, therefore, to simply call your 
attention to what I think makes it imperatively necessary that the 
authorization remain, and that the incoming Secretary will at the 
proper time see that the dry dock of the larger dimension at Charleston 
is constructed. 

Therefore, I think the committee would not jeopardize anything if 
it were to allow the authorization to stand, for the reason as I inti¬ 
mated that it leaves it to the Secretary of the Navy to take such 
action as he sees fit during the life of that authorization. 

The Acting Chairman. What is the life of the authorization? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. It is indeterminate. He himself 
-can give the contract or not, and therefore no work would be done. 

203 



204 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Senator Ball. I would like to ask you one question: The contract 
was not given simply because they could not give the contract within 
the limits set by the bill: that is correct, is it not? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. That perhaps is in a way correct, 
but the Secretary of the Navy informed me in a document here that 
the prime reason why he did not give the contract was because of the 
high cost of material and the uncertainty of obtaining it and the 
labor, the embarrassment, and unrest and shifting was such that 
every offer that he had was practically cost plus, and he did not pro¬ 
pose to let out any contracts any more that involved that, intimating 
that the reason he had let some practically on that basis was because 
of the exigencies of the war, which were such that he could not 
help it. 

Senator Ball. I think you had better say cost plus percentage or 
cost plus a fixed amount. It is cost plus all right. They made that 
proposition under a percentage. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Which amounted to the same 
thing. 

Senator Ball. And the other v as a fixed sum. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Yes; I was not advised as to 
whether he got an offer as to a fixed sum. His letter is here and I will 
have it put in the record with the permission of the committee. 

Senator Ball. Do not understand me to say a fixed sum for the 
cost of construction. A fixed sum for the contractor’s part. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Oh, yes: perhaps. 

Senator Ball. That would make no bid at all. There was no 
contractor who would make any proposition to build a dry dock: 
the only contractor was a New York contractor who would fix 
any amount and hesaid it could not be constructed under $7,000,00 r '. 
That is the only fixed amount that was given. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. I was not aware that that had 
occurred. 

Senator Dial. The only thing was with respect to the foundation 
of it; he did not want to build it until that was determined. 

Senator Ball. $4,000,000 would answer your question; $4,000,000 
was the limit as placed in the bill. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. In reply to the suggestion, I will 
say that the % were not assured but that a repetition of the disaster 
that occurred at Hog Island might be repeated there, until they had 
ascertained the nature of the foundation upon which they would 
build the dr dock. The pump-well section was put in and mv latest 
information is to the effect that the foundation has been ascertained, 
and is satisfactor . 

Now, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, as I sav, bearing in mind, as I 
know the committee will, that the authorization is not an appropria¬ 
tion, but simply leaves it at the discretion of the Secretary of the 
Navy as to whether or not he will build, or give out a contract, I 
want to submit some facts with respect to it. 

I will first take up the necessity- from the standpoint of defense, 
from the naval standpoint. 

Taking Cape Hatteras as the dividing line between the South 
Atlantic proper and the Gulf and the North Atlantic, there is in the 
tv r o sections or tw r o bights, in the terminology of the Navy people— 
from Cape Hatteras to Portsmouth, N. H., a distance of'about 700 


205 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

miles sea front or coast line. In that distance in the North Atlantic 
there are 18 dry docks, and the total expenditures bv the Navv will 
be for its naval forces. 

Senator Hale. These are all naval dry docks that you are sneaking 
of, are they ? v 1 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. They are dr docks. I presume 
the> were gotten from the Navy; yes, sir. 

The Acting ( n airman. There are not that many naval dry docks, 
it must include also some commercial dry docks! 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. No; I got this from the Navv 
Department as to what they were interested in and had spent monev 
for. There are 18. 1 shall enumerate them: At Portsmouth there 

is one, at Boston two, at New York four, at Philadelphia three, and 
at Norfolk six. 

Senator Hale. That is all naval property. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Yes; that is all naval property, 
making in all 18, at a cost of $632,369,264.12. From Hatteras to 
Galveston, roughly speaking, a distance of 2,000 miles, we have one 
dry dock of the lesser type at Charleston, and one small floating 
dock at New Orleans. 

Senator Ball. Now you call that a small dry dock. You ought 
to state the size of it. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. It is of a size that would take in 
the Utah. 

Senator Ball. It is 566 feet 7\ inches in length. 

The Chairman. That would take in one of the destroyers! 

Senator Hale. Did you say 560 feet? 

Senator Ball. Five hundred and sixty-six feet seven and one-half 
inches. 

Senator Hale. That is a very fair size dry dock. 

The Chairman. Yes; it is larger than is necessary for the de¬ 
stroyers. 

Senator Ball. It would take in the Utah. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Let me give you the exact size 
of the Charleston dry dock- 

Senator Ball. It is a concrete granite dry dock and very well 
built. 

The Chairman. How long has that been completed ? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. I do not recall just when that 
was completed. I will look through my files and insert the exact 
date in the record. 

Senator Ball. I think I can give you all that information sooner 
than you can. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. I want to get the exact size of 
the Charleston dry dock. I have it here. 

The board of inspection and survey of shore stations in its report 
dated August 5, 1913, said: 

The board of inspection and survey of shore stations in its report dated August 5, 
1913, discussing facilities at the Charleston (S. 0.) Navy Yard, says: 

"The docking facilities consist of one granite-lined masonry dry dock, with a length 
of 575 feet and width at the coping of 134 feet, with 34 feet of water over the sill at 
mean high water. This dock was completed in 1908 and can dock a ship of the Utah 
class. The outer sill of the dock is 600 feet back from the normal shore line, and the 
indentation thus formed silts up rapidly, seriously interfering in the past with the 
use of this dock. Since the construction of the new electrically operated hydraulic 


206 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

dredge, however, the entrance of the channel of the dock has been maintained at its 
dredged depth with but little difference and at small expense. 

“Although the board believes that increased docking facilities are an urgent naval 
need and that a second dock is required at Charleston to properly develop the station, 
it is of the opinion that, until the additional drv docks of largest size are provided at. 
certain other important stations on the Atlantic, Gulf, and Facific coasts, the con¬ 
struction of an additional dry dock at Charleston should be postponed. Space should 
be reserved for a second dock, and a suitable location is available south of Dry Dock 
No. 1. The development of the water front recommended in this report will not 
interfere with its construction at this point. 

“The question of precedence of location of additional dry docks at home and 
at outlying stations is one of policy of such importance that it demands the immediate 
consideration of the department. 

“The need of the station for increased docking facilities in the immediate future- 
can be best met by providing a marine railway of sufficient capacity and proper 
construction for safely hauling out a modern destroyer of the largest tonnage 
contemplated.” 

This board was composed of Rear Admiral John R. Edwards. Capt. George R. Evans, 
Commander William G. Du Bose, and Civil Engineer Archibald L. Parsons. 

In a comprehensive review upon the strategical importance of our naval stations 
in a report to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, Rear Admiral John R. Edwards 
said: 

“No American fleet could operate for a protracted period in the Caribbean without 
establishing on the Atlantic coast a naval base south of Cape Hatteras, and Charles¬ 
ton is the only port on that stretch of coast which can be adequately developed into 
such a base.” 

Among the expenditures which he stressed was the importance of a modern dry 
dock at Philadelphia and at Charleston, and Congress made provision for both, and 
the one at Philadelphia is half finished. The Helm Board, which made a survev of 
all the present and possible naval bases on the Atlantic coast, on page 25 of their 
report, gave, reasons why the suggestion of an extension and lengthening of the dry 
dock at Charleston ought not to be carried out, but that a new dry dock ought to be 
built if Charleston should be determined as the best base south of Hatteras. They 
argued that there should be a dry dock south of Hatteras big enough to take a battle 
cruiser, and it ought to be possible for a damaged battleship to get quickly into a 
dry dock south of that point if either stem or stern were damaged, drawing 30 or 40 
feet of water. The dry dock to be built at Charleston would accommodate a battle 
cruiser or battleship drawing 40 feet of water. 

In the Helm Board report, page 25, will be found a statement with reference to 
the necessity of periodic dredging at New York and Charleston. An officer, speaking 
of silting conditions at the New York and Charleston Navy Yards, made this state¬ 
ment: “The entire water area now subject to periodic dredging at the navy yard 
Charleston, S. C., is 50,000 square yards, and at the navy yard, Brooklyn, N. Y., is 
286,000 square yards.” Since that time Wallabout Basin has been "enlarged by 
removal of a part of Cobb Dock, so if these figures were correct at that time they are 
even more true now. 

Dredging or deepening of channels has been necessary at nearly all our navy 
yards. I think the only exception is at Portsmouth. At Boston, in 1897, we had 
one berth at the western end of the yard in which a ship drawing 28 feet could be 
berthed and none of the rest of the front would admit of a ship drawing over 24 feet, 
and at that time the main ship channel from the sea to that part of the harbor is believed 
to have been 30 feet, which has since been dredged to a depth of 35 feet. Additional 
dredging has been done on the Boston water front to berth battleships at piers on 
more than one-half of that front. I do not know how much the dredging has cost, 
but it has been a very large sum to make it available for ships of large draft. We 
can dock ships 30 feet draft on the western two-thirds of the yard. 

The Sixty-fifth Congress appropriated $4,500,000 to buy, complete, and put in 
commission the Commonwealth Dock, which had been begun by the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts. The contract required sufficient dredging to make it possible to 
carry large battleships into this new dock which the Government has purchased. 

In New York we now have four dry docks of which one can take the deep-draft 
ships of the battleship class, but is not long enough to take the battle cruisers. This 
dock was reported completed on July 23, 1912, and first ship was docked on July 26, 
1912. We had to do a considerable amount of dredging during the present year, 
costing, I think, about $75,000. 

At Philadelphia we are now working on a dry dock big enough to take battle cruisers 
with a limit of cost on it of $4,700,000. During the war, in order to hasten construe- 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 207 

tion, a supplemental agreement was entered into which will make this dry dock 
cost considerably more. In order to use this dry dock and enable the navy yard to 
take battle cruisers and battleships, it will be necessary to dredge the Delaware River 
from its mouth to the navy yard and provide continual maintenance for dredging. 
The cost of maintaining a 35-foot channel in the Delaware River was estimated in 
1910 by the War Department at $300,000 annually. Actual expenditures under 
“Maintenance” to secure a 35-foot channel have been in 1914, $531,496.49; in 1915, 
$302,181.99; in 1916, $441,497. 55; in 1917, $319,567.68; in 1918, $568,824.36. The 
present project is about 50 per cent complete. The probabilities are it will have to be 
deepened to 40 feet instead of 35, which will require many millions more. This will 
be necessary in order to take in the biggest naval and merchant ships, because in the 
future commerce will demand deep channels and big dry docks. 

Norfolk has, in addition to the two flooded last month which, were built by the 
Shipping Board on naval property, four dry docks. During the war when the Ship¬ 
ping Board had need for dry docks, after conference between the Shipping Board 
officials and the Secretary of the Navy, it was decided to utilize the shops of the Navy 
in order to economize on the plant. The limit of cost to build the dry dock at Norfolk 
was $4,356,000, and it will cost something more than that. In April of this year it 
was necessary to dock the Leviathan , and at that time Dry Dock No. 4 had been com¬ 
pleted sufficiently to make it available for this purpose, but it was found that avail¬ 
able channel between Hampton Roads and the entrance to the dry dock would not 
permit of the handling of this ship, and other arrangements had to be made. The 
War Department has undertaken the necessary dredging and will soon have that 
dock ready for the largest naval and commercial vessels. Periodic dredging is neces¬ 
sary to keep the channel open. We started with a 25-foot channel, and the water 
front at the Norfolk Navy Yard, which was increased, was increased from time to 
time until now a depth of 40 feet has been established. 

There is no dry dock big enough to take a dreadnaught between Hampton Roads 
and Panama, a distance of 1,768 nautical miles, excepting the one at Charleston, 
which will take one of the Utah type. 

The Chairman. Some one said here the other day that no ship had 
ever been taken into it; is that the case ? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Oh, I think they are constantly 
being taken there. I have seen ships in the dock. 

Now, I would like to continue my statement, Mr. Chairman* We 
all know that the most dangerous cape on the whole Atlantic sea¬ 
board is Cape Hatteras. No vessel of the larger type—and we are 
building the larger type both as to battleships and merchant ships— 
could find any place for repair or docking south of Hatteras. The 
bight from Hatteras to Galveston is the line fronting and protecting 
the South Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea, and 
is, as you will see by a map that I have here, almost a direct route 
and the shortest one, for any docking facility, to the Panama Canal. 
In case of any trouble we might have either by disabling a vessel or 
vessels, or anything happening during a time of war, no vessel of a 
size larger than those indicated could get any dockage south of Hat¬ 
teras, from Galveston to Hatteras, a distance of 2,000 miles. 

The Chairman. That 2,000 miles is coast line, is it? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Yes, sir; as against 700 miles 
from Hatteras to Portsmouth, N. PI. 

Now, every admiral—and I asked them to get just what they had 
to say, so it will go into this record—has expressed himself on it, and 
I want to call the attention of the committee to some remarks of 
Admiral Helm. He says: 

During the last 12 years, since the establishment of the navy yard at Charleston was 
first determined, the enterprise has come in for a vast deal of misrepresentation; and 
Senator Tillman, who has been its steadfast champion, has been roundly abused be¬ 
cause of it. Nevertheless, even under hostile administrations, it has grown and 
expanded. The fa-t is, as all naval men recognize, that with the opening of the 
Panama Canal the Charleston Navy Yard becomes an invaluable asset of the Navy. 


208 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1022. 


The prime purpose of the canal is to afford a quick means of transferring our battle¬ 
ships from our Atlantic to our Pacific coast. The incomparable superiority of the 
Charleston Navv Yard lies in the fact that not only is it the nearest yard of first-class 
equipment to the Panama Canal, but it is the only yard south of Norfolk which is 
impregnable against an attack by sea. Charleston, although under seige throughout 
two great wars, has never been captured from the water. Its defenses to-day guar¬ 
antee it against such a fate in future and make the Charleston Navy Yard, sheltered 
from storms and protected against any hostile fleet, the great strategic base from which 
any possible naval warfare of the future is most likely to be conducted. 

Admiral Edwards says: 

It behooves the thoughtful and progressive officers of the Navy to give immediate, 
extended, and careful consideration concerning the possibilities of development of 
the Charleston (S. C.) naval station. Whether viewed from a financial, industrial, 
or strategic standpoint, the progressive, if not the rapid development of this naval 
station, intimately concerns the efficiency and operation of the fleet. 

For military and strategic reasons it appears of paramount importance that there be 
developed on the Atlantic coast at some point south of Cape Hatteras a naval station 
capable of docking and repairing our largest and most important battleships. The pro¬ 
tection of the Isthmian Canal, a project that involved an expenditure of about 
$400,000,000, combined with the general existing belief upon the part of naval experts 
that if the fleet of the United States will ever be called upon to engage in battle, 
the contest will take place in the Caribbean, makes it a matter of importance to the 
efficiency of the fleet that there be developed on the mainland of the Atlantic coast— 
and independent of any projected outlying naval base—a first-class naval station. 

Senator Ball. Senator, what is the distance between the Charles¬ 
ton Dry Dock and the Caribbean Sea ? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Oh, it is less than a hundred 
miles. You see here Cuba and the bend of the Central American 
coast comprise what is known as the Carribean Sea and its line. 

Senator Ball. I just want to figure that up. How far is it from 
Norfolk over there to Charleston? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. From Norfolk to Charleston- 

Senator Dial. It is about 500 miles. 

Senator Ball. It is about 400 miles. 

The Chairman. I suggest to the committee that these things are 
capable of being ascertained with exact certainty—these distances. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Oh, yes; you can get those. 

Senator Ball. I understood the Senator to say that the distance 
was 2,000 miles on the coast and yet only 100 miles from Charleston 
down to the Caribbean and only 400 from Charleston up to Norfolk. 

I could not understand where he got the additional mileage. 

The Chairman. He means that the 2,000 miles is following all 
indentations and curves clear around the peninsula of Florida and 
up to Alabama and down to Galveston. 

Senator Ball. You must take in, then, the dry dock at New 
Orleans. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. I take in the floating dry dock 
at New Orleans. Here you start [indicating] and here is your coast 
line. Of course it is coast line clean down to Galveston. 

The Chairman. Senator Ball was comparing the discrepancy of 
2,000 miles. You mentioned 100 miles and I was explaining how it 
came about. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. The coast line as it runs down 
around the Florida Peninsula goes around and from the Florida 
Peninsula. It is quite a short distance to the Caribbean Sea. The 
Gulf being to the west of it and the Caribbean Sea to the south and 
southeast of it, has nothing to do with the coast line exposed, because 



NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


209 


you come from Galveston along the whole Gulf coast around the 
peninsula of Florida and up to Charleston. That is a coast line as 
a matter of course. Of course, if you are going to take an air line 
through the country you would not get the coast line. 

Senator Hale. How can you say that the Caribbean Sea is within 
100 miles of Charleston? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. I was just making a rough guess. 

Senator Hale. Going in what direction ? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Going a little to the west of 
Cuba. Here is the map showing it. 

The Chairman. Down throu<*h the Windward Passage ? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Yes. 

The Chairman. Do not let us take up too much time with respect 
to these distances. That can be ascertained, of course. 

Senator Ball. Yes; we can get all those distances. 

Senator Hale. That is not of importance, the distance to Gal¬ 
veston, but I do not see how you make it that. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. I was just making a rough guess. 
I was estimating the distance from Charleston to Cuba. It would be 
further than that; yes. 

Mr. Chairman, the record is full of the reports from the different 
admirals, that there should be south of Hatteras a dock sufficient to 
take our largest naval vessels. 

Senator Dial. That is the unanimous opinion. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. I do not think there is a dis¬ 
senting view on the part of any of those who have investigated it. 
At the entrance of Charleston Harbor is Fort Sumter, in the stream 
5 miles above the city. It is absolutely safe from attack from the sea. 

The Chairman. Senator Ball, you have paid special attention to 
this Charleston matter and I am depending upon you a good deal 
for advice in the matter, and for that reason I wish you would listen 
carefully to Senator Smith’s statement, if you please. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I desire to cor¬ 
rect a statement that I made with regard to that distance. 

Senator Ball. I think it would be well for you to correct that 
statement. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. I want to. 

Senator Ball. It is over 500 miles. You made the statement that 
it was 100 miles. I am very familiar with the figures with respect 
to that, as I have been over it very frequently. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. I was thinking of off the coast 
of Florida. 

Senator Ball. I did not think you wanted to make a statement of 
that kind and allow it to go into the record without your attention 
being called to it. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Certainly not. I was thinking 
of off the coast of Florida—the coast line—when I made that state¬ 
ment. 

Now, you will find in the record that everyone who has given atten¬ 
tion to this matter, all the admirals, that they are unanimous in their 
statement that it is necessary to have south of Hatteras a dock 
sufficiently large. They all say it is the best place along the coast 


34772—21-14 


210 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


line; that Charleston is preeminently the place for it, in view of the 
fact that it is practically the only real seaport on the south Atlantic. 

In addition to that, Mr. Chairman, the commercial situation is 
such that if we are going to mobilize our great industries and have 
the proper facilities for shipment to the rapidly developing commerce 
of this country, it is essential that there snail be somewhere on that 
vast coast line a place where the large merchant marine can dock 
and find facilities for docking. 

Senator Ball. Eight at that point, Senator, I would like to ask 
one question to bring out a fact. Do you know why when they lo¬ 
cated the yard and built the first dock, completed in 1908, that they 
took that yard so far up the river above Charleston and above all 
your necessities for merchant marine? You are 7 miles up the river 
from Charleston where all your merchant ships have their docks. 

The Chairman. Some one had a piece of land up there to sell 
probably. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. No; I think the explanation is to 
be found in this, that Charleston is a peninsula that narrows rapidly 
and the railroad facilities or yard facilities as the peninsula widens 
gives better and more ample room both for the terminals of the rail¬ 
roads that necessarily will have to come in, and not necessitate their 
running in and backing out. They will have ample leeway. The 
Government has built just north of that yard one of the greatest ter¬ 
minals on the Atlantic seaboard, at a cost of $17,000,000, and they 
have ample water; and they brought in the troops and discharged the 
troops in lesser time, or in as short a time as they did anywhere else. 

Senator Dial. If I may interrupt, Mr. Chairman, as I am wanted 
on the floor of the Senate, I will state that my colleague is much better 
posted on this matter than I am, and knowing that this will be the 
only dry dock in that great territory, I feel that it is absolutely neces¬ 
sary that this authorization should stand, and I would feel personal 
humiliation if it were repealed. 

This is the only appropriation, I believe, that has been made where 
there has been any effort made to repeal it. I shall be glad to assist 
the committee with any information I can afford them at any time, 
but I know that Senator Smith is much better posted than I. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, we are all aware 
of the fact that during the war the condition that resulted in the con¬ 
gestion at the port of New York was disastrous because of the lack of 
docking facilities and terminal facilities and the open sea. At Charles¬ 
ton there is, of course, an open sea the year around. I have, but I 
did not bring with me—and if the committee should see fit to use 
them—I have telegrams that have come from all over the West and 
Middle West as far up as Minneapolis, indorsing the development of 
this port to meet the necessities of commerce. It is absolutely essen¬ 
tial to the saving of freight and the development of its proper balance 
and the capitalization of our commerce that facilities for the docking 
of our larger merchant marine shall be somewhere south of Hatteras. 

The Acting Chairman. It is not the policy is it, Senator, of the 
Government to build docks for the merchant marine? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Oh, I think the Government 
does. They get a good deal of revenue from it. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


211 


The Acting Chairman. I think probably they do, hut as I under¬ 
stand and I am only asking to get your views on it—the function 
of this committee is to build purely with a view to naval needs. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Surely, and in legislating for the 
naval needs 1 should think it was clearly within the function of this 
committee to see just how much a Government utility may be u c ed 
by private enterprise, in that way aiding the upkeep and in the 
lessening of the cost and the increasing of revenue^-—for I. take it 
the Government would charge for the docking of private vessels or 
the utilization of their docks. 

Senator Hale. You w ere saying that you thought one of the 
advantages at Charleston was that it is open all the year around. 
1 ou do not mean to say that the various ports at Boston, Norfolk, 
and Philadelphia are not open all the year around ? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Sometimes. In 1917 and 1918— 
I believe that wa - the winter they had considerable difficulty in 
getting coal out to bunker their ships on account of the ice. 

Senator Hale. Well, they had minor troubles for a ihort time. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. They had real and considerable 
trouble that year. I know that beeau e I was chairman of the 
Inter tate Commerce Committee at that time. 

Senator Hale. But the ports are open the year around. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. But I know there w~as quite a 
good deal of difficulty in getting the coal out to bunker the ships. 

Senator Ball. You say that w e could get considerable revenue 
from private ships being docked at those yards. You must remember 
that your dry docks are so far away, and your piers are so far away 
from the docks, the commercial docks, that it is almost inconceivab'e 
that they could be used for that purpose. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Why? 

Senator Ball. It is 7 miles upstream. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. According to the statement here, 
of course the 2 miles would make but very little difference. 

The Chairman. I think it would make a good deal of difference. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. But you have an open straight 
channel right to the dry dock, and they have ample leeway for 
turning. They have all the water that is necessary at that part of 
the river—it is really not a river. The peninsula of Charleston 
projects out into the bay and forms two estuaries on either side—- 
one the Ashley River on one side, and the Cooper River on the 
other. It is really just a part of the bay. 

Senator Ball. I was going to add that so far as my inspection of 
the different yards is concerned, we are not able at the present time 
to have sufficient dockage space for our own naval ships, and to make 
preparation for the dockage of private ships at this time at this place 
or any other place would certainly be to the disadvantage of the naval 
owmecl craft. Take it in almost all the yards—when you take it in 
your own yards you need additional wharfage, because the small craft 
that you have there now have no place to tie up to the wffiarves; 
they are merely out in the stream and the repairs that are to be 
made on those ships have to be made out in the stream. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. That is only emphasizing the 
argument that I am making here now. Of course the Government 
would utilize all the docking facilities. 


*212 


NAVAI, APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Senator Ball. You must draw a line between wharves and docks. 
If you built a large dry dock there you need that additional wharfage 
for that dry dock. At present you have wharfage for your present 
dry dock. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. I see the Secretary of the Navy 
says here: 

Although the board believes that increased docking facilities are an urgent naval 
need, and that a second dock is required at Charleston to properly develop the station, 
it is of the opinion that until additional dry docks of the larger size are provided, etc. 

It added in its opinion, however, that “until additional dry docks of the largest 
size are provided at certain other important stations on the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific 
coasts, the construction of an additional dry dock at Charleston should be postponed.” 
It was in the spirit of that recommendation that work was pressed on the dry docks, 
particularly at Boston and Norfolk and Philadelphia, before beginning work on the 
dry dock at Charleston, for which Congress had given authorization and appropriation. 
In a comprehensive review the strategical importance of our naval stations to the 
Senate Naval Affairs Committee of Congress, Admiral Edwards said: 

The Chairman. What is the date of that letter ? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. This is dated August 5, 1913. 

The Chairman. That is from the Secretary of the Navy? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. This was from the board. 

The Chairman. The Naval General Board? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Yes—the Board of Inspection 
and vSurvey of Shore Stations. 

The Secretary says in a letter to me that the wharfage would not 
be as essential now as the dock itself. I will get that letter for the 
committee. 

Senator Ball. The Secretary’s letter does not agree though with 
the naval officers in charge of the dock. Their testimony before us 
was very emphatic that the most urgent need was for wharfage to 
make it an economic yard. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. I will find that, Mr. Chairman, 
and insert it in the record. 

Now, as I said a moment ago, we have no facilities south of Hat- 
teras for taking care of our larger ships. 

The Chairman. Senator Smith, I suggest that those papers you 
refer to, you take your time to get and put them in the record. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. I will. Here is a brief that I 
would like to call attention to as showing the necessity for the develop¬ 
ment of this port. It is as follows: 

1. The United States Government expended about $17,000,000 on Army terminals 
three miles above the navy yard. The ordnance department thereof is still retained 
by the Government, but the great modern warehouses are to be taken over by a semi¬ 
public corporation in the interest of the public and is prepared to handle all classes 
of business and ships from every point in the United States, which will result not 
only of commercial benefit to the country, but we hope profitably to the Government 
itself. There is now 30 feet of water to these terminals with sufficient turning basin, 
and their ability to handle any character of business is demonstrated by the fact that 
some 50,000 troops were landed here from ex-German liners, and also from the fact 
that they had handled considerable commercial business. 

2. The navy yard itself did not only handle naval ships but has been a great aid, 
especially the dry dock, in handling during peace times merchant ships. Two dry 
docks from a commercial angle would be helpful, or if any thing happens, as has hap¬ 
pened in the past, to the dock the result is a costly and long delay in time of peace 
and distress in time of war. 

3. The Standard Oi,l Co. is now constructing and has almost completed, a great 
modern refinery at Charleston, reputed to cost around $10,000,000, located about 3 
miles below the navy yard. This company has already started to refine crude oil 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


213 


imported from Mexico. Recently the public press has announced the consummation 
of a contract by the United States Shipping Board with this company to oil bunker 
all of the Shipping Board ships at Charleston from the Gulf and South Atlantic, 
especially for European ports. It is reported that there will be some 40 to 50 ships 
per month who will so bunker. The need of bunkering ships from the Gulf is caused 
by the fact that their capacity is insufficient to carry the ships from a Gulf point to 
Europe and return without bunkering in a European port, where the cost of such oil 
would be very excessive. By bunkering at Charleston they can make the round trip, 
thus saving the Government a very considerable sum of money. 

The Chairman. Senator, would it not be just as well to put thal 
entire statement or brief into the record ? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. I would like to bring it to your 
attention, especially in view of this next paragraph, because it is a 
matter of such vital importance to the department, the commerce 
of the Middle Atlantic and Southern States. Now that we are hoping 
to have a merchant marine to revive our commerce, it seems to me 
that it is a matter of great or vital importance to us than even this 
committee can re dize. 

The Chairman. I think the committee understands the general 
situation about the terminal that the Railroad Administration estab¬ 
lished there, and the establishment of the plant of the Standard Oil 
Co., all tending to develop the port of Charleston. But the ques¬ 
tion—and this may tend to expedite matters here—that has been 
urged before this committee does not involve any of those proposi¬ 
tions at all. For the purpose of this inquiry, all of that may be 
considered as established. It is urged that from the standpoint of 
the care of capital ships of the Navy—and that is the purpose of 
building a large dry dock—that this is not a good location; that it 
is too far from the actual harbor of Charleston; that it is expensive 
to maintain a sufficient channel to get capital ships up to the dock 
there, and if it is built it would be a good deal like Robinson Crusoe’s 
boat that he worked on so hard, and then could not put it in the 
water after building it. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Very well, Mr. Chairman, I will 
put this entire paper in the record. 

(The paper referred to is here printed in full, as follows:) 

South Atlantic States Association, 

Washington, D. C., February 15, 1921. 

Personal. 

Hon. E. D. Smith, 

United States Senate , Washington, D. C. 

Dear Senator Smith: In accordance with your request, I am submitting briefly 
a few commercial facts in regard to the Charleston situation, which I have already 
outlined during our talks. I am also sending you a resume of all the telegrams, 
letters, etc. If I can be of any further help and secure any data that you may think 
necessary, I will be glad to have you call on me, or wire, 
v-orv *-”ulv, vours. 

A. V. Snell. 


The Charleston 40-Foot Channel. 


February 15, 1921. 

1 The United States Government expended about $17,000,000 on Army terminals 
3 miles above the navy yard. The Ordnance Department thereof is still retained by 
the Government, but the great modern warehouses are to be taken over by a semi¬ 
public corporation in the interest of the public and is prepared to handle all classes 
of business and ships from every point in the United States, which will result not 
only of commercial benefit to the country but, we hope, profitably to the Government 


214 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


itself. There is now 30 feet of water to these terminals, with sufficient turning basin, 
and their ability to handle any character of business is demonstrated by the fact that 
some 50,000 troops were landed here from ex-German liners, and also from the fact 
that they had handled considerable commercial business. 

2. The navy yard itself did not only handle naval ships, but has been a great aid, 
especially the dry dock, in handling during peace times merchant ships. Two 
docks, from a commercial angle, would be helpful, or if anything happens, as has 
happened in the past, to the dock, the result is a costly and long delay in time of 
peace and distress in time of war. 

3. The Standard Oil Co. is now constructing, and has almost completed, a great 
modern refinery at Charleston, reputed to cost around $10,000,000, located about 3 
miles below the navy yard. This company has already started to refine crude oil 
imported from Mexico. Recently the public press has announced the consummation 
of a contract by the United States Shipping Board with this company to oil bunker 
all of the Shipping Board ships at Charleston from the Gulf and South Atlantic, 
especiallv for European ports. It is reported that there will be some 40 to 50 ships 
per month who w'ill so bunker. The need of bunkering ships from the Gulf is caused 
by the fact that their capacity is insufficient to carry the ships from a Gulf point to 
Europe and return without bunkering in a European port, where the cost of such oil 
would be very excessive. By bunkering at Charleston they can make the round trip, 
thus saving the Government a very considarable sum of money. 

4. The Southern Railway Co. has constructed, within the last few years at Charles¬ 
ton, a modern coal terminal handling some 1,800 tons per hour. It is understood that 
t'lis terminal will be doubled as soon as financial conditions permit. The demands 
on this terminal have been very great, especially in the exporting of coal to foreign 
ports as well as the bunkering of vessels. This coal is brought from Pocahontas and 
Clinchfield coal fields of Virginia, West Virginia, and eastern Kentucky. The busi¬ 
ness is also developing through eastern Tennessee. 

5. Charleston has long been known as a harbor of refuge for the reason that it is a 
natural habor, its rivers being but arms of the ocean ending about 20 miles in the 
interior. The harbor is of easy access, a safe anchorage being reached after picking 
up the lightship, requiring but one turn in the channel to reach such safe anchorage. 
It is constantly being used by ships in distress. It is, therefore, especially necessary 
that there should be a deep channel entrance which can care for ships of the greatest 
draft, for in time of storm and stress a leeway of 6 or 7 feet should be possible for 
any ship. 

Generally it should be borne in mind that to attain a uniform depth of 40 feet it is 
not necessary to dredge the entire Cooper River channel, but only the channel entrance 
and several places in the river itself, for the reason that the depth of water, after 
passing over the channel entrance, varies, at places being as deep as eighty-odd feet. 
Off of the wharves of the city proper it ranges from 45 to 60 feet, and at other-places 
just below the navy yard from 40 to 45 feet. (For these figures of water depth, see 
recent United States "Geological Survey map 470). 

According to the last reports of the Army engineer’s office, the foreign trade business 
of Charleston Harbor multiplied ten times. No other port compared with this increase. 
While some of the commercial business has dropped off recently, without doubt these 
figures will be exceeded because of the rapidly increasing importation of crude oil and 
also because of the rapidly developing business from the midwestern territory which is 
resulting from the fact that all southern ports have been placed on an equal export 
rate basis from this midwest territory with the port cities of the North Atlantic. With 
the reestablishment of the American-Hawaiian Line from the Facific coast, there is 
also a constantly increasing business from the Pacific ports. All of this business 
with the ever-increasing draft of vessels passing through the Panama Canal requires, 
from a commercial standpoint alone, a deep water channel to the navy yard and the 
Army terminals just above. 

Synopsis of Telegrams and Letters Received from Various Chambers of 

Commerce. 

Alabama: Senators Underwood and Heflin. Strong indorsements from Mont¬ 
gomery Chamber of Commerce. 

Georgia: Senators Smith and Harris. Support from Atlanta and Macon Chambers 
of Commerce. 

Florida: Senators Fletcher and Trammell. Support from Jacksonville Chamber 
of Commerce. 

Louisiana: Senators Ransdell and Gay. New Orleans Board of Trade, and also 
Association of Commerce. 


215 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

' Senators Smith and France. Indorsement by directors of Merchants 
and Manufacturers Association. Secretary of this organization with myself saw these 
Senators in person. 

Tennessee: Senators McKellar and Shields. Very strong letters from Nashville 
Commercial Club. 

Texas. Senators Sheppard and Culberson. Telegrams and letters from West Texas 
Chamber of Commerce. 

Missouri: Senators Spencer and Reed. Strong letters and telegrams from Kansas 
City Chamber of Commerce. 

West Virginia: Senators Sutherland and Elkins. A strong letter from the Parkers¬ 
burg Chamber of Commerce. 

Michigan, Townsend: Minnesota, Nelson and Kellogg; Wisconsin, Lenroot: A 
strong letter of indorsement from the Great Lakes Association, which reminded these 
four Senators of the support on our part of the Great Lakes-Atlantic Ocean Ship Canal 
and requested their support for Charleston. 

Iowa: Senators Kenyon and Cummins. A very strong telegram from the Des 
Moines Chamber of Commerce. 

New Jersey: Senator Frelinghuysen. We are attempting to get in touch with this 
Senator through certain Charleston parties who are friends of the Senator. 

General Report. 

Mr. Hale, president of the South Atlantic States Association, and myself have 
either jointly or individually seen the following Senators: 

Senator Smith of Georgia; Senators Fletcher, Ransdell; Senator Smith of Maryland; 
Senators France, McKellar, Sheppard; Senators Spencer, McNary, McCormick.* 

So far as the Democratic Senators are concerned, we naturally expected their sup¬ 
port and are looking to our Senators to cover this ground so far as possible. Senator 
Spencer, of Missouri, will possibly support, though he complains of the large appro¬ 
priations in the last eight years made for southern projects. Senator McNary is inter¬ 
ested only, he states, in the commercial development of the port and its relation to 
the Nation. I am sending him brief commercial data at his request. Senator McCor¬ 
mick was seen by Mr. Hale, and he is hopeful of securing his support. The telegram 
to Senator Kenyon should be followed up by our Senators, also following the letters 
to other Senators—Sutherland, Elkins, Townsend, Nelson, Kellogg, Lenroot—these 
Senators should be seen by Senators Smith and Dial. Senator Chamberlain, of Ore¬ 
gon, has visited Charleston and is a good friend of the port. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, will the com¬ 
mittee investigate the docks that we have north of Hatteras to see 
which one, so far as reaching the dock from the sea is concerned, is 
superior to the one at Charleston ? 

The Chairman. My mind is entirely open upon the subject. I just 
wanted to draw you out on it. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. I think you will find that the 
dock at Charleston is perhaps as accessible if not more accessible than 
the major portion of the docks north of Hatteras. I will get the 
figures up to date and submit them to this committee before you make 
your report, showing the amount of channel that you have to go 
through to reach the different docks, their length, and compare them 
with Charleston, and their facilities, and the ease with which they are 
kept up, and the ease with which the dock is reached. There are very 
few turns, if you will notice from the map I have here, from the sea to 
the Charleston dock; there are very few turns in the channel from the 
sea to the Charleston Navy Yard. It is 15 miles from the sea, if I 
remember correctly, to the dry dock. 

Senator Ball. No; it is 22J. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Well, that remains to be defi¬ 
nitely ascertained. 

Senator Ball. It is 15 miles to Charleston. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. My impression was that it was 
15 miles from the dry dock to the open sea. There are hardly any 


216 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


turns in the channel, and I should say that the dry dock was the 
easiest to reach, or the harbor is the easiest entered, or as easy as any 
we have on the Atlantic seaboard. 

Senator Swanson. What does the river and harbor appropriation 
bill appropriate for that now ? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Do you mean how much we 
appropriate now ? 

Senator Swanson. Yes; what are they doing with it; are they 
using that ? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Yes. 

Senator Swanson. I simply wanted to know what the rivers and 
harbors appropriation provided. 

Senator Ball. The rivers and harbors bill of 1918 made an appro¬ 
priation of SI,500,000 for the beginning of this project of 1,000-foot 
channel, 40 feet in depth, on the condition that the dry dock should 
be authorized. 

Senator Swanson. I thought we made it the condition the appro 
priation was made. 

Senator Ball. The appropriation was made conditional on the 
authorization of the dry dock. They have a 30-foot channel, 500 
feet in width now, up to the present dry dock. 

The Chairman. That is not sufficient for our capital ships. 

Senator Ball. No; but it is sufficient for any ship that the present 
dry dock would dock. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Now let me read a letter from 
Admiral Parks on this very point. 

Senator Ball. In connection with the Senator’s suggestion, I was 

f oing to say that of the $1,500,000, practically all but $72,000 of it 
as been contracted for or expended; most of it has been expended 
and the balance of it contracted for deepening this channel to 40 feet 
and widening it to 600 feet in places and 1,000 in other places, but 
they have not carried it out. 

Senator Swanson. Have they carried it up above the present 
dry dock? 

Senator Ball. Up to the present dry dock. 

Senator Swanson. They have not carried it beyond? 

Senator Ball. No. 

Senator Swanson. How deep have they made the water? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. They have dredged 40 feet 
already. 

Senator Swanson. How much more will it take to complete it? 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Just let me- 

The Chairman. I do not think that ought to go in the record as I 
think it is not correct. I may be mistaken myself. You say they 
have already gotten a 40-foot channel clear up to this dry dock? 
Senator Ball. No, sir. 

The Chairman. But you just did say so. 

Senator Ball. I said it was authorized, not completed. 

The Chairman. But Senator Swanson asked you if they had it up 
beyond the dry dock. 

Senator Ball. I said it was authorized to go up to dry dock only. 
The Chairman. He asked you how much was completed. 



NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 217 


Senator Ball. I had a letter from Secretary Baker a few days ago 
stating that they had it about one-tenth completed. 

Senator Swanson. You mean up to the present dry dock? 

Senator Ball. Yes, sir. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Let me read what Admiral 
Parks says- 

Senator Swanson. Only one-tenth completed with a million and a 
half ? What do they estimate it will take to complete it ? 

Senator Ball. He makes the further estimate to complete it at 
a little less than $4,000,000—three million nine hundred thousand and 
some odd dollars. But the estimate of all the engineers when we were 
down there, was $7,500,000, and that was the department’s estimate 
at that time, and on my cross-questioning him, he said they had 
reduced his figures; but it would be more expensive than that because 
they had to move the material twice, and almost all of it had to be 
taken out into the deep water, and that instead of 30 cents that they 
had figured on, it would cost 50 cents. In my judgment they could 
not dredge for less than $9,000,000. 

Senator Smith of South Carolina. Here is a letter in response to 
the very point the Senator is making, dated January 7, 1921, from 
Admiral Parks: 


Navy Department, 

Bureau of Yards and Docks, 
Washington , D. C., January 7, 1921. 

My Dear Senator: In compliance with your request contained in your letter of 
January 7 there is attached hereto a statement of work done and amount expended 
of appropriation made available for construction of dry dock at the navy yard, Charles¬ 
ton, S. C.; appropriation carried in the naval appropriation act of 1918. 

Very truly, yours, 

0. W. Parks, Chief of Bureav 

Hon. L. H. Ball, 

United States Senate, Washington, I). C. 


Information Concerning Proposed Dry Dock No. 2, Navy Yard, Charleston, 

S. C. 

costs of naval dry docks and appurtenances. 

Naval act approved July 1, 1918, provided $1,150,000 toward the construction of a 
large dry dock (limit of cost $4,000,000) at the navy yard, Charleston, S. C. 

The rivers and harbors act approved by Congress July 18, 1918, contained the fol¬ 
lowing item relative to dredging in Charleston Harbor and Cooper River: 

“Charleston Harbor and channels, South Carolina: Continuing improvement and 
for maintenance, $110,000; for improvement to provide a channel forty feet deep and 
one thousand feet wide, extending from the sea to the Charleston Navy Yard, 
$1,500,000: Provided, That this work shall not be undertaken until the proposed 
new dry dock at this navy yard, carrying a depth of forty feet of water over the blocks, 
has been authorized; in all, $1,610,000.” 

status of dry dock project at present time. 

Preparations have been made for the construction of the pump-well section of the 
dock by yard labor. The department has been in communication with the yards 
where excess material is known to be available, with a view to having this material 
transferred to Charleston for use in the construction of the pump-well section of the 

dry dock. . , 

Of the funds appropriated by Congress for the construction of the dock, there has 
been obligated to date a total of $60,541.67, of which $37,730.67 was obligated since 
Congress adjourned on June 5, 1920. 




218 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Careful estimate of the cost of constructing Dry Dock No. 2 at the navy yard, Charles¬ 
ton, S. C., indicates that this dock will cost approximately $4,750,000. 


STATUS OF DREDGING COOPER RIVER PROJECT. 


The original estimated cost of this project was $7,540,000. This amount of money 
contemplated a 40-foot channel, 1,000 feet wide. Included in this amount was 
$1,000,000 for the purchase of a dredge. The War Department now considers that 
this will not be necessary. The rivers and harbors act of 1918 appropriated $1,500,000 
for this project. The 1920 annual report of the War Department states that to carry 
on the work for the next fiscal year w ill cost $1,900,000. In this amount was included 
$400,000 for reconstructing a dredge. The War Department now considers that it is 
possible that this expenditure will not be necessary. On inquiry at the War Depart¬ 
ment as to the probable cost of a 600-foot channel, 40 feet deep, 1,000 feet on turns, 
advice was given that while it would be necessary, of course, to make a careful estimate 
of this, it was considered that the cost would be about a half of the original estimated 
cost, namely, $3,770,000. 

Of the amount, namely, $1,500,000, appropriated in the rivers and harbors act 
approved by Congresss July 18, 1918, for dredging Cooper River, $995,296.49 has been 
expended. 

In addition to the foregoing, there is now covered by existing contracts and outstand¬ 
ing liabilities, $434,042.52. 

Work on contract dated December 1, 1919, with the United Dredging Co., was 
started in November, 1920. Amount of this contract was approximately $259,927. 

The work on this particular contract was 27 per cent complete on December 1, 1920. 

So the committee will see that after investigation they found that 
a channel 600 feet wide and 1,000 feet on the turn would be all that 
would be necessary to accommodate our capital ships. In place of 
the estimated cost of $7,540,000 which included a new dredge, and 
also included the repair of an old dredge, that something like 
$1,400,000 was taken off there. Then by narrowing the channel to 
600 feet and only 1,000 feet on the turn, their estimate here, according 
to Admiral Parks, would be $3,770,000. 

Senator Ball. Mr. Chairman, I ask permission to put in the record 
a letter that I have received from Secretary Baker. 

The Chairman. You may put it in and call attention to any 
portion that you desire later. I would like to get through with 
this item. 

Senator Ball. It is very important in my judgment from the 
fact that he specifically states in this letter- 

The Chairman. Just read it- 

Senator Ball. That there has been an expenditure of $995,296 
and the contract is only one-tenth completed. 

Senator Swanson. Read it. 

Senator Ball. He writes as follows: 


In response to your letter dated January 7, 1921, requesting a statement of the 
expenditures and work done under the appropriation of $1,500,000, provided by the 
rivers and harbors act of July, 1918, for the 40-foot channel in Charleston Harbor, I 
have the honor to inform you that to December 1, 1920, the amount expended on this 
improvement was $995,296.49, leaving a balance of the appropriation amounting to 
$504,703.51. Of the latter amount the following sums are pledged—on account of 
outstanding liabilities, $44,304.94; existing contracts, $.389,737.58, making a total of 
$434,042.52; amount available, $70,660.99. 

The work done on the project has consisted in operation by Government dredges and 
by contract dredging under which there has been removed 2,458,110 cubic yards of 
material. The entire project is reported to be 10 per cent completed, as of date 
December 1, 1920. 

Full report concerning this improvement will be found at pages 682-686 of the 
Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers for the fiscal year 1920, and for your con¬ 
venient reference there are inclosed proof sheets of those pages. 

Very truly, yours, 

Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War. 



NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


219 


The Chairman. Senator Smith of South Carolina has been de¬ 
tained in the Senate, and we will suspend on this matter for the 
present and take up the matter of recreation in the Navy. 

RECREATION IN THE NAVY. 

STATEMENT OF CAPT. D. F. SELLERS, BUREAU OF NAVIGATION. 

. Capt. Sellers. Mr. Chairman, the item of recreation for enlisted 
men in the naval bill as it passed the House provides for only $800,- 
000 which will not permit the bureau to continue the work of fur¬ 
nishing educational facilities and libraries for enlisted men. 

During the past year the bureau allotted $32,000 from the appro¬ 
priation for recreation of enlisted men to conduct certain experi¬ 
mental schools on board ships of the Navy. The experimental 
schools comprise a modified correspondence course, which is not 
compulsory, to teach the men academic subjects as well as pro¬ 
fessional subjects. 

The essential difference between the scheme experimented with 
and the ordinary correspondence course is that lesson assignments 
are handed out to the men. They are worked over in the men’s 
spare time and handed in to the officers of the ship who correct 
the papers and furnish assistance to the men until they give them 
the next installment. 

There has been an instantaneous response to this educational 
scheme. On board the battleship Tennessee , for example, nearly 
60 per cent of the crew were immediately enrolled, and they ran the 
school very successfully there. 

On board the destroyers at Charleston there are about 18 appli¬ 
cants for those papers. The men are intensely interested. More 
than 50 per cent of the men are enrolled in those courses and the 
progress has been very gratifying. It has resulted not only in the 
men being contented, and proving their ability on board ship, but 
it has resulted in an increased economy of fuel consumption, and 
the men are improving their professional knowledge. 

We had hoped to have a separate item in the appropriation bill 
introduced for the school system, but the House Naval Committee 
did not report anv such bill out. Therefore we find ourselves now 
without any or will find ourselves at the end of the year without any 
funds to continue this work. The experiment we consider has been 
very successful. 

Senator Ball. The House has not put any appropriation in the 
bill for that purpose ? 

Capt. Sellers. No, sir;, we estimated a certain sum to come 
under the new heading, as all new legislation has to come from the 
House Naval Committee. 

Senator Ball. Did they have an approbation in their legislative 
bill prepared for it ? 

Capt. Sellers. No, sir; they did not report it out of the House 
Naval Committee. That is the way we had counted on obtaining 
these funds. Now that it has been reported out, we find ourselves 
without any funds, but under the broad heading of enlisted men, 
which provides for recreation, comfort, and contentment of the 


220 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


men, it is quite legal to expend money for that purpose—burnishing 
educational facilities for the men. 

The Chairman. What amount are you asking for ? 

Capt. Sellers. We are asking for $498,000 for educational training 
and libraries. The libraries are very intimately connected with the 
educational system. 

The Chairman. There is a provision for libraries in the bill. I am 
sorry you have not the page of the bill. 

Lieut. Hill. Mr. Chairman, it is at the bottom of page 7 and top 
of page 8. Line 24, page 7, is where it starts. 

Capt. Sellers. Heretofore we have gotten library books from the 
appropriation for instruments and supplies, but this year when we 
tried to get the money appropriated in another way we did not esti¬ 
mate for it in instruments and supplies. Therefore if we do not get 
it in this wav we have no provision for it in instruments and supplies, 
and would be without allotment for library books. It is quite 
im rtant. 



Le Chairman. That particular service was not included in that 


item? 


Capt. Sellers. We did not estimate for that when we sent in the 
estimates, because we expected to get it in this other manner. Now, 
if we lose out on this we have lost out altogether. 

Senator Ball. Did the House committee in preparing this bill 
understand that it was to be in the other bill? 

Capt. Sellers. Yes, sir; in a separate bill. 

Senator Ball. They took that into consideration ? 

Capt. Sellers. Yes, sir; we told them that at the time. 

The Chairman. You say you had $32,000 last year? 

Capt. Sellers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And you are asking for $400,000 this year? 

Capt. Sellers. We just experimented last year on certain ships. 
We had 6 large ships and 18 destroyers. We have 6,000 men now 
enrolled taking this course. 

The Chairman. What is the lowest figure? 

Capt. Sellers. From the statistics that we have at hand now— 
we have only been at it a portion of a year—it has cost us $8.26 per 
man to furnish these facilities, the books, and the course. We figured 
that about 40 per cent of the personnel will take these courses. 

The Chairman. Is that all you desire to say, Captain? 

Capt. Sellers. Yes, sir. I would like to emphasize the fact, 
however, that unless this appropriation is increased, we will find 
ourselves without anything to carry on this work, having counted 
on the other method of obtaining the funds. 

The Chairman. Very well; the committee will give your matter 
full consideration. 

The committee will now hear from Admiral Washington. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL THOMAS WASHINGTON, 
UNITED STATES NAVY. 

Admiral Washington. Mr. Chairman this, as I understand it, is on 
the legislative part of the bill that was passed by the House. 

The Chairman. I think you had completed your recommendation 
as to the appropriation bill, had you not? 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


221 


Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Coontz. Mr. Chairman, 1 asked Admiral Washington to 
come here on this matter, because we are both jointly interested. 

Admiral Washington. This is H. R. 15994. 

Senator Ball. That is the legislative bill ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; favorably reported from the 
House Naval Affairs Committee. As I understand it, sections 1, 2, 
and 3 have already been acted upon by the committee in the Chief 
of Bureau of Supplies hearings. 

Admiral Coontz. Except that two of them are handled in either 
the deficiency bill or the appropriation bill, so there is nothing to be 
done about them. 

Senator Ball. They are already cared for ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What sections are those ? 

Admiral Washington. One, two, and three and probably four. 

Senator Bell. Are all three of those sections cared for by the 
deficiency ? 

Admiral Coontz. Two of them are, but the one regarding clothing 
outfits was handled here Saturday. 

Admiral Washington. And section 4, 1 understand, is the same. 

Admiral Coontz. Section 4 is aviation, and the committee was 
was going to handle that in another manner. 

Senator Ball. We took up the aviation, too. 

Admiral Coontz. Y r es, this committee did. 

Admiral Washington. Section 5, I understand, has also been 
handled. 

Admiral Coontz. I ask that section 5 be stricken out. I made 
that request the first day I was here and explained why. 

Admiral Washington. That is naval districts. 

Admiral Coontz. It is in the other bill as well as here, and I ask 
that it be stricken out. 

Senator Ball. You are so opposed to that provision? 

Admiral Coontz. I am opposed to that provision because it 
eliminates the administrative power and it cripples the work of 
operation. All those districts have now been reduced down to where 
the command is within a navy yard, or some other place within it, 
except three—New York, Boston, and San Francisco. 

Senator Ball. You thought probably they would be reduced to 
two ? 

Admiral Coontz. I expect to reduce it to two and possibly one, 
but it would hurt us very materially in our work if that went into 
effect. 

Admiral Washington. It would be a limitation on the adminis¬ 
trative power of the Secretary which might work very unfortunately 
in some respects. 

Admiral Coontz. I think we have shown our good purpose in 
bringing them down to these three. The next would be San Francisco 
or probably Boston. But we would like to do it slowly, naturally 
ourselves. 

Lieut. Hill. Admiral, I think it might be well to call the attention 
of the committee—for use in conference—to the fact that Gov. Kelly 
in his hearings on the appropriation bill on the subject of districts, 
seemed to be laboring under a misapprehension that the cost of main- 


222 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


taining the district organization was up around between $500,000 
and $1,000,000 a year, just for maintaining the organization. 

The Chairman. Would that include all of them? 

Lieut. Hill. That includes all of them, but the district organiza¬ 
tion itself, the commandant’s offices, and the organization as a dis¬ 
trict organization only comes to a total of not more than about fifty 
or sixty thousand dollars. It is just a small amount; it is just a 
skeleton. There are other things that bring the total up to about 
five hundred and some odd thousand dollars for things which have* 
to go on. 

Senator Ball. Are these other propositions to he cared for anyhow ? 

Lieut. Hill. They have to go on. It is such things as communi¬ 
cation—telephone operators and telegraph operators. 

Senator Ball. Whether it is a separate organization or not, you 
have that expense ? 

Lieut. Hill. Yes. sir; but from an examination of his hearings he 
seemed to think that with this clause it would eliminate about, 
roughly, five or six hundred thousand dollars, whereas it would not 
eliminate more than thirty or forty thousand at the very most, and 
you destroy this skeleton organization that is absolutely necessary as 
a basis for a war organization. 

Admiral Coontz. Besides that, if we put them in the navy yard it 
would not eliminate them. 

Lieut. Hill. It would not. 

Admiral Coontz. It is a question which is not understood, but what 
is left there is a small amount, and we are reducing it all the time. 
The clerks are going down all the time ; they have been reduced 60 per 
cent. 

The Chairman. I think the committee understands that. How 
about section 6 ? 

Admiral Washington. The law authorizes the payment of a 
gratuity of four months—or it has in the past—of four months for 
men honorably discharged and reenlisting within a period of four 
months from the date of discharge. That did not contemplate the 
two and three year enlistments which Congress authorized us to make 
two years ago, and the comptroller has held that a man serving 
through one of those two or three year enlistments and reenlisting 
within four months is still entitled to four months’ gratuity, and the 
object of this provision was to give them a proportionate part of their 
enlistment. If they served two years, then they would get two 
months’ gratuity; if they served three years they would get three 
months. It does not seem right that a man if he has served two years’ 
enlistment and then reenlists should get a four months’ gratuity, the 
same as another fellow who has served for four years. 

Admiral Coontz. And I do not think it was ever intended. 

Admiral Washington. This clause 6 is properly in the interests 
of the Government and I do not think it is anything more or less than 
the man understood when he enlisted. It is a perfectly fair and 
square provision, and it will save a great deal of money. 

The Chairman. About how much ? 

Admiral Washington. Two million dollars and something. 

Lieut. Hill. $2,046,000. 



NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


223 


Senator Hale. Was it not the purpose of the other provision that 
if you give him a gratuity for a long period that he would be more 
apt to enlist for a longer period of years ? 

Admiral Washington. That was the original idea of it when we 
first had the three year enlistments, and then we gave them a three 
months’ gratuity for reenlistment. Then we changed it to four years 
and gave them four months. Now the supposition was when we had 
those two and three year enlistments that when they reenlisted they 
would get their proportionate part—two or three months. Instead 
of that the comptroller has held that they get the full amount under 
the existing law of four months’ pay on coming back. 

Senator Hale. No matter what term they enlisted for? 

Admiral Washington. Whether it was two years or three years, 
they get four months gratuity, under the comptroller’s decision. 

Senator Hale. That was not the original idea. 

Admiral Washington. No, sir; it was not. I think the changed 
way contemplated by this law is perfectly fair both to the individual 
and to the Government. 

The Chairman. Would this language accomplish the idea you 
have in view ? 

Admiral Washington. No, sir; as to the two and three year men 
it was a temporary measure entirely, and it did not contemplate to 
continue that beyond the stress which we consider now to have 
passed, and we have stopped since the 1st of December, or about 
that time, all two and three year enlistments, and we enlist men 
only for four years hereafter. Does that answer your question, 
Senator ? 

The Chairman. I think you misunderstood me. I asked you if 
the language of this section, as it is written here, would accomplish 
your purpose ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In correcting the matter ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. It would not cut off reenlistment, would it? 

Admiral Washington. Not at all. A man who reenlists now 
after having completed a two years enlistment has enlisted for four 
years, but he only gets two months gratuity. In other words, he 
gets one month gratuity for each year of service. 

The Chairman. This will accomplish that, in your judgment? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. How about section 7 ? 

Admiral Washington. I do not know about that. 

Admiral Coontz. There is no objection to that, I believe, on the 
part of the department, holding that up another year. I think that 
was brought out in Admiral Parks statement the other day. 

Lieut. Hill. That is a continuation of the wording in this year’s 
bill. 

Admiral Washington. Section 8 I understand to be the same. 
That is to be handled by the yards and docks. Admiral Peoples dis¬ 
cussed section 9, the question of rations, and I think the committee 
has that all in the hearings. 

Senator Hale. How about section 10? 

Admiral Washington. That is a section of the Revised Statutes 
which was passed, as I recall it, or finally amended in 1881 and has 


224 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


been in force since. It applies to the various corps of the Navy with 
the exception of civil engineers and the line. At the time of its pas¬ 
sage and until quite recently, our staff officers had no promotion above 
the grade of captain. Now all of the corps with the exception of 
chaplains have the same promotions by selection to all grades. 

The matter which brought this directly to the Secretary’s atten¬ 
tion was that last summer a professor of mathematics who had been 
instructor at the Naval Academy for something like 40 years was 
made by special act of Congress a lieutenant and allowed to go on the 
retired list. After serving a short time he went on the retired list 
and then put in a claim to be retired from the grade of lieutenant to 
that of commodore. The matter was referred to the Attorney General 
and the Attorney General decided in his favor, so that he is on the 
list to-day as having been retired from lieutenant to commodore, and 
in that respect his pay is higher on the retired list than it was when 
he was performing active service. There is one more case at the 
Academy of the same kind there may be others. There are quite a 
number of cases among those warrant officers who were taken in last 
summer by the act of June 4, 1920, who will not reach higher under 
any circumstances than the grade of lieutenant commander, when 
they will go on the retired list by age. Those are former carpenters 
and- 

Admiral Coontz. Boatswains ? 

Admiral Washington. No; the boatswains are not affected by it. 

Senator Hale. This would not work any injustice to anyone, 
would it ? 

Admiral Washington. It might if it is repealed in its present 
form; but we have asked to have it amended and the Secretary has 
agreed to it, although I do not know that he has sent a letter here as 
yet, but I know that this section as it is drawn up meets with his 
approval. I have talked it over with him and it has his approval, 
together with that of the various chiefs of bureaus with whom I have 
discussed it, and that is that section 1481 of the Revised Statutes 
shall apply to all branches of the naval service, provided that here¬ 
after no officer shall be retired under the provisions of said section 
who has not at the time of retirement attained the permanent rank 
of captain in the Navy. 

That would require of every officer at least 40 years’ service before 
he is eligible- 

The Chairman. Will that then retire them as commodores? 

Admiral Washington. It will from the grade of captain. That 
is what section 1481 does now; but it also authorizes retirement from 
any new grade—lieutenant, lieutenant commander, or commander— 
and it was to prevent a repetition of cases such as I have spoken of, 
of the professor of mathematics and various warrant officers who 
came into the permanent service last summer. 

The Chairman. Have you a copy of your proposed amendment ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir/ 

Admiral Coontz. The number affected is very few, but at this 
time to cut those fellows out who have been in the service for 40 or 
45 years, from something that they have expected all this time, does 
not seem right. It seems to me that at the same time a lieutenant 
should not be retired as commodore. A man who has served over 



NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


225 


that, we feel, should be made equal to all of them, and not take it 
away from a few that would come into it—and mighty few. 

Senator Hale. Under this provision a lieutenant who has served 
for 40 years, if he were retired, he would retire as lieutenant? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. And the same as to every rank ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. You are sure that this takes care of that situation. 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir; I am sure that it takes care of anybody 
getting anything who has not been in over 40 years—and there are 
very few of them. 

Admiral Washington. He must have served 40 years and must 
have reached the permanent rank of captain. 

The Chairman. The committee would like to have your amend¬ 
ment. 

Admiral Washington. I will leave that with the committee. 

The Chairman. Now, how about section 11 ? 

Admiral Washington. That I think the committee took up on 
Friday or Saturday. I think you have discussed that—the turning 
back- 

The Chairman. No; the confinement on bread and water. 

Admiral Washington. That is a matter which the Secretary has 
written especially about to the committee, and it is something 
which he has very much at heart. I do not believe the rest of us 
approve of it very much. 

Senator Hale. That is too stern a punishment, is it? 

Admiral Washington. He thinks so, but it has been since the 
original organization of the Navy and exists in all other service. 
An officer in charge of the naval prison at Portsmouth, N. H., I 
believe, was one of the first complainants. He said it barred him out 
from that and he had no means of punishing his men for infractions 
of discipline. 

Senator Hale. Admiral Coontz, do you agree with what Admiral 


Washington has said? 

Admiral Coontz. I do. 

Admiral Washington. I think it will cause a great deal of diffi¬ 
culty and interfere materially with the enforcement of discipline 
aboard ship. 

The Chairman. I suppose that punishment is only imposed in the 
cases of vicious character, is it not ? 

Admiral Washington. That is the general idea of it. There may 
be exceptions because commanding officers vary in temperament, 
etc., but it is a long established punishment, and I believe it is some¬ 
thing that will materially interfere with the discipline if rescinded. 

The Chvirman. As to section 12, we have already handled that 


matter. 

Admiral Washington. Yes. We handled that the other day, and 
section 13 also. 

Senator Hale. Section 13 is in the House appropriation bill. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Washington. Section 14 is a matter which the House 
Naval Affairs Committee very thoroughly went into, and I believe it 
is something that should be passed without delay. The provision 


34772—21-15 



226 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


here for postponing the time in which these men may file application 
for retirement is very liberal. We have already retired 50 officers 
under that provision, and I think there are to-day some 150 applicants 
awaiting. Many of these officers were taken in at the beginning of 
the war without any physical examination and ailments probably not 
known. 

I have in mind one case where an officer was, as I recall it, about 
two weeks in the service, less than three weeks anyway, when he 
developed tuberculosis to such an extent that they sent him to the 
hospital at Las Animas, Colo. He applied for retirement and the 
board of course found that his ailment was not contracted in line of 
duty, claiming that his short length of service, less than three weeks, 
could not have developed the tuberculosis to that extent. A strong 
effort was made to place him on the retired list. 

There are other cases where the officers have taken it to the courts 
to enforce this retirement privilege. One of those officers found his 
ailment did not exist, and he put in a claim to be returned to active 
duty. 

Admiral Coontz. We feel that the extension of time to June 30, 
1922, gives them plenty of time to find out whether they will make 
application. 

Senator Hale. It was only intended to apply to cases that came up 
during the war ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes. It gave them two and a half years 
to find out, and then taking the two years of the war, it gives them 
four and a half years in which to discover it. 

The Chairman. Section 15? 

Admiral Washington. There were several cases where men de¬ 
serted or were charged with desertion from our service, who went 
immediately into the service of some of our allies and fought hon¬ 
orably and well, and secured honorable discharges. There is no way 
by which we can remove a charge of desertion, no matter how credit¬ 
able a man’s record may have been thereafter. The object of this 
section is for the Secretary to have the discretion in all cases to 
remove the charge of desertion and to say that the man was not 
really a deserter. I recall a particular case, that of a young boy 
named Genet, who deserted from the Georgia at New York, went to 
France and enlisted in the Lafayette Flying Corps. He left his ship 
and took the first steamer across. It was about seven or eight da}^s 
between the time he left the ship when he was on his way to France. 

Senator Hale. He left for that purpose ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. As soon as we entered the war, 
this boy announced who he was and wanted to come into our service, 
but before any action was taken he was killed. I think he had four 
German planes to his credit. It was that case that brought the mat¬ 
ter very prominently to our attention. There is no way in which we 
can remove a charge of desertion. 

The Chairman. This leaves a certain amount of discretion in the 
department ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. Mr. McPherson, of the House 
Naval Affairs Committee, brought to my attention the other day the 
case of a marine whom they have every reason for believing fell over 
the sea wall and was drowned and his body never recovered. He was 
charged with desertion, but his friends and others are satisfied that 
he was drowned, but in this case we have no means of correcting it. 




NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 2 2 7 

Senator Hale. It would apply to a man who had deserted before 
the war, would it not ? 

Admiral Washington. No matter how creditable the man’s action 
might be thereafter, a charge of desertion can not be wiped out; once 
made it remains forever because we have no authority to have it 
removed. We think some latitude should be allowed. 

Senator Hale. With this statute in force the President could put 
anybody on the register who had deserted before the war and who 
had served in the war ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes; that is correct ? 

The Chairman. Section 16. 

Admiral Washington. In regard to that section, certain supply 
officers were directed by the general order of the department to fur¬ 
nish men discharged as undesirables and otherwise with an outfit of 
civilian clothing, costing about $15 for each outfit. A very short 
time after that, a couple of months or so, Congress passed an act 
authorizing this appropriation to cover these instances. The comp¬ 
troller decided that as Congress later on authorized it, there was no 
authority for the previous payments. As I recall it, the amount of 
the payments so made is about $3,000. The supply officers have 
been checked up for those amounts, and they paid them out in obe¬ 
dience to the general order of the department. 

Oftentimes the men who are dishonorably discharged remain 
around the navy yards or elsewhere and commit offenses, and it was 
■desirable to get them out of the uniform, and for that reason the 
department ordered these civilian outfits of clothing, in the same way 
that we give them to discharged prisoners. It is to correct this 
•checkage that we did that. 

Senator Hale. That is done now, anyway? 

Admiral Washington. It is done by law now. The total amount, 
as I recall it, is about $3,000, and that amount is checked against the 
accounts of these supply officers who paid the money, and they paid 
it under the order of the Navy Department. 

Senator Hale. In spite of the fact that the law did not exist at 
that time ? 

Admiral Washington. The law was thought to exist and I think 
if it had not been passed subsequently the comptroller would never 
have raised the point. But his attention was brought to it by the 
law being subsequently enacted. 

The Chairman. As the law at present exists, does it require you to 
furnish civilian outfits under these conditions ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. This covers a few cases, as I recall 
it, less than $3,000 in amount. 

Admiral Peoples. And section 3 covers that also, Admiral. 

The Chairman. We will take up section 17 now. 

Admiral Washington. The comptroller has recently held that 
in his opinion an officer promoted to a permanent grade takes rank 
at the foot of the grade. If he happens to be a temporary officer, 
we will say, near the top of the list, and is made a permanent officer 
in the same grade by the board of selection, then he goes to the 
foot of the list and loses all of his seniority that he held as a tem¬ 
porary officer. It has caused a good deal of an upset condition iu 


228 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


the grade of rear admiral particularly. It is for the purpose of 
straightening that out that we ask that that section be put in. 

There may possibly be some decision of the comptroller later which 
might jeopardize the list in each grade being perfectly straight, as 
we understand them, and so to prevent that we have asked that 
the provisions of section 1485 and 1486 shall continue in force, and 
the cases of officers who entered the service prior to March 4, 1913, 
be added to that; that, is the existing law be placed at the foot of 
that proviso, so as to prevent any disturbances from the condition 
as the Navy register is now carried. 

Senator Hale. Where do you get your date of May 22, 1917? 

Admiral Washington. That was the date that temporary officers 
were authorized in the Navy, the act of Congress of May 22, 1917, 
authorizing an increase in the number of officers during the war. 
As the war is still supposed to be on, those appointments are still 
in force under the existing law until December 31 of the present 
year. To prevent checkages of pay of officers who have been hereto¬ 
fore paid in the upper half of the rear admirals grade primarily 
due to this comptroller’s decision, we ask that this law be enacted 
so as to carry the method on in the same way that the Navy Depart¬ 
ment has done it since May 22, 1917, the date on which these tem¬ 
porary officers were appointed. 

For instance, we have an officer who was made a temporary rear 
admiral, say, three years ago, and he has reached a certain place on 
the Navy list, say in the upper half. Then the selection board 
makes him a permanent rear admiral. Under this decision of the 
comptroller, he then becomes a bottom officer in the rear admiral’s 
list; that is, he is a bottom man in the lower half, and the comp¬ 
troller might check his pay. 

Senator Swanson. He is below the temnorary admirals? 

Admiral Washington. He goes to the foot, at the bottom of the 
list. We have one such case that occurred in December, and I think 
there are others. 

Senator Swanson. Although he might be ahead as a temporary 
officer ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. Yet when he is made a permanent officer- 

Admiral Washington. Then he goes below the temporary officers. 

Senator Swanson. Although he might have been ahead of the 
others as a temporary officer, and generally would be ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes. 

Senator Swanson. By what construction was that foolishness 
brought about ? 

Admiral Washington. We can not understand it. 

Senator Hale. Would that apply to the temporary rank of bureau 
chiefs ? 

Admiral Washington. No, sir; it applies only to the rear admirals 
grade, to the line of the Navy. 

Senator Hale. It does not affect anybody but the rear admirals? 

Admiral Washington. No, sir. That is the only grade which has 
two rates of pay. 

Senator Swanson. Which do you think is better, to have a grade 
of commodore for the lower grade of rear admirals, or keep them 
rear admirals? 




NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


229 


Admiral Washington. We have gotten accustomed to the rehr 
admirals, Senator. I was very sorry indeed to see the old title of 
commodore abolished. 

Senator Swanson. Except for the idea of having an upper and a 
lower grade of rear admirals, you would not have all this trouble; if 
you had one grade of admirals and the other grade of commodores, 
you would not have this trouble? 

Admiral Washington. We would not. 

Senator Hale. What was the object of establishing these grades? 

Admiral Coontz. At the time it was done, the object was to give 
our officers prestige in meeting foreign officers abroad, in order that 
they might have the s*me rank. 

Senator Swanson. There is a great deal of vanity connected with it. 
A man liked to be called an admiral instead of being called a commo¬ 
dore, and you had to abolish the grade of commodore so as to have 
the lower grade of rear admirals. 

Admiral Coontz. I think everybody liked the title of commodore, 
hut we always found that our admiral had to take a back seat where- 
ever he struck any foreigner. 

Senator Hale. I do not see why it does not apply to commanders 
and captains as well as to rear admirals. 

Admiral Washington. There is only one grade which has two rates 
of pay, that of rear admiral. All the other grades have a fixed pay¬ 
ment entirely, and it is only in the case of this one grade of rear 
admirals that the comptroller has decided that the upper half man 
upon being permanently promoted drops to the very foot of the list. 

Senator Hale. What would happen to a temporary commander 
who had been made a permanent commander ? 

Admiral Washington. Nothing. 

Senator Hale. He would go down to the foot of the list ? 

Admiral Washington. No, sir. He has nothing to lose. Pay is 
the only thing we are concerned with here. 

Senator Hale. Would it not have an effect? 

Admiral Washington. Under the comptroller’s decision it would 
put him back- 

The Chairman. Why do you put him in here, if you don’t care 
anything about it ? 

Admiral Washington. That is to straighten out the Navy lists, 
to carry it on as we have and as the Secretary wishes, and as I wish, 
too, very materially, because otherwise it will ball us up badly. 

Senator Hale. Why, if it is not used ? 

Admiral Washington. It does drop him back under the comp¬ 
troller’s decision, but the department holds that the comptroller has 
no right to issue instructions covering the administration of the Navy. 

Senator Hale. And you don’t drop him back? 

Admiral Washington. No. 

Senator Swanson. Let me see if I understand it. 

All of the commanders get the same pay, all of the captains get 
the same pay, practically, unless they have longevity, but the rear- 
admirals of the upper half get higher pay than those of the lower 
half, because they abolish the grade of commodore. When a man 
is in the upper grade as a rear admiral, a temporary rear admiral, 
and he is made a permanent one, he goes to the foot of the lower 



230 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


gi'ade and his salary is reduced, and the Comptroller of the Treasury 
won’t pay him the salary to which otherwise he would be entitled. 

The Chairman. Let us pass on to the next section, section 18. 

Admiral Washington. That is for the sale of ships. 

The Chairman. Is that necessary ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. We have all manner of diffi¬ 
culty— 

Senator Hale. I have some further questions on this. If the 
chairman does not want them in the record, I will ask them after¬ 
wards. 

The Chairman. I have no objection to them going in the record. 
I thought you had concluded. 

Senator Swanson. You mean on section 17 ? 

Senator Hale. Yes. I want to know, in the case of a man who 
is appointed a temporary commander, and serves two years as a 
temporary commander, and then is made a permanent commander, 
where does he come in ? 

Admiral Washington. He comes in at the foot of the list of com¬ 
manders, but it does not affect his pay, because there is only one 
rate of pay for a commander. 

^Senator Hale. I understand about the pay, but it says he shall 
take rank and precedence from the date of his original commission. 

Admiral Washington. We hold that the comptroller is wrong, 
but he has the whip hand in the matter of pay. 

Senator Hale. Aside from the matter of pay, you are making this 
a law that he shall take rank and precedence ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir: but it will only remain in force 
until the 31st of December, this year, when the temporary appoint¬ 
ments will all go out, and then the Navy register will remain as we 
have it to-day. 

Senator Hale. I take it there will be other temporary appoint¬ 
ments from time to time in the Navy? 

Admiral Washington. We refer only to those made under the act 
of May 22, 1917, which is a war time provision. 

Senator Hale. I think it would be well to make it clear in this act 
just what you do refer to. 

Admiral Coontz. We are not making any temporary appoint¬ 
ments. 

Admiral Washington. We have not made any for a year or more. 

Senator Hale. I assume that an occasion may come up when you 
might want to do it, and I assume that there have beem temporary 
appointments made during the war which will later be made per¬ 
manent, but you do not want them to take rank and precedence 
over all future original commissions as permanent officers, do you? 
You want them to take rank from the time they are made permanent 
officers, and that they could not do under this as I understand it. 
I may be wrong. 

Admiral Washington. I think the word “hereafter” in line 12 
covers that, “that officers of the Navy who have been or hereafter 
may be.” 

Senator Hale. You are looking at it from the basis of pay, and I 
am looking at it from the point of the rank they will have. 

Admiral Washington. But does not the word “hereafter” in line- 
12 cover that? 



1ST AVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


231 


Senator Swanson. Let me see if I have not got this clear. After 
the approval of this act all through the Navy a new condition will 
exist. That is, a man who has a permanent appointment shall take 
precedence over a man who has a temporary appointment. That is 
all through the Navy after the passage of this act. Then from May 
22, 1917, until the passage of this act, which is covered in lines 16 to 
19, inclusive, they shall take, precedence from the date of their com¬ 
mission. That prevents back pay of these officers who are in the 
lower grade, and the Comptroller of the Treasury has decided against 
them. It reads, “ after May 22, 1917, until the date of the approval 
of this act, officers of the Navy shall take rank and precedence from 
the date of their origipal commission in the rank or grade, whether 
permanent or temporary.” That part, from lines 16 to 19, means 
until this act becomes effective. When this act is approved, then 
section 17, from line 11 to the word 11 provided 7 ’ in line 15, becomes 
effective and they take precedence after the passage of this act? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. Has any temporary officer been made a permanent 
officer during the year ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. Then according to this ever one would take the 
rank that thev would have had as temporary officers ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. Until the passage of the act. 

Admiral Washington. And then after that we want the perman¬ 
ents to be senior to the temporaries. 

Senator Swanson. If they did not do that they would come in 
here for claims for back pav. Is not that right? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. What effect will this provision have on a man who 
was appointed a permanent commander in the last two or three years 
from a temporary position ? 

Admiral Washington. It won’t have an; , or very little, as far as 
a commander is concerned. 

Senator Hale. What effect will it have on his rank ? 

Senator Swanson. Up until the approval of this act his precedence 
is according to his commission. 

Senator Hale. Up to the passage of this act he takes rank ahead 
of the others. 

Senator Swanson. Just as he has been. 

Admiral Coontz. Just as he has been; yes. 

Senator Swanson. The minute this act is signed, he goes ahead of 
the temporary ones. 

Senator Hale. I mean before the approval of this act, anything 
that has happened in the last two or three years ? 

Admiral .Coontz. No; anything that has happened in the last two 
or three years is made solid. Hereafter the permanents who have 
been selected go right where they belong, and on the 31st of Decem¬ 
ber, the temporaries all go out, anyhow. 

Senator Swanson. If they did not do that there would be a claim 
here for a whole lot of back pay which this cuts out ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; and there would be a good many 
officers checked. 


232 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Senator Swanson. It simply sa s that up to the approval of this 
act he shall take precedence according to his commission, and after 
the approval of this act the permanent man shall alwa s be ahead of 
the temporary man. That is right, is it not? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hale. Then this act should have been passed years ago. 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir: it was passed by the House two 
years ago, but did not get any further. 

Commander McCain. The reason it did not pass through at that 
time was that it extended to all grades, and it would make midshipmen 
who had just come out of the Naval Academy as ensigns ahead of 
warrant officers who had recently been commissioned temporary 
ensigns. 

Senator Swanson. Then, in addition, during the war, when this 
naval militia was in, it was the same thing, and the Army did not 
make a difference between a graduate of West Point, and we said we 
would not let the Navy do so. Durirg the war we did not see the 
necessity for it, but since the war is over I think this ought to be 
passed. '■ . 

The Chairman. Why should not a lieutenant commander or lieu¬ 
tenant, receiving a permanent grade, also precede the temporary 
officer ? 

Commander McCain. That is what killed it before, because we 
included those ranks. That is what killed the passage of this two 
or three years ago, because those ranks were included therein. The 
Secretary was against it because he felt the younsters just out of 
the Naval Academy should not go ahead of warrant officers who had 
been recently commissioned temporary ensigns. 

Admiral Washington. In line 13,section 17, after the word “of,” 
if you insert “permanent” before “commander,” that makes it 
perfectly clear. I think that makes it without any possibility of mis¬ 
construction. 

Senator Swanson.. Here is an amendment I would like to offer. 
My attention has been called to the situation by a girl from California 
who married a naval officer in Richmond years later, and it seems 
there is a hardship worked. On page 14 of the last act we have this 
provision: 

That"hereafter, immediately upon official notification of the death from wounds or 
disease not the result of his or her own misconduct, of any officer, enlisted man, or 
nurse on the active list of the Regular Navy or Regular Marine Corps or on the retired 
list when on active duty, the Paymaster General of the Navy shall cause to be paid to 
the widow, and if there be no widow to the child or children, and if there be no widow 
or child to any other dependent relative of such officer, enlisted man, or nurse pre¬ 
viously designated by him or her, an amount equal to six months’ pay at the rate 
received by such officer, enlisted man, or nurse at the date of his or her death. The 
Secretary of the Navy shall establish regulations requiring each officer and enlisted 
man or nurse having no wife or child to designate the proper dependent relative to 
whom this amount shall be paid. 

That was simply effective from the time it was passed. During the 
war, before that act was passed, there were some officers who were 
killed or died from sickness or on account of service, in which cases 
this benefit could not be obtained, and they are more deserving than 
some other people who came afterwards. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


233 


Mv attention has been called to simply one case of a -ladv from 
California who married an officer in Richmond, who has two children, 
who was left destitute, and she is working here in the departments. 

The Chairman. Will you bring that up when we take up the amend¬ 
ments ? 

Senator Swanson. I bring it up now because I wanted these 
officers to explain it. I offer this amendment: 

That the benefits provided in the act of June 4, 1920, for the beneficiaries of officers 
dying in the service shall apply in the cases of all officers who died on active duty be¬ 
tween November 11, 1918, and'June 4, 1920. 

Senator Hale. Why do you limit it to June 4, 1920? 

Senator Swanson. That was the time when this act became 
effective and all of them get it. They got it during the war but did 
not after the armistice. 

Admiral Washington. As I recall it, we had that provision in 
prior to the war, but when they passed the war risk bill they knocked 
out this provision and it lapsed between that time and June 4, 1920, 
when it was enacted. 

Senator Hale. It simply takes care of that interregnum. 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. How many cases are there? 

Admiral Washington. Not very many. 

Senator Swanson. One case has been called to my attention where 
the beneficiary would not get a cent, and if her husband had died 
since June 4, she would have gotten a gratuity. He was drowned in 
duty doing some hazardous work, but nothing could be obtained after 
the 11th of November and before June 4. Inadvertently, they al¬ 
lowed that interregnum to come in. Therefore, I want to offer that 
amendment. I did not want to offer it except when these officers 
were here that they might explain it. 

Lieut. Commander McCain. I do not think you have covered the 
interregnum. It was the 17th of October when the war risk insur¬ 
ance act was passed. 

Senator Swanson. This says November 11, 1918. 

Lieut. Commander McCain. That was the date of the armistice. 

Admiral Washington. I think it was made to cover that broken 
period. 

Senator Swanson. They are the only people that did not get it. 

Admiral Washington. Shall we take up section 18? 

The Chairman. Yes; if we are through with the other we can go 
on to that. 

Admiral Washington. That is something that I am not familiar 
with. 

Admiral Coontz. We have no special statute now under which we 
can sell those ships without going through all the circumstances of a 
survey, an appraisal, with a loss of time one way and another. This 
gives discretion to the President to sell obsolete ships. Of course, we 
have sold a large number of ships. We have gotten rid of practically 
all the yachts and we still have a number of subchasers, but we still 
have a large number of ships no longer of military value. It costs 
money to keep them up; it costs ship keepers, and things of that 
character, and the department is of the opinion that this section 
should go in. 


234 NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 

Senator Swanson. You have a right to sell ships now after a 
survey ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir; we have; but surveys and resurveys 
and such things take a long time. 

Senator Swanson. What is the present law? We enlarged it last 
year. 

Admiral Coontz. I don’t recall any law being enlarged last year. 

Senator Swanson. You have a right to have a survey of a ship if 
it is of a certain character and you can sell it under certain conditions. 
This would allow you to sell the whole Navy. 

Admiral Coontz. Yes; there is no doubt it would. It is not of 
any great importance, except as to the matter of saving time and 
so on. 

The Chairman. How was the Missouri sold? 

Admiral Coontz. By special act of Congress. 

Senator Swanson. They could not sell under the existing law? 

Admiral Coontz. No, sir. 

Senator Hale. Under this proposed section you could sell the 
whole Navv ? 

Senator Swanson. Yes. I am not in favor of it. 

Admiral Coontz. I am doubtful as to its propriety. 

Senator Swanson. As long as 3 7 ou are required to have a survey, 
there is no danger of any fraud in the sale of any vessels. I do not 
think this ought to go through. 

Admiral Coontz. I am doubtful of the propriety of that section. 

The Chairman. Wliat authority is there vested in the Secretary 
of the N avy to select ships for targets and experiments ? 

Admiral Coontz. Those are old ones. I do not believe we have 
had to have authority of law to utilize them. Do you recall, Admiral, 
in the case of the Indiana , Iowa, or Massachusetts ? 

Admiral Peoples. No; there is no special authority of law. 

Admiral Coontz. They can be condemned in the regular way and 
stricken from the list. 

The Chairman. I should think that would he considered in naval 
use. 

Admiral Coontz. Yes. We have methods to do that. x\fter think¬ 
ing this over, I doubt the propriety of putting in that clause. 

Senator Swanson. The present law is ample under which to sell 
these vessels, and in a way which will satisfy the people. 

The Chairman. The reason I asked about selecting ships for target 
practice, there is quite an insistent request that some provision be 
made for authority to provide some obsolete ships, or German ships, 
for the use of Gen. Mitchell to destroy them with bombs. 

Admiral Coontz. The Secretary of the Navy will make a report 
on that within 48 hours after the joint board acts. As I said here 
the other day, the Navy itself is going to have experiments with the 
Iowa under radio control, and with the five German ships, three 
destroyers, and the Frankfurt and Ospreesland —bombing and all 
sorts of experiments. 

Senator Hale. Those ships are of no value to us, are they? 

Admiral Coontz. They are; but under the treaty of Versailles we 
are compelled to sink them before August 1. 

The Chairman. Are you through with section 18 ? If so, we will 
take up section 19. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


235 


Admiral Washington [reading:] 

That the percentages of captains and commanders in the Supply Corps are hereby 
increased from 4 and 8 to 6 and 12, respectively. 

The Secretary wrote a letter to the committee of the House of 
Representatives on the 2d of April, 1920, approving of this provision. 
During the past winter I took it up with him and he disapproved it 
and did not recommend its enactment. 

Admiral Coontz. You had better report that the Secretary is 
going to send another letter down here in which he approves it. 

Admiral Washington. Then, that is all right. He told me he did 
not wish to approve it. 

Senator Hale. Do you all approve of it? 

Admiral Coontz. I believe it should be the same for all, and if 
they have been slighted I believe it is only square to make them 
equal to the others. 

Senator Swanson. Does the line want it ? 

Admiral Coontz. No; the line has not got it and is not asking 
for it. 

Senator Swanson. You won't be coming up here and asking for it 
for the line ? 

Admiral Coontz. No; I won't. 

Senator Hale. What does it mean? 

Admiral Washington. At the various navy yards and shore sta¬ 
tions there are several activities which practically, we will say, are 
equally important with those that are presided over by the Medical 
Corps, and, generally speaking, whereas the Medical Corps or the 
hospital would have a captain, a medical officer with the rank of 
captain in command of it, the supply department would have only 
one supply officer with similar rank at the yard. He might be the 
general storekeeper, we will sa}L Then, the paymaster of the yard 
and the disbursing officer, we will say, would be of lower rank. 

The Chairman. Why do they have higher percentages than the 
line ? Why should not the entire percentage throughout the Navy 
be the same ? 

Admiral Washington. It should be, but when they enacted the 
personnel bill of August 29, 1916, and made these ratios they took the 
numbers as they existed in the Navy Register at that time as a basis 
fundamentally very largely and figured out these percentages on the 
then existing conditions—the paymasters, the doctors, the civil 
engineers. 

The percentage given the supply corps was a half of 1 per cent of 
flag officers, 4 per cent of captains, and 8 per cent of commanders, 
which was the same as that given to the Medical Corps. In the Con¬ 
struction Corps they gave 4.5 per cent more captains and 6 per cent 
more commanders. In the Civil Engineering Corps they gave 1| per 
cent more captains and 6 per cent more commanders. In the Chap¬ 
lains Corps they gave 6 per cent more captains and 12 per cent more 
commanders. 

In other words, the Construction, Civil Engineer, and Chaplains 
Corps were given considerably more than either the Medical or the 
Supply. 

Senator Hale. This brings them all about even? 


236 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Washington. Nearer. As I figure it out in five or six 
years the ratio would be about equal between the Supply and the 
Medical Corps. 

Senator Swanson. Let me see if I have this right. In the Con¬ 
struction Corps they give one-half per cent of admirals; in the Engi¬ 
neer Corps one-half of 1 per cent, in the Medical Corps one-half of 1 
per cent, and in the Supply Corps one-half of 1 per cent. 

Senator Hale. That is the same. 

Senator Swanson. The line, 1 per cent admirals. We give them 
more because we need them in .segregated fleets. Captains in the 
Construction Corps, per cent. That is a small corps of 150, and 
if we did not* give them a certain per cent we would not have any. 
The civil engineers get 5| per cent in captains; the Medical Corps gets 
4 per cent, the Supply Corps 4 per cent, and the line 4 per cent. That 
is right ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. In the case of commanders, the Construction 
Corps gets 14 per cent. It is mighty hard to get people to go into 
construction; the Engineering Corps, 14 per cent; Medical, 4 per 
cent; line, 7 per cent. 

This is to increase the Supply Corps from 4 to 6 in captains and 
from 8 to 12 in commanders? 

Admiral Washington. It is 50 per cent increase in each grade. 

Senator Swanson. What I want to know is whether it is going 
to be held as a precedent for the line to come here next year and 
say, ‘‘We are the fighting force of the Navy”- 

Admiral Washington. I hope not. 

Senator Swanson. ‘‘We bear the brunt of it. You give even the 
supply department a greater percentage of captains and commanders 
than you give us.” How does the line feel about that? 

Admiral Washington. As far as I am concerned, the line will 
not ask for anything more. 

Senator Swanson. Not as far as you are concerned, but can you 
speak for the entire line? 

Admiral Coontz. As far as it is possible to do so. The line officers 
have got to get out, you know, if they are not promoted. You 
have no provision for supply officers retirement because you have 
no age of retirement. Therefore in that respect the line has a little 
advantage. 

Senator Swanson. The line has this advantage. The line is slowly 
promoted at the beginning. All the staff officers run far ahead of 
the line in the first 10 or 15 years. In the last 10 or 15 years the 
line recently has been promoted much faster than the staff officers, 
especially the supply department. There is some element of justice 
in it. 

Admiral Coontz. There is some element of justice in it. At the 
same time it is rather a dangerous thing to bring up at the present 
time. Somebody might throw something in the machinery. 

Senator Hale. Who is asking for this ? 

Admiral Coontz. The Supply Corps. 

Senator Hale. Is the head of the corps asking for it? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes. 



NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


237 


Senator Hale. Why do you want it ? 

Admiral Peoples. In order to equalize the promotion of the officers 
of the Supply Corps with the running mates in the line. Since 1916 
the law stipulates that up to and including the rank of lieutenant 
commander they shall keep pace with each other. That is, the staff 
man shall keep pace with the running mate in the line. The flow of 
promotion has been so rapid that the running mate in the line is now 
the equivalent of about four to five years ahead of the original 
running mate in staff corps, and it is to equalize this that these per¬ 
centages have been proposed. 

Senator Swanson. Let me ask you this. Until we passed the law 
of 1916, which we fought out at the time I was acting chairman, at 
that time we had no rank of admiral in the Supply Corps at all. 

Admiral Peoples. No. 

Senator Swanson. You had mighty few captains. We increased 
the corps there and treated all these different departments precisely 
as of the line, and it never had been done before up to lieutenant 
commander. After that you had mighty slow progress higher, did 
you not ? 

Admiral Peoples. It was very slow. 

Senator Swanson. We have treated these corps all of them equal 
with the line, put them ahead of the line. Each corps is treated with 
the same consideration as anybody in the line, except you # can not 
promote them, and they do not need any more supply officers. 
You have the same percentage the line has, the same the Medical 
Department has; that is, if Congress determines you need so many 
Supply officers. That is true, is it not ? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes. 

Senator S\v anson. There is no difference. The only reason why 
you don't promote as fast is because Congress has not thought you 
needed as many officers in the Supply Corps as in the line. 

Admiral Peoples. No; they don’t want to get additional officers. 
It is merely to increase the percentage. 

Senator Swanson. That is what I said. The reason you do not 
get the increase of officers is because you do not need as many men 
in the Supply Corps as in the line. 

The Chairman. It would be a beautiful situation if you had as 
many men in the Supply Corps as you had in the line—just the one 
item of overhead cost equal to the whole organization. 

Admiral Peoples. The total number is all right. It is merely a 
question of the distribution of those numbers in those ranks; that 
is all. 

Senator Swanson. We give you the same number of captains in 
percentage that the Medical Corps has; the same percentage the line 
has. The only difference is the small Engineering and Construction 
Corps, which requires special talent, an especially small corps. You 
have the same percentage as anybody else, except for those two small 
Gorps, the engineering and the construction. 

Admiral Peoples . The Medical Corps is very much larger in num¬ 
bers. The smaller the corps it seems the larger the percentage it has 
been necessary. The Supply Corps is not nearly as large as the Med¬ 
ical Corps, and we have got these people that are five years now 
behind. 


238 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Senator Swanson. How many men have you ? 

Admiral Peoples. Six hundred and forty. 

Senator Hale. How many captains now ? 

Admiral Peoples. Twenty-four; 4 per cent of that. 

Senator Hale. Twenty-four captains now? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes. 

Senator Hale. And that is not enough? 

Admiral Peoples. No, sir. It will represent an actual cost of 
about $26,000 a year. 

The Chairman. Is that all on that section? 

Admiral Washington. My only objection is that it is building up 
more officers for shore duty. I think it is perfectly proper they should 
be heads of departments, etc., but it is because captains as a rule do 
not go to sea, and in that respect it makes it an addition to the number 
for shore duty. 

Senator Hale. Captains in the Supply Corps, you mean? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Admiral People's. It does not increase the number already on 
shore. 

Admiral Washington. Only relatively. 

Senator Swanson. The Construction Corps never goes to sea ? 

Admiral Peoples. No. 

Senator Swanson. The Engineering Corps never goes to sea ? 

Admiral Peoples. No. 

Senator Swanson. The Medical Corps does go to sea ? 

Admiral Peoples. Yes. 

Senator Swanson. Well, we will consider this. Give us a memo¬ 
randum on it. 

Admiral Washington. In regard to section 20, the comptroller 
has held that enlisted men of the Navy transferred after 16 or 20 
years’ service to the Fleet Naval Reserve, as they are now author¬ 
ized by law, are transferred on the day they complete the service. 
Otherwise, if a man wishes to be transferred after 16 years’ service 
he has to wait until he has completed 20 years, and then go on. The 
object of this was to let the men transfer at any time during an 
enlistment after they had completed 16 years of service. If they 
have less than 20 years’ service, then they go on the 16-year basis. 
That is to correct the comptroller’s decision. 

Section 21 is for the purpose of preventing men wearing the naval 
uniform. This section as it appears here was agreed to after Congress¬ 
man Bankhead appeared before the House Naval Affairs Committee, 
and he and I concluded that that would meet all the requirements. 
He claimed that a number of men had in his section of the country 
wished to buy Army and Navy uniforms for general use, and they 
had been arrested. 

Senator Hale. It is a pretty good idea, is it not? 

Admiral Washington. He claimed that because of the poverty of 
the people it was hard not to allow it, and particularly so as the 
Government had put this stuff on sale all over the country, and yet 
they had run in these five or six men because they were wearing the 
uniform. I think that meets the situation. 

The Chairman. Why do they discriminate in favor of people 
convicted of a felony ? It does not apply to them. 

Admiral Washington. I see that they are excepted. 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 2 39 

Senator Swanson. Under the general law a man that gets out of 
the Navy could not wear the uniform. 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir. 

Senator Swanson. And that extended it so they could wear it until 
the 1st of January, 1923. 

Senator Hale. These fellows convicted of moral turpitude, can 
they wear it ? 

Senator Swanson. They can not. No man except he is a member 
of the Navy can wear the uniform. Then we passed the law extending 
it until January 1, 1923. 

Admiral Washington. It was not so much to prevent the people 
wearing it but to prevent the misuse of it. We have a great many 
cases around the navy yards and stations, and I suppose it is the 
same with the Army also, where all sorts of crimes have been com¬ 
mitted by men wearing the uniform, and it was found on investigation 
that many of these uniforms were worn by men not belonging to 
either service. 

The Chairman. Why not repeal the whole act? I don’t see why 
people should wear the uniform that are not in service. 

Admiral Washington. I think as it is worded there now it will 
meet all the requirements. 

Senator Hale. Don’t you think they ought to stop wearing it any 
more now for public use ? 

Admiral Washington. They have a great many million dollars 
worth of it—how many, do you know ? 

Admiral Peoples. $61,000,000. 

Senator Hale. This says it can not be worn after January 1, 1923. 
If you are going to sell them on up to January 1, 1923, then you will 
come before us at that time and ask to have it extended. 

Admiral Washington. We asked last year to have it repealed out¬ 
right, but Mr. Bankhead made this appeal to the Naval Affairs Com¬ 
mittee of the House because of these cases he had personal knowledge 
of, so they made the limit 1923. The change was not made at the 
request of the department. 

The Chairman. It looks to me like that is rather a weak cause. 
Can’t they take the buttons off the uniform and the insignia, so as to 
change the appearance of it ? 

Admiral Washington. That is what we require, that all distin¬ 
guishing marks shall he removed before sold. 

The Chairman. I think the whole act ought to be repealed. 

Admiral Washington. The next has already been settled. 

The Chairman. What is your recommendation in regard to sec¬ 
tion 20 ? 

Admiral Washington. That is to correct a comptroller’s decision 
that men have to be transferred on the dates of completion of 16 and 
20 years’ service. 

Admiral Coontz. Supposing a man has been in for 16 years and 
he thinks he wants to stay for 20. After staying 18 he decides he 
would like to get out. We would like to let him do it, but the comp¬ 
troller says he can not do it until his 20 years are up. It is a benefit, 
and costs nothing. 

The Chairman. We have already heard about section 22. What 
about section 23 ? That is this personnel bureau. We reported that 
bill. 


240 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 


Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; you reported that last year. 

Senator Hale. What is that? 

Admiral Washington. The Bureau of Navigation is nothing except 
the personnel, and the term 11 Navigation” is in no way an indication 
of the duties of that bureau. Last year they changed “ Steam 
Engineering” to “ Engineering Bureau,” and it was recommended that 
“Navigation” should be changed to “personnel.” 

Senator Hale. Will it not cause a lot of mix ups ? 

Admiral Washington. It will for a very little while. It is imma¬ 
terial. It would cause a little mix up for a while, but in a year or 
two people will almost have forgotten they knew it. 

Senator Hale. The time-honored name is Navigation. 

Admiral Washington. Yes. 

Senator Hale. It has always been Navigation? 

Admiral Washington. Yes. 

Senator Hale. Why not let it stay that? 

The Chairman. Now we are up to section 24. 

Admiral Coontz. That is the bill for the bureau of aeronautics, 
which we all favor. It has been gone into many times. Of course 
you all understand the situation. 

Senator Swanson. This committee reported it. 

Admiral Coontz. Yes. Aeronautics is under operation. I have 
not the time to properly attend to that job, so I have a director of 
aviation. He has got part of it under Construction, part of it under 
Engineering, part of it under Ordnance. To give it the proper status 
and what we all expect aviation to be in the future, and what you 
have all been told in the last few days, it should be made a separate 
bureau and controlled by one officer who has its interests at heart, 
with full power and authority. 

Senator Hale. You mean a separate bureau in the Navy Depart¬ 
ment; you do not mean to join with the Army. 

Admiral Coontz. A separate bureau in the Navy, yes. 

Senator Hale. Is this practically the same as the bill reported 
from this committee by Senator Keyes? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir; and the same as reported by the House. 

I think it is word for word. It has all been attended to. 

The Chairman. How about this organization of the bureau that 
is provided in this bill here? Has that been worked out in the 
department ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That makes him like the chief of another bureau ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is that the same in the other bureaus as to the 
general organization ? 

Admiral Coontz. Yes, sir; the organization is just the same. It has 
been through all of the committees, and everything else. 

The Chairman. A chief clerk at a salary of $2,250; is that the 
same ? 

Admiral Coontz. That is the same salary as the other chief clerks 
get. 

The Chairman. Well, that concludes the hearing. 

By the way, here is another amendment that has been proposed: 

That any officer of the Navy who has served over 40 years a3 a commissioned officer 
and 4 years as chief of bureau, may, on his own application, and in the discretion of 


NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1922. 241 

the Secretary, be assigned to active duty and when so assigned shall receive the active 
duty pay and allowance of his rank. 

Is not that authority already vested in the Secretary? 

Admiral Washington. During war only. After the war is over 
any retired officer ordered to active duty can not receive the pay 
ater than that of a lieutenant commander in the Navy or a major 
the Marine Corps. The full active-duty pay for a retired officer 
>nly continuous during the present war. 

7he Chairman. Does that apply also to admirals ? 

admiral Washington. It applies to everybody, yes; it is general 

slation. 

Senator Swanson. They could not get as high as lieutenant com¬ 
manders until it was amended two years ago. The Army got it as 
high as major, and we followed it up and gave the Navy the lieu¬ 
tenant commander’s pay. 

The great disadvantage of this law is the fact it puts the man on 
the retired list superior over the man on the active list. A man gets 
retired, the Navy wants him or needs him, and he comes right back, 
gets his pay, retired, and quits when he pleases and goes back. The 
fact he does not get any higher than lieutenant commander has a 
tendency to retard a fellow from being so anxious to get on the 
retired list, and you make it more attractive to be on the retired list 
than to be on the active list and the fellows will be trying to get on 
the retired list; is not that so, Admiral? 

Admiral Washington. There are a great many of them on the 
retired list, some that we could well use actively if we were allowed 
to—a great many. 

Senator Swanson. Their full pay as lieutenants commander amounts 
to about three-quarters of what they will get on the retired list ? 

Admiral Washington. Yes, sir; about $3,000 a year—$3,500. 

Senator Swanson. It amounts to about the same in the higher 
grades. 

Admiral Washington. They would all be the same. 

Senator Swanson. You take a man that has been in the service for 
40 years and been retired-- 

The Chairman. We will take that under consideration. 

Senator Swanson. I have not looked into it thoroughly, but I am 
not in favor much of increases in the priviliges of retired officers. 

The Chairman. This concludes the hearing. 

(Thereupon, the committee adjourned subject to the call of the 
chairman.) 

34722—21-16 


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